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SUMMARY OF THESIS 
This thesis is a study of local rather than national black politics. 
The participation of Gujaratis, who comprise the largest ethnic minority 
community in Bolton, in local politics is constrained by their loyalty 
to Gujarati identities and by racism within political parties. 
The settlement patterns of Gujaratis in Bolton reflect in part the 
socio-economic constraints experienced by black immigrants in Britain 
generally, and in part their allegiance to faction, caste, sect and 
religious identities. On the basis of some of these social identities 
have developed organisations which respond to particular social, 
religious and political needs. These organisations provide the only 
opportunities for the development of black structures of support and 
leadership within this large community. Notions of racism are based upon 
a dialogue between white and Gujarati notions of what is common sense. 
These notions form the basis of Gujaratis' perceptions of social 
distances that separate them from others. 
The core of support for leaders is based upon personal social 
networks. The social characteristics of these social networks influence 
the patterns of close friendships between Gujaratis and members of other 
communities in the town. These patterns show that Gujaratis exclude 
Gujaratis who belong to other Gujarati religious communities and members 
of other ethnic communities, black and white, from close friendships. 
Friendships with those perceived to be social distant are of lower 
intensity, thus excluding these people from sharing in a common body of 
Gujarati knowledge. 
In the context of Bolton these Gujaratis find themselves unable to 
participate within the formal political hierarchy and decision making 
arenas. The local Community Relations Council offers Gujarati and other 
black leaders of organisations a forum within which they can meet with 
some of the locally and nationally elected political representatives. 
The debate centres on events, involving Gujarati and other participants, 
which allow leaders of Gujarati organisations and politicians and other 
members of the CRC to negotiate the power relations between black and 
white. However, the consequence is that the Gujaratis are still 
relegated to the periphery of formal political decision-making arenas. 
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A note on Names used in the Thesis 
Where names have been used, I have followed three different forms of 
usage: (1) where actual names have been used, they refer to people whose 
names have appeared in the local or national Press, such as those of the 
MPs. (2) In one instance I have used a fictitious name for a leader 
with the intention of making it easier for the reader to identify him. 
The name I chose was Mr Sandhu. No person with this name to my knowledge 
was a leader of the Vishwa Hindu Parishad and has ever lived in Bolton. 
(3) all other people who are identified are referred to as Mr A. or Mr 
B., and the initials have been randomly chosen, so any correspondence 
with the names of living people is accidental. 
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INTRODUCTION 
A survey of literature on the politics of race drew attention to 
three broad topic fields of interest: firstly immigration, legislation 
and administration; secondly, government policies for race relations; 
and thirdly, race relations pressure groups, in particular the ultra-
right, anti-racist Asian and black organisations (Ben-Tovim and 
Gabriel,1979:2). This thesis will focus attention on the third field, 
race relations pressure groups, and will look at ethnic leaders' 
attempts to influence local white political decision makers with the aim 
of obtaining what they believe to be a more equitable share of scarce 
resources. 
This implies that participation in local politics goes beyond voting 
alone. With the exception of total alienation and withdrawal from 
political participation, if voting is taken as a baseline for political 
involvement, then to some degree most Gujaratis participated in local 
politics. It is, however, participation that involved Gujarati leaders 
in debates aimed at achieving political influence over the local white 
politicians through the deployment of ethnic alliances and "black" votes 
that is of central concern to this thesis. In particular the focus will 
be on ethnic organisations and their leaders attempts to participate in 
local politics mainly through one informal political arena, namely the 
local CRC. Although most of the political activity took place in this 
arena, its 
critical. 
position 
Though its 
in relation to the formal political arenas 
position in theory could be close to 
is 
the 
traditional formal political arenas, in practice its position is often 
marginalised. By bringing into political debate the importance of the 
position of the local CRC, Gujarati leaders by trying to influence the 
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white decision-makers raised the political tension between the 
participants in CRC arena and the white participants in the formal 
political arenas. Therefore, I shall argue that ethnic politics is a 
form of urban movement [1] (discussed below). Attention will be focused 
on a collection of such movements involving Gujaratis [2] living in 
Bolton, North West England, between 1973-1976, whose leaders set out to 
obtain for their grassroots supporters a share of local public resources 
to which they considered they had restricted access because of racism. 
In so doing they contributed to a change in the culture of the town. 
The Introduction is set out in three parts: Part I will concentrate 
on theoretical issues of ethnic political participation at the local 
level, Part II will address some of the key issues associated with the 
collection of data, and Part III will set out the contents of the 
thesis. 
Part I 
In this Part I shall argue that ethnic politics in Bolton can be 
regarded as a confrontation between a mainly Gujarati minority as 
keen voters in formal political arenas, some as members of political 
parties, and a few as leaders seeking political recognition in informal 
political arenas and the white councillors and MPs. Arguments will 
stress the importance of ethnic politics in the local context in the 
1970s for the following reasons: firstly, IImany local governments in the 
1970s behaved as if Asian and black people did not exist ll 
(McKay,1977:96); secondly, there were opportunities for Gujaratis to 
participate in local politics which were not available to them in 
national politics; thirdly, the proximity of ethnic leaders to certain 
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informal political arenas made it possible for them to participate; 
fourthly, the local political structure could more readily than national 
political structures to accommodate grassroots participation; and 
fifthly, local governments were aware that under the 1976 Race Relations 
Act they might be charged with providing a balanced view. In a general 
sense such ethnic political activity which was to be found in Bolton is 
typical of that found in other towns and cities with large ethnic 
minority communities. However, it is appropriate to begin this 
discussion by setting the debate within the broader field of race 
relations beginning by distinguishing between the politics of race, 
ethnic politics and racism in politics. 
Though the politics of race, Moore (1978:482) argues, may provide 
answers to some of the most pressing issues that face Britain's 
multiracial society, they have received comparatively little attention 
(Layton-Henry and Rich,1986:6; Layton-Henry,1984:xi; Ward,1978:477). By 
this assertion Moore drew attention to the importance of racism in 
British society, and particularly to the extent to which racism had 
become an accepted element in British politics. Immigration is often 
taken as central to analyses which underlie the politics of race, 
because the tension between governmental control of immigration balanced 
by support for racial equality influences and is influenced by the 
political actions, in the broadest sense, of Asian, black [3] and white 
people in Britain (Layton-Henry,1984; Miles, 1982; Layton-Henry and 
Rich,1986). The phrase the 'politics of race' describes the way in which 
governments and politicians have politicised race; it emphasises lithe 
role of successive post-war governments in institutional ising racism 
particularly through their policies on immigration" (Ben-Tovim et 
al.,1986:14). Studies of the politics of race encompass both national 
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and local issues, which include immigration, nationality, employment, 
education, housing, equality of opportunity, the activities of anti-
racist organisations and racist bodies (Ben-Tovim et al.,1979:2). This 
classification tells us little about ethnic participation in politics. 
Layton-Henry (1986: 166-170) describe five forms of political 
participation; briefly these are integration, development of Asian and 
black organisations within and without the white political system, 
linkage of Asians and black people through buffer organisations to the 
political system, the development of links through a range of forms of 
participation, and finally alienation and withdrawal from all but 
minimal forms of participation. 
These descriptive categories distinguish only roughly between the 
different forms of participation in local and national politics. 
Since white people were the chief participants in local party politics 
in the 1970s, Asians as supporters and members were marginalised. There 
were exceptions; for instance in a few of the London boroughs, Bradford 
and Blackburn some Asians had achieved positions within their political 
parties and within local formal political hierarchies. In most places 
where Asians lived, their participation in politics was limited to 
voting. As a form of participation, voting is the same whether the 
election is local or national. Therefore, the accessibility of ethnic 
leaders to, and participation in, an informal political arena, such as 
that provided the local eRe, allows for the development of a 
distinctively local form of political participation outside the 
political party system and the formal political structures. There is no 
parallel form of participation at the national level through the eRE. 
Thus the subject of this thesis lies within the field of local politics 
of race, and is concerned with ethnic politics and racism in local 
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politics. 
Although the phrase the "politics of race" is used to describe 
political activity at the national and local levels (e.g. Ben-Tovim et 
al.,1986), the similarities and differences between ethnic community 
participation at the local and national levels are clear. Therefore 
a discussion of governmental control of immigration and support for 
racial equality is not central to this thesis, although clearly its 
effects on racism in local politics cannot be ignored. Studies of the 
politics of race take for granted that the impact on ethnic communities 
and their response to racism at the local and national levels will be 
similar (Yancey, Erickson and Juliani,1976:392-399; see for instance 
Ben-Tovim et al.,1986; Rex and Tomlinson,1979). For this reason this 
thesis argues that sociologists of race relations have neglected to 
study Asian (and black) minorities as active political agents, ethnic 
politics at a local level and the support structures through which they 
can exert influence. Many of them view local politics in terms of how 
local authorities respond to the demands from minority communities 
rather than in terms of how they might respond to local authorities 
(e.g. Ben-Tovim et al, 1986). The literature gives the impression that 
Asian and black people were, and still are, the passive recipients of 
support or the lack of it and that they made little effort to compete 
for more public resources than those allocated to them. Consequently 
there is a gap in our understanding of how minority groups mobilise 
support and develop structures of leadership (Layton-Henry and Rich, 
1986:6) and support outside the political party system. 
Local politics and racism studies have concentrated upon 
disadvantages arising from the allocation of resources to minority 
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communities (Gifford,1989; Robinson, 1987,1981, 1980, 1979; Rex and 
Tomlinson,1979; Lawrence, 1974; Rex and Moore, 1971). Such research 
points to racial discrimination against Asian and black people in the 
contexts of key public services (Brown,1984). As these studies set the 
protest within the national context of race relations, they overlook 
their local importance as a form of urban movement (discussed below). 
Generally, attention is drawn to the position of black minorities in 
the working class as being poor and disadvantaged (e.g. Miles,1982; 
Townsend,1979; Rex and Moore,1971), but amongst the few who have 
recognised the possibility of a forceful response by the minorities are 
Rex and Tomlinson (1979:Chaps 8 and 9), who noted the possible formation 
of "adversarial ethnic units". The chief social characteristics that 
provide an indication of low social class position and disadvantage of 
Asian minorities are race and colour, a lack of appropriate or 
recognised educational and training qualifications, finding employment 
in generally low status and low paid work, and settlement in inner urban 
areas (Chap. 1). Responses to situations of social disadvantage can take 
many forms; these range from joining a political party, to ethnic 
politics, joining a militant Asian organisation, and participating in a 
protest movement or rioting. 
Although Rex and Tomlinson (1979:Chaps.8 and 9), see the formation of 
hostile and aggressive organisations as a response by Asian and black 
people to their social experiences, they wrongly, I believe, explain 
this in terms of white racism (Rex and Tomlinson, 1979:243). Their 
analysis rightly points to the importance of the formation of political 
groups outside the formal political system. Any analysis of the 
formation of opposition by Asian and/or black minorities to their social 
situation needs to take account of their social standing in the wider 
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community, of the role of ethnic organisations, and of contact between 
their leaders and the political parties (Chaps. 2,3). During the 1970s 
one form of response that was probably more common than the literature 
suggests is ethnic politics (e.g. Katznelson,1973; Scott,1972/73). 
Research on ethnic politics during this period shows how political 
protest in Britain was contained and controlled politically by 
channelling demands by ethnic leaders through local CRCs (Katznelson, 
1973; Hill and Issacharoff,1971). What is not explored is how in trying 
to contain ethnic movements local politicians gave ethnic leaders 
opportunities to express their political demands. Although inexperienced 
politically, they used such opportunities to persuade politicians to 
positively discriminate in their favour rather than to await their 
efforts to convince the wider electorate of the plight of a section of 
members, who claimed to be disadvantaged. This confrontation raised 
important questions about definitions of, access to, and decisions over 
the allocation of public resources in towns and cities, where 
ethnic communities form a significant part of the population. 
questions placed the responsibility on mainly white dominated 
authorities to decide the extent to which they should achieve a 
these 
These 
local 
more 
impartial distribution of public resources. Those asking for resources 
came from different cultural backgrounds to those controlling the 
resources (Chaps.S-7). 
Ethnic politics is concerned with the attempts by leaders of ethnic 
organisations developing alliances with other leaders and white local 
politicians in mainly informal political arenas to generate support to 
persuade, cajole or force them into making more favourable allocations 
of public resources. Though it forms an integral part of local politics, 
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the latter provides the context in which the former occurs. There are 
differences between ethnic and local politics. Firstly, ethnic politics 
provides opportunities for ethnic leaders to develop political alliances 
across ethnic organisations, in order to influence white political 
decision-makers within and without the formal political arenas. Their 
aim is to gain recognition as political representatives of ethnic 
communities in formal political arenas. However, the white politicians 
tend to see ethnic politics as support which they can utilise as 
democratically elected representatives. Therefore, the extent of the 
access to and influence over decision-making in formally recognised 
political arenas that politicians allow ethnic leaders forms the 
substance of racism in politics. Secondly, ethnic politics is a form of 
urban protest movement about the lack of access of ethnic communities to 
public resources, such as to positions of decision-making, housing, 
education, social welfare, and employment. Thirdly, the organisational 
bases of these movements are cross-cultural. These bases are linked to a 
membership through social, religious and community networks (discussed 
below; see Chaps.2,4). Fourthly, these movements are local and fifthly, 
they are concerned with changing the social meaning of common urban 
experience through conflict. In doing this ethnic leaders and 
politicians are redefining some of the central values of the local 
community (Chaps.4,7). Thus ethnic politics is an expression of urban 
conflict: Asians and black people use events to develop alliances which 
form bases for urban movements. These enable leaders to translate their 
social and political disadvantages into political terms, which allow for 
comparison between the perceived advantaged position of the white 
community and the disadvantaged position of the minority communities 
into relations of power and powerlessness (Chaps.6,7). 
18 
During the 1960s and 1970s urban movements existed and flourished 
(Katznelson, 1973; Bentley,1972/73; Scott,1972/73; Hill and Issacharoff, 
1971; Beetham, 1970; John,1969; also mentioned by Barot,1980; Anwar, 
1979; Ballards,1977; Lawrence,1974; Rex and Moore,1971). Some 
sociologists dismiss them not recognising them as vehicles for the 
development of urban movements (Lowe,1986:73-76; Rex and Moore,1971:17 
[4]). This suggests that ethnic politics is disregarded as an urban 
movement because the form it takes is complex and because some forms of 
ethnic political activity are not connected with movements, e.g. riots. 
Reasons for this include a reluctance to accept that ethnic 
organisations are participants in urban movements [5], to recognise the 
importance of social networks as enhancing the structures of 
communication and support, to accept that a generalised aim can provide 
a focus for a complex of movements in a cross cultural situation and to 
accept that in some instances movements may have no clear beginning and 
end. 
In part Lowe confronts this difficulty when he argues, using Rex and 
Moore's analysis of Sparkbrook, that housing classes provide lithe means 
by which special interests can be advanced II (Lowe,1986:74; also 73-
75,100,105). This argument misses the point, since it assumes that the 
establishment of a generalised aim such as equal opportunity for all in 
a political context is not a specific interest and as such cannot 
provide a focal point for urban movements. Therefore, it is not housing 
classes that provide bases for action but ethnic organisations. This 
misunderstanding arises from taking the view that an ethnic population 
forms a coherent community, whose members are prepared to forgo their 
ethnic identities. Evidence offered below (also Chap.2) shows that the 
Gujarati population consists of a collection of disparate communities 
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which during the 1970s showed little inclination to unite to achieve a 
common goal. 
Though ethnic politics was not a form of urban movement envisaged by 
Castells (1983), it shares many characteristics with urban social 
movements. Both Castells (1983) and Lowe (1986), who adhere to the idea 
of an urban social movement as a single effective movement occurring in 
one place, overlook the possibility of alliances between organisations 
in the same or different places at similar or different times with 
similar aims [6]. Although some have argued that the term urban social 
movement only applies "to groups that achieve social transformations" 
(cf.Pickvance,1983, in Lowe (1986:5), Lowe himself defines the term as 
applying to "organisations standing outside the formal party system 
which bring people together to defend or challenge the provision of 
urban public services 
(Lowe,1986:3). Therefore 
and to protect the local environment" 
I would argue that it is unsound regard an 
ethnic community or ethnic organisation as an urban movement 
[see footnote 5]. Rather it is the mobilisation of support, 
per se 
rea 1 or 
fictitious, between leaders of organisations with the aim of influencing 
political decision-makers by dominating the political space 
between communities within a community. The development of a community 
identity on the basis of alliances between ethnic organisations that 
share an aim, particular or general, in a political context can be 
regarded as a form of urban movement. Therefore, I shall extend Lowe's 
definition of urban movements recognising that (a) they can have a 
single general aim, such as to challenge racial inequality, (b) they can 
comprise a complex of micro-movements whose leaders may compete with one 
another in order to achieve this aim, (c) they have many bases and (d) 
they may continue to flourish over a period of time. 
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Critical to any urban movement is the distance between the leaders 
and the followers, their social identity, the context in which this 
identity is located, that is common sense racism (discussed below) in 
this instance, and the social relationships in which the movement is 
embedded, that is ethnic communities and social networks. 
A distinction needs to be made between urban movements and ethnic 
organisations. The former are based upon alliances and therefore have no 
hierarchical structure, while the latter are structured to some degree. 
Elected representatives of ethnic organisations refer to themselves as 
leaders and to their supporters as members, and their structures tend to 
be non- or semi-hierarchical. On the one hand, many of the bureaucratic 
characteristics of hierarchical structures are absent. Those elected to 
offices may have to perform decision-making tasks, but they do not 
always choose to see themselves as leaders. On the other hand, it would 
also be correct to describe such organisations as having a partial 
hierarchy, since people are elected to positions in the organisations. 
Their members pay dues and the organisations have charters, which are 
recognised by outside bodies, such as CRCs and the Charities Commission. 
Thus they differ in this respect from the classic model of urban 
social movement. I shall refer to those who hold positions of 
chairperson in these organisations as leaders, as they perform the 
functions of leadership and choose to regard themselves as leaders. Thus 
the social and bureaucratic distances between these leaders and their 
members or supporters is small. In this sense ethnic politics involves 
leaders, mainly men [7], in grassroots movements. 
An essential element in any urban movement is the establishment of a 
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social identity or identities which is (are) acceptable to participants, 
leaders and those in power. In the context of everyday urban experiences 
the identities which set members of ethnic groups apart from others in 
the working class, who may also be in poverty, are their experiences of 
racism. The mobilisation of support behind social identities that are 
acceptable to members of ethnic communities who share these 
disadvantages lies at the roots of ethnic politics. Ethnic politics 
involves a conflict about the meaning of urban experiences and therefore 
about changes to a common culture, which incorporates ideas about 
inferiority, superiority, equality of opportunity, that is ideas 
embedded in common sense racism. 
The roots of common sense racism can be traced to Britain's empire, 
where many of the ideas about relationships between white, black and 
Asian became accepted and after the dissolution of the empire have 
formed the foundations of common sense racism in Britain since the 1950s 
(CCCS,1983; Miles,1982; Hall,1981; Rex and Tomlinson,1979). This gave 
rise to a distinctive set of ideas, attitudes, values and beliefs which 
when taken together form a body of common sense racism (Lawrence, 1983; 
Hall,1981). This knowledge not only recognises the right of white people 
to exploit black people (cf. Walvin,1984:47; Miles,1982:119), but also 
provides individuals, media and governments with ideas about how to 
interpret the actions of Asian and black minority communities 
(cf.Lawrence,1983; Hall,1981). It provides the person-in-the-street 
with a set of social attitudes, values and prejudices about how to think 
and behave towards black and Asian people living here (Lawrence, 1983: 
49). "As a way of thinking and in its immediacy, common sense is 
appropriate to 'the practical struggle of everyday life of the masses'" 
(Lawrence,1983:49). Just as white people draw upon this body of 
22 
knowledge, Asian and black people who have experienced racism have 
developed responses to it which form part of a distinctive set of ideas 
and reactions for coping with racism (Gifford et al.,1989). 
Two important constraints define the extent of common sense racism: 
the first is skin colour and the second are the social boundaries 
surrounding ethnic communities. It is difficult to determine the extent 
to which the former defines the positions of white, black and Asian 
people. Some point to the "immutable fact of colour" (Walvin,1984:19), 
while others offer caution, arguing that the "association of colour with 
conquered and therefore subordinate status" outweighs in sociological 
terms the importance of the "association of colour with low social class 
standing" (Braham, 1986:8). What is important is that in terms of common 
sense racism Asian and black people are labelled as "black". In the 
public mind three notions characterise this body of knowledge, they are 
immigrant, black and inferior. The latter is defined on the one hand by 
perceived differences in cultural patterns (e.g. dress) in association 
with skin colour and attitudes to "black", and on the other hand by 
religious beliefs, caste and faction membership and perceived social 
disadvantages. These social symbols form the basis of a dialogue of 
conflict between the leaders of ethnic movements and the politicians. 
The dynamic emerges from the new social meanings based upon these two 
sets of ideas that develop out of confrontations between Gujarati 
leaders and white politicians over the allocation of public resources in 
informal political arena of the CRC. 
Therefore, I shall define common sense racism as a body of knowledge 
comprising social attitudes, values and prejudices, derived from past 
and present experiences with black and Asian peoples in Britain's one-
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time colonies, which provide white people today with a shorthand guide 
to understanding the actions of their. This body of knowledge is an 
element in a wider body of common sense knowledge. Social relationships 
are reciprocal, that is they involve rights and duties. The reciprocal 
of white common sense racism is also a body of knowledge, which 
comprises social attitudes, values and prejudices, based upon past and 
present experiences with white people, that enable Asian and black 
people to select the appropriate roles when interacting with white 
people. This shorthand guide allows Asian and black people to cope with 
and manage their social, economic and political relationships with white 
people in daily life in a social environment in which racism is 
institutionalised. 
Arguably, common sense racism shares some of the 
characteristics associated with common sense knowledge, 
social 
such as 
"knowledge of trustworthy recipes for interpreting the social world and 
for handling things or men in order to obtain the best results in every 
situation with a minimum of effort by avoiding undesirable consequences II 
(Schutz,1976:103). It was from such a stock of recipes that Governments 
during the 1970s drew for their reactions to racial situations that were 
later likened to a "moral panic" (Hall,1981:32-34), a panic based upon a 
British fear of alien cultures (Lawrence,1983:47-49). As I have argued 
above, there are two reciprocal and changing bodies of common sense 
racism, one which is used by white people and one which is employed by 
Asian and black people. This is public knowledge. What adds to the 
dynamic of ethnic politics is a realisation that evidence of support for 
leaders is based upon the legitimacy of their claims of support. If they 
can draw explanations from the reservoir of common sense racism with 
which other leaders, supporters and white politicians can agree, its 
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acceptance will confer upon them influence. In a situation of conflict 
it is this knowledge which acquires social value. I shall argue that it 
is the interrelationship between this public knowledge and private 
bodies of knowledge, that is knowledge of Gujarati social organisation, 
that enables ethnic leaders to make claims for support and to manipulate 
social identities (Chap.4). These debates are not just about attempts to 
bid for influence over white politicians, but also attempts to define 
the central values in an urban community. 
This raises two issues: the first is concerned with the ethnic 
community being studied and the second is with the place of the 
research. 
The coherence of urban movements involving ethnic minorities depends 
not only upon shared social situations and experiences, but also 
upon shared ideas. This implies that some form of transmission of 
culture exists through those social relationships which underpin ethnic 
communities. Therefore, the emphasis of this study is on the local 
context, local ethnic communities and those social relationships which 
provide underpin community social structures, namely social networks. 
The concept of community is central to the analysis of ethnic urban 
movements (cf. Castells,1983: Chap.l; Lowe,1986:5). Although the concept 
of community is difficult to define, three factors contribute towards an 
understanding of what is a community; these are territory, association 
and identity (Bell and Newby,1975:27-31). In this instance territory can 
be equated with an area of settlement of an ethnic community; social 
association is based upon relationships of friendship; and social 
identities emerge through the mobilisation of social and religious 
ethnic identities which form the bases for alliances in political arenas 
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(see Chaps.3,6-7). 
The notion of territory takes on a number of levels of meaning since 
Gujaratis comprise one of a number of Asian and black communities 
living in Bolton alongside a large white community. As the largest of 
these groups, Gujaratis have over time established their geographical 
territory through settlement, expansion of ethnic-based businesses and 
religious activities (see below and Chap.l). Furthermore, they 
themselves are separated into two religious collectivities, namely 
Hindus and Muslims, and within each there are a number of independent 
smaller communities. For the Gujaratis the term community only makes 
sense when they align themselves with some other tangible identity to 
which they can attribute social "belonging" (Cohen, 1982:9). To describe 
them as a community makes sense at three levels of interaction, that is 
their opposition to (a) the white community is expressed in terms of 
minority-majority or Asian/black-white, (b) other Asian and black 
communities is expressed in terms of a Gujarati identity and/or 
religious identities, and (c) other Gujaratis is expressed in terms of 
intra-Gujarati identities. There are a wide range of organisations to 
which Gujaratis belong and to which they claim allegiance when they 
refer to limy community". Thus, there is no single Gujarati community: 
there are many Gujarati communities and many levels of Gujarati social 
identities (Chaps. 2-4). 
The structures of these communities are based upon social networks 
which link members within them to those outside them (Chap.3). Social 
networks provide a foundation for the structures of Muslim and Hindu 
communities (cf.Laumann,1976;1973). Mitchell (1979;1973;1971) has drawn 
attention to the importance of these social characteristics. The social 
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characteristics of Gujarati social networks can be expected to reflect 
differences in social and religious values between Muslim and Hindu 
communities, as well as making explicit the extent of and depth of 
friendship (intensity) between Gujaratis and members of other 
communities generally (Chap.3). Social networks have an important role 
in the development of urban social movements, since they link people 
across social class, and I shall argue ethnic communities, into 
movements that have no hierarchical structure (cf. Castells,1983:19; 
Chap. 6). The social characteristics of the networks enhance or detract 
from the overall organisational structure of ethnic communities. Thus 
they not only underpin the social structures of Gujarati communities, 
but also provide Gujaratis with relationships through they can exchange 
knowledge and a means to control this knowledge. Moreover, through 
friendships Gujaratis develop a shared set of social perceptions about 
their own community, those of other Gujaratis, those of other minorities 
and the white community (Chap.4). I shall argue that the social 
differences in the structures of Gujarati social networks contribute to 
the seeming solidarity or fragmentary nature of the two large religious 
communities, namely that of the Hindus and the Muslims. 
Embodied in these social networks are perceptions of social 
distances, which form the basis of a complex process of labelling and 
social identification (see Chap.4). The mechanics that underlies this 
process is 
perceptions 
based upon Gujarati perceptions of social distance. These 
enable Gujaratis to distinguish between their relationships 
to kin, close friends, ordinary friends and acquaintances, between those 
who belong to their community and those who do not, and between Gujarat; 
and members of other communities. Thus they establish social boundaries 
within which or over which they allow knowledge to be exchanged and 
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social identities extended or curtailed. However, the boundaries of the 
"publicness of knowledge" (Emmett,1982:207-209) are to an extent 
coterminous with the social boundaries of each community and between 
each community, thus providing a hierarchy of social identities (Cohen, 
1982). 
These social identities provide Gujarati leaders with a source of 
knowledge of communities, which they can draw upon when defining the 
social boundaries of their communities in relation to claims for 
support. A crucial part of defining social identity is the knowledge 
that others have of these social identities. Therefore boundary shifting 
is a process employed by Gujarati leaders when defining the social 
boundaries of their communities in order to generate alliances or 
"political" communities that can cope with the "exigencies of survival 
and the structure of opportunity" (Yancey, Erickson and Juliani, 1976 
:400) in a political world in which they have no access to formal 
political arenas (Chaps.5-7). With opportunities to achieve influence 
over politicians, other ethnic leaders and the possibility of gaining 
access to public resources, these leaders believe that they have power 
[8], that is they are an example of a "covert power elite" (Bell and 
Newby, 1975: 24) . 
To have any effect the confirmation of power or the lack of it has to 
be expressed publicly, that is there needs to exist an arena in which 
claims to it or the lack of it can be made. Without access to formal 
local and national political arenas, the arena that is readily 
available to ethnic leaders is the informal political arena provided by 
the local CRC (now Racial Equality Council - REC). A recent study of 
local politics of race observed that local organisations not solely of 
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ethnic origin "provide forums for the identification of commonly 
acknowledged problems and the articulation of collective demands" (Ben-
Tovim et al.,1986:65). Although this sounds reasonable, in practice 
organisations with little experience of racism are unlikely to publicise 
ethnic demands. Strangely, these authors also ignore the political role 
of local ethnic organisations to articulate political needs, but 
recognise their anti-racist function (Ben-Tovim et al., 1986:65 ff.). 
What gives the CRC arena a political character is the importance 
councillors and MPs attach to their relationships and debates with 
Gujarati leaders. Often this can be reduced to seeing those who are 
thought to be able to influence Asian (and black) votes (Anwar, 1986; 
1984; 1980; Layton-Henry,1984). An awareness of the Gujarati leaders of 
this concern has in turn given them a political asset: in return for 
votes they want political influence/ recognition as representatives. 
Thus, the CRC became not just an arena in which the politicians sought 
to control and contain Gujarati demands, but it also an arena in which 
leaders could bargain for support with other leaders and the politicians 
for their demands. Consequently, the CRC acted as a buffer for the 
politicians and a pressure group for the leaders. 
The assumption that Gujaratis must accept and recognise only white 
political parties as being the only organisations through which 
political views can be expressed in a multicultural society is 
misguided. Asians and black people cannot be adequately represented by a 
political selection system, which sets itself above the principle 
of equal opportunities on the grounds that democracy is the very essence 
of equal opportunities. If ethnic urban movements are to be successful, 
they should lead to some kind of change in the social meaning of 
democracy. Even if confrontation between the Gujarati leaders and the 
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white politicians did not produce any immediate change in opportunity on 
the ground, it increased politicians' awareness of racism and the 
disadvantages that flow from it. 
Bolton shares certain characteristics with other places where studies 
have identified the presence of ethnic politics (cf. Anwar,1979; 
Katznelson,1973; Hill and Issacharoff,197l). For instance the device by 
which local political parties controlled ethnic political activity was 
and still is the same as elsewhere, namely the local CRC (Katznelson, 
1973; Hill and Issacharoff,197l) [9]. Descriptions of ethnic politics 
in these and other studies suggests that the emergence of ethnic 
politics here was and is similar to developments elsewhere. However, 
there are certain differences, for instance, the pattern of settlement 
of Gujaratis here differs from that in Blackburn, 
in that Bolton attracted both Gujarati Muslims 
mainly Muslims settled in Blackburn (Chap. 1). 
a neighbouring town, 
and Hindus, whereas 
Bolton is an appropriate place for such a study because it provided a 
blend of shared and distinctive economic and political characteristics 
which provided a fruitful ground for the development of ethnic politics. 
In addition to the complex nature of the Gujarati community, two factors 
contributed to making this context appropriate: firstly the rapid growth 
of the ethnic population and secondly the pressure to meet the demands 
of this population by politicians. 
The strength of demand by ethnic leaders for greater political 
recognition was matched by the rapid growth of the local ethnic 
communities from comprising 2.9% of the total population in 1971 to 6.4% 
in 1981 (District Trends, 1987). Figures show that by the end of the 
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research in 1977 
population (Chap. 1). 
these communities comprised 6.7% of the total 
Such rapid growth of the ethnic communities led to 
a rise in demands by their members for a share of public resources, 
namely greater opportunities for education, employment, better housing 
and welfare benefits. Particular to the local situation is the expansion 
of different Gujarati ethnic communities under the broad umbrellas of 
Hinduism and Islam. Above all, this provided a ideal context for the 
development of ethnic politics. The wider social environment of Bolton 
set the scene with its declining textile and associated industries which 
allowed for the development of a situation in which competition between 
white and Asian and black people for employment, support for the low 
wage earner and the unemployed was destined to escalate. While welcoming 
a source of new votes, in the face of growing demands the white 
politicians showed signs of moral panic (cf. Hall,1981). As in local 
politics there is greater scope, flexibility and accessibility for 
political participation by ethnic leaders than in national politics, 
Bolton provides an appropriate situation for research on ethnic 
politics. 
Furthermore Bolton is typical of many towns of similar size that 
attracted Asian migrants. They were drawn to a thriving textile 
industry because it provided (a) a large number of low-paid and low 
skilled jobs required simple and cheap training, (b) jobs which were not 
in great demand from members of the white community, who were seeking 
higher status jobs and (c) employment in an industry in which many 
migrants had worked or of which they had some knowledge prior to coming 
here. Although the textile industry experienced a revival which lasted 
from the end of the Second World War through to the middle to late 
1970s, it had experienced declines and recessions. This industry 
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experienced a recession before the Second World War, when British 
colonies began producing textiles and when the association between the 
adequate supply of water, coal and the particular weather conditions 
over Bolton no longer became critical for the survival of the industry 
(Joint Working on Structure Plans in Greater Manchester Employment Sub 
Group,1972: Para.2.2). After the Second World War it was not the 
recession alone which contributed to the decline of this industry, but 
the 1959 Cotton Act which accounted for the closure of three quarters of 
Bolton's textile mills between 1959 and 1969. Nevertheless, this 
industry continued to dominate the town by being the largest employer 
of men and women through the years from 1959 to 1965 and then the second 
largest employer from 1965 to 1971. Although it remains one of the 
largest employers of Asians throughout the 1970s to the beginning of the 
1990s, it was a declining industry. Therefore Gujaratis found themselves 
in a situation of increasing competition with growing numbers of 
unemployed white people, who were once again ready to accept any job. 
Since there was a reduction in jobs across the country, which can be 
attributed in part to competition from other countries, and in part to 
deskilling, the difficulties the Gujaratis experienced here finding 
housing and work and coping with increasing racism, suggest that Bolton 
was little different from other towns and cities in Britain (cf. Smith, 
1989). Today the textile industry is recovering as new technology 
replaces manpower. Unfortunately, this changing industry does not 
attract many Asians, in part because they do not have appropriate 
qualifications and in part make no positive effort to obtain them. 
Three factors set the scene in Bolton in the 1970s which raised the 
political awareness of the Gujaratis, the white politicians and the 
white community to racism. The first was the arrival of Ugandan Asians 
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in 1972-1973, which above all others served to make visible to the 
white community the presence of an expanding "black" community. The 
second factor was the emerging demands that the Gujaratis made for 
scarce resources, and the third factor was the politicians' awareness of 
a new source of political support. The political presence Asians needs 
to be seen against the political history of the town. From 1964 to 1970 
the town was represented in Parliament by Labour MPs. In 1970 Bolton's 
vote swung in favour of the Conservatives, but in 1974 the majority was 
regained by the Labour Party. Politically Bolton was regarded as a 
marginal constituency. Against this background of political party 
competition for control, the major political parties began to compete 
for Gujarati support. The politicians' realisation of the value of this 
new source of votes coincided with the Gujaratis' demands for housing, 
jobs, places in schools, planning permission for buildings, for 
political influence and for local and national benefits. Typically, this 
awareness led to Labour Party victories in local and national elections 
as it did elsewhere (cf. Anwar and Kohler,1975). 
However, Bolton was different from other urban centres in so far as 
grassroots protest flourished and led to changes in the social and 
political understanding of multiculturalism. In particular the protest 
originated within a rich diversity of ethnic organisations distinguished 
by differences in caste and religious belief. To claim that ethnic 
politics was more advanced here than elsewhere would be difficult to 
substantiate, since there were few studies of ethnic politics. It is 
difficult to provide some measure of change, although political 
party recognition might act as such a bench mark. Doubt has been 
expressed about whether or not the party political system in Britain can 
represent the views of minorities (Hall,1985; Stone,1985; Rex and 
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Tomlinson,1979). Possibly for this reason Hall (1985) drew attention to 
the need to consider ethnic politics within informal local political 
arenas. In recent local elections (1992) the Labour Party supported a 
second black candidate, but gave him an unwinnable seat. To some extent 
this signifies change (see Chaps.5 and 7). 
To conclude this section, Bolton shares both similarities and 
differences with from other urban centres where Asian settled. Because 
Gujarati leaders were given the freedom to develop politically, albeit 
temporarily, in the CRC, their protest against social and racial 
disadvantage gave the setting a difference, which cannot be found 
elsewhere. Two of the most important influences on the political 
behaviour of Gujarati and white communities are their economic statuses 
and the balance of political power between them. Although this may not 
determine the outcome of decision-making, any convincing model should 
take the economic, social and political power realities as a starting 
point (Stone,1985:61). This thesis will take as a starting point the 
socio-economic position of Gujaratis in relation to other minority 
communities and the white community. 
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FOOTNOTES 
1. Ethnic politics again became the focus of interest a decade or so 
later, when in the light of equal opportunities legislation 
attention moved to minority representation on local government bodies 
(Ball and Solomos,1990; Ben-Tovim et al,1986). Recently, it is 
claimed in passing that ethnic community protest in the 1980s can be 
seen as a form of urban movement, although no explanations are 
offered for this approach (Werbner and Anwar,1991). Having made this 
point, the movements described appear to conform more to the 
definition of urban social movements offered by Castells than do 
those discussed below. 
2. The second term that needs clarifying is Gujarati. In this thesis I 
shall normally use the terms Muslim and Hindu when referring to 
Gujarati Muslims and Hindus but exclude other Muslims, such as 
Pakistanis and Bangladeshis. When I refer to both Muslims and Hindus 
in relation to Pakistanis and Bangladeshis, I shall use the term 
Gujarati. On occasions I shall refer to all Muslims, that is Gujarati 
Muslims, Pakistanis, Bangladeshis and others. On other occasions I 
use the label Asian to include all people who live in Bolton who 
trace their origins to the Indian subcontinent. For the association 
between Gujarati and the label black see footnote 3. 
3. First I need to clarify my usage of the term black. Much of the 
literature on race uses the word "black" to describe those who are 
the targets of racism. At one level I can accept this, since those 
who discriminate against members of certain minority communities do 
so on the grounds of perceiving them as black. However, from my 
experience the Afro-Caribbeans, Africans choose to call themselves 
black. Asians do not. I shall use the term black when referring to 
people perceived of by white people as black. However, this does not 
mean that those perceived as black, perceive themselves as black. The 
Gujaratis prefer not to refer to themselves as black; they are 
Gujaratis or Indians (Chaps.3; also Modood,1988; Westwood,1984). 
Labels such as these form an important part of common sense racism 
(Allen and Macey,1990:376; Castles et al,1984:98-99, 194; Lawrence, 
1983: Chap. 2), as I shall show these are only the more obvious 
labels. 
4. Later Rex altered his view (1986,Chap.5) 
5. I do not consider that ethnic communities can functioning like urban 
social movements. For one thing, they are more permanent than 
movements and they do have some form of hierarchical structure. 
Ethnic communities and ethnic organisations do share similarities, 
in so far as the latter often represents the former. I consider that 
it detracts from the analysis by confusing to suggest that 
communities are similar to movements (cf. Gilroy,1986:235-236). 
6. See discussion in Lowe,1986:38-48; also Chaps.4-6. 
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7. Since all Gujaratis who participated in inter- and intra-Gujarati 
politics in Bolton without exception were men, all Gujaratis 
interviewed were male. Although I spoke to some of the women about 
various aspects of their lives, I did not include any of them in the 
survey. In Chapter One immigration figures for Bolton are given 
which indicate that a large proportion of Indian immigrants coming 
here were women. Gujarati men gave me the impression that their 
wives were withdrawn, unable to communicate in English, made no 
important decisions, could not go out unchaperoned and the home and 
kitchen were the places were women found satisfaction. Little was 
said about their work and their contribution to household income. 
Allen makes the point that not only do the immigration figures 
suggest that women are the dependents of their husbands (Allen,1982: 
129-130), but that in India and Pakistan there is evidence to 
suggest that women are far more independent as wives and decision-
makers, as leaders and as employers than they are in Britain 
(Allen,1982:135). "Their experience in Britain and their approach to 
this experience is therefore not to be equated in any simple way, to 
that of their sisters from India, Pakistan or Bangladesh" (Allen, 
1982:135). In other words, an outsider's impression of the role of 
Gujarati women as subordinate and submissive is nothing more than 
an impression created by Gujarati men. 
The suggestion that many women work either in factories or at home 
and are the recipients of "appalling low rates of pay" and that even 
less is known about those who work in family businesses as unpaid 
workers (Allen,1982:138) points to discrimination and double 
disadvantage. I would argue, however, that such data do not explain 
how Gujarati men (and other men from India, Pakistan and Bangladesh) 
have achieved such a position of dominance over their wives, 
daughters and other female relatives. Although Allen does not 
explain how the immigration experience has enabled men to achieve 
such a position of dominance (Allen, 1982), I recognise this as an 
important issue and one worthy of deeper research. For further 
discussion see Appendix I. 
8. Locally, as nationally, there are other spheres of power besides 
political ones, for instance social, religious, business and 
financial, and professional ones, through which Gujaratis could 
gain access to power, but these are not relevant to this thesis. 
During the 1970s it seemed as if the access of Gujaratis generally 
to positions within the formal political hierarchy was more 
difficult to achieve than it was for Asians and black people towards 
the end of the nineteenth century and the initial decades of this 
century. Although nationally a few Asians and black people achieved 
positions as councillors in Blackburn, Bradford, Leicester and some 
London Boroughs, generally positions in the national political 
hierarchy were closed to them. In Bolton since the 1970s Asians and 
black people have had little success in local or national elections. 
9. This is one of the major criticisms made by Asian and black people of 
the CRE and RECs today (Sunday Telegraph,November,1992:15). 
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Part II 
Research Methodology 
The aim of this Part is to clarify selected aspects of research 
methodology. Three issues in particular will be discussed: firstly, the 
general approach used including the extent to which this influences or 
is influenced by the researcher moving across cultures; secondly,the 
degree to which it impinges upon the understanding behind the usage of 
the concept of culture; and thirdly, how the above issues have effected 
and are modified by the collection and analysis of data. The first issue 
centres around a debate about which approach predominates - the social 
anthropological or sociological approach -, and therefore to what extent 
can this thesis be described as ethnographic. The second issue is 
concerned with the understanding of the concept of culture and how the 
cultures of ethnic minorities relate to British culture. The third issue 
focuses on a debate about the consequence of interpretation of data 
drawn from a cross-cultural situation. These three issues are 
intertwined and effect each other and the analysis of the data. Details 
of fieldwork and sampling are described in Appendix I, the questionnaire 
can be found in Appendix II and details of social network analysis in 
Appendix IV. 
As this thesis focuses on an area of interest that is located at the 
interface between white British and Gujarati cultures within British 
society, it raises questions about research done across cultures. These 
include detailing the approach, issues raised when a researcher from one 
culture claims to record and analyse the views of those belonging to 
another culture. Whose views are recorded? To what extent do those 
recorded subscribe to the stated views? Can a person belonging to one 
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culture accurately record those of members belonging to another culture? 
Some of these latter concerns will be discussed below. 
The subject of this thesis is how Gujaratis developed ethnic 
politics, so that they could exploit a gap between the grassroots and 
the local political party and formal political structure. By definition 
I do not claim to provide a total description of Gujarati culture or 
social life in Bolton. The thesis focuses on an area of political 
interaction in which both Gujarati leaders and members, white 
politicians and members of BCCR, the wider public and the Press 
participated. As the aim of this research is to demonstrate how Gujarati 
leaders sought to obtain access to public resources, the research needs 
to take account of their socio-economic position, the religious 
organisations which provide leaders with structures of leadership, their 
perceptions of community and social networks and their perceptions of 
political representation and participation in local politics. In 
presenting an analysis of the observable social actions of Gujaratis and 
the meanings that these actions were intended to provide for certain 
audiences, I am making explicit what they made explicit. I am 
interpreting their actions, meanings, beliefs that pertain to ethnic 
politics. This is an exercise to provide an in-depth understanding of 
their social world in so far as it impinges upon ethnic politics. 
Discussion of research that involves crossing ethnic and/or cultural 
boundaries raises the questions about approaches and it is this which I 
shall discuss first. 
In this research an anthropological approach is combined with a 
sociological one. An assumption is made that a major difference between 
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these disciplines lies in their approaches and subject matter. Today 
both disciplines utilise a wide range of approaches and study a wide 
range of subject matter. Since neither sociology nor anthropology has a 
monopoly of a particular approach to research, it would be simplistic to 
reduce the difference in the approaches of these disciplines to that of 
micro- and macro-approaches. In anthropological and sociological 
research qualitative and quantitative techniques have been combined 
(Bryman,1988:147; Cicourel,1981). There is no firm separation between 
the techniques used by one discipline and those employed by the other. 
Practitioners of both draw on a range of techniques of data collection 
and analysis appropriate to the subject studied. 
Since this research project looked at ethnic politics from the 
Gujarati side; it would be incorrect to presume that therefore that this 
determined which approach would be used. In fact a range of approaches 
and techniques are used; the former include macro- and micro-
approaches, and the latter include nonparticipant and participant 
observation, case studies and a questionnaire. Recognising the dangers 
of employing a micro-approach which "runs the risk of losing touch with 
social reality and imposing instead 'a fictional non-existing world 
constructed by the scientific observer'" (Bryman quoting Schutz, 1988: 
52), I have locating this study within a macro-approach. Although much 
of the research concentrates upon the microcosm of actions that occurred 
within the arena provided by Bolton Council for Community Relations 
(BCCR), to make sense of this political activity the research draws upon 
the wider aspects of local social interaction and to an extent upon 
national events. 
Another dimension of the debate about approaches revolves around the 
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issue of the extent to which research on another culture and what is 
loosely termed an anthropological content forms an ethnography. Since 
this thesis because it goes beyond description and focuses on general 
theoret i ca 1 issues, it cannot be regarded as an ethnography 
(Mair,1966:7). The aim of the study is not to provide a Gujarati view of 
Gujarati life, but to analyse Gujarati access to local political 
processes. In part by doing such research a view is provided of aspects 
of Gujarati social life. The emphasis is on the latter. In doing this, 
as an outsider, I am providing what in a relative sense is an insiders' 
view of local politics, in particular ethnic politics. Most people who 
are involved in local politics have greater or lesser experience of 
ethnic politics, what they may be less familiar with is how aspects of 
Gujarati social organisation impinge upon ethnic politics. 
From a different point of view this study may be described as 
ethnographic, since it involves both ethnography and analysis. I would 
argue that this approach is appropriate for a study of racism. To quote 
Willis: 'The role of ethnography is to show the cultural viewpoint of 
the oppressed, their "hidden" knowledges and resistances as well as the 
basis on which entrapping "decisions" are taken in some sense of 
liberty, but which nevertheless help to produce "structure'" (Willis, 
1981:201-3, quoted in Marcus,1986:179; see also Willis,1979:119-126,171-
179). This approach is appropriate to a study of ethnic politics, since 
it makes explicit through ethnography the extent of institutional racism 
in local politics. In particular it raises an important issue about 
central values. If politics is concerned with the definition and 
maintenance of central social values, then the Gujaratis' (and Asian and 
black) view that at least some of these values do not pertain to them, 
points to two issues. Firstly, central values can change but to share 
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these values cannot be achieved through a simple process of settlement 
and integration. Secondly, racism may prevent central values from 
becoming appropriate to members of minority communities living in a 
multicultural and multiracial society. Efforts by these minorities to 
change central values to accommodate their urban experiences are 
associated more often with protest, since racism prevents change through 
everyday social contact. If living in a multicultural society implies 
the existence of diverse communities, linked by a complex web of 
cultural similarities and differences, then the central values of the 
society should reflect the views of these communities. While this does 
not preclude the possibility that there are other interpretations, it 
makes no attempt to recognise that Gujaratis, members of other 
minorities and other white people might dispute the centrality of these 
values. At present racial unrest suggests that the views of minorities 
are not being taken into account by governments and politicians 
(cf.Gifford,1989). 
To summarise, in so far as this research presents a picture of 
selected aspects of Gujarati social and political life, some would argue 
that it could be regarded as an ethnography (cf.Bryman,1988:45). Since 
this thesis goes beyond a description of Gujarati social and political 
life, it cannot be accepted as an ethnography, although parts of it may 
be ethnographic. It combines a sociological with an anthropological 
approach. 
The second issue is concerned with the understanding of the concept 
of culture and its deployment in this thesis. 
The approach taken here is that Gujaratis are part of British 
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society; therefore they are inside rather than outside British society. 
Having made this point, there are still social boundaries to be crossed. 
This means that I as a researcher and Gujaratis as the subjects of the 
research are insiders. It also means that I am not concerned with their 
place of origin, be it Gujarat, Uganda or elsewhere, as a means to 
differentiate between cultures with the intention of arguing that 
Gujaratis have to cross from one culture to another to participate 
within this society. As a social attribute which distinguishes Gujaratis 
from those who are not Gujaratis, I employ it to make apparent 
differences, such as when distinguishing between differences in the 
pattern of Hindu and Muslim social association. However, there is an 
implication that people who are British and belong to different ethnic 
groups have cultures which are separate from British culture (cf. 
Cohen,1982;1986). This is a contentious view: it argues that relatively 
geographically, therefore socially, isolated communities have identities 
based upon cultural differences, although they still form part of a 
British culture. However, black and Asian Britons who are also isolated, 
socially and to a lesser extent geographically (e.g. Smith,1989), have 
cultures and social identities which separate them from British culture, 
but are regarded them as not forming part of a British culture. This 
view I suggest upholds the theme of "between two cultures" (Watson, 
1977). As such it is unhelpful for an analysis of ethnic politics, since 
ethnic politics involves a debate about central values, the assumption 
made in this thesis is that Gujaratis are part of British society and 
that their culture forms part of a British culture. 
The argument behind this thesis is that Gujarati, Asian and black 
ethnic groups living here may have separate social identities, but that 
their cultures form part of British culture. In other words living here 
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does not require Gujaratis to give up social values and beliefs that 
they recognise as Gujarati and replace them with "British" values. 
Similarly white Britons do not need to accept Gujarati social values, 
unless they are in frequent contact with them through work, socially or 
through sharing religious beliefs. By recognising Gujarati values a 
Briton does not become a Gujarati. Furthermore, the social values 
Gujaratis recognise as Gujarati are not necessarily accepted and 
recognised as Gujarati by people living in Gujarat. Nevertheless, any 
research on people who do not belong to the researcher's immediate 
social world, requires the researcher to learn about social meanings 
accepted by others. This is accepted by most sociologists without 
comment. Few choose to explain how they cross social divides, although 
there are some exceptions for instance Sacks (1985), Cicourel (1981), 
Schutz (1976), Garfinkel (1967), Becker (1963), and Goffman (1959). 
Generally sociologists presume that because they are members of the same 
society and understand that part of the culture accepted by the group in 
which they live, that they therefore can understand the social meanings 
and social actions of other groups and communities with whom they do not 
live. What is implied is that sociological understanding is possible 
within our society, irrespective of how far removed the group studied is 
from the experiences of the researcher. Sociologists who are interested 
in the sociology of everyday life have questioned this assumption. 
It is simplistic to presume that the study of another ethnic group 
within British society involves a greater or lesser shift from the 
familiar to the unfamiliar than does the study of other groups within 
the "social" group to which the researcher belongs. It is accepted that 
to study other cultures, particularly those separated from British 
society by geographical distance, involves a major a shift by the 
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researcher from the familiar to the unfamiliar. Any attempt to plot the 
steps that link the familiar to the unfamiliar is an exercise in degree. 
As Sharrock and Anderson point out: "Once different monolithic cultures 
have been decomposed into cultural differences, the problem of 
understanding and its near relation - the problem of meaning - become a 
great deal more tractable" (1982:131). The approach adopted here needs 
to be distinguished from others employed in race relations research, 
since in studying ethnic politics I am studying a Gujarati view of a 
political process which both Gujaratis and white politicians accepted. 
That is the Gujaratis were not pressurising the politicians into 
creating, say a Gujarati or Indian political system in Bolton. Therefore 
the approach taken here is that ethnic politics is about ethnic 
differences and not about the clash or meeting of two monolithic 
cultures. 
It is interesting to note that in the two works on British cultures 
referred to above, the Asian and Afro-Caribbean communities living here 
are ignored (Cohen,1982; 1986). In Belonging attention is focused on 
rural communities. No mention is made even of the one island Asian 
community, that of the Pakistanis who live in Stornoway, Lewis, in the 
earlier volume. In its sequel, Symbolising Boundaries, which focuses on 
identity and diversity in urban British cultures, there is no mention 
of Asian and black cultures. The lack of inclusion of these cultures 
tacitly supports the argument that some anthropologists take the view 
that ethnic groups, whose members migrated to Britain, have cultures 
which are different from a British culture in the sense that they 
represent separate monolithic cultures. This suggests that the 1970s 
concept of "between two cultures" has not only survived to the present 
time, but that it is more strongly entrenched than ever. How "other" are 
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Asian and black British cultures? This is not a useful debate in part 
for the reasons given by Miles (1982:Chap.3), in part for the uncritical 
consequences of labelling ( Introduction Part I above, Modood,1988; 
Westwood, 1984) , and in part because it reinforces the view that "black" 
people belong to hostile "non-British" cultures. Thus they are 
categorised as outsiders. However, a critical analysis of labelling 
which is grounded in social interaction is interesting and important in 
any study of a multiracial situation (Chap.3 below, also MacDonald 
Report, 1989:Chap.26). 
Undoubtedly the debate about British society being a unitary society 
or a complex society consisting of multiple cultures is critical, since 
it determines the approach of governments, politicians, people and 
researchers to minorities within the society. The fragility of people 
and certainly governments accepting the latter view was highlighted 
recently by the Salman Rushdie incident, by an increase in racism as a 
result of the Gulf War, by concern expressed by politicians over the 
participation of Muslims canvassing for an independent Muslim political 
party in recent local elections, and by the establishment of a Muslim 
parliament in Britain. In the race relations context sociologists have 
debated the idea of describing British society as pluralistic or 
multicultural (discussed in Part I above), but the latter has come to be 
accepted as the more accurate and appropriate description of British 
society (cf.Rex,1987;1986). This notion takes on board the idea of 
British society being comprised of a number of cultures (multicultural) 
all of which are accorded equal freedom of expression within the private 
domain and a unitary set of institutions in the public domain (Rex, 
1987:228). However, Rex observes that such a society as he describes is 
an ideal model and does not exist as yet. However, his model suggests 
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that a multicultural society is one consisting of communities the 
cultural differences between whom are a matter of degree and not kind. 
The third issue considers how the above approach and interpretation 
of the concept of culture relate to the collection of data and the 
analysis of data. The combination of approaches is reflected in the 
range of methods of data collection and the range of techniques for data 
analysis. 
Aspects of the approach employed share much with symbolic 
interactionism. An advantage of this is that it recognises the 
importance for sociological analysis of the ordinary Gujaratis' 
interpretations of the everyday social and political world that 
underpinned their social actions and social meanings. It emphasises the 
political strategies and tactics which Gujaratis consider appropriate to 
ethnic politics, such as the importance of the role of social and 
religious organisations, labelling and social meanings embedded in 
Gujaratis' body of common sense racism. The concept of ethnicity draws 
attention to social boundaries which are based upon Gujarati perceptions 
of social identities in the social world as seen from their point of 
view. 
To collect the data I had to cross cultural boundaries into Gujarati 
society, learn about aspects of Gujarati culture, and gain an 
understanding of their view of local politics, ethnic politics and 
racism in politics. This raises a number of important issues about the 
relationship between British culture and that of ethnic groups, like 
Gujaratis. The extremes of this debate suggest that on the one hand a 
researcher cannot cross culture boundaries, and on the other that total 
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immersion is possible. This presupposes that a monolithic culture exists 
in which a researcher can avoid becoming or can choose to become 
immersed. In Social Anthropology there is considerable debate about this 
issue (Clifford and Marcus, 1986), where researchers have been crossing 
boundaries to study cultures for much longer than in Sociology. Amongst 
the questions such a study raises is: what kind of a view and whose view 
does a researcher provide - that of the researcher or that of the 
subjects researched? To some degree this study presents a version of an 
outsider's view of insiders' views (cf.Sharrock and Anderson,1982: 121). 
Where the approach used here diverges from that used by many 
anthropologists is that Gujarati actors are treated as "only 
interpretive actors" as opposed to "excavating the meanings that they 
have for the actions they take" (Sharrock and Anderson,1982:131). 
The approach used in this study of ethnic politics and racism in 
local politics involved the use of both micro- and macro-methods for the 
collection of data. I had direct contact with the Gujaratis and a 
considerable amount of data was collected participant and nonparticipant 
observation. However, data were also collected by means of case studies 
and a questionnaire. Therefore, this study brings together data for 
qualitative and quantitative analysis. This made it possible to combine 
a qualitative analysis with a computer analysis of the data in general 
and with a highly formalised computer analysis of the data on social 
networks. Although this has been done before (Mitchell,1967), it is 
still unusual in anthropological research but more common in 
sociological research. This research is a methodological experiment 
designed to combine the insight of direct observation with the stringent 
crosschecking that only carefully controlled numerical data can provide. 
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Firstly, regarding the general collection of data, working across 
cultures presented well established difficulties, such as the need to 
bridge the language gap through the use of an interpreter. Attempts to 
employ Gujarati interviewers to overcome some of these difficulties 
ended in frustration (see Appendix I for a discussion of this issue). 
The difficulties that I experienced trying to persuade Gujarati students 
to take on the job of interviewing suggested that being a Gujarati may 
have given a researcher some advantages, for instance access to the 
language; but it could be disadvantageous, for instance such a person 
might be seen to compromise Gujarati social values. A few Muslims who 
tried to complete some interviews for me, struggled even more than I 
did. The Hindu interviewers worked with the support of the VHP and this 
undoubtedly helped them overcome the difficulties faced by people within 
a community gaining access to information that some regarded as private. 
Secondly, when I interviewed, with or without an interpreter, I could 
move from a Hindu to a Muslim respondent without offence being taken. 
Although respondents might have been suspicious of my motives, only time 
could prove them right or wrong. Furthermore, they could choose to 
conceal information from me without causing offence, knowing or 
believing that it would take me a long time to gain access to it. Had I 
been a Gujarati, this would not be true and I could gain access to it 
quickly. Since Gujaratis who belonged to this community would be seen as 
members of it first and foremost, it was more difficult for them to 
separate their roles as members from that of interviewers and have this 
recognised and accepted by members of the community. Therefore, I would 
argue being clearly not a Gujarati was an advantage when working in 
these close Gujarati communities. For instance there was an advantage in 
being able to make clear to respondents, whom I met for the first time, 
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that I was unaware of some critical piece of information. 
Thirdly, the tangibility of cultural boundaries between Gujaratis 
and the white community provided for this study of social movements with 
social markers which provided a social constructed separation between 
grassroots protest and leadership, the established political structures 
and the cross-cultural dimension. Fourthly, two different methods were 
used to collect data on social background, marriage patterns, religious 
beliefs and membership of religious organisations, caste associations 
and communities, friendship and social association, social class 
position and employment, political allegiances and opinions. These are 
participant observation and a questionnaire; they reflect aspects of 
anthropological and sociological approaches. In terms of the material 
collected they support and enrich one another. 
Fifthly, the collection and analysis of one set of data illustrates 
the combination of approaches well. The data are distinctive as it 
involves observation, the questionnaire and computer analysis. I have 
already made the point above that such data are not unique to social 
anthropology or sociology research. Observation allowed me to verify to 
an extent the complex and detailed data on patterns of social 
association, friendship and close friendship in particular which I 
collected by means of the questionnaire. On the one hand, the 
combination of methods of data collection and analysis enrich the data 
and give it a depth which sets it apart from the other data. On the 
other hand, these data in comparison with other data in the thesis are 
separated from it by virtue of the complexity and precision of computer 
analysis. If social networks are assumed to underpin the social 
structures of communities, then the collection of detailed data on 
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friendships becomes important. Furthermore, these data provided an 
important source of information about social identities. They provided 
concrete factual evidence which could be used to support data on 
perceptions of social distances between communities and ethnic groups. 
These data became the linchpin for the analysis of structures of 
leadership, because (a) they brought together diverse approaches, 
different methods of data collection with complex methods of data 
analysis, (b) they linked the overall analysis of the thesis, and (c) 
the collection of this data above other data required a crossing of 
cultures and an exchange of trust. 
This research takes as its analytical starting point lithe notion of 
a shared set of meanings and understandings ll , IIwhat it seeks to 
demonstrate and not what it is predicated on ll (Sharrock and Anderson, 
1982:133). They go on to argue that a researcher should concentrate upon 
II those th i ngs wh i ch a 11 ow him to act II . liThe idea of the actor as an 
interpretative actor does not require the attribution of shared 
meaningsll (Sharrock and Anderson,1982:133), which need to emerge from 
the analysis. Therefore, no attempt is being made to understand the 
meanings the Gujaratis attach to social actions, but to treat them as 
interpretive actors (see above). What is attempted is to explain their 
view of participation in a shared political process rather than to treat 
their interpretations as a form of causal attribution. This requires 
some knowledge of their social organisations and culture as well as some 
knowledge of the social constraints which form part of their social 
world, but I do not offer an interpretation or description of their 
culture or social meanings associated with it. Social network analysis 
allowed me to meet these rigorous principles for the understanding and 
interpretation of the views of actors and analyst. 
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Part III 
Thesis Contents 
Chapter 1 describes how Gujaratis, with other immigrants from New 
Commonwealth countries, came to Britain in the 1950s in search of work, 
rewards and security. Those who settled in Bolton formed the beginning 
of what became the largest ethnic minority in the town. This Chapter 
begins by describing their pattern of migration and settlement. Their 
socio-economic position is defined by their qualifications, the jobs 
and social class position and by the housing that was available to them. 
Like many immigrants, they sought jobs in occupation sectors and moved 
into housing areas that were to disadvantage them as a group. Economic 
recessions in the textile industry, their reliance on white people for 
employment contributed to their low social class standing. Their 
vulnerability to racial discrimination was made more apparent when other 
people in the town began to suffer from similar disadvantages, such as 
unemployment. Thus, they became a poor and powerless minority within 
Bolton's inner urban area. This Chapter sets the scene. 
The aim of Chapter 2 is to analyse the socio-religious structure of 
this minority and to analyse the roles of the religious organisations 
whose leaders have taken on political functions, thus providing bases 
for grassroots movements. It is divided into two parts: the first 
describes the Muslim communities and the second the Hindu communities. 
The growth and development of ethnic organisations representing 
communities within the Hindu and Muslim populations was a consequence 
of an existing commitment to social values and beliefs based on 
membership of factions, caste association/ communities and other 
religious organisations. In the 70s with the majority of Gujaratis 
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regarding communication as a barrier to participation in white political 
organisations, one alternative was for them to utilise their existing 
religious organisations as bases for political movements. The role of 
these organisations was to support social and religious values and 
beliefs, as well as to provide Gujaratis with ready-made structures of 
leadership and support. The changing role of the local CRC provided 
these leaders with access to an informal political arena in which they 
could develop their political skills and express opposition on behalf of 
their supporters to those in political control of the town. 
Chapter 3 concentrates on the social relationships of Gujaratis 
within and without their communities. Social networks form the basis of 
the social structure of their communities and provide the links that 
relate the individual to his socio-religious organisations and through 
them to the wider urban community. As such they are a social resource in 
that on the one hand, they provide access to knowledge about Gujaratis 
which can be made available or restricted, and on the other hand, may 
provide or restrict Gujaratis' access to members in other communities 
and through them to other scarce resources. The networks to which 
Gujaratis have any measurable access is not that of the networks of 
those in positions of power, political or financial, but their own 
personal social networks. Thus the emphasis is on friendship and 
particularly close friendship, because friendship is the one 
relationship which can cut across racial and social class divisions. As 
such it can reduce social differences. The analysis of close friends 
within social networks shows (1) to what extent Gujaratis are prepared 
to commit themselves to friendships with members of their own and other 
communities, and (2) to what extent they can obtain access to those 
with power in Bolton. 
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In Chapter 4 the idea that Gujaratis' knowledge of their own 
communities is a form of power is explored. Amongst Gujaratis cohesion 
depends upon two forms of social resources: the publicness of knowledge 
and the deployment of and access to this knowledge in the political 
arena. Knowledge of Gujarati organisations is recognised as important by 
Gujaratis who find themselves in the role of leaders, when they become 
aware of the political value of their vote to the white politicians and 
the increasing dependence of their supporters on local authority and 
national resources. They find themselves competing with disadvantaged 
and advantaged people from other communities for the same scarce public 
resources. One way for Gujarati leaders to control the balance between 
white politicians' eagerness to influence Gujarati voters and the access 
of the latter to scarce resources is to restrict the politicians' access 
to knowledge of Gujarati social organisation. This implies the 
management of perceptions of social distance. An analysis of perceptions 
of social distance reveals that it is not only ideas about whom a person 
can marry, who is acceptable as a close friend, ordinary friend or 
acquaintance, but it also leads to the definition of social boundaries 
between Gujarati communities, the us, and non-Gujaratis, the them. 
Using ideas within both white and their understanding of common sense 
racism (see definition in Part I above), Gujaratis and their leaders 
have established a broad set of strategies underpinning potential 
political alliances between themselves and leaders of other Asian and 
black communities. From the white political point of view essentially 
these beliefs are not political and should be given no political value. 
The aim of this Chapter is to analyse these perceptions, demonstrate how 
they have become embodied in a set of social labels, which in turn form 
a set of social identities that mark levels of meaning within a Gujarati 
53 
body of common sense racism. 
Chapter 5 builds on the previous Chapters in that it examines the 
inadequacies of the links between Gujarati leaders of socio-religious 
organisations and the formally elected white politicians. Without access 
to representation in formal political arenas, because they are not 
perceived to be a political group or a group within a political party, 
the Gujaratis see themselves as politically powerless. However, on the 
one hand, the white politicians need the Gujarati votes and Gujaratis 
are also showing themselves to be more assiduous voters than are white 
voters, and on the other hand, these voters are more easily identifiable 
than the white floating voters. Thus the politicians are caught in a 
dilemma: to control Gujarati demands for a greater share of scarce 
resources including participation in politics, they use the informal 
arena of the CRC for political debates with Gujarati leaders; but to 
obtain Gujarati votes, 
demands. This chapter 
they have to commit themselves to Gujarati 
sets the scene for the negotiations that took 
place between Gujaratis and the politicians for resources. 
Chapter 6 describes and analyses some of the events that bring 
Gujarati leaders and white politicians into confrontation. I use the 
term events to describe a series of grassroots movements which are based 
on changing alliances, real and fictitious, between Gujarati leaders and 
some times leaders of other minority communities with the express aim of 
defining support for claims to better access to scarce resources. These 
key events gave these leaders opportunities to make statements about 
the power relationship between themselves and their communities and the 
white politicians and the white community. The debates laid the basis 
for Gujaratis demands for resources and thus made political the needs of 
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this minority. It also demonstrates how through debate leaders and 
politicians negotiated definitions of the power relationship deploying 
the social identities of the participants in the events. The importance 
of Gujarati knowledge as a resource emerges as leaders bargain political 
support for access to resources. These movements taken together amount 
to an urban social movement. 
Finally, Chapter 7 continues with the analysis the consequences of 
the process of negotiation arising from the events. I argue that the 
attempts by the white politicians to attempt to control the Gujarati 
leaders is translated into party political competition for Gujarati 
votes. Therefore, the decisions arrived at by the politicians reflect a 
reluctance to admit Gujarati leaders into party politics or into the 
formal political arenas. This reluctance I suggest is a form of racism 
in politics. This Chapter will form the conclusion drawing together the 
argument that Gujaratis will experience difficulties in attempting to 
sustain grassroots protests on socio-religious bases which have no 
direct or concrete relationship with a recognised political base. 
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CHAPTER 1 
MIGRATION AND SETTLEMENT OF GUJARATIS IN BOLTON 1950 - 1976 
The aim of this Chapter is to define the socio-economic position of 
Gujaratis in Bolton in the early to middle 1970s, that is to set the 
scene in which the participants in ethnic politics lived. The argument 
is that the pattern of arrival of the Gujaratis enhanced their tendency 
to form small exclusive communities divided along social and religious 
lines, which generally were invisible to outsiders. As a whole they were 
perceived by members of the white community to be part of one, growing 
and visible immigrant community in the town. The characteristics of 
visibility and exclusiveness were expressed through skin colour and 
patterns of migration, employment and settlement. Some of these shared 
social characteristics act as identities around which migrants can form 
movements to express their dissatisfaction. This Chapter argues that 
these characteristics set apart the Gujarati communities from the main-
stream political parties and other communities in Bolton. 
This Chapter is divided into three sections: the first deals briefly 
with the migration of Gujaratis, the second examines their pattern of 
employment and the third analyses their pattern of settlement. 
Migration Patterns of Asians 
A four-stage historical model of South Asian migration to Britain 
has tended to dominate descriptions of migration and settlement (Brah, 
1982:12-26; Ballard.R and C, 1977:29-43). This model [1] distinguishes 
between four phases of settlement: firstly, settlement between the world 
wars; secondly, the demand for unskilled labour after the Second World 
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War; thirdly, consolidation of first generation migrant communities, and 
finally, the emergence of second generation British born children of 
migrants. The first phase saw the arrival of individual pioneers and 
pedlars who came here before and between the wars, the second phase 
begins with the end of the Second World War and the demand for unskilled 
labour, the third phase began about 1960 (for Sikhs) and saw the arrival 
of wives and children coming to join their husbands. The fourth phase 
began about 1970 and witnessed the emergence and growth of second 
generation British educated Asians moving away from inner urban areas 
into better housing areas (cf. Ballard R. and C,1977:21-22). By 
employing a diachronic model the aim is to convey an impression of 
change in the social, economic and political statuses of Sikh migrants, 
as they change from newly arrived migrants to English speaking settled 
people living in the outer urban housing areas. Although there is a 
tendency to endow this model with explanatory power, it simply offers a 
loose descriptive framework based on identifiable social characteristics 
associated with phases of settlement (cf.Reader,1964). For instance, 
the relationship between the growth of faction disputes and the phases 
of consolidation is associated with the third phase of settlement, since 
this was the period when ethnic organisations emerged alongside a growth 
in Asian community facilities and services (Ballard.R and C, 1977:39). 
However, with no clear guidelines exist on what to include and what to 
exclude, this model comprises a set of categories separated only by 
historical periods. To some extent it can be employed as evidence of the 
development of political awareness in minority communities (cf.Brah, 
1982). I shall use this model to provide an historical framework for 
organising the data on the Gujaratis and to allow for some comparisons 
to be made between Gujaratis and other migrants. 
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The First and Second Phases of Settlement of Gujaratis in Bolton (1950s 
to 1960s) 
Records of the First Phase of Asian settlements ln Bolton are 
fragmentary. The West Indians who came before 1950 fought for Britain in 
the Second World War. One of the town's first Asian families, the Deans, 
came from what is now Pakistan, arrived in the early 1930s. In the 1947 
Census a family with an Asian name was registered as living at 5, Henry 
Street, Bolton. Gujaratis began arriving in Bolton in the middle 50s 
along with other Asian migrants. Few Asians came to Bolton prior to 
1950, and the majority of those who did, appear to have been Pakistanis. 
Therefore, I am concerned with the second phase when Asians came to 
towns like Bolton, North-West of England, to seek employment in what was 
then a thriving textile industry. Because the indigenous workers did not 
want these jobs (Brah,1982:13), migrants experienced little difficulty 
finding work. Locally the textile industry had always been a large 
employer of women (Cohen & Jenner,1981:112-113), now as employers wanted 
to maintain high rates of production and pay low wages, they employed 
Asians, who were prepared to work unsociable hours, with relatively few 
skills. Although I have no information on the jobs these Gujaratis 
found, research suggests that the characteristics of jobs found by other 
immigrants required low skills, involved unsocial hours of work, working 
conditions were poor, work was repetitive, wages were low and employees 
required little training (Allen et al.,1977; Bohning,1981:33). Such jobs 
were typical of a semi-automated manufacturing industry such as 
textiles, which was able to utilise the skills offered by these 
migrants. Initially Asians settled in run-down and poor inner town areas 
close to the mills. 
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The 1961 Census provides scant information on migrants, as data on 
country of birth was not recorded, but it does provide some information 
on migrants who came from the ex-colonies. According to it the number of 
New Commonwealth immigrants living in Bolton comprised 534 men and 564 
women (OPCS,Census, 1961). This does not tally with the information held 
by the Local Authority Housing Department, which appears to be 
conservative recording only some 67 Asian dwellings (Table 1.1). There 
is no indication as to whether or not these Asians were Gujaratis. Only 
a small number of the sample came here during this phase of settlement: 
two were Muslims and three were Hindus and they accounted for 2% of the 
total sample (Table 1.2). 
Table 1.1: Dwellings occupied by Asians in Bolton 1956-71 
(Housing Department, Bolton Local Authority) 
1956 1959 1962 1965 1968 1971 
No. of Dwellings: 27 67 180 367 808 1211 
Though this pattern of migration and settlement of Gujaratis sampled 
reflects national trends, there are some differences. There are grounds 
for claiming that Bolton's nineteenth and early twentieth century 
trading links with India, based upon the import of raw cotton and later 
leather and the export of textiles and leather goods (Saxelby,1971:97), 
may account for it being selected by Gujaratis for settlement. Before 
the Second World War the textile industry experienced a recession 
brought about by a growth in the manufacture of textiles in Britain's 
colonies; locally the industry experienced major changes. For instance 
the closure of the coal mines, which provided the mills with a source of 
energy, forced mills to look to other forms of power. Nevertheless 
between 1956-1959 the textile industry enjoyed a revival and was looking 
more for workers. In general the rate of unemployment in the town rose 
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from 1% to 2.5%; although nationally it was slightly higher 
(Ogden,1966:Diagram 4). 
Towards the end of this phase the local textile industry experienced 
another and more sustained recession. The 1959 Cotton Act, which was 
intended to rationalise and revitalise this industry, set in motion the 
large scale closure of mills with outdated machinery (Joint Working on 
Structure Plans in Greater Manchester Employment Sub Group,1972: Para. 
2.2). The mills which survived this Act were encouraged to install new 
machinery at considerable expense. This Act resulted in the closure of 
over a fifth of the textile mills in Lancashire, and Bolton was 
particularly badly affected. It also affected other textile dependent 
industries. For instance many engineering firms that made textile 
machinery had to diversify and the surviving mills had to do likewise. 
Thus, for complex reasons there was no shortage of jobs in the town for 
a period of time (Ogden,1966:4). 
During this period of migration men came alone. Their aim was to 
accumulate sufficient money to return home and purchase a business or 
land. However, few achieved this aim and many who came alone brought 
over their wives and children a few years later. For those who came 
to save money the difficulty of earning sufficient money to save some, 
the changing value of money both in Britain and India and the expense of 
living here combined to change this ideal into a myth (cf.Anwar,1979). 
Most failed to reckon on the pressures that make such a short term plan 
of migration difficult to execute (Bohning,1981:36-37). However, the 
"myth of return" far from being a temporary ideal associated with the 
first stage of migration, became an important and achievable goal for 
those who live here. 
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The Third Phase of Settlement (1960s to 1970s) 
This is described as the period of consolidation, when migrants 
were jOined by their wives and families (Ballard.R and C,1977:35). The 
majority of Gujaratis came during this phase and the number of Asian 
dwellings in the town rose from 67 to over 808 (Table 1.1). This phase 
associates the growth of these communities with the emergence of ethnic 
identities in political arenas, education institutions and employment 
(Ballard.R and C.,1977). Over half (55.8%) of the sample came here in 
this period (Table 1.2) and the majority of them were able to find work 
in the mills. This suggests that firstly, jobs were available in the 
textile industry during the period between 1950 and 1960 for reasons 
given above (Introduction Part 1 above), and secondly jobs available a 
decade later still demanded little skill and little knowledge of 
English. Neither employers nor workers sought to increase the skills 
they looked for or improve those they offered. 
Table 1.2: Analysis of Sample by Phase of Settlement* 
Phase Muslim % Hindu % Totals % 
1970-76 III 30 28.85 78 50.65 108 41.86 
1960-69 II 71 68.27 73 47.4 144 55.81 
1956-59 I 2 1.92 3 1.95 5 1.94 
No Answer 1 0.96 1 0.39 
Totals: 104 100.00 154 100 258 100 
* The fieldwork was completed in July 1976. 
In the space of relatively short period the Asian population grew 
rapidly from a few hundred in the previous decade to over 3050 (OPCS, 
Sample Census,1966). Although politicians assumed that migrants such as 
Gujaratis would assimilate into the white communities, the likelihood of 
this occurring diminished as they experienced secondary socialisation. A 
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reason for this is that they were still intent on returning home to 
Gujarat once they had saved enough money. As they gradually began to 
commit themselves to living permanently in Britain, they participated ln 
the community activities that promoted the development of Gujarati 
social identities and social values (cf.Bohning,1981:35). Over time they 
became aware of a new set of deprivations, such as the lack of a TV, and 
a car, which is a consequence of that "unsocial game between standard of 
living and the cost of living in a post-industrial society" (Bohning, 
1981:35). Mr Jenkins, then Home Secretary, argued "against the notion of 
'assimilation' but in favour of 'integration'" (Brah,1982:15). Meanwhile 
Asian culture became established through the performance of religious 
rituals, availability of Asian foods, clothing and the consolidation of 
the family and social networks of friends (Brah, 1982:17; Ballard.R and 
C, 1977:37-39). Furthermore Asians began to discover for themselves the 
salience of ethnic solidarity. They became politically aware of the need 
to unionise through the efforts of the Indian Workers Association 
(John,1969:135ff) and a number of industrial disputes served to 
reinforce this awareness, for instance strikes at Mansfield Hosiery and 
Imperial Typewriters. 
The Fourth Phase of Settlement - 1970s to 1977 
Between 1970 and 1977 some 3492 Asian migrants came to Bolton and 
3422 (98%) of these came directly from Gujarat, North West India, which 
was and still remains one of the main migrant sending areas (Banton, 
1972:137; Rose et al, 1969:57-58). From their names it is possible to 
identify the majority (93%) of them as Gujaratis. As they recognised a 
common social identity based upon a common origin, a common culture and 
language, they can be defined as an ethnic group (Wallman, 1979; 
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Lyon,1972/73; Desai,1963). 
The pattern of migration of Gujaratis to Bolton can be likened to a 
steady stream with two high points: one in 1972 and one in 1976. Overall 
figures for new migrants who gave Bolton as their destination to 
immigration officials indicate that the numbers of male and female 
migrants rose slightly from 22% to 33% and from 34% to 51% respectively, 
but that the numbers of children declined from 42% to 15% (Table 1.3). 
These fluctuations should be seen against a background of an overall 
drop in the numbers of migrants entering Britain. Although this pattern 
of migration is in keeping with the fourth phase of migration which 
predicted a rise in the number of wives and children (Bohning,1981:37), 
there is a local difference, namely the decrease in the number of 
children that came here. It is difficult to separate adults from 
children in migration records, but where it is possible data indicate 
that most migrants were adult men and women, children forming a small 
group of dependents. This suggests that most migrants who came were 
either single men in their late twenties to forties and women, who were 
either fiancees or wives coming to join husbands. Generally, this 
analysis confirms the view that migration offered them opportunities to 
re-establish themselves. 
Table 1.3: New Migrants who gave Bolton as their Destination [2] 
Year of Males Females Children [3] Totals % 
Arrival % % % 
1970 78 22.61 119 34.49 148 42.9 345 100 
1971 118 25 201 42.58 153 32.42 472 100 
1972 239 39.24 272 44.66 98 16.1 609 100 
1973 139 32.63 181 42.49 106 24.88 426 100 
1974 101 33.78 124 41.47 74 24.75 299 100 
1975 145 36.71 165 41. 77 85 21. 52 395 100 
1976 227 42.27 229 42.65 81 15.08 537 100 
1977 138 33.74 209 51.10 62 15.16 409 100 
Totals 1185 33.93 1500 42.96 807 23.11 3492 
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These data show that Gujarati migrants were coming here mainly from 
the Indian subcontinent and in smaller numbers from other ex-British 
colonies. More detailed analysis reveals that many migrants who came 
from Uganda either before 1972 or during 1972, but who were not part of 
the process of resettlement, could settle wherever they chose. Those who 
came as part of the resettlement scheme were initially compulsorily 
settled. If the figures for migration are analysed in terms of the 
countries of last residence, then the data show that just over half of 
all migrants who gave Bolton as their destination at Heathrow came 
directly from India, the others coming from Uganda, the Rest of Africa 
and Pakistan (Table 1.4). In addition to Gujaratis, a number of those 
who came from Uganda and the rest of Africa included Pakistanis and 
Sikhs. The only year when the number of migrants emigrating from Uganda 
was greater than those from the other three countries was 1972, which 
was the year of mass migration of Ugandan Asians. Though these data do 
not take account of internal migration of Asians within Britain, they 
provide evidence that Bolton's Asian population is predominantly of 
Indian and Gujarati origin. 
Table 1.4: Migration of Asians by Country of Last Residence 
Year of Uganda Rest of Pakistan India* Totals 
Arrival Africa 
1970 9 50 81 205 345 
1971 18 99 66 289 472 
1972 333 64 51 161 609 
1973 80 86 42 218 426 
1974 6 90 17 186 299 
1975 7 112 50 226 395 
1976 1 148 113 275 537 
1977 1 48 129 231 409 
Totals 455 697 549 1791 3492 
% 13.03 19.96 15.72 51.29 100 
*These figures include 17 migrants from Bangladesh as we 11 as a few 
Gujarati migrants who came from Burma. 
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Some evidence of the religious composition of these refugees is 
reflected in the origins of the respondents: the majority were Hindus 
(60.4%) as compared to a minority (21.2%) of Muslims (Table 1.5). 
Although most of the Hindus in the sample came here between 1970 - 1976 
(Table 1.2), it is difficult to separate the refugees who came in 1972 
from others who fled Uganda either before or after this date. For those 
who came in 1972, the reception they received was hostile with the local 
media reporting the fears of the white community at being swamped 
(Chap.6). These data suggest that the Gujaratis who came here had a 
clear idea of where they intended to settle initially (immigration 
procedures required that migrants gave addresses of houses to which 
they would go). As regards the Ugandan Gujaratis this would appear to 
contradict the findings of Bristow (1979:206), but an explanation for 
this may be that Bolton was not singled out to provide for those being 
settled (see also Ward,1973: 374-376). With the economic recession 
deepening, a popular view which drew upon ideas that these migrants 
would take jobs away from white workers, be allocated housing intended 
for the needy, and the presence of their children in schools would 
adversely affect the level of educational attainment of white children 
(Brah,1982: 20), served to increase the level of racial hostility in the 
town and the country generally (cf.Moore,1975). From accounts in the 
national and local press the white response to the arrival of Asians 
here was little different to that which they received elsewhere. 
Locally, hostility was further exacerbated by the continuing recession 
in industry generally and the textile industry in particular, which in 
turn effected the prosperity of other associated industries reducing the 
number of jobs available to those looking for work with few skills and 
qualifications. Now those seeking work from all communities found 
themselves in competition for jobs and benefits. 
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Table 1.5: Countries from which Respondents came to the U.K. 
U.K. Indian African No Answer Totals 
Subcontinent Continent 
Hindus 2 55 93 4 154 
% 1.3 35.71 60.39 2.6 100% 
Muslims 13 68 22 1 104 
% 12.5 65.39 21.15 0.69 100% 
Totals 15 123 115 5 258 
% 5.82 47.67 44.57 1.94 100% 
Two factors dominated this phase; firstly there was the emergence of 
a second generation in the Asian communities (Ballard.R and C,1977:41), 
and secondly there were the measures taken to control immigration. 
The stringency of the latter were increased through the use of virginity 
testing, surveillance of couples in their first year of marriage and 
children being subjected to X-ray examinations to verify their ages 
(Brah,1982). This sedulous application of immigration rules by the Home 
Office led not only to an increase in the numbers of kin of local 
families being detained at detention centres, to the separation of 
families and heart-rending cases of deportation, but it also reinforced 
the fears amongst local Gujaratis that they were viewed by the 
Government as visitors. With the politicians seeing the reduction of the 
numbers of immigrants entering the country as the political key to 
controlling the vote and racism (Brah,1982:21; also Bohning,1981), some 
local Gujarati observers interpreted this as indicating that their 
position here was not as secure as they had believed. 
Origins of Gujarati Migrants 
Of the three forms of migration neither bloc nor individual 
migration are self-perpetuating, the former is a once-in-a-time 
migration of a large group of people, such as the refugees from East 
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Africa, and the latter depends upon individuals migrating at will. The 
characteristics of chain migration, the third form, are by definition 
self-perpetuating. Bohning does not make clear that chain migration is 
self-perpetuating and when it is placed in conjunction with a demand by 
post-industrial society for low-wage labour, the causes of the self-
perpetuation of the shortage of labour need to be separated from those 
that motivate the chain. When the labour shortage disappears, the chain 
will continue to deliver migrants into the country. Moreover, a chain 
can draw into its stream people who are related to members of the chain 
but who may have migrated at earlier times to other ex-colonies. Thus 
each chain has the potential to gather and disperse its members 
according to economic fortunes that determine its final points of 
deposition. A chain which brings particular individuals to Bolton may 
take some kin living in Africa to Canada and bring others from Burma 
back to Gujarat. Wherever the chain collects or deposits members, the 
identity of the members of the chain remains specific. 
A model of migration argues that in a liberal capitalist country 
which is committed to a policy of full employment and high real growth 
policies, labour shortages are resolved by bringing migrant workers who 
can fill the low-wage insecure jobs that require few skills. The 
consequences of this are that it initiates an unending and self-feeding 
stream of migrants (Bohning,1981:29). Although this model is used to 
explain polyannual migration to Britain from Europe, it has 
applicability to Gujarati migration. As Bohning points out the ideal 
form of migration that fits this model is chain migration (1981:34), 
which draws people from particular areas. He then points out that 
multiple chains form the self-feeding stream. The mechanics of chain 
migration have been described as a process by which one adult, usually a 
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male, migrates to a chosen country and town; establishes himself and 
then is joined by a brother, sister, wife, children or more distant kin 
(Watson,1977:189-190; Banton, 1972:128-131; MacDonald and MacDonald, 
1964:82). The chain is sustained by ties of kinship and marriage, which 
define the extent of the pool of potential migrants. In theory the chain 
ceases when there are no more kin to follow; in practice the chain is 
self-perpetuating. This model of migration can be used to explain 
Gujarati migration to Bolton. 
A consequence of this form of migration was the formation of isolated 
groups of Hindus or Muslims who came from the same village and district 
belonging to the same caste and sect, choosing to live close together 
and to keep in touch with each other. These groups form the foundation 
in a hierarchy of Gujarati communities (Table:1.6). Each chain in the 
collection of chains that comprises the Gujarati population is an 
embryonic community. By virtue of the fact that some chains are larger 
than others, the larger ones can assert their superiority over others by 
by generating sufficient funds to purchase property for use as religious 
or community centres, just as the Kutchis, Surtis and Baruchis have 
done. The overwhelming majority of the sample of 258 respondents traced 
their origins to districts in Gujarat, spoke Gujarati, patronised 
Gujarati owned shops and chose to live in areas where Gujaratis had 
settled. 
Hindus came from four main areas of Gujarat, namely Kutch, Kathiawar, 
Surat and Navsari: only four Patel families came from Petlad and Nadiad, 
and they describe themselves as IICharotar li Patels - the original elite 
group of Patels (Pocock, 1972:2). The few Hindu respondents (3%) who 
came from other states in India were educated men, most were marginal 
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men who avoided involvement in the Gujarati communities. One of them, 
the Sikh, became involved with the largest local Hindu organisation, the 
Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP) (Chaps. 2,5-7). By contrast the Muslims 
trace their origins primarily to two districts, Broach and Surat, with a 
few coming from Kathiawar (Table 1.5). One Muslim preferred to trace his 
origins to South Africa. Generally, Muslims give the appearance of 
being a more tightly knit group than Hindus. The consequences of shallow 
or deep chains are not only important for the analysis of settlement 
patterns (see below), but they are important for the analysis of the 
social networks of the Gujarati respondents (Chap.3), since the former 
determine the social boundaries of the primary section of the latter. 
Table 1.6: State and District of Origin of Respondents in Sample 
State District Religious Affiliations 
Hindu Mus 1 im Total 
Gujarat Kutch 49 49 
Kathiawar 14 7 21 
Ahmadabad 2 2 
Nadiad 2 2 
Pet lad 2 147 103 2 250 
Broach 57% 48 39.9% 48 96.9% 
Surat 33 48 81 
Navsari 42 42 
Daman 1 1 
Gujarat* 1 1 
Mombasa* 1 1 
Maharastra Bombay 2 2 
Sholapur 1 1 
Madya Indore 1 1 
Pradesh 
Andra Hyderabad 7 1 1 1 8 
Pradesh 2.7% 0.4% 3.1% 
Bengal Calcutta 1 1 
Bihar Patna 1 1 
Punjab 1 1 
Totals: 154 104 258 
% 59.69% 40.31% 100% 
* Districts of origin in Gujarat not specified by two respondents. 
(Hahlo,1983) 
Districts from which migrants came are represented here by a small or 
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large bundle of chains. A more detailed analysis of the actual number of 
chains represented by this sample has not been done, since this is not 
directly relevant to this thesis. What is implied is that the 
relationships between members of chains are defined in terms of certain 
common social identities. At one extreme Muslims and Hindus are divided 
by the social identities that link them to villages and districts, and 
at the other extreme are divided and united by a different set of 
social identities, such as Muslim or Hindu, caste and sect membership, 
Gujarati, Indian, and immigrant. Their identity as Gujaratis is based 
upon their ability to trace their ancestry to this state. Many years ago 
Desai remarked upon the strength of the linguistic regional identity 
that unites Gujaratis (1963:10-18,34,56). It is this shared origin that 
has contributed to Gujaratis forming an intra-dependent group within the 
local immigrant community. 
The change in their status from migrants to settlers locally 
coincided with the development of specific community identities and with 
the Gujaratis emerging as the dominant minority. Some indication of the 
stability of this Gujarati settlement can be ascertained from the length 
of time that the respondents had lived here [5]. Some 43% of the sample 
had lived here for nine or more years and 90% had lived here for two or 
more years (Table 1.7). The impression given is that they form an 
established community or rather, on closer observation, a collection of 
Table 1.7 Length of Residence of Gujarati Respondents in Bolton 
Date of Length 
Arrival Residence 
1975--76 1 - present 
1971--74 5 - 2 years 
1968--70 8 - 6 years 
1962--67 14 - 9 years 
1956--61 20 - 14 years 
Totals: 
No.of 
Respondents 
25 
70 
51 
98 
14 
258 
70 
% Cumulative 
9.69 
27.13 
19.77 
37.98 
5.43 
100 
% 
100 
90.31 
63.18 
43.41 
5.43 
o 
communities. As their numbers grew in size, they attracted more 
Gujaratis to Bolton (Desai 1963:31-35). Thus sharing the experience of 
migration, a general social identity as an immigrant, a specific social 
identity as a member of a chain of migrants, contributed to Gujaratis 
translating their social identities into political realities through 
their search for work and housing (see below), facilities to practice 
their religions (Chap.2), develop social identities as communities 
(Chaps.3,4) and a political voice (Chaps.5-7). 
Reasons for Coming to Bolton 
The first step in the migration process is deciding to migrate and 
the second is to establish the purpose; one aim is to obtain a job, 
which, 
Whilst 
it is believed, will be an improvement on one's present 
there is some substance in the idea that migrants believe 
job. 
that 
they are migrating to a country where success is likely to be within 
their grasp (Dorson,1959), the realities of the practicalities of the 
immigration process require that they establish more concrete reasons 
for migrating, such as establishing a house to go to, learning from kin 
that housing and jobs are available, and believing that one's life style 
is likely to improve (White and Woods,1980:7; Anwar,1979:21). This 
implies that it is essential to maintain contact with kin resident in 
the receiving country who can provide the appropriate information. 
Decisions to migrate are not determined by such simple messages alone; 
the receiving country has to make explicit its demand for migrants. 
Therefore, a more structured approach to constructing a theory of 
migration might argue that a receiving society needs to have a liberal 
capitalist structure, be committed to full employment and high real 
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growth policies. Such a society will experience shortages of labour in 
socially undesirable and low-wage jobs, which it will try to meet by 
encouraging the migration of foreign workers. The consequence of this 
would be that no internal solution is found to resolve the labour 
shortages, which becomes part of the structure. Thus the migration chain 
becomes an unending and self-feeding process (Bohning,1981:29). 
Evidence in support of the argument for a self-feeding process of 
migration shows how Gujaratis continued to come here, even though the 
employment situation was worsening. The relationship between migration 
and unemployment is not as clear for Gujaratis as it is for West Indians 
(Peach,1978/79:40-44). It has been suggested that for Gujaratis living 
in Blackburn an inverse relationship holds between in-migration and 
unemployment (Robinson, 1980). In Bolton the number of male migrants 
arriving matched the rise in unemployment generally and particularly in 
the minority itself. With the recession the attraction of potential job 
opportunities linked to a better style of life should have diminished. 
Table 1.8 shows how the numbers of Asian immigrants coming here between 
1970-1977 increased as the percentage of gross unemployed rose. Though 
good employment prospects strengthen the attraction, poor prospects do 
not undermine them. This analysis shows how over a period of three 
years the self-feeding chains continued to draw people into Bolton, 
although the employment prospects for migrants worsened, unemployment 
becoming a feature of working life. This partly supports the argument 
that an existing Gujarati population attracts Gujaratis (Desai,1963:17), 
irrespective of real employment prospects. It partly confirms Bohning's 
(1981) argument that only political legislation can stop the self-
feeding processes of migration. 
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Table 1.8: Number of Asian Immigrants who gave Bolton as their Place of 
Destination in relation to Unemployment 
Year of Males* Gross Ethnic Arrival % Unemployment [6] Unemployment [7] 1970-71 78 22.61 3.9 
1971-72 118 25.00 3.9 
1972-73 239 39.24 4.8 
1973-74 139 32.63 3.6 
1974-75 101 33.78 3.5 3.8 109 1975-76 145 36.71 5.3 6.0 232 1976-77 227 42.27 7.0 10.3 445 
*These numbers and percentages are taken from Tab le 1. 2 above. 
The Gujarati population expanded in size from approximately 3050 
people in 1966 to about 14,000 by 1977 (Table 1.9) and by 1984 to about 
20,000 (District Trends,1984:10). Most researchers agree that the 
largest community comprises Gujaratis (Hahlo,1980:296; Sherrington, 
n.d.; Hill, 1977:14,54 [8]). During the third phase of settlement this 
population more than trebled in size: Bolton had became a Gujarati 
centre. Without an accurate breakdown of the religious composition of 
the Gujarati population, a way to arrive at an idea of its composition 
is to bring together a number of sources of evidence: Census data, 
Heathrow immigration lists, BCCR Area Profiles, various small surveys 
(Sherrington n.d; Hill 1977), and the impressions of officers in the 
BCCR. Observers agree that Muslims outnumber Hindus. During the 1970s 
the former were estimated as comprising about 7,000 and the latter 6,000 
individuals. Since then these numbers have increased and presently these 
two communities number about 9,000 and 8,000 people respectively. 
Table 1.9: Population of Bolton Metropolitan Borough (Area Profile 
1977, Bolton Council for Community Relations) 
British Citizens 
Indians (primarily 
Pakistanis 
Bangladeshis 
West Indians 
Others 
Totals: 
(white) 
Gujaratis) 
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No. 
250,950 
13,000-14,000 ) 
1,000 ) 
50 ) 
1,000 ) 
1, 000 ) 
268,000 - 267,000 
% 
93.28 
6.72 
100% 
Employment 
Any analysis of Gujarati employment and housing needs to be done 
against this background of a population fed by the continuous arrival of 
new migrants either as migrants, fiancees, fiances or children. As 
Bohning rightly observes that governmental legislation is one way in 
which these migration chains can be controlled (1981:34). Nevertheless, 
"over time, foreign workers become a more and more indispensable part of 
the labour force of post-industrial societies unless their employment is 
curtailed by political act" (Bohning, 1981: 34). Initially both male and 
female Gujaratis became an indispensable part of the local labour force 
along with white women. Yet some 20 years later the Gujaratis still 
depend upon low skilled, low-waged and undesirable jobs in a shrinking 
job market, while white women, irrespective of qualifications, search 
for jobs even though they are still low-paid and low skilled. After this 
research was completed the Government introduced further legislation to 
control immigration; to an extent this has reduced the self-feeding 
process of the chains. 
For a chain to be self-feeding the implications are that, once the 
opportunities for jobs decreases, other motivating reasons for 
migrating will continue to attract prospective migrants, for instance 
knowledge of the availability, real or assumed, educational 
opportunities. These attractions add to the imagery of opportunity. Some 
57% of Muslims and Hindus sampled were drawn to Bolton having been 
informed of possibly the availability of jobs, an improved style of life 
or the attractions of a growing Gujarati community (Table 1.10). They 
were not asked why they came to Britain, as this, I was informed, might 
have raised their suspicions about this research (see Appendix I). 
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However, a survey in nearby Blackburn revealed that for a predominantly 
Gujarati Muslim population, the main reason given for coming here was 
to improve their life-style and work opportunities. The main reason for 
choosing to settle in Blackburn was to join their families (Townson and 
Moorhouse, 1979:13, Tables A2 and A3). For Bolton's Gujaratis joining 
their families who were living here (57%) was a greater priority than 
finding a job (19%). 
Table 1.10: Reasons given by Respondents for Coming to Bolton 
Reasons Hindus % Mus 1 ims % Total % 
Sample 
Kin & family 95 61.7 51 49.0 146 56.59 
Friends 26 16.9 16 15.4 42 16.28 
Gujarati Community 3 1.9 5 4.8 8 3.10 
Job Opportunities 27 17.5 23 22.1 50 19.38 
Religious 
Opportunities 1 1.0 1 0.39 
College Education 2 1.3 4 3.8 6 2.32 
Availability of 
Housing 1 1.0 1 0.39 
No particular 
reason 1 0.6 3 2.9 4 1. 55 
Totals: 154 100% 104 100% 258 100% 
(Hah 10, 1983) . 
Some 50% of the Blackburn sample heard about their present jobs 
through friends (Townson and Moorhouse, 1979:21, Table A16) as compared 
with 32% of Gujaratis sampled who heard about them from kin or friends. 
The majority (37%) of the respondents heard about their present jobs 
through advertisements (Table 1.11) as compared with 5% in the Blackburn 
sample. For Gujaratis there were other attractions, such as joining an 
expanding Gujarati population, a belief in job opportunities and/or an 
improved life style. They were young with young families and therefore 
could look forward to a better life with good job prospects. The average 
mean age for the Hindu men was 32.6 years and for the Muslim men 38.6 
years. Most of them came already married and keen to find work, so that 
they could bring over their families later on. 
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Table 1.11: How Respondents found their Present Jobs 
Hindus Mus 1 ims Total 
No % No % No % 
Kin 17 11.04 14 13.46 31 12.02) 
Close friends 16 10.39 5 4.81 21 8.14) 32.2% 
Ordinary Friends 13 8.44 18 17.31 31 12.02) 
Advertisements 53 34.41 42 40.38 95 36.82 
Promotion 1 0.65 4 3.85 5 1.94 
Labour Exchange 5 3.25 3 2.88 8 3.10 
Went to Door 1 0.65 1 0.96 2 0.77 
No answer 48 31.17 17 16.35 65 25.19 
Totals: 154 100% 104 100% 258 100% 
Some arguments regarding occupations and employment of minorities 
assume that work is always available however low-paid, insecure or 
dirty. Others offer explanations as to why migrants cannot obtain jobs 
commensurate with their skills and qualifications, or why, once they 
have lived here for some time, they cannot improve their job 
opportunities (Braham, Pearn and Rhodes,1981). Still others suggest that 
racism is part of the ideology of capitalism in Britain and that this 
accounts for immigrants only being able to find jobs that are poorly 
paid, insecure and rejected by white indigenous workers (Miles,1982). 
These explanations recognise the low skills of immigrants and the 
characteristics of the jobs available to them. Most Asians came here 
with few skills or qualifications (Wright, 1968:34-5); and the Gujaratis 
who came here are no exception (Hahlo, 1980). Only 1.6% (4) Gujaratis 
sampled, all Hindus, claimed to have had no schooling. The majority of 
respondents (74.03%), that is 88.5% of Muslims and 64.3% of Hindus, had 
attended school but had no experience of education beyond secondary 
school level (Hahlo, 1980:304). A distinction needs to be drawn between 
the attraction of these workers to job shortages and the self-feeding 
properties of migration chains. Once the need for labour disappears, 
then the place of self-feeding chains bringing more migrants into the 
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job market has applicability only to Government legislation to control 
it. Any difficulties experienced by immigrants in finding jobs need to 
be explained by using other models, such as the dual labour market 
model, which shows how racial discrimination can become a device for 
allocating a reduced number of jobs to an increasing number of 
applicants (Blackburn and Mann,1981a). During the 1950s when there was 
full employment, Gujaratis accepted jobs that others who were white or 
better qualified were not prepared to accept. Better jobs were not 
available to them, because employers discriminated against them (Cohen 
and Jenner, 1981:112-113,122). A decade or two later they compete for 
similar jobs, but now racial discrimination contributes to their not 
being offered them. 
There is evidence to support these explanations. For instance the 
textile industry was the biggest employer of women in Bolton; some 38.4% 
of women were employed in the textile mills in 1959. Although this 
percentage was reduced by 1965 to 26% owing to the drastic closure of 
mills, the industry was still the largest employer of women. By 1971 the 
retail distributive business had become the biggest employer of women 
(19.4%) and only 15.04% were employed in the textile mills (Ogden,1966: 
Tables 2,3 and 4). Over the same period of time male employment in the 
mills was reduced from 19.94% in 1959 to 11.43% in 1965 and to 9.79% in 
1971. The mills employed more women than men. Although the data does not 
distinguish between white and New Commonwealth women, it is probably 
reasonable to assume that most of these women were white. 
In the 1970s white women and Gujarati men could still find employment 
in this industry, but the numbers of white male workers had decreased, 
suggesting that the work was no longer considered desirable. In part an 
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explanation for this can be attributed to the history of the industry, 
the monotony of the work, the conditions in which people worked, the 
poor pay and the increasing vulnerability of the industry to the effects 
of the local and national recessions. An explanation for the reduction 
in the numbers of women workers a decade later can be explained by the 
closure of mills and by a change of attitude which suggested that mill 
work for women was not seen as desirable. Thus, to a limited extent 
opportunities increased for Gujaratis to find unskilled and low skilled 
work in the mills. As women become less dependent upon this industry for 
employment, the offering of these jobs to Gujaratis by employers can be 
taken as an exercise in their preference for the next available source 
of reserve labour. 
For Gujaratis their commitment to their chains and through them to 
their communities takes priority over market forces. Their commitment 
to their community identity takes precedence over other social 
identities (Chap.4). This emerges from the following analysis of their 
occupational mobility. An analysis of the occupations of respondents 
reflects the range of occupations they held (Table 1.12). The majority 
of the sample held jobs in the textile industry (49%); this being the 
industry that first offered them jobs and it was also the industry with 
Table 1.12: Occupations of Respondents 
Occupational Category 
Professional 
Self-Employed 
Clerical 
Textiles 
Engineering 
Transport 
Other 
Students/Apprentices 
Unemployed/Retired 
No Answer 
Total: 
(Hahlo,1983). 
Total 
9 
22 
10 
126 
25 
15 
14 
23 
13 
1 
258 
78 
% 
3.49 
8.53 
3.88 
48.84 
9.69 
5.81 
5.43 
8.91 
5.04 
0.39 
100.01% 
which they were most familiar. Gujarat had and has a developing textile 
industry. Five of sampled who held professional jobs were not Gujaratis, 
one was a Sikh, a lecturer, four who came from other states in India 
included three doctors and an engineer. Generally this pattern of 
employment is typical of Asian workers in other textile towns, for 
instance Bradford (Allen et al,1977:58; Table 2.14). 
For Gujaratis the mills offered night shift work as well as day shift 
work, some offering variations such as multi-shift and continental shift 
work. Apart from the familiarity of Gujaratis with this industry, work 
in the mills offered some positive advantages: firstly, night shift work 
was better paid than day shift work; secondly, Gujaratis could work with 
mainly Gujaratis and other Asians, 
the majority of the workers could 
such as Pakistanis, which meant that 
speak languages with which they were 
familiar; thirdly, they did not need to interact with certain others at 
work, particularly white workers, with the result that the most social 
important interactions occur outside the place of work; fourthly, the 
work itself required only minimal commitment, and finally, the work 
contracts were sufficiently simple and immediate, that to break a 
contract was as easy for the employer as it was for the employee. The 
combination of these features of work in this industry appealed to the 
Gujarati work ethic. Mill work allowed them to maintain the social ties 
which they valued most, that is to their kin and friends in Bolton, 
Britain and India. Mill work was viewed by white workers as no longer 
desirable, because it is associated with old ideas about working class 
work, long hours, poor conditions of work, low pay, little job security 
and few transferable skills. However, for Gujaratis its advantages 
balanced, if not outweighed, its disadvantages. The greatest advantage 
was that they could continue to maintain strong ties with their 
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communities at home and abroad. 
This commitment to their communities may have overridden an incentive 
on their part to improve their job prospects. Racial discrimination may 
also account for such a commitment, since it provides Gujaratis with a 
way of coping and living with racism. When Gujaratis in the sample were 
questioned about their job prospects, they showed little inclination to 
express intentions to seek promotion, or to change their jobs for better 
ones (Table 1.13). Some 60% of the sample did not wish to change their 
jobs, even though many informed me that they experienced racism at work. 
Only 21.3% expressed a wish to change their jobs for other jobs and a 
further 12% said that they would like better jobs, but did not specify 
what these might be. The large percentage of respondents who expressed 
a preference for remaining in their jobs can be explained in part by 
the freedom it gives them to maintain community ties and in part by an 
adaptation to conditions in which they have learnt to avoid the worst 
effects of racism. 
Table 1.13: Occupational Ambitions of Respondents 
Occupations 
Remain in same occupation 
Change to a new specified occupation 
Change to a better job (unspecified) 
Don't know 
No Answer 
Totals 
(Hahlo,1983). 
Total 
156 
55 
31 
6 
10 
258 
% 
60.46 
21.32 
12.02 
2.32 
3.88 
100% 
The suggestion that Gujaratis who favour work in the textile 
industry might transfer to alternative but similar work in other 
industries, were it available, is unconvincing (Cohen and Jenner, 1981: 
122). In part this has been and still is difficult, because there is 
little transferability of skills from the textile to other industries. 
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In part, and more importantly, the reason is that the characteristics 
of the work that the Gujaratis favoured were not related to the work 
itself but to the conditions of work. Such explanations as that 
offered by Cohen and Jenner take insufficient account of the 
individual's abilities to make decisions within the context of their own 
cultural values (Kosmin,1979; Allen et al,1977). Rather they tend to 
emphasise overall determining factors like racism. A more plausible 
explanation which does not contradict these arguments, but in the 
context offers a more satisfactory explanation, is that by 1976 
Gujarati men were experiencing the effects of working in a declining 
industry. Their own preferred work ethic were best suited to a 
situation when redundancies and unemployment are uncommon occurrences 
for low paid unskilled workers. Initially the social characteristics of 
their work ethic were self-determined, but a decade later they became 
part of the way of working life in the industry experiencing a 
recession. The recession did not encourage them to acquire new skills. 
Rather the reverse; the trend amongst respondents was to remain in the 
same job (60%). Only 12% indicated a desire to move to another job, and 
they could not think of a job to which they would like to move. This 
suggests apathy or a sense of loss of control over their lives. 
When those who expressed a desire to change their jobs were asked 
to explain why they would not achieve their ambitions, their replies 
suggested that the main single reason was a lack of training and racial 
discrimination (Table 1.14). A further 18% of replies implied that some 
combination of racism with a lack of training, spoken English or 
experience would explain their lack of success. Another 11% indicated 
that a lack of training in conjunction with a lack of experience or 
spoken English accounted for their lack of success. These data show that 
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Gujaratis are aware of racism and to an extent they are also aware of 
their own deficiencies in terms of skills within the job market. However 
they committed themselves to an industry that became increasingly 
vulnerable to the consequences of recessions, to jobs that remain low-
paid and insecure, to a style of work that did not improve their 
employment prospects or careers, and if anything made them even more 
vulnerable to unemployment and poverty. 
Table 1.14: Reasons given by Respondents for being unable to achieve the 
Jobs they desire 
Lack of training 
Spoken English 
Experience 
Education 
Racial discrimination 
Combinations: 
Totals 
14 
9 
6 
1 
13 
% 
22.95 
14.75 
9.84 
1. 64 
21. 31 
Lack of training and spoken English 3 4.92) 
Lack of training and experience 1 1.64) 11.48% 
Lack of spoken English and experience 3 4.92) 
Lack of training and racial discrimination 5 8.2 ) 
Lack of spoken English and racial ) 18.04% 
discrimination 2 3.28) 
Lack of experience and racial discrimination _4~ ____ 6~.5~6~)_ 
Tot a 1 s =-61"'--_1:0:....>0<-"'0'-'-. =-0 1~% 
(Hahlo,1983). 
Consequences of this work ethic were apparent by 1976. Gujaratis were 
prepared to accept being put at risk of poverty by breaking work 
contracts, when it was convenient to do so, such when visiting family in 
India. On their return they would wait until they could obtain another 
job in the mills. Being out of work meant that they became dependent 
upon the welfare system for support. As the decline in work 
opportunities in the North West increased, poverty and unemployment 
became common experiences for them. It ensured that they became major 
competitors for welfare benefits along with the growing numbers of 
indigenous workers and school leavers. Thus by 1976 Gujarati communities 
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had become familiar with the politics of poverty and powerlessness. 
Within the next decade they began experiencing particularly high rates 
of unemployment, for instance in August 1982 25% were registered as 
unemployed (District Trends, 1987: 13). Their social identity as 
immigrants and their place within the social class structure as defined 
by their occupations provided the Gujaratis with a firm social basis 
within Bolton society. All that they required to form a recognisable 
social movements was a spatial and political base spatially. 
Residential Settlement Patterns of Gujaratis in Bolton 
The aim of this section is to identify those factors effecting the 
Gujaratis' patterns of settlement, which increased their visible 
association with certain social and economic disadvantages. During the 
first stages of settlement the Gujaratis moved into inner town houses 
vacated by owners, moving to better housing further out of town. In 
response to the growing demand from immigrants for housing, these owners 
could rent or sell them at inflated prices. The demand for housing 
brought Gujaratis into the inner urban areas, and the pattern by which 
they purchased property contributed to their clustering in these 
neighbourhoods. Although initially they had to purchase property from 
white owners, those who came later preferred to buy or rent houses from 
Gujaratis (cf.Desai,1963:17,34). Newly arrived immigrants went to houses 
owned by kin. Thus kinship obligations and social necessity contributed 
to the pooling resources to purchase the next family owned home. As 
more members of the chain arrived they could repeat the process, thus 
extending their ownership of property as a family. This preferential 
form of expansion together with availability of housing led to Gujaratis 
becoming the main inner town residents and home owners. 
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Initially, these Gujaratis acquired property as tenants or lodgers, 
but ownership was the preferred form of occupation. The pattern of 
occupation shows how strong was the desire of Gujaratis to possess their 
own homes. By the time the respondents had moved to the houses in which 
they were interviewed, a space of four to five years, the number of 
tenants/lodgers had dropped from 37.99% (Table 1.15) to 10.86% (Table 
1.16) and owner occupiers had increased from 32.56% to 63.95%. The 
rise of 5% of Hindus and 9% of Muslims living with their families to 34% 
(Hindus) and 12% (Muslims) can be accounted for by the rising numbers of 
new dependents coming here. In Table 1.15 42.9% of Hindus were 
tenants/lodgers as compared with less than a third (30.8%) of Muslims. A 
possible explanation for this difference might be that the latter 
recognise their obligations to a wider group of kin than do the former. 
Table 1.15: Type of Occupancy of Respondents in their previous Houses 
prior to the purchase of the present Homes 
Status 
Owner 
Member of family 
Relative 
Lodger/tenant 
Respondent not in UK[9] 
No Answer 
Totals 
(Hahlo,1983). 
Hindus 
N % o. 
43 27.9 
8 5.2 
7 4.6 
66 42.86 
21 13.6 
9 5.8 
154 99.9 
Muslims 
N % o. 
41 39.42 
9 8.65 
1 0.96 
32 30.77 
11 10.58 
10 9.62 
104 100 
Totals 
N % o. 
84 32.56 
17 6.59 
8 3.10 
98 37.99 
32 12.40 
19 7.36 
258 100 
Table 1.16: Type of Occupancy of Respondents in their Present Homes 
Status Hindus Mus 1 ims Totals 
No. % No. % No. % 
Owner 84 54.54 81 77.9 165 63.95 
Member of owner's 
fam; ly 52 33.57 13 12.5 65 25.19 
Lodger/tenant 
(not Council) 18 11.69 8 7.69 26 10.08 
Tenant-Council 2 1.9 2 0.78 
Totals 154 100 104 100 258 100 
(Hahlo,1983). 
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In a survey carried out by Bolton Planning Department (1976), various 
wards in the Metropolitan Borough are ranked in terms of twenty-two 
indicators separated into nine broad areas: housing, health, race, 
education, culture, social crises, age structures, employment and 
mobility. On the basis of these indicators, the wards of the town could 
be compared and ranked into three categories: "average and above", 
"below average", and "poor". The poor wards are Bradford, Derby, Church, 
East, North, Farnworth North and South, which excluding Farnworth, are 
town centre wards (Map 1). The wards with below average scores are Darcy 
Lever-cum-Breightmet, Great Lever, Halliwell, Rumworth, Tonge (and 
Farnworth South East and South West). The remaining wards in the borough 
are ranked as average or above average on their scores. When the 
locations of the minority communities generally and the sample in 
particular are plotted, their findings demonstrate that the Gujaratis 
sampled had settled in the poor inner city wards. The social 
characteristics of these wards include not only a high ethnic minority 
population, but also a high number of elderly, single parents and 
unemployed. Here more houses lack facilities like baths, there is a high 
proportion of rented property, a high number of non-car owners and TB 
sufferers [10]. 
According to the 1974 Electoral Register [11] Gujaratis were 
concentrated in a few wards; little was known about their distribution 
other than that some wards were favoured by Muslims and others by 
Hindus, and that some were mixed Hindu and Muslim wards. If wards are 
classified according to the findings of the Planning Department survey, 
then it is possible to identify their pattern of settlement. Table 1.17 
presents the wards into which and from which respondents moved until 
85 
ex> 
0'1 
MAP 1 
MET'R()POLIT AN BOROtJGf-I OF BOLT'()N 1 976 
N 
~ I 
Blackrod & Horwich 
South 
KEY 
Tc;:,,,,,,,, Cent/'o 
~ 
6. I I, 1 7=Wnrd Nos. 
®=. Nos. of Respondf!nt s 
ill \rVard 
P()(,..e~t \Vo.rch = 9, 10, 
I J, 7, ~ 1 :~, 1 5. 
e~low I\verog~ 
VlJilr(ls: 17.. I. 
D S, :J, 2. 
I\V(~rllqt! & 
1\1)()ve Av(~ril<;W 
Wilrds " 19.2], 
o ft. 4. 1 " 21, 20,6. 
17 
Astley 8ridye 
6 
Horwich Central 
16 
Heaton 
Deane-cum-lostock 
o 
\.Jes thou9h ton 
. .. 
\·Jesthoughton-East ~. Hulton Hulton fr.1/umworth 
12 
?2 ?J 
Ttlrio/!,Ol'iJc/shi+'..,J 
LO 
.. , - .. '. 
. '., ... ' ... 
Darcy lever-cum, 
" '-Brei!)htme t " 
" 
i( l' ar <; "~'::I 
I (I 
they established themselves in the homes where they were interviewed. It 
shows how the majority of them lived and continue to live in the "poor" 
and the "below average" wards. Additionally, it demonstrates how 
incoming Gujaratis moved into these same "poor" wards. 
Table 1.17: Bolton Wards in which respondents lived and live now 
Derby 
Bradford 
North 
East 
Church 
West 
Farnworth 
Sub-Totals: 
Rumworth 
Great Lever 
Halliwell 
Tonge 
Darcy Lever-
cum-Breightmet 
Sub-Totals: 
Little Lever 
Hulton 
1 
Ward of First 
Residence 
14 
4 
"Poorest 4 
wards" 
"Below 
average 
wards" 
1 
4 
27 
4 
5 
3 
3 
15 
"Average 
Deane-cum-Lostock and above 
Smithills average 
Heaton wards" 
Egerton 
Sub-Totals: 
Bolton (not specified) 7 
2 
Ward of Previous 
Residence 
66 
36 
15 
3 
7 
11 
3 
55.1% 141 71.36% 
11 
12 
7 
2 
30.61% 32 16.08% 
1 0.5% 
1 0.5% 
14.29% 24 12.06% 
TOTALS: 49 100% 199 100%* 
(Hahlo,1983). 
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Ward of Present 
Residence 
77 
54 
15 
3 
7 
24 
3 
183 70.93% 
23 
21 
21 
1 
4 
70 27.13% 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
5 1. 94% 
258 100% 
Fact coincides with folklore: in Derby and Bradford wards in the 
early 1950s a triangular area bounded by two major thoroughfares namely 
Derby Street and Deane Road, the Gujaratis settled first. From this area 
they expanded their area of settlement in a circular fashion south-
eastwards and north-eastwards around the town centre. This pincer 
movement continued as more of them settled here, until eventually the 
town centre was surrounded by wards in which most Gujaratis resided. In 
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the course of settlement the Gujaratis established businesses, shops, 
temples and mosques and community centres which became recognised as 
symbols of their presence and social identity (Desai,1963:39,57,64). 
Underlying this expansion around the town is an undercurrent of 
residential mobility that gave them opportunities to select houses next 
to others belonging to their caste and religious community [12]. The 
exception to this settlement pattern are the Gujarati and other Asian 
professionals who prefer to live in middle class white areas. 
The expansion of Gujarati occupation and ownership of houses from one 
small area to an area to surrounding the town centre can be explained 
only in terms of a commitment to home ownership and continuing access to 
either poor quality housing or council housing (cf.Smith,1989). It is 
common knowledge amongst Gujaratis that, if they wish to raise money 
they approach kin. This way of raising funds partly supports the choice 
and constraint thesis by implying that banks and building societies may 
constrain Asian applicants by exercising power over their option to lend 
funds. It also partly undermines it, since obligations to kin for funds 
may constrain options in at least two ways: firstly in terms of the 
amount required and secondly by creating an obligation to return the 
favour. The decision to lend by normal lenders of funds may be 
constrained by racially discriminatory attitudes; equally the amount 
that can be raised by kin may exercise other constraints, such as kin 
having insufficient funds (cf.Robinson,1979:390-396). I have no direct 
evidence for this. Indirect evidence of the clustering of Gujaratis 
around the town centre suggests that the resources to buy houses further 
out of town were not available whatever their source of funds, the 
desire to remove further out was not expressed and the decision to live 
close together was both positive and strong. This research and that of 
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others has stressed five factors: firstly, the high social value 
Gujaratis, like other Asians (Dahya,1974), place upon home ownership; 
secondly the lack of competition for this housing; thirdly, housing 
further out of town was both expensive and competition from those who 
were better off for it was much greater; fourthly, the loans they 
received from the Local Authority only extended their home ownership 
within the inner urban area; and finally, the value of the houses they 
owned was too low to enable them to generate sufficient funds to 
purchase housing in better areas. Thus Gujaratis became spatially 
separate from better off members of the white community. The combined 
effects of these processes on Gujaratis brought about social, economic 
and racial polarisation within and between segments of the housing 
system (cf.Smith,1989:63-65). 
The clustering of Gujaratis into this inner area allowed them to 
establish shops which specialised in Gujarati and Asian commodities 
ranging from clothes and food to musical instruments, records to videos 
and electronic goods. Such clustering in inner urban areas serves a 
number of purposes: firstly, it enables Gujaratis to create their own 
cultural and secure environment (Phillips, 1981; Smith,1981; Desai, 
1963); secondly, it encourages them to make demands for space in the 
form of property; thirdly, clustering increase their politically 
visibility; fourthly, it ensures that they lay claim to an area that 
politically symbolises poverty, deprivation and dependence on local and 
governmental welfare. By purchasing the houses most in need of repair 
and renovation in the inner city areas, the Gujaratis have placed 
themselves in the centre of an urban social, economic and political 
system. The position of settlement is ambiguous, on the one hand it 
symbolises the stark centrality of their powerlessness, on the other 
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hand it places them at the centre of a politico-economic system of 
resources. 
One dynamic aspect arising from the availability of houses and the 
propensity of Gujaratis to purchase houses is that it has led to a 
clustering of Gujaratis from particular areas, that is those who share a 
social identity based upon a district of origin. The availability of 
houses within poor wards allowed them to move and buy houses frequently 
(Table 1.18), which gave them opportunities to move closer to the group 
with whom they shared a social identity. Hindu respondents moved house 
at least once every three years, whereas the Muslims moved house every 
four to five years on average. Not all who moved to new homes sold 
their old ones, many kept them to rent or sell another day. 
Table 1.18: Length of Residence in Present and Previous Homes [14] 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Bolton as Second or One or two Three or more 
first place or Third places of places of 
of residence place of residence residence 
in UK residence in UK prior in UK prior 
Hindus: 
Present Totals 
residence 12.99% 75.97% 11.04% 100% 
in Bolton: 20 97 20 17 154 
Average years: 3.45 3.67 3.15 3.26 
Previous 
residence 
Average years: 3.85 5.02 
Muslims: 
Present 
residence 9.62% 78.85% 11.54% 100% 
in Bolton: 10 58 24 12 104 
Average years: 5.2 3.74 4.96 4.83 
Previous 
residence 
Average years: 5.52 5.17 
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The consequence of this process of social/ residential identification 
is that small groups of Gujaratis sharing the same district of origin 
formed an enclave. Such enclaves formed the basis of factions [13]. An 
analysis of the residential movements of those sampled gives some 
indication of how clustering occurred along factional and religious 
lines with the consequence that some areas of the town are more "Muslim" 
than "Hindu" and some are mixed. The pattern of settlement shows that 
the majority of Muslims (Table 1.19) and Hindus (Table 1.20) lived on 
Table 1.19: Residence Pattern of Muslim Respondents by Ward 
District of Origin in Gujarat 
Wards: Broach[15] Surat[16] Kathiawar Andra Pradesh Totals 
N 
North 13 1 1 15 0 
Halliwell 11 3 1 15 r 
West 5 2 7 t 
East 1 1 2 h 
(37.5%) 
Derby 8 23 1 32 S 
Rumworth 3 4 1 8 0 
Bradford 7 11 1 19 u 
Great Lever 2 1 3 t 
Farnworth h 
North 3 3 (62.5%) 
Totals: 48 48 7 1 104 
% 46.16 46.15 6.37 0.96 100 
Source: Hahlo 1983. 
the southern side of the town with 38% Muslims and 25% of Hindus living 
on the northern side. As the area of first settlement was on the 
southern side in Derby and Bradford wards, both Hindus and Muslims 
established themselves here. Gradually, they have moved outwards and 
around the town, establishing similar facilities in other areas. The 
Muslims have established more mosques in the northern part than in the 
southern part. Each mosque represents faction interests based upon caste 
community identities (jamatbandi), as such some belong to the ICC and 
some are independent. The Hindus have fewer temples because these tend 
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to be organised by sect rather than by faction. The majority of Muslims 
from Broach district live in the northern section, while the majority of 
those from Surat district live in the southern section (Table 1.19). 
This residential separation of Muslims from these two districts is not 
only given symbolic expression in the perceptions Surtis and Baruchis 
have of each other in daily life, but it also reflects a power struggle 
between factions in the Islamic community for control of the mosques. 
Table 1.20: Residence Pattern of Hindu Respondents by Ward 
Districts 
Central South 
Gujarat 
of Origin 
Other towns in North and 
West Gujarat 
Surat Navsari 
Surat Province 
Bhuj Kutch Kathiawar Other Total 
Kutch Province 
Wards: 
Halliwell 
West 
East 
Tonge 
Smithills 
Darcy Lever-
cum-
Breightmet 
Church 
Egerton 
Deane-cum-
Lostock 
Derby 
Rumworth 
Bradford 
Great Lever 
Hulton 
Little 
Lever 
1 
5 
1 
13 
1 
7 
3 
3 
7 
3 
1 
13 
8 
6 
1 
Totals 31 42 
% 20.13 27.27 
Source: Hahlo 1983. 
TOTAL = 154 (100%) 
3 
5 
10 
5 
17 
5 
1 
46 
29.87 
1 
2 
1 
3 
7 
4.55 
1 
1 
1 
3 
5 
11 
7.14 
2* 
1* 
1* 
1* 
1* 
1* 
7* 
1* 
1* 
1* 
17 
11.05 
6 
17 
1 N 
1 0 
1 r 
4 
7 
t 
h 
1 (25%). 
1 S 
45 0 
15 u 
35 t 
18 h 
1 
1 
154 
100.01 
(75%) 
* Others trace origins to: Ahmadabad 2, Petland 2, Nadiad 2, Gujarat 1, 
Daman 1 Patna (Bihar) 1 Calcutta (Bengal) 1, Indore (Andra Pradesh) 1, 
Bombay 2, Maharastra 1, Punjab 1, Mombasa 1, and "not stated" 1. 
While Muslims moved around the town centre, establishing themselves 
in streets and wards in relation to their faction and sect allegiances 
(Chap.2), the pattern of settlement of Hindus was slightly different. 
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Hindus have spread themselves across the town with most living in four 
wards. In terms of their places of origin, the greatest proportion of 
Hindus in the sample trace their origins to Surat and Navsari districts 
located in south-central Gujarat, Kutch, including Bhuj, and Kathiawar 
district in the north-west of Gujarat. If Bolton is divided into a 
northern and a southern section, the majority of Hindu respondents 
(75.3%) live in the southern section of the town and a minority (25.7%) 
live in the northern section (Table 1.20). Unlike the Muslims, the 
Hindus have contained their expansion to the western and eastern areas 
of the southern half of the town, thus creating some social and 
geographical distance between themselves and the Muslims. 
The debate about housing restricting people's access to scarce 
resources, such as health and education does have bearing upon the 
geographical position of the Gujaratis. Although in 1973 many Gujaratis 
were purchasing houses, some were beginning to purchase additional 
houses for the purposes of generating wealth (Saunders,1989:208; 
Hamnett,1989). When the Local Authority first offered council houses for 
sale, Gujaratis took the opportunity to purchase them. When the 
opportunity was presented again later on, they purchased additional 
council houses. Thus their desire for houses goes beyond simple pride in 
ownership (cf.Dayha,1974), it suggests that they regard purchasing 
houses as a way to generate wealth. The wealth is generated by their 
selling or renting these houses to kin, friends, other Gujaratis or, if 
the houses are in demolition areas, obtaining compensation from the 
Local Authority. Gujaratis see home ownership as a means by which they 
can accumulate capital in an environment in which they may not obtain 
access to wealth through other avenues, such as employment. With 
Gujaratis preferring to purchase homes from Gujaratis, they have a ready 
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market of people looking for homes for rent or purchase a market 
protected from intrusion from white housing agents which to a large 
extent they can control. The effect of this on Gujarati settlement is 
that they occupy a distinct and visible space within Bolton, which gives 
them a social and economic base within their communities. 
This process of residential mobility has led to members of factions 
collecting together within a neighbourhood. However, the socio-
geographical position of Gujaratis marked their low socio-economic and 
political position in Bolton society. The only bases on which Gujarati 
social identities could develop were on religious and community bases 
(Chap.2) and social networks (Chap.3). These provide Gujaratis with 
social and spatial identities that allow community differences to become 
the bases for the mobilisation of support, the development of ethnic 
identities within a racial context (Chap.4) and structures of political 
leadership outside formal political party structures (Chaps.5,6 and 7). 
This Chapter set out the economic and political situation in which 
Gujaratis established themselves. Their disadvantages, whether arising 
from a racial, economic or political cause, has its roots within the 
poverty and powerlessness which they experienced as visible inner city 
residents. In an effort to overcome this situation, they need to develop 
bases from which could mobilise support for grassroots movements. 
Faction, caste, and sect divisions provided them with such bases. The 
subject of the next Chapter is to identify the main organisations that 
participated in local ethnic political activities. 
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FOOTNOTES 
1. There are other models which identify stages of migration and 
settlement, such as Bohning's four stage model (Bohning,1981). 
2. These data, supplied by immigration officials at Heathrow, are drawn 
from lists of migrants who gave Bolton as their destination. 
3. I have arbitrarily identified children as being under ten years of 
age, because on these lists the age of the child is given. For 
children over ten years of age, often no age was specified, thus 
making it difficult to distinguish between children and adults. 
Dependents over the age of ten are identified as male or female and 
their ages are sometimes given. An adult's sex is given, the sex of 
a child is not usually stated. On occasions it is impossible to 
distinguish between an adult and a child/minor in the entry. These 
data show that a large number of Gujarati women migrated to Bolton 
with or without their husbands, that is as dependents. 
4. There is little evidence which gives any indication of the speed at 
which Ugandan Asians, who were settled, moved to their preferred 
place of settlement. 
5. At the time this survey was carried out, Gujaratis felt insecure 
answering questions on their length of stay in Britain. In some 
instances this could be calculated, in others it was impossible to 
establish. 
6. These figures are based on Table 8.4, Central Statistics Office, No. 
13, HMSO, 1977. 
7. These percentages of unemployed members of ethnic minorities in 
Bolton were for the final month or next month for which figures were 
available (Manchester Council for Community Relations, 1982). 
8. Hill's figures seem to be on the low side. 
9. These respondents did not own or live in houses in Britain prior to 
their present homes. 
10. These wards and their residents share the social characteristics 
that are typical of those living in inner city areas (Gans,1969:99-
103; Rex and Moore, 1971:272ff.; Rex and Tomlinson, 1979: 127-157; 
Gerrard, 1981:641-644). Post 1976, large areas were demolished, thus 
reducing the availability of poor quality old housing. The building 
of new Council housing led to inner city residents becoming even 
more dependent upon Local Authority and national welfare support. 
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11. According to the 1974 Electoral Register Gujaratis were concentrated 
in a few wards. After reorganisation of Local Authority boundaries 
in 1974, Farnworth, Little Lever, Egerton, Westhoughton and a number 
of other wards were incorporated into the Metropolitan Borough of 
Bolton. Since the survey a further reorganisation of the local 
political structure of the town has witnessed a reduction in the 
number of wards. 
12. It is difficult to show how many Gujaratis could have moved into 
better areas of the town. What I have shown is how many respondents 
have remained in the poorer areas. In theory, on their second or 
third removal of residence, they had opportunities to move to better 
areas. I did not inquire as to why they did not take the 
opportunity to improve themselves or whether they lack the resources 
to do so, or experienced some form of constraint or direct or 
indirect discrimination and thus were prevented from doing so. 
13. I have used the term faction in a particular way that distinguishes 
it from the accepted usage. Five characteristics are regarded as 
typical of factions: they are conflict groups, political groups, 
both corporate groups, recruited by a leader and recruited on the 
basis of diverse principles (Nicholas,196S:28-29). The groups I 
describe as factions can under certain circumstances become 
corporate, for instance if they acquire property for usage as a 
mosque. They are viewed by the white politicians as politically 
destructive forces. Otherwise, they share the characteristics of 
other factions. 
14. Where a resident lived for less than a year in a house, I have 
regarded this as being equivalent to half a year. 
IS. The Muslim who gave Uganda as his place of origin identified himself 
later on as a Baruchi Vohra. 
16. Another Muslim, who gave his place of origin as Uganda, is a Memon 
and came from Kathiawar. 
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CHAPTER 2 
ETHNIC ORGANISATIONS: The Development of Structures of Leadership and 
Support 
In this Chapter I shall concentrate on the development of religious 
organisations in the Muslim and Hindus communities, since their role is 
central to ethnic politics. Ethnic politics is concerned with grassroots 
ethnic protest outside the formal political party and hierarchy 
structures. I shall argue that Gujaratis as a whole cannot co-operate, 
because they are divided at a number of levels by faction, caste, sect 
and religious belief. At each of these levels exist organisations which 
have the potential to become bases for protest movements, since they 
combine both members who share enough in common to meet to discuss 
grievances with a simple structure of leadership. Each organisation 
provides its members with a social identity, which becomes part of a 
hierarchy of belonging. Taken together these social identities form a 
complex of belonging that fixes the social position of a Gujarati within 
the social world of Gujaratis and Bolton society. 
The origins of Gujaratis are closely associated with the migration 
chains that brought them to Britain and Bolton. A consequence of chain 
migration is that each chain draws in individuals who are linked by 
marriage and kinship to a specific location. The Gujarati population in 
Bolton consists of a collection of members of chains of varying sizes 
and duration (manifest or latent), whose members initially shared the 
urge to migrate, the place to which they have migrated and an identity 
as Gujaratis. The experiences which they share include the process of 
migration, the difficulties of settlement, finding accommodation and 
work in a new country and racism. The most clearly definable social 
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values and commitments that most of the people in these chains share 
with some, but which separate them from others, are their religious 
beliefs. Thus they can be separated into Muslims and Hindus. This 
Chapter will analyse the faction, caste, sect and religious structures 
that unite and divide members of these chains. This Chapter is divided 
into two sections: the first is concerned with the Muslim communities 
and the second with the Hindu communities. 
Muslims 
For Muslims the pools from which they were drawn into migration 
chains share many social characteristics. Where Muslims come from the 
same village, or villages linked by marriage (ekada), they share 
membership of a district and membership of a caste community 
(jamatbandi). This implies that they also share the views of an Islamic 
school, a pathway and at the most general level a common social identity 
as Muslims. The faction, which comprises migrants who came from the same 
district but may have been members of different chains of migration, is 
usually too small to amass the funds needed to purchase a mosque. 
However the caste community, which may include more than one faction, 
may be able to raise this kind of money. Apart from this, the caste 
community is recognised by Muslims as the organisation comprising social 
equals [1], that is those who can marry and who share the same place of 
prayer. Thus the caste community is most likely to provide a basis for a 
Muslim organisation. Each community looks after the religious and social 
welfare of its own members (Misra,1964:143). The link between the 
district of origin, the mosque and the caste community is a close one. 
In a sense the caste community reaches out beyond the mosque to include 
Muslims living elsewhere. Thus a mosque becomes a social, religious and 
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political symbol of a caste community, and symbolically represents the 
community's influence and wealth. At the root of the Muslim and Islamic 
communities lie three social identities which link together culture, 
religion, unity and conflict. These are the divisions between Surti and 
Baruchi Vohras, between those Muslims who follow the Deobandi and 
Berelewi schools, and thirdly those between Muslims and non-Muslim 
communities. 
Most of the Muslim migrants traced their origins to three areas of 
Gujarat - Broach, Surat and Kathiawar -, and the majority came from the 
former two. There is no simple relationship between district of origin 
and membership of a caste community. Some caste communities are spread 
over two or more districts, while others seem to be restricted to one. I 
identified six Muslim caste communities (Table 2.1); these are Sunni 
Vohras, Daudi Bohra, Memon, Nagori, Khojah [2] and Miabhai [3]. The 
largest of these is the Sunni Vohra community. In Gujarat they were 
predominantly an agricultural people, who after migrating to Africa and 
other countries achieved success as businessmen (Tambs-Lyche,1980:29 
ff.; Mayer,1973:3,28). An analysis of the pattern of settlement of the 
Muslims offers an indication of the numerical superiority of the caste 
communities. 
The distribution of caste 
principally the Sunni Vohras [4] 
communities suggests that it was 
who migrated to Britain (Table 2.1); 
they comprise 90% of the sample. Some of them trace their origins to 
Surat, others to Broach. Confirmation of this divide are the labels 
Surti and Baruchi, which are employed as social identities. Evidence 
shows that there is one major caste community, the Vohras; the other 
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Table 2.1: Caste Communities and Districts of Origin 
Caste: Districts of Origin 
Communities Surat Broach Kutch & Andra Totals % 
Kathiawar Pradesh 
Sunni Vohra 47 47 94 90.39 
Memon 4 4 3.85 Sunni 
Nagori 1 0.96% - 1 0.96 
Miabhai 1 0.96% - 1 0.96 
Khojah 2 1.92% 2 1. 92) 
Daudi Bohra 1 0.96% 1 0.96) Shia 
Other 1 o ~-% 1 0.96 • ~b 0 
Totals: 48 48 7 1 104 
Percentages: 46.15% 46.15% 6.73% 0.96% 100% 
Source: Hahlo 1983. 
communities are small by comparison. Consequently this community 
dominates the local Gujarati communities. 
Of the smaller caste communities the largest are the Memons. The 
smallest are represented by only a few families. The head of household 
of two were interviewed. They belong to the Nagori and Miabhai caste 
communities, who also trace their origins to the Broach and Surat 
districts respectively. All of these Muslim caste communities recognise 
Sunni Islam. The Khojah and Daudi Bohra communities, who are Shia 
Muslims, are similarly small in number. They attend prayers in the 
closest mosque. A Muslim from Hyderabad attends the Church of England, 
although he has neither formally renounced Islam nor officially been 
accepted into the church here. Muslims representing these latter three 
communities are onlookers in mosque struggles. 
Under the umbrella of caste community membership are factions which 
are divided by the places of origin of chains and in theory, but not in 
practice, united by marriage. Muslims place great importance upon in-
caste marriages and a preference for first cousin or cousin marriage. An 
effect of this is to emphasise the importance of the social 
relationships that link those come from the place of origin of a chain. 
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Social equality and social identities are given expression through the 
selection of spouses and the social commitment by families that 
accompanies approval of marriages. From what is theoretically a wide set 
of options, various overlapping preferences reduce the range of choice 
of spouse to what is a small pool. At its widest, Sunni Muslims can 
marry any Muslim outside the natal family, and even a non-believer who 
gives a commitment to convert to Islam. For the Shia Muslims the choice 
is restricted to Shia Muslims. However, from this theoretically 
wide choice, Gujarati Muslims prefer to marry spouses who are Gujarati 
Muslims, belong to the same caste community, faction and trace their 
origins to villages linked by marriage exchanges (ekada) (Pocock, 1972: 
66; Misra,1964:142), and ideally should also be first cousins (cf.Misra, 
1964:152-153). This interrelationship of social identities serves to 
increase the social importance of the caste community in relation to 
other social identities. The high number of in-caste community marriages 
among those sampled reflects this. Most Muslim respondents (96%) 
married spouses who belonged to the same caste community as themselves 
(Tables 2.2). Of the four Muslims whose wives did not belong to their 
husbands' caste communities, the one, who had married the Muslim who 
came from Hyderabad, came from Hawick, Scotland; another, a Khojah 
woman, had married a Baruchi Vohra, and two Muslim women, who belonged 
to different caste communities which they did not identify, had married 
Surti Vohras. 
Table 2.2: Caste Communities of Husbands and Wives in Sample 
Caste Community Totals % Respondents % 
married 
Same as husband 94 95.92 
Different from husband 4 4.08 
Married 98 100% 94.23 
Single 6 5.77 
Totals: 104 100% 
Source: Hahlo 1983. 
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Three illustrations show what a high social value Muslims place upon 
caste community membership. The first is a preference for cousin 
marriages. A close examination of marriage choices shows that a third of 
Surti Vohras married kin, who came from the same villages as they did. 
While over a fifth (22%) of Baruchis married kin 22%, but most of them 
came from other villages than those of their husbands (Table 2.3). 
Overall a third of the Muslims had married cousins and most of these 
were first cousins [5]. An explanation for this preference is not to be 
found in Islam, or accounted for solely by the possession of property or 
wealth. It may also have originated with Muslims' need for protection 
Table 2.3: Marriages with Kin and Non-Kin 
Wives: Kin Non-Kin Totals % 
Surti Vohra 15 33.33% 30 66.67% 45 100 
Baruchi Vohra 10 22.73% 34 77.27% 44 100 
Nagori 1 1 
Miabhai 1 1 
Memon 2 2 4 
Khojah 1 1 
Daudi Bohra 1 1 
Muslim 1 1 
Totals: 29 29.59% 69 70.41% 98 100 
Source: Hahlo 1983. 
in Gujarati villages where they live alongside Hindus. Whether or not 
this explanation is convincing, this preference ensures that Muslims 
maintain close relationships between their factions and caste 
communities. The pattern of selection of cousins revealed a further 
difference between Surtis and Baruchis. Most Surtis married cousins who 
came from the same villages as themselves, whereas the Baruchis married 
cousins who came from different villages. This would suggest that for 
Surtis the village caste community is more important than the faction; 
while the reverse holds for Baruchis. 
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The second illustrates the high personal value that Muslims attach to 
marriages within ekadas. A Vohra Baruchi, who arranged the marriages of 
his eldest son and daughter, said: "I wrote to my relatives in the five 
villages: Kapodra, Kosamri, Kandh, Mangrol, Dhamrod. They selected a 
brother and a sister and both marriages were celebrated in Bolton". 
Unfortunately, a few years later both ended in divorce. Now he blames 
his kin in these villages for having chosen a brother and a sister whose 
mother came from the city of Surat and therefore was a stranger to the 
five villages. Because of this he says: "She (his daughter-in-law) 
cooks differently, the food doesn't taste the same as ours, and for this 
reason the marriage could never work". Apart from distrust being 
expressed in terms of "cooking", a cultural idiom by which the equal and 
unequal, friends and strangers, are identified and separated (Mayer, 
1973:33-52; Dubois,1959:183-186), this father committed himself to 
social and religious isolation to show his disgust for his kin and caste 
community, who arranged these marriages. 
The final illustration is drawn from a Baruchi wedding I attended in 
Blackburn. The main guests invited traced their origins to villages 
within the district surrounding the village of the bridegroom. Although 
others might be invited, the members of the ekada expected to be invited 
and knew from their proximity to the marital couple, what the value of 
the present they gave should be. 
At the moment there is little sign of these marriage preferences 
changing. By deliberately not giving their children this information, 
parents try to establish and maintain control over their children's 
choice of marriage partners. A view of held by outsiders is that the 
desire of young Gujaratis to continue to uphold arranged in-caste 
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marriages will diminish as they become more anglicised. Evidence to 
support such a change is based more upon wishful thinking than upon 
fact. Most Muslims are reluctant to allow their children to marry out of 
the caste community. More Vohra Baruchi (8I%) than Surti Vohras (64%) 
are of the opinion that their children should marry in-caste. The latter 
are more prepared to let their children marry any Sunni Muslim (28%) 
than are Baruchi Vohras (4%). Only four Muslims sampled recognised that 
their children might and could choose to marry anyone. All of them 
stated that caste community customs and values were of little importance 
here. One traces his origins to Broach district, one to Surat district, 
one to Hyderabad and one to South Africa. This evidence again points to 
the strength of these Muslims' commitment to in-caste community 
marriages and reinforces the argument that the link between faction and 
caste community is close and strong. 
The social importance of membership of a faction and a caste 
community is that it provides Muslims with a specific social identity, 
that is a social location within a well defined set of social networks. 
Marriage enables Muslims to maintain ties with members of their caste 
communities irrespective of geographical and social distances. Thus 
they cannot easily tolerate a fellow Muslim's decision to allow his 
child to marry out of the caste community, since this may imply marrying 
out of the Islamic community. The consequences of chain migration and 
marriage preferences have made the maintenance of links between Bolton 
Muslims and their kin in Gujarat a basis for the mobilisation of larger 
structures of support. 
As 
Muslims 
has been noted above (Chap.I), 
shows that members of these 
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the settlement pattern of these 
communities have settled in 
different parts of the town. The Baruchis favour the northern side of 
the town, while the Surtis favour the southern side. Thus these two 
social identities have become translated from a geographical context 
into physical 
struggles for 
(ICC), which 
and social opposition. This opposition emerges in 
the control of mosques and the Islamic Culture Centre 
controls most Muslim social and communal activities. 
Between these differences of location, social identities at caste 
community level are a further set of social and religious differences. 
Crosscutting faction allegiances are Muslims' commitments to one of 
two Islamic sects, sometimes referred to as schools. Excluding Shia 
Muslims who playa minor role in community affairs, the majority of 
Muslims belong to either the Deobandi or Berelewi schools. The history 
and background of these schools suggest that they share a number of 
similarities, including their origins at a time when many Muslims in 
colonial India expressed anti-British feelings, and differences, such as 
their interpretation of certain aspects of Islamic procedure and prayer 
(Hardy,1972:170,242,277-278; Ziya-ul-Hasan Faruqi, 1963: vii, 75,96,170-
171). Both schools established centres in the 1800s in Gujarat with the 
result that many Muslims who lived there accepted their teachings. 
Although today there is a degree of consensus on religious practices and 
preaching between the followers of these schools, there are some minor 
differences. One difference between them, I was informed, is that 
Berelewis read out salutations to the Prophet, whereas in Deobandi 
mosques they are read out by Muslim worshippers collectively. 
An analysis of respondents' membership of these schools shows that 
generally Surtis and Baruchis accept the teachings of the Deobandi 
school, but a minority of Baruchis favour those of the Berelewi school. 
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Prior to 1969 the Surtis and Baruchis had to co-operate in order to 
survive as Muslims in a predominantly Christian environment. After 1969 
the Islamic community expanded and this led to opportunities for 
supporters of each school to establish their social and religious 
differences. Now Baruchi Muslims began to oppose Surti control with 
vigour, and this opposition has dominated the Islamic community ever 
since (see Chap.6). When the Muslims settled in Bolton, the first 
mosque they established was Zakariah mosque, and the committee that 
controlled Muslim affairs met there. Informants stated that until 1972 
most of the positions on committees controlling Zakariah mosque and the 
ICC were held by Surti Muslims. In this competition for control, it is 
these large communities which can support their members. 
To an extent a small community like that of the Memons is the 
exception which proves the rule. The Memons who trace their origins to 
the north west of Gujarat support the Berelewi school. Two Memons 
interviewed did not identify the Islamic school they supported, or 
state in which mosque they prayed. As Muslims they can pray in any 
mosque, but at the time of the research tension between the followers of 
these two schools was high. This might account for them not identifying 
a mosque. With some Baruchis trying to establish a Berelewi mosque, 
these Memons supported the venture. Since they are a small community and 
live amongst Deobandi and Berelewi followers, they depended them for 
support as Muslims and as Gujaratis. Thus they are in a vulnerable 
position. When they received little support from other Muslims, most 
left Bolton to live in Glasgow and London, where there are larger Memon 
communities (see Chap.3). While they lived here, they pledged support 
to Lena Street mosque which is located in the northern part. 
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Later as the larger Islamic communities expanded with new arrivals 
coming from India and Africa, new mosques were established. Between 1973 
and 1976 the control of the day-to-day management of the mosques became 
separated from the overall control of Muslim religious affairs. The 
former responsibility was delegated to mosque committees, who lived 
close to and prayed at their mosque. The latter became the function of 
the Islamic Culture Centre, whose headquarters are at Zakariah mosque. 
By 1976 there were five mosques and a sixth was being planned by the 
Pakistani community; the five were Tayaibah in Cannon Street, Zakariah 
mosque in Peace Street, Church Street mosque, Makki mosque in Back Apple 
Terrace, and Lena Street mosque (Map 2). Excluding Zakariah mosque, all 
of the remaining four mosques are located in the northern part of the 
town. 
An impression of the composition of the Islamic community suggests 
that Surtis comprise two-thirds and Baruchis a third. Evidence shows 
that the majority of Muslims are Deobandi, and that they control 
most of the mosques and the Islamic Culture Centre (ICC). The control of 
the Berelewi mosques is in the hands of mosque committees, who reject 
the authority of the ICC. There is a further cleavage within the 
Deobandi community between those who trace their origins to Surat or 
Broach districts (Table 2.4). The division between Surti and Baruchi is 
fundamental and underpins the other divisions within the Islamic 
community. Both of these communities are large enough to gain control 
of the ICC. Although members of both factions support the teachings of 
the Deobandi school, they are in competition for control of the Islamic 
community. Generally the trend has been for the Baruchis to be more 
politically active and eager to impose their attitudes to Islamic 
practice and authority on the Surtis. 
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Table 2.4: District and Islamic School Affiliations 
Islamic District Allegiances 
Schools Surat Broach Kutch & Andra Totals 
Kathiawar Pradesh 
Deobandi 47 97.9% 36 75% 83 
Berelewi 9 18.7% 1 10 Others* 2 4.2% 4 1 7 Don't know 1 2.1% 1 2.1% 2 No answer 2 2 
Totals 48 48 7 1 104 
% 100% 100% 100 
* Shafii, Shia and Christian. 
Source: Hahlo 1983. 
The division along faction lines does not match the division along 
caste community lines. To some extent the sample reflected this; the 
majority of Surti and Baruchi Vohras are Deobandi and a minority (9.62%) 
are Berelewi (Table 2.5). Already having control over their own mosque 
committees, Baruchi Deobandis succeeded in gaining control over the ICC 
(see Chap.6). This meant that as the smaller of the two large Muslim 
communities, they achieved the maximum degree of control possible over 
Islamic affairs. Their support for this take-over came not from their 
identity as Deobandi or Berelewi, but from their social identity as 
Baruchis. Therefore, the division between the factions underlies the 
division between the caste communities and between Islamic schools. 
Table 2.5: Caste Community Membership of Islamic Schools 
Islamic Schools: 
Deobandi Berelewi Others Don't No 
Caste Know answer 
Community: 
Surti Vohra 46 97.87% 1 2.13% 
Baruchi Vohra 36 76.6% 8 17% 2* 4.3% 1 2.13% 
Memon 1 1* 2 
Nagori 1 
Miabhai 1 
Khojah 2+ 
Daudi Bohra 1+ 
Mus 1 im 1@ 
Totals: 83 10 7 2 2 104 
% 79.81 9.62 6.73 1. 92 1. 92 100 
* Shafii; + Shia; @ Christian. 
Source: Hahlo 1983. 
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The control of a mosque is central to control of faction and caste. 
Such control implies control of resources, funds, donations, 
applications for public funds, religious teachings, and appointments of 
imams and through them control of the community that prays in the 
mosque. Therefore, control by a faction is regarded as not only 
desirable, but essential if it is to create a congenial social and 
political environment for its members. Without this control a faction 
would have to accept the dictates of another faction in a religious 
setting and this implies that the members of the former would have their 
socially unequal position publicised. Since the Baruchis and Surtis 
share some wards but dominate others, competition for control of 
individual mosques and the ICC is not a foregone conclusion. This leaves 
the control of the ICC open to take-overs by politically active members 
and lies at the root of Muslim ethnic politics. 
Although the Surti-Baruchi divide forms such an integral part of 
Muslim social and religious life, it remains to be explained how the 
Baruchis who are in the minority have achieved domination. As a group 
they have built up an image which emphasises their commitment to Islam 
compared with that of the Surtis, which stresses flexibility and 
understanding. Separated by marriage preferences and village alliances, 
Surtis and Baruchis distinguish between each other in social situations. 
Their separate social identities are expressed in terms of stereotypes. 
From the Surti Vohra point of view, a Baruchi is dull, narrow-minded, 
poorly educated, rigid in religious beliefs, aggressive and "they carry 
knives even in the mosque". Surtis see themselves as enlightened, 
educationally progressive, flexible in their approach to Islam, 
reasonable and peaceful. Thus Surtis believe that they have a 
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worldliness which their neighbouring Baruchis do not share. Meanwhile, 
Baruchis see themselves as the "pious ones", and they look down on 
Surtis as a people who flaunt the strict principles of Islam. These 
stereotypes point to the depth of the social division between these two 
communities. 
The interconnection between these social and religious identities 
becomes apparent when the conflict between factions, castes and Islamic 
schools is translated into demands that impinge upon the white 
community. These are expressed in the form of a need for more facilities 
for Muslims, such as single sex schools, facilities to bury the dead 
within 24 hours, halal meat in schools, access to the coroner over 
weekends and holidays, and the right of Muslim children to wear Islamic 
symbols in school. Such demands give the impression that these Muslims 
are deeply committed to Islam. Indications of commitment include 
observing the taboo on the eating of pork, attendance of prayers on 
Fridays, the need to pray fives times a day, the burial of the dead 
within 24 hours, and marriage to cousins. Although cousin marriage is 
not a religious but a social observance, it is only Gujarati and 
Pakistani Muslims who observe it. These six observances have become 
recognised as symbols which "stand for" the social identity of Islam 
and more specifically Sunni Vohra Muslims. Thus, the Muslims form a 
cohesive group who share a commitment to a common set of symbols in 
situations in which their beliefs are often seen by those around them, 
particularly white Boltonians, to be alien and threatening. 
To obtain some indication of commitment, the Muslim respondents were 
asked to rank these observances in terms of their importance, that is 
as very important, important and unimportant. Although it is to be 
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expected that Muslims might place similar value on all five of these 
observances, the value the respondents placed on them shows that there 
exists some degree of difference (Table 2.6). The sixth observance has 
more to do with in-caste community marriages than with Islam. The data 
in the Table is arranged according to membership of faction, caste 
community and Islamic School. 
The only Muslims who are in any kind of agreement are those who 
traced their identities to Broach, supported the Berelewi school and 
represented the small communities. They are in total agreement on the 
importance of attendance at Friday prayers and on the taboo on pork. 
They are also in agreement on the importance of 24 hour burials and to 
a lesser extent upon the importance of cousin marriage and single sex 
Table 2.6: Ranking of Selected Religious Observances by Muslim 
Respondents by School @ 
Surti Vohra Deobandi: Observances 
Taboo Attend Cousin Pray Grow a Burial Single Total 
on Friday Marriage 5/Day Beard within Sex 
Pork Prayers 24 hours School 
% % % % % % % 
Very 
Important 95.8 97.9 40.4 89.4 25.5 97.9 57.4 
Important 2.1 2.1 44.7 10.6 59.6 27.7 
Un-
important 2.1 14.9 12.8 2.1 12.8 
No Answer 2.1 2.1 
Totals 100% 100% !OO% 100% 100% 100% 100% 47 
Baruchi Vohra Deobandi: Observances 
Taboo Attend Cousin Pray Grow a Burial Single Total 
on Friday Marriage 5/Day Beard within Sex 
Pork Prayers 24 hours School 
% % % % % % % 
Very 
44.4 75 58.3 Important 88.9 91.7 36.1 94.4 
Important 2.7 5.6 36.1 5.6 41.7 22.2 25 
Un-
important 8.3 2.7 19.4 13.9 2.7 13.9 
No Answer 3.8 2.7 
Totals 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 36 
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Baruchi Vohra Bere 1 ewi : 
Very 
Important 
Important 
Un-
important 
Totals 
Memons: 
Very 
Taboo Attend 
on Friday 
Pork Prayers 
% % 
100 100 
100% 100% 
Taboo Attend 
on Friday 
Pork Prayers 
% % 
Important 75 75 
Important 
Un-
important 
No Answer 25 25 
Totals 100% 100% 
Baruchi Vohra*: 
Very 
Important 
Important 
Un-
important 
Totals 
Taboo Attend 
on Friday 
Pork Prayers 
% % 
100 100 
100% 100% 
Observances 
Cousin Pray Grow a 
Marriage 5/Day Beard 
% 
44.4 
11.1 
44.4 
99% 
% 
100 
100% 
% 
22.2 
77.8 
100% 
Observances 
Cousin Pray Grow a 
Marriage 5/Day Beard 
% 
25 
50 
25 
100% 
% 
25 
50 
25 
100% 
% 
50 
25 
25 
100% 
Observances 
Cousin Pray Grow a 
Marriage 5/Day Beard 
% 
25 
25 
25 
100% 
% 
75 
25 
100% 
% 
25 
50 
25 
100% 
Burial Single Total 
within Sex 
24 hours School 
% % 
66.7 
33.3 
100% 
44.4 
44.4 
11.1 
99% 9 
Burial Single Total 
within Sex 
24 hours School 
% % 
50 
25 
25 
100% 
25 
25 
25 
25 
100% 4 
Burial Single Total 
within Sex 
24 hours School 
% % 
100 
100% 
25 
25 
50 
100% 4 
*Includes two Baruchis Vohras, a Miabhai and a Nagori. 
Khojah and Daudi Bohra: 
Very 
Taboo Attend 
on Friday 
Pork Prayers 
% % 
Important 100 
Important 
66.7 
Un-
Observances 
Cousin Pray Grow a 
Marriage 5/Day Beard 
% % % 
Burial Single Total 
within Sex 
24 hours School 
% % 
66.7 66.7 
33.3 66.7 33.3 33.3 
important 
Totals 100% 
33.3 100 
100% 100% 
33.3 66.7 
100% 100% 100% 100% 3 
@ The Muslim who now attends church has been excluded, as he no longer 
observes any Islamic observances. 
schooling. They agree upon the relative unimportance of Muslims wearing 
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beards. The Surti and Baruchi Vohras who support the Deobandi school 
were not in agreement. The former consider attendance at Friday prayers 
and burial within 24 hours to be very important with the taboo on pork 
being of almost equal importance; next in order of rank is praying five 
times a day. Only just over half support the idea of single sex schools, 
40% agreed with cousin marriage and only 25% think it very important for 
a Muslim to wear a beard. The latter think that praying five times a day 
is most important, and then in order of importance come attendance at 
prayers on Friday, the taboo on pork and burial within 24 hours. Just 
over 50 percent of Baruchis support single sex schooling, 44% think that 
wearing a beard is important (see Chap.6, the bearded schoolboy dispute) 
and 36% accept the importance of cousin marriage. Apart from suggesting 
that there is no absolute agreement on the importance of these 
observances to Muslims, it does suggest that the view that Baruchis are 
pious is appropriate if applied to those who are Berelewis. 
The important issue that arises from this analysis is that the 
Baruchis who support the Deobandi school are not in agreement with the 
Surtis. Their respectively different opinions of what are important 
observances for Muslims confirm the divide between them. Thus struggle 
for control of the Deobandi mosques is located not only within the 
factions, but is also embedded in what each faction would consider the 
appropriate behaviour for a Muslim. The divide between these factions is 
further reinforced by the practice of tabligh [6], which is an 
evangelistic exercise supported particularly by members of the Deobandi 
school. The aim of it is to convert Hindus to Islam and to persuade lax 
Muslims to return to the fold. Some 49.4% of the respondents (41) 
participate in tabligh and most of them (55.6%) are Vohra Baruchis. This 
commitment endorses the stereotype of Baruchis as being the most pious 
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of the two factions. Therefore, in thought, ln practice and in 
commitment Baruchis believe that they should have control of the mosques 
and the ICC. The Surtis would like to control these organisations, but 
they do not have the same conviction to gain control. Faction conflict 
dominates the social interaction between Muslims and as they dominate 
the local Islamic community, this division dominates community affairs. 
These internal differences are partly submerged when there is a 
threat to the Islamic community from the non-Muslim communities. For 
instance, when Muslims were informed that they could not have 24 hour 
and seven days a week access to the cemetery to bury their dead, they 
united in their protest. However, when one Baruchi leader attempted to 
gain a position of influence by exploiting a political situation 
involving the white community, the Surtis refused to support him (see 
bearded school boy, Chap.6). At another level members of both factions 
accept the Sunni Hanafi pathway and follow the teachings of the Sunna, 
Shariah and Hadiths. Thus, they share a common and overriding religious 
identity irrespective of their place of origin, they are all Sunni 
Hanafi Muslims. Commitment to these observances is called into question 
when Islam or the social identity of Muslims is under threat or when the 
mere expression of it reinforces the identities of the believers as 
Muslims. In a Christian country like Britain, Muslims publicly adhere to 
these observances in word and deed, 
commitment to Islam. 
because they confirm their 
At the centre of the active Muslim community lies the control of the 
mosques, as 'symbols and what they symbolise are fused' into a complex 
Islamic social identity (Evans-Pritchard, 1967:245-247; Firth, 1973: 
415). The public expression of beliefs in Islam provides the Muslims 
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with both a symbol of Gujarati Islam as well as membership of the wider 
Muslim brotherhood. Thus, the Gujarati Muslims, both Sunni and Shia, are 
united in their acknowledgement of their religious identity. This 
common identity is given expression at funerals of fellow Muslims, 
Gujarati and Pakistani, which all Muslims are expected to attend and 
thereby to demonstrate their respect for the Islamic brotherhood. 
The Muslim population interacts at three levels: firstly at the level 
of factions and caste communities (Diagram 1); secondly at the level of 
Islamic schools, namely as Deobandis or Berelewis; and thirdly at the 
level of a united Sunni Hanafi Islamic community. These three levels of 
interaction give Muslims the potential to unite or divide according to 
which social identity is appropriate to a social situation. At one level 
they can be opposed to one another at the level of factions, while at 
another level they can be opposed to all those who are not Muslims. It 
is this facility to detach and reattach that makes Muslims a potential 
threat locally or nationally, on religious or political grounds. 
Nationally the formation of an Islamic parliament drew attention to 
Muslims' potential to develop as a political force. For this reason the 
presence of Muslim candidates in a recent local election unnerved white 
candidates who opposed them. Selected aspects of this potential to 
detach and reattach are explored below in the local context (Chap.6). Of 
concern are the social structures which underpin the Islamic community, 
cutting across organisational divides, and thus providing bases for 
friendship and ethnic political support (Chaps. 3 and 4). More 
immediately the next section of this Chapter will look at Hindu 
organisations. 
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Diagram 1 
Model of Muslim Respondents' Spatial. Residential 
and Religious Allegiances. 
Form of Islam Shia 
Islamic 
Pathway 
Islamic 
School 
Caste 
Community 
Khojah, 
I Daudi Bohra 
District Kutch 
of Origin r 
in Kathiawar 
Gujarat 
Taluka in 
District 
Faction Marginal 
Residential 
Location Central 
in Bolton. 
Sunni 
Hanafi 
I 
, 
I 
Deobandi Berelewi 
Vohra Miabhai Nagori Vohra Memon 
I 
Surat Broach 
Potential to Factionalise 
at Ta~l b~Chment 
Central 
Southern 
Kutch 
I 
Kathiawar 
Marginal 
/ 
Northern 
Line = indicates spatial, residential and religious allegiances 
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Hindus 
In this section of the Chapter I shall concentrate on the development 
of Hindu religious organisations and the divisions which separate them 
and allegiances which unite them. 
The migration chains that brought Hindus here also separate them by 
origin, caste and sect into a collection of communities. Where the 
Hindus differ from the Muslims is in the greater range of social 
differences that separate the members of chains from each other. To what 
extent Hindus' participation in the migration process has some bearing 
on their positions within the caste system and within the occupational 
system in Gujarat lies outside the scope of this thesis. Undoubtedly the 
close relationship between caste position and occupation that is a 
characteristic of the caste system could not be sustained by migrants 
who chose to migrate to countries, where such relationships did not 
pertain. Undoubtedly migration has presented Hindus with opportunities 
to change their occupations, their fortunes and thus their status 
within the caste system. With few exceptions, the identity derived from 
the association between caste and occupation has fallen away and has 
given way to new opportunities to achieve upward social mobility. What 
is particularly important is that such mobility can bring as great 
rewards in the wider society as it can within the Hindu communities; 
upward social mobility is seen as important by both parents and their 
children. Therefore, the caste system as it operates here shares 
similarities with its parent system in India, but it is different. If 
nothing else, the experience of migration and the social situation in 
Britain are different. I shall discuss migration before I analyse the 
caste system. 
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The reasons for Hindus migrating are similar to those that motivated 
Muslims, but they possibly include the wish to escape from some of the 
constraints imposed by the caste system. The effect of chain migration 
on the Hindu population has been similar to that described for Muslims. 
It led to the development of a collection of large and small caste 
communities, whose members trace their origins to particular districts 
and towns or cities in Gujarat. Unlike Muslims shared origins have not 
lead to the emergence of factions. This might be explained by the 
Hindus' confining the selection of spouses to ekadas but to an avoidance 
of cousin marriages. Thus the link between chains whose members look for 
spouses from an ekada does not lead to the formation of strong kin-
based groups, as it does for Muslims. Consequently caste membership 
takes precedence over faction membership. 
The Caste System 
The most precise form of identification available to Hindus is that 
of caste. Although the caste system dominates the lives of Hindus 
living here, there are issues that point to a weakening of it, such as 
the link between varna and caste. Traditionally this system of social 
stratification is based on four varnas in a rigid hierarchy. "The 
principle of hierarchy is the attribution of a rank to each element in 
relation to the whole" (Dumont, 1972:131). What appears to be happening 
is that these Hindus are losing sight of the relationship between the 
framework provided by the varnas and the castes ranked within it. This 
suggests that the sharpness of the code of identification which the 
system once provided has become blunted through its lack of application 
to many aspects of life in Britain. When Hindus were asked to identify 
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their varnas, the majority (67.5%) of Hindus could not or chose not to 
do so. Only 32.5% of them identified a varna. They are clearly aware of 
the hierarchy of varnas, since they possess an idea of the rank position 
of their caste ln relation to some other castes. Therefore the 
identification of varna can be taken as evidence of either a deliberate 
attempt to reduce the importance of caste ranking to outsiders or as 
evidence of the diminishing importance of caste as a form of social 
stratification in this community. In certain circumstances Hindus 
reveal an awareness of varna membership, such as when they refer to the 
social distance between themselves and their doctors, who happened to be 
Brahmins. The caste system is based upon a complex relationship between 
specialisation and interdependence of constituent groups. At one level 
specialisation entails separation of them, at another it demands co-
operation if the needs of the whole are to be met. This relation to the 
whole links the division of labour to the hierarchy (Dumont, 1972:133). 
Thus, the unwillingness or inability of respondents to identify their 
varna is possibly an attempt to reduce its importance to outsiders. 
From discussions with Hindus I was later able to place most of the 
castes within what they believed to be the correct varnas (Table 2.7). I 
did not ask respondents to rank their caste in relation to other castes. 
Individual caste membership has become now the key to social 
identification; every respondent was able to identify his caste (Table 
2.7). The majority (92.8%) of Hindus interviewed belong to castes within 
the Vaishya varna. Six respondents who belong to the Solanki, Rohit 
Chauhan and Dhobi Rajput castes are looked down on, which suggests that 
their rank is perceived to be lower than that of most Hindus. Although 
none identified these castes as being in the Shudra varna, consensus 
suggests that they are Shudra. Thus the effect of chain migration has 
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been to accentuate the caste identities of those in a chain at the 
expense of an understanding of their place within the total Hindu 
society. Although this small population lacks the interdependence 
associated with Hindus living in larger communities, there are issues 
which point to the divisions between castes. For instance, a Mandhata 
Patel who worked for a Water Authority told me how he had instructed a 
Kutchi builder, whom he employed, to bring his own supply of water. The 
explanation he gave was that he did not want this Kutchi, whom he 
regarded as being of lower caste, to pollute his supply of water. This 
example confirms that caste identity remains an indelible mark by which 
some Hindus establish their social positions in relation to one another. 
Table 2.7: Probable Varna and Caste Membership of Hindus 
Caste Varna: Vaishya 
Mistry 14 
Kumbar 1 
Parjapati Kumbar 5 
Rajput Rana 1 
Rajput 1 
Katri 2 
Luhar 4 
Lohana 1 
Bania 1 
Zarola Bania 1 
Koli 11) 
Mandhata Patel 14) 
Matia Patel 1) 
Leva Patel 44) 
Patidar Patel 7) 
Kadva Patel 4) 
Kanbi Patel 18) 
Leva Patidar Patel 6) 
Leva Kanbi Patel 5) 
Kadva Patidar Patel 1) 
Totals 142 
Patels 
III 
72.08% 
92.2% 
OVERALL TOTAL = 154 100.01% 
Source: Hahlo 1983. 
Caste Varna: Brahman 
2 
1 
1 
Brahman 
Lingayat 
Bawa 
Total: 4 2.6% 
Caste Varna: Kshatriya 
Kshatriya 1 
Total: 1 0.65% 
Caste Varna: 
Solanki 
Rohit Chauhan 
Rajput Dhobi 
Total: 
Shudra 
2 
3 
1 
6 3.9% 
Other: Ramgharia Sikh 
Sikh 1 
Total: 1 0.65% 
Some 92% of Hindus belong to the Vaishya varna, the remainder are 
Brahmans, Kshatriyas, Shudras and Sikhs. Although twenty-eight different 
castes are represented in the sample, some castes are not represented in 
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the sample, for instance Soni, Mochi, Darji, Halpati, Thakkar, Parmar, 
Gohil and Valand. The majority (72%) of Hindus belong to one of the 
IIpatel li castes. Although the title patel superficially confers a degree 
of homogeneity on this group because they share a common name, they 
comprise a diverse collection of unrelated caste communities tracing 
their origins to different parts of Gujarat (see below). Not only does 
each caste name indicate a social difference, but those sharing the same 
name do not necessarily come from the same part of Gujarat. Therefore, 
they do not regard each other as social equals. One group of patels who 
are not clearly identified as patels are Kolis. They are included with 
the Patels, because today most of them prefer to be known as Mandhata 
Patels. Locally the Leva Patels and Mandhata Patels represent the 
largest of the caste communities. 
By tradition members of different castes perform different 
occupational roles. The combination of occupation and religious notions 
of purity and pollution form the basis of the caste hierarchy. 
Migration to Britain has meant that Hindus have had to accept jobs 
which bear no relation to their positions within the caste system. 
Migration has created opportunities for Hindus to achieve upward social 
mobility by either maintaining occupations associated with their caste 
positions or, more likely, abandoning these for new occupations. If 
anything, chain migration has made it even more difficult for Hindus to 
establish occupational relationships with members of other castes 
(cf.Desai,1963:S7-S8). The majority of Hindus in this sample have 
abandoned their caste related occupations in favour of typical urban-
industrial jobs. It is possible for some Hindus to practise their 
traditional occupations, for instance jewellers and carpenters, but in 
practice this is not easily achievable for the majority. Though many 
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members of business and trading castes, such as patels, have succeeded 
in establishing thriving grocery businesses serving mainly Gujarati 
communities, only a few members of other castes have managed to follow 
their traditional occupations. One caste whose members have established 
themselves in this way are the Sonis, who manage much of the trade in 
Indian jewellery in the north-west of England. Most Hindus recognise 
that weddings, cremations and other rituals require the services of a 
Brahman; in 1976, there were two Brahmans who could perform the role 
and this they did as part-time occupations over and above their full-
time jobs in mills. The remainder of the sample held jobs which are 
unrelated to their caste occupations. 
Generally Hindus have accepted a wide range of jobs: 35.71% of them 
worked in textile mills, but the occupations of the majority (64.29%) 
were disassociated from mills. These included electricians, bus drivers, 
washing machine mechanics, builders, joiners and a few of the younger 
ones were students (12.99%). Only a few (5.19%) were unemployed or 
retired persons. Those who came from outside Gujarat held jobs which are 
classified as Class I. The Brahmans and the Kshatriyas were doctors who 
traced their origins to Calcutta (Bengal), Indore (Madya Pradesh), 
Maharastra and Patna (Bihar) respectively, and with the exception of one 
doctor. Three others, the Sikh, a Mistry and the Zarola Bania, also 
held jobs which placed them in Class I, namely lecturer, tax officer and 
accountant. Of these three, two are Gujaratis and the third is a Sikh 
who traced his origins to the Punjab in Pakistan. Thus, most Hindus had 
accepted low-paying and often insecure jobs, which placed them in the 
semiskilled and unskilled Manual Class (Class VII), while those who came 
from other states in India hold jobs which are the better paid and 
professional. The modern work environment has brought together members 
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of castes who in a traditional caste setting might have been separated 
by their interdependence of skills. Some can recreate interdependencies, 
like a few doctors who can force such relationships upon their 
colleagues and patients, or shopkeepers who can foster such 
relationships with customers (cf. Desai,1963:S7-60). For the majority, 
however, the work situation in an urban environment serves to undermine 
traditional caste relationships. 
In one way the relationship between caste and occupation has become 
obscured through the process of migration; in another it has become more 
important than ever. Caste identity has become an important social 
identity that provides direction to certain social activities for 
Hindus, such as selecting spouses for their children, and being able to 
identify structures of social and financial support that are immediately 
accessible to them. As an identity it unites those who share it, but 
separates them from those who do not. 
Caste and District of Origin 
District of origin provides a guide to caste identity in so far as it 
locates castes within the wider geographical and social framework. 
Although its relevance in Bolton appears to be remote, on the one hand 
it provides Hindus with a shorthand guide to the identification of the 
social positions of related and unrelated castes. On the other hand, it 
provides a social identity which is based upon either a common social 
experience or a shared life-style. 
The majority of respondents (Table 2.8) came from Surat district 
and many of these came from the Navsari area. Another large group of 
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Hindus traced their origins to Kutch district. Common origins provide 
social identities around which three caste communities have formed, 
these are Kutchi (32.5%), Surti (27.3%) and Mandhata Patels (21.4%). 
These factions are collections of patel castes, whose members perceive 
of each other as roughly socially equal. They have developed 
organisations, generally of a religious nature, which serve their social 
and religious needs. For instance the Kutchi Patels shared in the 
emergence of the Swaminarayan sects the new face of Hinduism 
(Williams,1984). The Surti Patels share in the older face of Hinduism 
and the Mandhata Patels come from an area around the city of Navsari and 
share in a move to elevate their status within their varna. Furthermore, 
common geographical locations provide these collections of castes with 
social identities. In addition, these identities unite each collection 
of patels, but divide them from the non-patel castes. 
Table 2.8: Origin of Hindu Respondents by District 
Districts Castes 
Surat 42 27.27% 
Navsari in Surat 33 21.43% 
Kathiawar 13 8.44% 
Kutch 50 32.47% 
Ahmadabad 6 3.9% 
Gujarat 1 0.65% 
Other* 9 5.84% 
Total: 154 100% 
* These respondents did not state their district of orlgln in Gujarat, 
but they are Gujaratis and come from the districts that the majority of 
their caste originate from. The Rajput Rana came from Daman. 
Usually, those who share such an identity can also share food, although 
they do not recognise equality in marriage. Geographical identities 
provide Hindus with a ready-made guide to a common sense model of a 
caste hierarchy based upon perceived social distance, which they express 
in terms of status differences; it enables them to define those who are 
socially equal from those who are socially unequal. 
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Caste and Social Mobility 
Without any common geographical base, it has proved to be difficult 
for members of different castes to develop a common social identity, 
irrespective of whether the identity was real or apparent. It is 
acceptable to argue that migration strips the migrants of their social 
identities, however it also needs to be recognised that migration allows 
migrants to create new identities and to claim new status within the 
caste hierarchy. There are three separate instances of castes or members 
of castes who experienced either upward or downward social mobility 
during the period of research. They reflect some of the opportunities 
for mobility that accompany the experience of migration. Furthermore, 
they highlight some of the issues underlying the establishment of 
social equality between different castes. The process of status change 
that Kanbis underwent before adopting the title Patidar (Pocock,1972) is 
one example and the rise of the Kutchi Patels through the Swaminarayan 
movement is another (Williams,1984). 
One group of Patels who used migration to improve their caste 
position within their varna are the Mandhata Patels. When asked some 
Mandhata Patels referred to themselves as Koli Mandhata Patels; some 
professed to not knowing the name Koli, and others referred to 
themselves as Kolis. "The term Koli ... refers to an assortment of people 
who owned little land and who were presumably of tribal origin" 
(Pocock,1972:30; Mandelbaum, 1972:462). Mandelbaum describes them as low 
caste agriculturalists, or agricultural labourers who have 
'Sanskritized' and 'Rajputized' themselves (1972:462-463). However, 
neither Mandelbaum (1972) nor Pocock (1972) make reference to a Mandhata 
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Patel caste; and Morris (1968) does not mention Mandhata Patels living 
in Uganda. The chairperson of the Mandhata Patel Caste Association gave 
the following explanation for the origin of their caste name: In 
Gujarat their caste name was Koli. Migration to East Africa gave Kolis 
the opportunity to improve themselves, and many became successful 
businessmen, teachers and doctors. The caste association established a 
fund to assist their members to obtain an education, training or to 
establish businesses. With the success of their members, they decided 
to change their caste name to Mandhata Patel. Today he asserts that his 
caste is the largest in Bolton and has high caste status. It would seem 
that here is an example of a caste whose members have used a recognised 
social process for raising their caste position in conjunction with the 
opportunities presented by migration. 
Another caste which may have used a similar process to alter its 
status in the caste hierarchy are Mistry. In Gujarat they claim that 
they were known as Kumbar. Though I did not pursue the explanation for 
this change of caste name, it is interesting to note that both Mistry 
and Koli established strong caste associations in East Africa which they 
brought to Britain. Both caste associations took decisions to limit the 
amount of dowry to be paid, because members of both became aware of the 
large amounts of money that the grooms' families are expecting to have 
spent on them in the form of presents. A consequence of this expenditure 
was that the brides' families were often crippled financially. This only 
led to the impoverishment of the caste [7]. 
In the 70s such decisions by caste associations illustrated their 
concern to protect their caste position by changing names allied to 
bargaining for new and higher status, to controlling the size of dowry 
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payments and to outcasteing errant members. The maintenance of caste 
rules by members brings caste approval; the breaking of caste rules 
brings opprobrium and sometimes punishment. The decision to outcaste 
and to administer the decision is an indication of the strength or 
weakness of a caste association. For instance in 1975-76 a Bolton Hindu, 
whom I shall call Mr P, his family and those of his children were 
declared outcastes by their caste association, the Shree Sarvodaya Samaj 
(UK). The issue which led to his outcasteing revolved around his 
decision to marry a third wife. After his first wife's death, his 
relatives helped him select a second wife. After living with her for a 
year, he sent her back to Gujarat to manage as best as she could without 
him. It was said that her family in Gujarat refused to look after her 
because they were too poor and she was no longer their responsibility as 
they had paid her dowry. As a result of the shock at being sent back to 
India and the treatment meted out to her as a single woman without a 
husband, she is reported to have become mentally ill. She died five 
years after being set back to Gujarat. 
Although apparently not legally divorced from his second wife, Mr P 
decided to marry for a third time. His kin in Gujarat found him another 
partner. After the marriage was arranged, he discovered by chance that 
the woman had two sons by a previous marriage. When his two sons learned 
of the existence of their prospective stepmother's two sons, they 
objected to the marriage. Their objection was made on the grounds that, 
according to Hindu custom, all males in a family share rights to the 
family estate and contribute to its upkeep. They realised that when 
their father married, their stepmother's two sons would gain rights as 
males to property to which they had never contributed. Having got their 
father drunk one night, they persuaded him to sign a change of deeds in 
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their favour. Thus, they seized control of the family property and in a 
sense usurped their father's authority and power. They threatened to 
make this knowledge public, thus shaming him, if he went through with 
the marriage. 
After making and breaking the arrangements for the marriage on 
numerous occasions over the period of a year, Mr P decided against the 
marriage even though he had fixed another date for the wedding. By now 
the woman was in Britain, living with her kin in Leicester awaiting his 
final decision. In an effort to encourage Mr P to make a positive 
decision, his caste association representatives offered him a 
compromise: he could go through with the marriage, thus giving this 
woman who came from a poor family the legal chance to live here. In 
return the association would support her and her sons socially and 
financially. The caste association made it clear that they would 
disapprove if he withdrew from the marriage, and that he and his family 
would be in danger of being outcaste. This implied that he and his 
family would be isolated from his kin and caste. Thus, the decision Mr P 
faced to all intents and purposes was a "Hobson's choice". If he married 
the woman as he intended, he would have the support of his caste 
association, but his sons would have control of the estate. They might 
shame him publicly as well as privately by revealing his inferior social 
status within his family, as well as making him aware of his insecure 
financial position. If he chose to withdraw from the marriage, then his 
sons apparently indicated that they would return the control of the 
estate to him. If he did not go through with the marriage, the officers 
of the association said that they would consider what sanctions the 
association should mete out to him and his family. 
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Mr P chose to withdraw from the marriage, and by coincidence this was 
followed by a Home Office order on his "wife-to-be" to leave the 
country. Both the men's and women's committees of his caste association 
decided to outcaste him and his family. A letter from the association 
was sent to all caste members (Appendix III) instructing them not to 
socialise with any member of the P family, unless they too wished to be 
outcaste. The outcasteing had other more immediate and unhappy 
consequences for Mr P's daughter who was to be married about this time. 
Few of the invited guests attended the wedding, because they had 
received the letter threatening them with outcasteing if they had 
anything to do with this family. The bridegroom, who came from Gujarat, 
only heard about the decision of the association after his marriage. He 
took his frustration and anger out on his wife, who after enduring a 
battering for several weeks appealed to the local Community Relations 
Officer (CRO) to force her husband to stop beating her. The CRO could do 
little except advise her to seek some kind of separation (see Chap.6). 
An outcasteing of a Hindu by his own caste community is a certain 
sign of strength and control. This case illustrates the importance of 
caste community approval for Hindus. Not only do associations take on 
the role of community monitors, but they are also a resource offering 
their members a wide range of benefits, which include financial, social 
and psychological support. Efforts by caste members to maintain what 
they believe to be their appropriate social status reinforces the social 
importance of the caste hierarchy in the Hindu communities. However, the 
strength of Hindus' commitment to caste customs serves to divide rather 
than unite them. To obtain a measure of the strength of caste customs 
respondents were asked to rank seven customs which Hindus informed me 
are of great importance to them; these are to avoid eating meat, to 
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marry within caste, to cremate the dead within 24 hours, to eat food 
cooked only by members of one's caste, to arrange marriages of daughters 
when they reach the age of sixteen, to maintain caste superiority, and 
to belong to one's caste association. The responses of the Hindus 
indicate that there is a reasonable degree of agreement on the need to 
cremate the dead within twenty-four hours; some 49% ranked this custom 
as being very important. Attitudes to marriage within caste and the 
avoidance of meat were ranked as being of generally lower importance, 
although neither of these two customs was ranked as convincingly 
unimportant. The attitude to the remaining four customs is that they are 
unimportant, though membership of one's caste association is regarded as 
more important than the other three. 
Though the Hindus generally support social values and rules that 
enable them to maintain the endogamous boundaries of their castes, some 
of the same values are shared by members of different castes. The 
support of caste values divides castes at one level, at another forms 
the basis for the development of social identities and social 
organisations. To analyse the commitment of some Hindus to caste rules, 
I shall restrict the analysis to the patels who form the majority of the 
sample and the population. 
The "Patels" 
The title patel is claimed by Hindus (and Muslims) and they comprise 
the majority of Hindus in the local population. Although some Hindus and 
some Sunni Vohra Muslims (Misra,1964:l70) have taken the name Patel, the 
Hindus use it as if it is part of a caste name [8]. 
his caste as solely "patel" (cf. Pocock,1972:56); 
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No Hindu refers to 
usually some other 
caste name is attached to it such as Leva Patel or Kanbi Patel. The best 
known of the patel castes comprise the Leva, Patidar, Kadva, Kanbi, Leva 
Patidar, Leva Kanbi and Kadva Patidar Patel communities, which form a 
complex set of inter-related castes (cf. Pocock, 1972:56). These castes 
can be separated into Kutchi and Surti Patels. Separate from them are 
another group of patels, namely the Mandhata Patels who come from 
Navsari and who were members of the Koli caste (see above and below). 
Only four respondents traced their origins to the Charotar area, and 
none came from the famous "six" Charotar villages (Pocock, 1972:2) [9]. 
Three Kutchi castes are represented in the sample, they are Leva 
Patels, Kanbi Patels and Leva Kanbi Patels [10]. Members of these 
castes perceive of themselves as equal, if not superior, to patels from 
Charotar and Surat districts. When these Kutchis were asked to rank in 
order of importance seven caste-related values and customs (Table 2.9), 
some 85% ranked as being very important cremation of the dead within 
twenty-four hours, 61% the avoidance of meat, and 48% marriage in-
caste. Belonging to one's caste association, eating food cooked only by 
members of one's own caste and the maintenance of the superior position 
of one's caste were considered to be of lesser importance. Yet it was a 
disagreement over the cooking of food that led to some of these patels 
to state that when in hospital, they would have to refuse all hospital 
food [11]. They are strict vegetarians avoiding eating meat and eggs, 
mushrooms, garlic and onions (cf. Dubois, 1959:189). They make use of 
'hot' and 'cold' categories for organising ingredients for meals, for 
diagnosing illness and for prescribing medicines. It would seem that for 
these patels the avoidance of meat can be linked to the rise of the new 
face of Hinduism (cf. Williams,1984). The strict adherence to a 
vegetarian diet is a characteristic of one process of upward social 
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mobility, namely 'sanskritization' (Mandelbaum,1972). 
Table 2.9: Ranking of Caste-related Customs regarded as Very Important 
by Kutchi, Surti and Mandhata Patels* 
Cremate dead 
Kutchi 
Patels 
Very 
Important 
No. % 
Surti 
Patels 
Very 
Important 
No. % 
Mandhata 
Patels 
Very 
Important 
No. % 
within 24 hrs. 39 84.78 11 40.74 8 32 
Avoid eating 
meat 28 60.87 7 25.93 
Marry in-
caste 22 47.83 11 40.74 6 24 
Belong to 
one's caste 
association 9 19.57 
Eat food cooked 
by members of 
one's own caste 5 10.87 
* Where less than 10% have agreed that a custom 1S very important, I 
have not recorded it in this Table. 
Surti Patels define themselves as being separate from the Kutchi and 
Mandhata Patels. Their commitment to caste customs suggests that they 
are less concerned with their caste status than are those from Kutch 
(Table 2.9). Few respondents from these castes consider as very 
important the observance of customs like in-caste marriage (41%), the 
avoidance of eating meat (26%), and none regarded eating food cooked by 
members of one's own caste as very important. The majority of these 
respondents consider the avoidance of eating meat, membership of one's 
caste association, eating food cooked by members of one's caste, and the 
maintenance of the superiority of one's caste's position as unimportant. 
A possible explanation for these responses could be that no religious 
reforms took place in Surat district in recent times that might have 
united these castes in the way that the Swaminarayan movement brought 
together the Kutchi Patels. The order in which they ranked caste customs 
and values as being important reflects a less positive attitude to the 
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maintenance of caste status. Many Surti Pate1s eat meat and eat with 
friends who belong to other castes. They are widening the range of 
people with whom they associate, but in the process they are losing 
their basis for developing a caste identity amongst themselves. By doing 
this they are also in danger of separating themselves from other Hindu 
castes. Today they form the largest group of supporters of the Vishwa 
Hindu Parishad (VHP), a multi-caste based religious organisation. 
In contrast to the Kutchi and Surti Pate1s, Mandhata/ Ko1i Pate1s 
have achieved upward social mobility (see above). The aim of these 
pate1s to improve their caste status is part of an ongoing process. Thus 
the customs and values that they considered to be very important reflect 
a totally different set of opinions (Table 2.9). Members of virtually 
every caste ranked cremation of the dead within 24 hours as being very 
important, but only a third of these Pate1s considered it very 
important. In marked contrast to the other castes, they attached the 
least importance to the avoidance of eating meat. Rather than following 
the usual paths of upward social mobility within the caste hierarchy, 
such as changing their name, these Patels are relinquishing many of the 
normally accepted symbols of upward mobility. 
These three groups of patels present a contrast between the 
Leva, Patidar and Kanbi Patel castes, who believe in their established 
high status within the caste system compared to other patels and other 
castes in the Vaishya varna; the Surti Pate1s whose commitment to caste 
values is either not as great as that of the Kutchis, and is possibly 
even diminishing; and the Mandhata Pate1s whose commitment to these same 
values is minimal. A consequence of such a varying pattern of commitment 
to caste values is that these Hindus are being increasingly separated by 
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them. Thus the shared title of "patel" may provide a common social 
identity, but other than that they comprise three disparate communities. 
These changes herald a breakdown in the caste system based upon a 
gradual weakening of ties between castes. 
While opinion reflects an ideal, reality demands that these Hindus 
continue to adhere to their caste values and rules. Thus the divide 
between the castes is further cemented by in-caste marriages. Of those 
Hindu respondents who are married, some 95% married in-caste (Table 
2.10); their wives belonging to the same castes as their husbands and 
tracing their origins to villages which are part of ekadas that 
included the villages of their husbands. Only 5% of the married 
respondents married wives who either did not belong to the same caste as 
themselves or are not Hindus. 
Table 2.10: Marriages of Hindu Respondents 
Married: 
Single 
Tota 1 : 
Source: Hahlo 1983. 
in-caste 96 
out of caste 5 
Tota 1: 101 
53 
154 
95.05% 
4.95% 
100% 
34.42% 
100% 
65.58% 
Existing marriages do not provide an indication of any changes in 
the overall pattern of marriage, although it is commonly believed that 
as Asian youngsters grow up in Britain they will set aside their 
"traditional" beliefs and adopt more Western habits. An analysis of 
marriage preferences suggests that attitudes may be changing. It is 
respondents in the higher castes, rather than those in the lower castes, 
who claim to accept the notion of free choice of spouse for their 
children (Table 2.11). The possibility of marriage to any Hindu implies 
that caste is no longer socially important, and 28 (18%) of Hindu 
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respondents opted for this preference. However, the majority of 
respondents prefer their children to marry in-caste (68%). The social 
importance of in-caste marriages to these respondents provides an 
indication of the continuing endogamous nature of castes. 
Table 2.11: Respondents' Marriage Preference 
Preference 
for: 
marriage+: 
In-caste: 
In any Patel 
caste: 
Any Hindu: 
Anybody 
of their 
choice: 
Don't know: 
Totals: 
Brahmans 
m s 
3 1 
3 1 
Source: Hahlo 1983. 
+ m = married s = single 
presumed Varna 
Kshatriya Vaishya Shudra Sikh Totals 
m m s 
74 30 
m s 
1 
m 
105 
68.18% 
1 
1 
12 
1 
14 2 
1 
0.65% 
28 
18.18% 
6 2 2* 1* 1 17 
11. 04% 
213 
1.95% 
94 48 2 4 1 154 
100% 
* These were the three Rohit Chauhan respondents, all of whom were 
outcaste by their caste association (see above, and Chap.7). 
Just as the villages of the Kanbi and Patidar [12] Patels in Charotar 
district are linked together in marriage exchange circles (ekadas), so 
are the villages allover Gujarat. Therefore, it is not even considered 
feasible for a Leva Patel from Daisara near Bhuj, Kutch, to choose to 
marry a Leva Patel who comes from Pardi in Surat district. Chain 
migration, which has brought together Patels from the same varna and 
even the same caste, has also made the social divisions between them 
even more apparent. 
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Religious Organisations 
It is under the umbrella of religious organisations that Hindus 
developed organisations with simple structures of leadership and 
support. Within some of these organisations Hindus belonging to 
different castes have come together to share certain goals, such as the 
establishment of a religious and community centre. The growth and 
establishment of Hinduism in Bolton can be linked to the development of 
these religious organisations and Hindu ethnic politics. Recruitment to 
these organisations is based either on common geographical origin and a 
firm commitment to caste values; or on a loose notion of geographical 
origin and an apparent lack of commitment to caste values (Table 2.12). 
The combination of a common district of origin, and the maintenance 
of caste exclusiveness through a reinforcing set of religious beliefs 
has led to the development and growth of two Swaminarayan sects. They 
identify themselves as the Shree Kutch Satsang Swaminarayan and the 
Shree Swaminarayan Sects. They draw their followers primarily from the 
Kutchi Patels (Williams,1984; Barot,1980,1972/3; see also Chaudhuri, 
1979), although according to Williams (1984) their influence extends to 
castes elsewhere in Gujarat. Over 80% of Hindus who traced their origins 
to Kutch belonged to one or other of these sects. Furthermore, the 
majority of them are also members of the Shree Kutch Leva Patel Burial 
Society, which exclusively manages the cremations for these Patels. 
Swaminarayan beliefs allied to a social ideology of reform supported by 
values relating to caste exclusiveness make for a clear structure of 
leadership (Barot,1980). However, this leadership survives by non-
contact with and non-participation in the local CRC forum and in the 
wider political arena. Though this may give members of both Swaminarayan 
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sects social identities, it also serves to separate them from the other 
Hindus and to isolate them from the Gujarati and other minority 
communities. 
Table 2.12: Religious Affiliations of Respondents by District of Origin 
District or 
City of Shree Shree 
Origin of Swami - Kutch 
Respon- narayan Swami -
dents Mandir[13] narayan Saibaba VHP[14] Hindu Others 
% % % % % % 
Kutch 13 81. 25 19 82.61 2 10.53 13 18.31 3 13.64 1 33.33 
Kathiawar 1 6.25 2 8.7 2 10.53 6 8.45 2 9.09 
Nadiad 2 12.5 
Petlad 1 5.26 1 1. 41 
Ahmadabad 1 1.41 1 4.55 
Surat 2 8.7 5 26.32 18 25.35 6 27.27 1 33.33 
Navsari 8 42.11 27 38.03 6 27.27 1 33.33 
States: 
Gujarat 1 1. 41 
Maharastra 1 4.55 
Punjab 1 1. 41 
Cities 
Bombay 2 2.82 
Calcutta 1 4.55 
Indore 1 4.55 
Patna 1 4.55 
Daman 1 5.26 
Other 
Mombasa 1 1.41 
Totals 16 23 19 71 22 3 154 
% 100 100.01 100.01 100.01 100 100 
In Bolton, which is a recognised centre for the Swaminarayans (Barot, 
1972/3;1980), there are two temples (Chap.2, Muslims, Map.2). Moreover, 
both Swaminarayan sects share the same founder, recruit adherents from 
the same districts of Gujarat and often even from the same families. 
Relations between their followers are occasionally marked by aggression, 
which is supported by tales of inhumanity related by members of one 
sect about the behaviour of those in the other. Stories are told of how 
children are enticed away from their families and taken by the Swami to 
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sects social identities, it also serves to separate them from the other 
Hindus and to isolate them from the Gujarati and other minority 
communities. 
Table 2.12: Religious Affiliations of Respondents by District of Origin 
District or 
City of Shree Shree 
Origin of Swami - Kutch 
Respon- narayan Swami -
dents Mandir[13] narayan Saibaba VHP[14] Hindu Others 
% % % % % % 
Kutch 13 81. 25 19 82.61 2 10.53 13 18.31 3 13.64 1 33.33 
Kathiawar 1 6.25 2 8.7 2 10.53 6 8.45 2 9.09 
Nadiad 2 12.5 
Petlad 1 5.26 1 1.41 
Ahmadabad 1 1.41 1 4.55 
Surat 2 8.7 5 26.32 18 25.35 6 27.27 1 33.33 
Navsari 8 42.11 27 38.03 6 27.27 1 33.33 
States: 
Gujarat 1 1. 41 
Maharastra 1 4.55 
Punjab 1 1.41 
Cities 
Bombay 2 2.82 
Calcutta 1 4.55 
Indore 1 4.55 
Patna 1 4.55 
Daman 1 5.26 
Other 
Mombasa 1 1. 41 
Totals 16 23 19 71 22 3 154 
% 100 100.01 100.01 100.01 100 100 
In Bolton, which is a recognised centre for the Swaminarayans (Barot, 
1972/3;1980), there are two temples (Chap.2, Muslims, Map.2). Moreover, 
both Swaminarayan sects share the same founder, recruit adherents from 
the same districts of Gujarat and often even from the same families. 
Relations between their followers are occasionally marked by aggression, 
which is supported by tales of inhumanity related by members of one 
sect about the behaviour of those in the other. Stories are told of how 
children are enticed away from their families and taken by the Swami to 
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Swaminarayan sects, this movement is modern and its leader, Saibaba, 
argues that his message should have universal appeal across continents, 
religions, nations and races. It is an eclectic belief system in the 
sense that, according to those adherents to whom I spoke, one can pray 
to one's own god whoever he may be through Saibaba. As might be 
expected, the followers of Saibaba, who form a small group, are drawn 
from a wide range of districts and castes (Table 2.12). His claims to 
miraculous cures have added to the appeal of his movement. When his 
followers in 
included both 
Bolton celebrated the birth of Krishna, the worshippers 
Hindu and white believers. By establishing their 
independence by renting halls not owned or controlled by other Hindus, 
the followers of Saibaba have developed their own social identity - an 
identity separate from that of the VHP. Since 1976 this group has 
diminished in size after experiencing problems of leadership. 
In a sense by definition Hinduism is caste based; however, the VHP 
claims to be a multi-caste based organisation. This means that its 
members are not drawn from specific castes or from particular districts. 
The VHP is an international organisation whose aim is the promotion of 
Hinduism. The VHP in Bolton was, and Hindus here claim that it still is, 
the largest single branch of this organisation of any in Britain (Hindu 
Vishwa, October 1974:21). As a registered charity, the VHP endeavours to 
provide for both the religious and community needs of all Hindus and of 
anyone else who chooses to join. Thus its membership is drawn from a 
wide range of states, districts and castes (Table 2.12). 
Initially the VHP had no centre and its members hired halls to 
celebrate their festivals. Early in 1973, Mr Sandhu as I shall call him, 
a Sikh from East Africa, was elected chairperson. At the time he was 
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also a member of the local CRC. Prior to his taking up the position of 
chairman, his predecessors had unsuccessfully attempted to unite the 
membership of the VHP. The interests of castes, like that of a large 
caste such as the Mandhata Patels, led to conflicts over the control of 
money and space. Once part of the VHP, the Mandhata Patels separated 
complaining that they could not hold their festivals when it was 
convenient for them. Meanwhile members of smaller castes in the VHP 
argued that all castes should participate equally. Representatives of 
each caste on the committee were seen, rightly or wrongly, to favour 
where possible, the interests of their own castes. In 1972 it became 
clear that the VHP could not achieve its aim to become independent 
without a building of its own. While its members could not decide 
whether or not caste allegiance was more or less important than the 
establishment of a multi-caste Hindu organisation. Against this 
background of inter-caste rivalry, Mr Sandhu was elected chairman. As 
there are relatively few Sikhs in Bolton, Mr Sandhu was seen by VHP 
members to have no significant caste power base and therefore, he did 
not pose a threat to other caste representatives. 
Under his leadership, the conflicts between various caste 
representatives were shelved and he launched the VHP on a campaign to 
raise £25,000 from the local Indian population for a building to be 
purchased for use as a community centre. In 1974 he began the 
negotiations for the purchase of St. Barnabas, which belonged to the 
Church of England. The negotiations were successful and the local and 
national media claimed that this marked the first sale by the Church to 
members of a non-Christian faith in England (BEN,6/5/75, 13/5/75; 
Guardian, 7/5/75). Under his leadership, the VHP supported this purchase 
and its development into a multi-caste centre. On the ground floor, 
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which was the original sacred area, are the community facilities and on 
the first floor is a place for worship. Here Hindus of every persuasion 
can participate in community activities, religious festivals and worship 
any Hindu god of their choice. Undoubtedly, the VHP was, and still is, 
the most popular organisation if the responses of the Hindu sub-sample 
are taken as a guide; some 46% of the Hindus are members of the VHP. The 
largest proportion of these come from the Surat and Navsari districts. 
As a multi-caste organisation, its members have an opportunity to 
combine their commitment to Hinduism in a way that is convenient to them 
and acceptable to the wider Hindu community. 
Those respondents who did not belong to any religious organisations 
can be divided into two sub-categories: firstly, those who accept the 
general principles of Hinduism and caste membership but who do not wish 
to be associated with any religious organisations; secondly, those who 
are antagonistic to the VHP. Generally doctors, like many other 
professional Indians, declared their belief in Hinduism to be a general 
one. Some others, who are no longer socially and residentially linked 
to the Gujaratis, made similar claims. Quite a few of them look upon 
the VHP as a passive supporter of the caste system. 
Mandhata Patels set out to demonstrate that their power lay in the 
size of their community. Initially, they belonged to the VHP, but found 
themselves in conflict with them over decisions about the timing and 
place for holding festivals. They argued that their need for a 
community centre was as great as that of the VHP, and expressed their 
hostility towards the VHP publicly in the press and privately within the 
confines of the Hindu community. At one point they argued publicly that 
the VHP should not be given an urban aid grant of £40,000 for improving 
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their centre, as this would be detrimental to the interests of the whole 
"Indian" population. This protest illustrated the depth of the rivalry 
between this large caste and the other smaller castes. Finally in 1980 
the Mandhata Patels bought a church which they converted into a temple. 
Unfortunately, a few years later it was damaged by arson. They repaired 
the damage and today are an established and thriving community. 
Some evidence of a conflict of social identity can be seen in the 
commitment of Hindus to their castes associations and sects over and 
above their commitment to the VHP. This was reflected in a comment 
made by Mr Sandhu at the opening of the VHP community centre: it was 
there for the use of all Hindus, irrespective of caste or religious 
differences. Evidence for this commitment can be found in the wide range 
of statues and pictures of Hindu gods, including Saibaba, which are to 
be found in the temple. The pattern of donations to the VHP revealed 
some of the conflict that underlies the relations between various Hindu 
religious organisations. Members of the VHP make regular donations to 
it; but this does not prevent them from making donations to other 
religious organisations. It is not the commitment of Hindus to the VHP 
that is in question, but the commitment of those who belong to other 
religious organisations. 
Some 54% of respondents who are committed to other religious 
organisations also make regular donations to the VHP. The majority of 
those who did not contribute belonged to the Shree Swaminarayan sect or 
declared themselves to be just Hindus. They gave the least to the VHP 
when it most needed support. In contrast over 80% of respondents who are 
members of the Shree Kutch Swaminarayan and Saibaba sect donated money 
to the VHP. In a sense, by deliberately not undermining caste values, 
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these latter two organisations support the notion of caste. With the VHP 
having the most effective leader of all minority organisations, Hindus 
from other castes and sects were attracted to the VHP. Nevertheless, the 
link between various Hindu organisations was tenuous and in the event of 
the Sikh resigning from the leadership of the VHP, the link would break. 
This happened in 1980 when he resigned. The Mandhata Patels and the 
Parjapati Kumbars broke away, the former established their Krishna 
temple and the latter their own organisation. 
Finally, there are Hindus who do not belong to any of the existing 
religious organisations or caste associations. Generally they are well 
educated men who show little outward commitment to caste values. 
Occasionally they attend religious ceremonies at the VHP, but they 
rarely become involved in VHP activities. These individuals comprise a 
collection of Hindus with no links between them. They might support the 
VHP as the largest of the Hindu organisations, whose facilities they can 
use, with donations. These people are located on the margins of the 
Hindu communities. 
To conclude this section, the Hindus are divided at one level by 
caste, at another into factions and at a third level by religious 
commitment. At each level new social identities emerge on the basis of 
new combinations of social equality between members. With no unifying 
structure they face a problem of developing a pan-Hindu social identity. 
Hindus comprise a bricolage of castes, tracing their origins to diverse 
districts in Gujarat. Some seek to maintain both by attitude and belief 
the exclusiveness of their castes; others take a more liberal attitude 
thereby developing new complex non-caste based social identities. 
Within Bolton's Hindu population, the old and the new faces of Hinduism 
144 
clash with those of the old and new Hindu on the streets, ln the 
temples, in community centres and in the political arena. Few of these 
religious organisations have appropriate bases from which they can 
launch a social movement. Of the four which are in a position to do so, 
that is the two Swaminarayan sects, the Mandhata Patels and the VHP, 
only the latter two have used the political arena of the CRC to make a 
protest or mount a campaign to influence politicians. The crux of the 
problem for the Hindus in their search for a common identity is that 
"religion .... was never separated from their general life" (Chaudhuri, 
1979:299). 
The Hindu community is segmented by food rules which stress 
comparative hierarchy, pollution and division. By contrast, Islam 
stresses the unity of Islam versus the rest of the world. Pork for 
Muslims is forbidden, for Hindus polluting. Commensality is a religious 
prescription for Muslims. Among Hindus the caste that handles pollutes 
rather than the food being polluting. Pollution is cumulative, that is 
cooked food, faeces, beef, blood and the castes associated with them are 
increasingly polluting. Commensality divides Hindus and unites Muslims. 
Where close friendship is reinforced by commensality, the development of 
structures of support follow lines of commensality. Where commensality 
divides individuals, structures of support follow lines of social and 
religious equality. Unity and commensality for Hindus are in opposition 
to inequality and close friendship. Unity and commensality for Muslims 
support equality and close friendship. 
A number of issues come together which laid the basis for Gujarati 
ethnic politics and protest. For Hindus the social constraints of caste 
led to the establishment of independent organisations, which socially 
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separate Hindus from each other and Hindus from non-Hindu communities. 
Thus there is no link vertically or horizontally between these 
organisations. For them to become the social bases for movements of 
protest is difficult, since they have to reach across the social divides 
which underlie caste differences. For the Muslims religious differences 
are submerged beneath a common understanding of Islam. Thus able to 
separate and compete as factions and sects, they can unite behind both 
the ICC and in defence of Islam. Thus as bases for social movements the 
Islamic organisations are powerful, since their individual concerns are 
shared and the opposition to them by non-Muslim communities is also 
shared. For the Muslims greater unity placed greater constraints upon 
their leaders; for the Hindus disunity gave their leaders greater 
freedom. 
Underlying the community structures of both Muslims and Hindus are 
social networks which provide the social relationships that link members 
of both religious communities across organisational divides. With 
organisations social networks allow members of organisations to unite or 
fragment as social and religious communities. The analysis of Muslim 
organisations points to their potential to unite; the analysis of Hindu 
organisations suggests that caste allegiances in particular cause 
disunity. This Chapter described and analysed the main organisational 
participants in local ethnic politics. Leadership in these organisations 
is addressed in Chapter 5. The concept of community as a social 
construction is central to ethnic politics, since debates about the 
relationships of members of organisations to communities helps leaders 
to define support. The underlying and underpinning the community are 
social networks; an analysis of these networks forms the subject of the 
next Chapter. 
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FOOTNOTES 
1. See Barth in E.R.Le~ch (ed.), Aspects of Caste in South India, Ceylon 
and North-West Paklstan,1960. Although this may be typical of Islam 
in Gujarat, in West Africa Islam has not been found to be compatible 
with caste-like hereditary craft groups elsewhere (S.F.Nadel, A Black 
Byzantium, IAI, OUP, London, 1969,Chaps. 14-16; also J.S.Trimingham, 
'The Phases of Islamic Expansion and Islamic Culture Zones in 
Africa', in I.M.Lewis (ed) Islam in Tropical Africa, IAI, OUP, 
London, 1966:135). 
2. The sizes of these communities today, according to Misra (1964:178), 
are Sunni Vohra - 65,000, Daudi Bohra - 21,000, Memon - 4,500, 
Nagori - c. 1,000, Khojah - c. 1000. 
3. There is no record of a caste community of this name in Misra, 1964. 
4. Sunni Vohras became known as Patels (Misra, 1964:155-170). 
5. I am indebted to the late Prof.E.L.Peters for drawing my attention 
to his paper on this subject. 
6. As a movement, tabligh originated in India in 1924, when the Deobandi 
Ulami were looking for greater political support from the Muslim 
community, the performance of tabligh offering a way to increase the 
size and the political commitment of the community (Hardy,1972:208). 
7. Today this decision has been forgotten and high dowries are now being 
paid by the father of the bride to protect her from abuse by her 
mother-in-law and other members of the family into which she 
marries. 
8. The origin of the name goes back to Mogul times, when some Kanbis 
were appointed as assistant revenue officers. They became known by 
their titles as Desai, Amin and Patel. Desai ranked highest, the 
Amin second, the Patel third. The Patel was the head man of the 
village: he had most to do with the actual assessment of taxes, 
their collection and also administered justice (Pocock, 1972:57). 
9. These six villages in Charotar District, Gujarat, became famous 
through their association with the rise of the wealthy and 
prestigious Patidar caste. 
10. For a detailed analysis of the inter-relationship between the Kanbi 
and Patidar Patel castes see Pocock, 1972 and 1973. 
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11. Representatives of the two Swaminarayan sects have argued that their 
members, when patients in the hospital, will always refuse to eat 
the food provided by the hospitals, even if the individual 
ingredients were acceptable. The only food they can eat is food 
prepared by members of their sects, that is castes. 
12. Pocock has given one explanation for the orlgln of the caste term 
'patidar' (1972:1,52,69ff). Leva Patidar Patel informants told me 
that the term 'patidar' was given to Patels whose job it was to 
weigh grain. Patidar means 'weigher of grain' . 
13. Two respondents were members of both the Shree Swaminarayan sect and 
the Shree Kutch Swaminarayan sect. 
14. Anyone can belong to a sect and also be a member of the VHP; many 
were members of two organisations and donated money to both. 
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CHAPTER 3 
COMMUNITIES AND CLOSE FRIENDS 
In the previous Chapter attention was focused on social and religious 
organisations, which form the basis of structures of support and 
leadership. The aim of this Chapter is to explore the concept of 
community 
underlying 
in terms social networks which provide the community with an 
social structure. van den Berghe makes the point that the 
analysis of racial and ethnic relations should not be concentrated 
solely on cultural differences and acculturation between groups. He 
writes: lilt is important to distinguish analytically the structural 
elements of ethnic relations from the cultural ones. The dynamics of 
group membership, solidarity, and conflict, and the network of 
structured relationships both within and between groups, are at least as 
essential to an understanding of ethnic relations as the cultural 
dynamics of group contact II (van den Berghe,1970:150). If the social 
structure of a community is defined lias a persisting pattern of social 
relationships among social positions" (Laumann, 1973:3-4), 
of Gujarati social networks and particularly close 
relationships should provide an understanding of the 
structure of Gujarati communities and their social 
an analysis 
friendship 
underlying 
boundaries. 
Furthermore an analysis of close friendship will provide a measure of 
the extent to which Gujaratis are prepared to invest one of their valued 
social relationships, close friendship, in relationships with their 
social equals and unequals within and without their own communities. 
All studies of the poor point to their having less access to scarce 
resources such as political and economic power, wealth and information, 
than those who are better off (Goldthorpe,1980; Miles, 1982, Townsend, 
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1979). One characteristic of such studies is that they stress the 
absence of social relationships between those in power and those 
without it (Lin,1982; Laumann and Pappi,1976). Without any clear base 
within the formal white political power structure for the development 
of political power in the 1970s (Rex and Tomlinson,1979), the Hindus and 
Muslims have at least two options: they could develop their social 
networks into structures of support within their communities or they 
could extend their friendship to those with power belonging to other 
communities, namely the white politicians and businessmen. My argument 
is that they chose the former, because it enabled them to strengthen 
their existing power bases in social and religious organisations by 
controlling information (Chap.6). Whereas to do the latter might 
strengthen them, but it would expose them to racism. 
Community 
When attributing a social identity to themselves, people describe 
themselves as being part of a community (Cohen,1982). This implies a 
sharing of cultural background, social relations and sometimes a 
geographical boundary (Cohen,1982:3-7,9-11). A shared identity as 
reflected in this use of the term community also implies that those who 
recognise it do so, because they either share in it or are excluded from 
sharing in it (Emmett,1982:207). The extent to which people can share in 
a social identity is dependent upon the social distance between 
themselves and those who identify or give expression to it in a social 
situation. If social identities are arranged in order of their 
exclusiveness-inclusiveness, Cohen argues that the arrangement provides 
in a deceptively simple sense a structure of social identities (Cohen, 
1982:10). I am suggesting that in a general sense all people who live in 
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Britain today can define their belonging in terms of labels which 
describe identities or communities. The exclusiveness or inclusiveness 
of social identities give some indication of the extent to which they 
are shared by others. 
When Gujaratis refer to themselves as Gujaratis, as Hindus or 
Muslims, as members of a caste, as members of a village or faction, they 
speak of themselves as belonging to a community. The term community is 
used by Gujaratis to describe the social identities that are inclusive 
to themselves. At levels of ascending social interaction (inclusiveness) 
the definition of community becomes increasingly simplified and 
generalised, whereas at levels of descending interaction (exclusiveness) 
the definition of community increases in specificity. At one level, 
Hindus and Muslims use the term community (kom) when referring to the 
castes and caste communities. At another level, they use community when 
referring to Hindus or Muslims who attend their mosques or temples. For 
instance, the Muslims claim that their most specific identification is 
the label "Sunni Vohra". The term community as used by the Hindus 
shares certain similarities with the way Muslims use it, but there are 
differences. They also use caste labels to describe themselves. Only 
officers of Hindu and Muslim organisations like the VHP and ICC speak of 
the Hindu or the Muslim community. 
The social importance of the notion of community to Gujaratis is that 
it has social and ideological relevance. For instance Desai (1963: 55ff) 
describes how Indian businessmen depend upon the support of their caste 
community. Where a Gujarati establishes a business, its success depends 
as much upon the support of his community as it does upon his knowledge 
of the business and the market he seeks to exploit. Those who establish 
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businesses without a community to support them face risk of failure. 
Shia Daudi Bohora, Khojah and Memon respondents all spoke of "not 
having" a community to support them. An number of instances illustrate 
this: firstly, a Leva Patel started a business selling vegetables and 
groceries. The particular customers he sought were other Leva and Kanbi 
Patels, Kutchi Swaminarayans, whose women have a reputation for being 
discerning buyers. By attracting these customers, he acquired a name for 
selling vegetables and spices that became recognised by women of other 
caste communities as being of good quality and fresh. Once he had 
obtained the support of these Patels, his success was assured. He 
prospered and his business expanded. 
Another instance which highlighted this point arose in the context of 
competition between driving schools for customers. By 1974 many 
Gujaratis began looking for jobs outside the textile industry. A number 
established driving schools; these gave them the opportunity to become 
self-employed and to respond to a growing demand for driving lessons 
from Gujaratis. A Memon established a driving school which he believed 
to be supported by an increasing number of clients, Muslim, Hindu and 
white, who had been referred by his past pupils. Towards the end of 1979 
his business suddenly declined. He attributed the decline to there not 
being a large Memon community to support him, but it could have been 
caused by competition from an increasing number of Gujarati and 
Pakistani owned schools which had sprung into existence. Shortly 
afterwards his business collapsed and he moved to Glasgow where there is 
a large Memon community. By contrast a Mandhata Patel's driving school 
business, which was established soon after that of the Memon, survived 
and prospered because he could draw on the support of his own large 
caste community. The community looks after its members. 
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The other contexts in which notions of community are crucial include 
arrangement of marriages, the acceptance of cooked food and water, whom 
one can touch and from whom one can receive help and on whom one can 
trust and rely. The community explanation has a more complex aetiology 
than is suggested by these examples. The awareness and experience of 
culture, as defined by the notion of community, is of sociological 
importance, and its importance lies in the interpretation and analysis 
of social interaction that is meaningful to the actors (cf. Willis, 
1979). The action that is meaningful emerges through the establishment 
of social relationships, such as close friendship, supported by a 
dynamic culture which strengthens the ties between Gujaratis, between 
Gujaratis and other minorities and between Gujaratis and the white 
community. Although there are other such relationships, as between 
people in business, I shall concentrate upon close friendship. 
Close Friendship: a strong tie 
There are many social relationships which link Gujaratis to members 
of other communities. Some relationships are based upon social equality 
and one such is friendship. Friendship overrides differences of social 
inequality. Three characteristics are identifiable as being associated 
with friendship: autonomy (as opposed to ascription), unpredictability 
(as opposed to routinisation) and terminality (as opposed to open-
endedness) (Paine,1969:519). A kinship relationship differs from that 
of close friendship in that it is involuntary, public and ascribed. 
Close friendship differs from acquaintanceship in that the latter is 
neither a relationship of confidence or intimacy and therefore, is not 
terminal. Acquaintanceship may develop into friendship but it also may 
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not. Ordinary friendship I shall regard as a relationship in between 
close friendship and acquaintanceship. Furthermore, as I have defined 
close friendship, it is possible for ego to have as close friends, two 
individuals who dislike or even hate each other. What is important to 
this thesis is ego's decision to have them as close friends, not their 
decisions to not have each other as close friends. 
By the term friendship I mean individuals who are paired in the same 
role (friend/friend). Friendship is a voluntary role, which can occur 
within an ascribed role such as a kinship relationship, that is kin can 
be friends. As a voluntary role its affective content is dependent upon 
a "sense of worth" (Briggs in Paine, 1969). The implication is that 
friendships can cross social divides between social class and race. An 
assumption that underlies this argument is that those who share a 
similar set of deeply held social attitudes, values and beliefs are also 
those who share similar social positions in a society. "Similarities in 
status, attitudes, beliefs, and behaviour facilitate the formation of 
intimate (or consensual) relationships among incumbents of social 
positions" (Laumann,1979:386); stated simply, like attracts like. 
This analysis will concentrate on the primary zone in social networks 
in which are to be found close friends (Chap.4). A social network is "a 
specific set of linkages among a defined set of persons, with the 
additional property that the characteristics of these linkages as a 
whole may be used to interpret the social behaviour of the persons 
involved" (Mitchell, 1971:2). From the actor's point of view, the 
individuals in the social network are definable in such a manner that 
they are not confused with persons who lie outside it. It is this 
information that enables the actor to make abstractions about his 
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network as compared with the networks of others (Niemeijer,1973:50). 
This is an egocentred social network in which social relations are 
organised around an anchor person (cf. Boissevain, 1974;1968). Radiating 
out from the actor are direct, reciprocal relationships with a unique 
set of individuals whom he refers to as kin, close friends and friends 
of lesser degree, such as ordinary friends and acquaintances. In the 
sense that an actor creates his own social network both actor and 
observer can regard it as being a bounded group [1]. As a system it 
provides an individual with access to resources as well as acting as a 
channel for controlling incoming and outgoing information and ideas 
about what are appropriate attitudes, values, beliefs and forms of 
social behaviour. Therefore, social networks need to be analysed in 
terms of their social and structural characteristics; I shall analyse 
first the social and the structural characteristics. I shall begin by 
analysing the size of these networks. 
Size 
Size is the characteristic of zones which forms the basis for most 
network analyses. To avoid the problem of overloading a few ties, the 
number of possible close friends were restricted to ten, excluding 
anchor persons. This was done for the following reasons: (a) to avoid 
the lack of analytical continuity associated with too low numbers - such 
as in the case of three close friendships; (b) to recognise that people 
draw a distinction between their "best" and "close" friends [2]; (c) 
to allow for a variation in the number of close friendships between one 
and ten [3], and (d) to recognise that these close friends are the most 
likely of all friends to exercise control over an anchor point. Though 
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the number of close friends was limited to ten, most of them identified 
ten or fewer close friends (Table 3.1). A number claimed to have no 
close friends [4], but then identified ten close friends. Most Hindus 
claimed to have between three and six close friends, while most Muslims 
identified between three and five close friends. The mean sizes of these 
primary zones show that those of Hindus (5.56 persons) are slightly 
larger than those of Muslims (5.1 persons). Although a restriction was 
placed upon the overall number of close friends, in practice few 
respondents had more than ten close friends. 
Table 3.1: Size of Primary Zones in Gujaratis' Social Networks 
HINDUS MUSLIMS 
Size Fre- Percent- Size Fre- Percent-
quency age quency age 
0 9 5.84 0 14 13.46* 
1 3 1. 95 1 6 5.77 
2 7 4.55 2 7 6.73 
3 17 11.04 3 12 11.54 
4 22 14.29 4 11 10.57 
5 29 18.83 5 13 12.5 
6 21 13.64 6 6 5.77 
7 3 1. 95 7 4 3.85 
8 9 5.84 8 4 3.85 
9 3 1. 95 9 1 0.96 
10 31 20.13 10 26 25 
Totals: 154 100.01 104 100 
Mean sizes of zones: Hindus = 5.56 persons and Muslims = 5.1 persons. 
What is important about close friends is how they can help one 
another gain access to information, support, opportunities or resources. 
To analyse these aspects of the social characteristics of networks, I 
shall employ the concept of reachability. Reachability I define in 
terms of the accessibility of close friendships across community, 
geographical and class boundaries. Access to scarce resources, be they 
wealth, power, influence or information, can be gained through personal 
achievement or through ties with other persons who have access to them. 
Reachability can be evaluated in terms of knowledge passed on by 
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colleagues (Coleman, Katz and Menzel,1977; Erbe,1977) or skills at 
networking (Laumann and Pappi,1976). Basically reachability depends upon 
frequency of contact, which depends to some extent upon geographical 
proximity and social standing. Reachability is a complex concept 
comprising a number of elements which facilitate or impede access to 
resources through others. 
For instance an analysis of the ethnic identities of close friends 
will show to what extent Gujaratis have taken the opportunity to extend 
friendships across community boundaries. I shall define reachability in 
terms of homogeneity/heterogeneity, residential location, frequency of 
contact and freedom of association. Given the political climate of the 
1970s, I shall argue that Gujaratis were able to transform their 
religious organisations into power bases, through investing in close 
friendships with people within their communities, who were residentially 
close to them, allowing for a high frequency of contact, but done at the 
expense of overriding the social rewards that might be brought by the 
freedom to associate with close friends belonging to different ethnic 
groups and different social classes. I shall analyse the concept of 
reachability beginning by looking at the ethnic background of close 
friends (homogeneity/heterogeneity), then their places of residence, 
frequency of contact and finally their social standing. 
(a) Homogeneity/Heterogeneity 
The concepts of homogeneity or heterogeneity are used to describe 
zones in terms of the ethnic membership of the close friends of 
respondents. Homogeneity will be used to describe zones in which 
all close friends of an anchor point belong to the same ethnic group and 
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accept the same religion. Heterogeneity will be used to describe zones 
which include one or more close friends who are Gujarati but accept a 
different set of beliefs to those held by the respondent and/or belong 
to other ethnic communities and/or the white community and the remaining 
close friends are Gujaratis who belong to the same ethnic group and 
accept the same beliefs as the anchor point. 
The Gujarati population comprises 5.2% of the total population of 
Bolton; Muslims make up about 3% and Hindus 2.2% of it, with the smaller 
minorities, such as the Pakistanis and West Indians, comprising 0.3% the 
(see Chap.I). On the basis of the principle of homophily Gujaratis 
should establish most of their close friendships with Gujaratis on the 
grounds that they share similar racial and political disadvantages 
while also sharing the most positive social characteristics in common, 
such as membership of the same ethnic group, the same religion, elements 
of the same caste system or caste community. The corollary of the 
principle of homophily is that the greatest social distance should 
separate those who share the least in common: since they share the least 
in common with members of the white community, who are also those 
perceived to racially and politically disadvantage them, Gujaratis 
should have few white close friends. After investing in close 
friendships within their own religious communities, Hindus and Muslims 
should prefer establishing close friendships with those in other 
minorities, before establishing similarly intense friendships with 
members of the white community. 
Altogether some 530 Muslim close friends are located within some 90 
Muslim anchored zones and 857 Hindu close friends are to be found in 145 
Hindu anchored zones. An analysis of close friends in primary zones of 
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social networks shows that the majority of close friends, Hindus (58%) 
and Muslims (65%), of Gujarati respondents belong to the same ethnic and 
religious groups as they do (Table 3.2). As a percentage of the total 
number of zones, 72% (65) of Muslim and 66% (96) of Hindu zones are 
comprised of only such close friends. Therefore, the majority of 
Gujarati anchored zones are homogeneous. This supports the hypothesis 
that like attracts like. 
Table 3.2: Distribution of Close Friends in Homogeneous and 
Heterogeneous Network Zones* 
Homogeneous Heterogeneous 
Zones Zones 
Respondents No. % No. % Totals 
Muslim (65) 343 64.72% (25) 187 35.28% 530 100% 
Hindus (96) 498 58.11% (49) 359 41.89% 857 100% 
* Muslims (14) and Hindus (9) who have no close friends have been 
excluded. 
The remaining zones comprise various combinations of close friends 
belonging to the same communities as and different communities to the 
anchor points. Therefore, these zones are described as being 
heterogeneous. In terms of individuals, 35.3% of Muslim and 41.9% of 
Hindu close friends are anchored in these zones. These close friends are 
to be found in 27.8% of Muslim and 33.8% of Hindu anchored zones. Thus a 
third and less of zones anchored by respondents contain one or more 
close friends belonging to different communities. At first sight this 
suggests that a third of respondents are prepared to establish close 
friendships across ethnic communities. It also suggests that Hindus are 
more prepared to accept into close friendship members of other 
communities than are Muslims. 
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However, more detailed analysis of the social identities of close 
friends in these heterogeneous zones shows that the majority are 
Gujaratis who belong to the same religious communities as the 
respondents (Table 3.3). Some 54.5% of close friends in Muslim anchored 
zones are Muslims and some 69.6% of close friends in Hindu zones are 
Hindus. This contradicts the impression that Hindus are more likely than 
Muslims to accept as close friends members of other ethnic groups. 
Analysis of the ethnic identities of the remaining close friends of 
Muslims show that 17.7% of Muslim close friends are Gujarati Hindus, 
15.5% are white people and a further 12.3% include Pakistanis (21), a 
West Indian and an African. In addition to the 69.6% of Hindus in Hindu 
anchored heterogeneous zones, they include 3.4% of Gujarati Muslims, 
19.5% of white people, 7.4% of friends from other ethnic communities, 
Pakistanis (22), West Indians (2) and Parsee and a Sikh. This supports 
the above finding that Hindus are reluctant to accept as close friends 
people who are not Hindu, but it also shows that they are more ready to 
have white people than Muslims as close friends. 
Table 3.3: Community Identities of Close Friends in Heterogeneous Zones 
Pakistani (21) 
Gujarati West Indian (1) 
Mus 1 im Hindu White African (1) Total 
Nos. of 
Respondents: 
Mus 1 im 102 33 29 23 187 
(25) 54.54% 17.65% 15.51% 12.3% 100% 
Pakistani (22) 
West Indian (2) 
Gujarati Par see (1) 
Mus 1 im Hindu White Sikh (1) 
Hindu 12 243 68 26 349) 
(49) 3.44% 69.63% 19.48% 7.45% 100%) 
) 359 
Sikh Hindu ) 100% 
Sikh 8 2 10) 
(1) 20% 80% 100%) 
and that the Muslims are more prepared to have Hindus than Pakistanis or 
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white people as close friends. Even with a Sikh as chairperson of the 
VHP, only one Hindu respondent had a Sikh as a close friend. No 
respondent claimed to have a Chinese or Somali close friend, the latter 
being the larger of these two very small communities. Most of Mr 
Sandhu's close friends are Sikhs (8), but he has two Hindu close 
friends. It is their presence makes his zone of close friendship 
heterogeneous. These patterns of friendship suggest that this generation 
were unwilling to commit themselves to establishing strong ties, like 
that of close friendship, with members of other communities. 
This confirms the hypothesis that Gujaratis are committed to close 
friendships with Gujaratis. It also lends support to the argument that 
the members of these two communities give the appearance of being two 
separate religious communities (Brooks and Singh, 1978/79:22). Analysis 
further shows that there is an even greater reluctance on the part of 
Gujaratis to establish strong ties with members of other minorities who 
share similar social disadvantages. Although the apparent probabilities 
of Gujaratis befriending white people is high, the actual chances of 
their doing so are low. Gujaratis would appear to consciously avoid 
strong ties with white people, possibly to avoid becoming involved in 
relationships which are likely to make them vulnerable to racial 
harassment and discrimination (cf.Smith,1976:185). 
While the inclusion of close friends from other communities is 
possible, the majority of zones comprised some combination of close 
friends who are Gujarati and members of other minority or majority 
communities. Only two zones can be identified as totally heterogeneous: 
one anchored to a doctor comprises only one close friend, a white 
shopkeeper, and the other is that of a student. Neither offers 
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convincing support for an argument that the fragmentary nature of this 
community allows for the establishment of close friendships with those 
who are not Gujarati Hindus. To establish close friendships with people 
who hold different beliefs and/or belong to other communities in such 
close communities, as these two Gujarati communities are, is difficult. 
Only two Muslims have a majority of close friends who are not 
Gujaratis; they comprise 90% and 70% of their primary lones. One is a 
qualified chemical engineer and his close friends belong to the same 
social class as he does. At the time of the survey the other had no job. 
An important social characteristic that would support this pattern of 
close friendship is their location. 
(b) Geographical Range 
An important factor that influences interaction between close friends 
is their geographical proximity. Two models of the such networks have 
become accepted. The first suggests that members of social networks who 
share the same geographical environment have increased opportunities for 
social contact at the expense of decreasing their range of access to 
scarce resources. By living in the same environment, they share similar 
social experiences drawn from the same pool of experiences. By sharing 
the same experiences they handicap themselves in that those contributing 
to the common pool of knowledge bring nothing new to it. When this is 
taken together with a high frequency of contact, the combination creates 
a social environment in which close friends exert a conforming influence 
upon one another (Hart,1970/71:84-87; also Mayer,1962). The second model 
suggests that members of social networks who are spread over a wide 
geographical area have opportunities to draw on a wider range of social 
experiences which are different, since they are located in different 
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social environments. Moreover, separated by geographical barriers, they 
do not meet sufficiently often to create a social environment in which 
friends can exert a conforming influence upon each other. Rather the 
reverse, this opens up individuals to being receptive to new influences 
and ideas. It can be argued that it would be to the advantage of members 
of a minority community to invest in social relationships within their 
own community, thereby increasing the strength of their ties to at least 
one major resource, namely political support (Lin,1982:134-135). 
Ideally, the most efficient social situation in which members of a 
community could strengthen their political commitment to each other and 
express a common interest to each other is by living reasonably close 
together. Other advantages that come from residential proximity include 
the development of a safe environment (Smith,1984:360). 
The majority of close friends of the Hindus (76%) and Muslims (75%) 
live in Bolton; some 22% are resident in Britain and the remaining 2%-3% 
live overseas (Table 3.4). The pattern of residence of close friends 
Table 3.4: Place of Residence of Close Friends* 
Respondents Bolton UK Residents Overseas Totals 
Metropolitan (excluding 
Borough Bolton Metro-
(only) politan Borough) 
Hindu (145) 75.5% 22.29% 2.21% 100% 
647 191 19 857 
Mus 1 im (90) 74.72% 22.45% 2.83% 100% 
396 119 15 530 
Totals:(235) 1043 310 34 1387 
% 100% 75.2% 22.35% 2.45% 100% 
* Nine Hindu and fourteen Muslim respondents stated that they had no 
close friends. 
shows that most are resident in Bolton. Excluding those close friends 
who live outside the Bolton Metropolitan boundary, the pattern of 
residence of those close friends who live in Bolton matches reasonably 
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closely the pattern of residence of the respondents (Chap. I). Some 65% 
of close friends live in poor wards, 17% in below average wards and 5% 
in average and above wards; likewise the close friends of Muslims live 
in similar areas, 73% in poor wards, 17% in below average wards and 4% 
in average and above wards. Since these Gujaratis live in similar socio-
economic areas as their close friends, their social experiences 
complement those of the respondents. This serves only to strengthen 
their view of their generally disadvantageous position. 
Twenty-two per cent of close friends of Muslims and Hindus live in 
other towns and cities within Britain. This points to the existence of 
considerable contact between Gujaratis here and those living elsewhere 
in Britain. A detailed analysis of the place of residence of close 
friends of Muslims shows that over half of them live within fifty miles 
of Bolton, whereas over 70% of close friends of Hindus live over fifty 
miles away. The majority of close friends of Muslims are reachable and 
contact is maintained through visiting and attendance at various social 
functions, such as weddings, prayers and funerals. For the Hindus such 
contact is less easy to maintain, since most of their close friends live 
further away. Though there are large Hindu and Muslim communities in 
London, most of the Muslim communities are evenly spread across England 
with large communities in the north of England and Scotland, such as 
Dewsbury, Manchester, 
Newcastle and Dundee. 
Preston, Colne, Blackburn, Nelson and Glasgow, 
An analysis of locations of Hindu close friends 
living outside Bolton but within Britain provided an even wider spread 
of towns and cities than that of close friends of Muslims. 
Although relatively recent settlers might be expected to maintain 
relationships with kin living overseas, only a minority of respondents 
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mentioned having close friends who lived overseas. Virtually as many 
close friends of Hindus (2.2%) as Muslims (2.8%) live overseas. Of these 
the majority live in India with smaller numbers living in Canada and the 
USA. Many Gujaratis migrated to Canada and the USA during the period of 
research, and a number spoke of their intention to visit kin in, or to 
migrate to, one of these countries. Where close friends live overseas 
they are separated from close friends here. Irrespective of the ethnic 
community to which they belong, their presence has no detectable effect 
on a person's close friends here. In other words, such close friends are 
the exceptions which prove the rule that like attracts like. There is a 
close association between the place of residence of close friends and 
their frequency of contact. This association lies at the heart of social 
network analysis. 
(c) Frequency of Contact 
Frequency of contact is a characteristic of close friendship 
relationships which is in part linked to geographical proximity and in 
part to personal commitment. Undoubtedly, frequent meetings help friends 
exchange ideas, information and support. The number of times close 
friends meet will be analysed separately from the places where they 
meet. The term "multilocality" will be used when referring to the 
latter. 
A majority (80%) of Muslims meet their Muslim close friends at least 
once a week, and 72% of them are Bolton residents (Table 3.5). Although 
most of the remaining close friends meet less often, only a quarter of 
them live outside Bolton. Muslims, belonging to the same caste 
community, belonging to the same sect, sharing the same approach to 
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Islam, and sharing the same areas of residence, are likely to keep in 
close contact with their friends. They can do so through attending 
prayers in the same mosque, meeting at funerals as they are by their 
mores obliged to do, and by recognising the rulings of the same mosque 
committee, such as the ICC. Proximity of residence increases the 
opportunities for social contact. This is a typical pattern of contact 
for a Muslim community notwithstanding their strong ties with other 
similar communities elsewhere in Britain and overseas. It points to the 
formation of a close, if not closed, community. 
Table 3.5: Frequency of Contact Between Muslims and their Close Friends 
Frequency Residence of Close Friends 
of Miles from Bolton 
Contact Bolton 10 25 50 100 150 200 Over- Totals 
seas 
At least 380 16 22 4 3 2 427 
once/week: 71.7% 80.57% 
At most 
once/month: 3 10 1 2 4 8 28 
at least 5.28% 
once in 
10 mths: 12 7 9 1 11 10 6 56 
Once/year 10.57% 
and less 
often: 1 2 1 5 9 
Corres- 1. 7% 
pond: 10 10 
1.89% 
Tota 1 : 530 
100.01% 
The opportunity for Hindus to share in religious festivals and 
rituals as a single community is available, but caste differences and 
food taboos make participation in communal social activities more 
difficult. Despite these potential hindrances, some 73% of close 
friends of Hindus meet at least once a week and most of them are Bolton 
residents (Table 3.6). A quarter of their remaining friends live 
outside Bolton and meet less often. Even though the Hindus have much 
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less in common with each other than do the Muslims, they still meet 
as frequently. The Hindu pattern of contact points to communities which 
also keep in relatively close contact with each other. As a number of 
them do not recognise a single community centre, this implies that they 
meet at work, at home or in some other less public situation, that is in 
locations and situations where they are less likely to jeopardise their 
caste rulings. The frequency of contact between Hindus suggest that they 
too form a close, if not closed, community. 
Table 3.6: Frequency of Contact Between Hindus and their Close Friends 
Frequency Residence of Close Friends 
of Miles from Bolton 
Contact Bolton 10 25 50 100 150 200 Over- Totals 
seas 
At least 603 19 2 1 1 626 
once/week: 70.36% 73.05% 
At most 
once/month: 22 7 2 1 19 1 17 69 
at least 8.05% 
once in 
10 mths: 21 7 9 2 32 8 38 117 
Once/year 13.65% 
and less 
often: 1 1 3 1 20 5 31 
Corres- 3.62% 
pond 14 14 
1.63% 
Totals: 857 
% 100% 
These characteristics suggest that both Hindus and Muslims form part 
of two separate but close religious and social communities. The roles of 
the Hindu and Muslim social and religious institutions that form a 
central part of their lives are dissimilar and contrasting. The mosque 
holds a key position in the functioning of the Islamic community. 
Muslims go to mosque to pray, pay regular dues to it, the dead are 
brought to it to be prepared for the burial, which is organised by a 
mosque committee, views on what is or is not appropriate behaviour for 
Muslims are debated there, and it is in the mosque that most of the 
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political decisions are taken. What is agreed by mosque committees is 
accepted by the people. For instance as Muslim men consider that they 
have an obligation to attend burials of members of their Islamic 
community, these are occasions when they can meet to express their 
community and Islamic solidarity. Attendance at prayer times allows 
Muslims to learn about new events, concerns, activities and gossip. 
Similarly, knowledge of any social behaviour by a member that is 
disapproved of can be rapidly disseminated through community social 
networks and communal disapproval can be formulated. Thus, the mosque is 
the place where Muslims meet and assess each others' actions and those 
of their families against a common set of values, which are located 
within Muslim and Islamic culture. Mosques provide a focal point for 
the Muslim community and the role of the mosque lies at its heart and at 
the heart of the community lies the family. 
In contrast to the central role of the mosque, the role of the temple 
among Hindus is peripheral. With no overall religious structure to unite 
Hindus, most temples serve the socio-religious needs of the members of 
specific castes and sects. They enhance rather than diminish caste 
differences. Members of a temple may have frequent contact with members 
of their own castes and sects, but they have less contact with members 
of the wider Hindu community. This pattern of social contact possibly 
intensifies the social control that members of castes and sects 
exercise over members at the expense of the development of some form of 
wider unity. Though the aim of the founders of the VHP was to create a 
multi-caste facility, the strength of the commitment of Hindus to their 
caste identities has prevented it from becoming a focal point around 
which the members of this community can unite. 
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An analysis of the places where people meet (multi locality) is more 
likely to reflect the importance of the mosque and temple in the daily 
lives of Muslims and Hindus than does frequency of contact. My intention 
was to obtain an idea of the number of places where respondents meet 
their close friends (Table 3.7), the number of times they meet during a 
week in one specific place was not taken into account. For instance a 
Muslim may meet a friend at the mosque six times in one week, while an 
Hindu may only meet his friend once a week at the temple. The number of 
different places where respondents meet their close friends provides a 
broader picture of social life than does the number of times people meet 
in one place. 
Table 3.7: Degree of Multilocality among Hindu and Muslim Close Friends 
Zones 
No. 
% 
Zones 
No 
% 
MUSLIM RESPONDENTS 
Number of places where close friends meet 
0-0.9 1-1.9 2-2.9 3-3.9 4-4.9 5-5.9 
10 29 21 18 10 
11.11 32.22 23.33 20 11.11 
HINDU RESPONDENTS 
Number of places where close friends meet 
0-0.9 1-1.9 2-2.9 3-3.9 4-4.9 5-5.9 
1 60 57 18 6 2 
0.69 41.38 39.31 12.41 4.14 1.38 
6-6.9 Total 
2 90 
2.22 100 
6-6.9 Total 
1 145 
0.69 100 
To gain some measure of the range of places where Gujaratis meet 
their close friends, respondents were asked to state where they met 
their close friends. The analysis of multi locality is done by zone 
rather than by individuals, that is I have treated the zone as a social 
unit. An analysis of multilocality shows that (55%) of Muslims and 
(52%) of Hindus meet their close friends 2 to 3 times/place/week. The 
differences in patterns of contact between Muslims and Hindus and their 
close friends are highlighted by the pattern of contact of the remaining 
Muslims (45%) and Hindus (48%). Of the Hindus the majority (41%) meet 
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their close friends once a week in one place as compared with 11% of 
Muslims. Some 31% of the remaining Muslims meet their close friends four 
to five times in different places jweek as compared with 5.5% of 
Hindus. These differences point to them having a much higher degree of 
contact with their close friends than do Hindus. The places where they 
meet them include the mosque, home, work, Asian cinemas and gatherings. 
Generally most of these places are frequented mainly, but not totally, 
by Muslims, particularly as many express disapproval of fellow Muslims 
who visit public houses and other public places of entertainment. Though 
opportunities for them to meet members of other ethnic groups are 
reduced, opportunities to meet fellow Muslims are increased. This is 
reflected in the high intensity of the relationships in their zones 
(see structural characteristics below). To meet close friends so 
frequently suggests that the social and religious activities of this 
community, its members and their families are closely enmeshed. 
Community social control and conformity can only be strengthened by such 
frequent contact. 
In comparison, Hindu respondents have much less contact with their 
close friends. Caste differences and to a lesser extent religious 
differences ensure that there are few places where they can meet 
socially without jeopardising their caste status. This pattern of 
contact suggests that the social control by caste communities remains 
untouched, or if anything, it may be weakened, by Hindus not openly 
admitting to meeting members of other castes in private or public 
places. In a negative sense this may reflect on the strength of caste 
associations and some religious communities; but it suggests no overall 
Hindu community control. 
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(d) Social Standing and Freedom of Association 
The high frequency of contact in a higher number of different places 
logically suggests that people with this pattern of contact should have 
a wide range of friends from different walks of life. Whereas the 
reverse implies a narrow range of contact thus limiting the 
possibilities of meeting friends from a narrow range of social 
backgrounds. However, what the evidence has shown so far is that neither 
pattern of contact has increased the close friendships between Muslims 
and Hindus and members of other non-Gujarati communities. Therefore, an 
analysis of the freedom of association should show to what extent the 
close friends these Gujaratis have in terms of their occupational 
experiences add to or replicate their experiences. 
These Gujarati are encapsulated within the working class, 
disadvantaged by their "racial" visibility, their inability to 
communicate, their lack of qualifications, their low position in the 
class structure and their lack of formal political power (Rex and 
Tomlinson,1979:120-126; Banton, 1972:72). From the point of view of 
improving their access to better jobs and to politically 
people, close friendship offers them a way of bridging 
influential 
social and 
occupational distances between themselves and people in occupations of 
high social standing within their own communities. 
Social association is one of the more complex aspects of 
reachability. To a degree the aspects of reachability discussed above 
are consequences of occupation and the rewards that it brings. On the 
one hand, there is an implication that the higher an individual's 
position within the social class system, the higher are the social 
positions of his(her) friends and therefore, the greater is his access 
171 
to information, power and wealth (cf.Lin,1982:132-135; Blau,1967:133-
140). On the other hand, there is another implication: that Gujaratis 
who are located at the bottom of the social class structure have as 
close friends people who are in the same position as themselves. These 
close friends could be Gujaratis, members of other Asian and black 
minorities, white people or members from anyone of these communities 
who hold higher social class positions. 
Furthermore, the social class position of these Gujaratis could have 
changed in a number of ways since they arrived in the early 1950s. The 
first occupations available to them were those of low status, little 
skill and low pay (cf. Palmer,1977: 249-251; Watson, 1977:191-197; 
Constantinides, 1977:279-282). Much of immigrant folklore is built 
around the notion of starting low and being able and free to rise to the 
top of the adopted society (Dorson,1959:135-165). Thus occupations held 
by Gujaratis by the 1970s, some ten to fifteen years after coming here, 
provide a useful indication of their social standing in British society 
(Goldthorpe,1981/82;1980). An analysis of occupations of Gujaratis with 
those of their close friends provides a pattern of social association 
which shows the extent to which their close friendships cross community 
and social class boundaries. 
As first generation migrants, these Gujaratis irrespective of age 
have achieved limited access to jobs of higher social standing. By 
relating age to social standing, it becomes clear that they are no 
different from other Asian and black workers: the majority hold jobs of 
low social standing with all attendant characteristics of low pay, 
insecurity, low prestige (Tables 3.8 and 3.9). A few Hindus (3.9%) as 
compared with one Muslim hold jobs in Social Class I. On the basis of 
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Table 3.8: Analysis of Age and Class Position of Muslims [5] 
Age of Respondents 
Class 16-19 20-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 45-49 50-54 55-64 N.A. Total 
I 1 1 
0.96% 
II 2 1 1 1 1 6 
5.77% 
III 2 2 4 8 
7.69% 
IVa 1 1 1 2 2 3 2 12 
11. 54% 
VI 1 1 2 
1.92% 
VIla 1 8 5 10 19 9 8 5 3 1 69 
66.35% 
Others 1 1 1 2 5 
4.81% 
N.A. 1 1 
0.96% 
Totals: 2 13 10 15 26 12 13 9 3 1 104 
% • o • 1. 92 12.5 9.62 14.42 25 11.54 12.5 8.65 2.88 0.96 100% 
Table 3.9: Analysis of Age and Class Position of Hindus 
Age of Respondents 
Class 16-19 20-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 45-49 50-54 55-74 Total 
I 1 1 4 6 
3.9% 
I I 2 1 3 
1.95% 
III 3 5 1 1 10 
6.49% 
IVa 1 1 2 
1.3% 
IVc 1 1 
0.65% 
VI 2 7 5 2 3 1 1 21 
13.64% 
VIla 4 15 15 11 13 12 4 2 5 81 
52.6% 
Others 17 6 1 1 1 3 29 
18.83% 
N.A. 1 1 
0.65% 
Totals: 24 34 26 16 17 19 6 4 8 154 
% :15.58 22.08 16.88 10.39 11.04 12.34 3.9 2.6 5.19 100% 
their present occupations the majority (71%) of Muslims and Hindus hold 
jobs which place them in Class VIla and other. The jobs they hold are as 
manual wage workers employed mainly in the textile industry in semi- and 
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unskilled grades (cf.Goldthorpe,1980:41). There is little difference ln 
the social standing of the jobs the majority of them hold. 
The evidence points to Gujaratis befriending people whose social 
standing is similar to their own, and the majority of these close 
friends are Gujaratis. The corollary of this is that Gujaratis reserve 
for friendships of lesser intensity for those who belong to other 
communities and other social classes. The data (Tables 3.10 a,b,c) on 
the social standing of the Muslims and all of their close friends shows 
that the majority of them (69.9%) and their close friends (60%) hold 
jobs of similar social standing in Classes VI, VII and Other. They have 
few close friends (15.5%) who are employed in jobs of higher social 
standing than themselves (Table 3.10b), but a third (39%) of their close 
friends have jobs of lower social standing. A few Muslims in Class VII 
have close friends in higher social classes, which suggests that close 
friendships have provided them with little access to people in higher 
social positions. As such it confirms the argument that close 
friendships make demands upon individuals that are difficult to sustain 
across classes (Paine,1969). However, Muslims claimed that Islam is an 
Table 3.10a: Social Standing of Muslims and their Close Friends* 
Class of: 
Respondents: Gujarati Close Friends 
Class: No. % I II III IV V VI VII Others Totals 
I 2 2.22 4 4 
II 1 1.11 2 10 8 5 9 12 46 
III 8 8.89 1 10 14 45 9 79 
IV 14 15.56 1 1 6 14 49 12 83 
V 2 2.22 
VI 1 1.11 1 4 5 
VII 57 63.33 7 4 10 27 207 36 291 60% 
Others 5 5.56 3 3 16 22 
Totals: 90 100% 18 16 34 60 3 330 69 530 
62.26% 
* I have combined Classes IVa and IVc into one Class IV, fo llowi ng 
Goldthorpe, 1980. 
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Table 3.10b: Summary Analysis of Social Standing of Muslims and 
their Close Friends 
Close 
Friends: 
Total 
530 
100% 
Class Standing 
Above Equal* 
82 241 
15.47% 45.47% 
Below 
207 
39.06% 
Respondents 
* Equal class positions of Muslims and close friends are identified as 
lying along the diagonal across Table 3.10a, those in higher 
positions lie to the right and those in lower positions to the left. 
Table 3.10c: Class Position of Muslims having no Close Friends 
Class IV 2 
VII - 10 
Others - 2 
Total: 14 
egalitarian religion, which lays stress on social equality. Though there 
is some evidence which points to a belief that Islam can overcome class 
differences between fellow Muslims, class divisions in contemporary 
Islam are becoming, if anything, stronger rather than weaker (Gilsenan, 
1979:265). 
Like the Muslims, the majority of Hindus (82.6%) and their close 
friends (76.4%) hold jobs in Social Classes VI, VII and Others (Table 
3.lla). An analysis of the social standing of their close friends shows 
that most of them belong to classes equivalent to (41.9%) or lower than 
(30.1%) those of the respondents (Table 3.l1b). Amongst Hindus the 
social standing of their close friends appears to be evenly spread 
between those of higher, equal and lower standing. An explanation for 
this might be that in the sample there are more Hindus than Muslims who 
hold jobs of either high or low social standing. The pattern of 
occupations of respondents in Class VI offers some evidence that more 
Hindus than Muslims are learning new skills, such as moulding, fitting 
and turning. However, after obtaining the appropriate experience, they 
often opt to become self-employed. The potential success that owning a 
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business promises includes in part the possibility of being free of 
white and Asian employers and promises the possibility of the 
accumulation of wealth through personal effort. A common sense notion, 
which is difficult to disprove, suggests that for Gujaratis to befriend 
non-Gujaratis and particularly members of the white community is likely 
to bring rewards. However, analysis of heterogeneous zones indicated 
that such a notion needs to be approached with caution. 
Table 3.11a: Social Standing of Hindus and their Close Friends* 
Class of: 
Respondents Gujarati Close Friends of: 
No. % I II III IV V VI VII Others Total 
I 6 4.14 20 8 7 1 36 
II 3 2.07 3 6 1 1 10 1 22 
III 10 6.9 1 9 9 5 5 26 15 70 
IV 6 4.14 4 2 4 8 3 25 28 74 
V 1 0.69 
VI 15 10.34 1 3 5 9 8 30 14 70 
VII 80 55.17 5 6 30 57 3 31 228 78 438 76.43% 
Others 24 16.55 1 11 7 1 3 41 83 147 
Totals: 104 100% 31 32 65 94 4 51 361 219 857 
42.12% 
* I have combined Classes IVa, IVb and IVc into one Class IV, following 
Goldthorpe, 1980. 
Table 3.11b: Summary Analysis of Social Standing of Hindus and 
their Close Friends* 
Social 
Close Total Above 
Friends: 556 157 
100% 28.24% 
* See note below Table 3.10b. 
Standing 
Equal 
220 
39.57% 
Below 
179 
32.19% 
Respondents 
Table 3.11c: Class Positions of Hindus having no Close Friends 
Class VI 2 
VII 2 
Other - 5 
Tota 1 : 9 
An occupation favoured by Gujaratis is that of becoming self-
employed running their own businesses. Both Hindus and Muslims aspire to 
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owning their own businesses, believing that it can bring them wealth and 
independence without the disadvantages of working with or being employed 
by people belonging to their own or other communities. It is difficult 
to estimate the number of Gujarati businesses in the communities. The 
most prominent self-employed people are shopkeepers, and my impression 
is that there are more Hindu than Muslim shopkeepers. This would be in 
keeping with the Hindu, and particularly Swaminarayan, work ethic that 
gave rise to the Swaminarayan sects in the previous century in Gujarat 
(cf. Williams, 1984). There are also a number of Gujaratis who own shops 
in Manchester, and some of these could be described as being wealthy. 
Not all businessmen are shopkeepers: it is more difficult to identify 
these people, because they are not so visible. In general the success of 
Asian businesses is itself mercurial and interesting, but it is not 
relevant to this thesis. 
Social networks give those to whom they are anchored access through 
their close friends to information, power and influence that may be seen 
either to place constraints on them by channelling and controlling it, 
or increasing their opportunities to experience by exposing them to new 
influences. The presence of close friends from other communities in 
their networks implies that these Gujarati anchor points have access to 
resources and information that is not available to those anchoring 
homogeneous network zones. The presence of close friends from other 
communities suggests that some degree of social mobility through social 
association is occurring, and one indication of the extent to which it 
occurs can be gauged by an analysis of the social standing of close 
friends who belong to other communities. 
There are at least three possible patterns of accessibility that can 
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be related to close friendship: firstly, there is investment in close 
friendships with Gujaratis irrespective of social standing, although 
most hold jobs of similar social standing. The majority of the Hindus 
and Muslims sampled did just this (see above). Secondly, there is the 
possibility is for Gujaratis to invest in close friendships with members 
of other minority communities, whose social, economic and political 
status is similar to their own. Thirdly, there is the possibility for 
Gujaratis to invest in close friendships with members of the white 
community, who might be perceived to have access to the resources to 
which they do not have access, or to belong to a higher social class and 
therefore have influence which those lower down do not have. 
I shall first analyse the social standing of Gujaratis who have close 
friends who belong to other communities. Then I shall analyse the social 
standing of their Gujarati close friends, then their close friends from 
other minority communities and finally their white close friends. 
The social standing of the sub-sample of Muslims (Table 3.12) who 
have close friends belonging to other communities shows that most of 
them are of slightly higher social standing than the total sample of 
Muslims (Table 3.10a above). Most of them hold jobs in Social Classes 
III to V (57.1%). A possible explanation for this difference in social 
standing might be that those holding such jobs are ambitious, are 
educated or have been more fortunate, and therefore are likely to be 
looking for friends who will give them access to social advantages. As 
Gujaratis comprise the majority of the close friends in these zones, the 
numbers of close friends who are not Gujaratis is small. All the Hindu 
close friends (28) of Muslims are to be found in heterogeneous zones, 
and an analysis of their social standing shows that the jobs they hold 
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Table 3.12: Social Standing of Muslims Anchoring Heterogeneous Zones* 
Classes 
I I I III IV V VI VII Other Total 
No. 1 4 6 2 7 1 21 
% 4.76 57.14 38.1 100 
* Excluding respondents who claimed to have no close friends. 
are of lower social standing than those of the Muslim anchor points 
(Table 3.13). The social standing of the Muslim and Hindu close friends 
is generally lower (63.9%) than that of the Muslims' who anchor the 
zones. The social standing of the majority of close friends from the 
other minority communities (60.8%) is also lower than that of the 
Muslims anchoring the zones (Table 3.14). An analysis of the social 
standing of the few white close friends (Table 3.15) of these Muslims 
shows that most are of lower social standing than the Muslims (44.8%). 
Table 3.13: Social Standing of Gujarati Close Friends of Muslims 
Class Position 
Close Friends Above Equal Below Respondents 
Total: III 15 25 71 
% : 100 13.52 22.52 63.96 
* = includes 28 Hindu close friends 
Table 3.14: Social Standing of Minority Community Close Friends of 
Muslims 
Close Friends 
Tota 1: 23 
% : 100 
Class Position 
Above Equal Below Respondents 
4 5 14 
17.39 21.74 60.87 
Table 3.15: Social Standing of White Close Friends of Muslims 
Close Friends 
Tota 1: 29 
% : 100% 
Class Position 
Above Equal 
8 8 
27.59% 27.59% 
Below 
13 
44.83% 
Respondents 
Thus the pattern of social association of the majority of close 
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friends in heterogeneous zones shows that Muslim respondents establish 
close friendships with people of lower social standing than themselves 
rather than with those with higher social standing. Arguably this may 
enable them to protect their social values rather than to expose them to 
new and less easily resistible influences. However, the disadvantage of 
this pattern is that they do not gain access to sought after resources. 
The existence of close friendships between these Muslims and close 
friends from other communities and the white community in particular 
might be interpreted as suggesting that the impressions of Muslims' 
commitment to their social values or more narrowly to their Islamic 
values protects them from a process of anglicisation. It may also 
suggest that amongst them there exists a fear, real or unreal, that 
continuous exposure to non-Islamic social values might dilute their 
commitment to Islam. Then this pattern of close friendship would protect 
them and their commitment to Islam. 
If close friendships with members of other communities are taken as 
an indication of their potential access to public resources, then it 
remains limited. Friendships of lesser intensity are used for such 
purposes. If anything, this pattern of close friendship suggests 
dissociation rather than association with any community that does not 
share an Islamic identity, irrespective of whether or not they share 
similar immigration, racial, social, economic or political experiences. 
This pattern of dissociation echoes the explanation given for the 
collapse of CARD (Heineman,1972). However, it points to a potential 
benefit, namely the political power that is generated by a shared 
social identity, which emerged on the occasion when the Muslims 
demonstrated against the publication of The Satanic Verses. The trend 
amongst Muslims to establish close friendships with Muslims of similar 
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social standing leads to the development of a strong network of high 
intensity relationships based upon shared social characteristics which 
underpins the Muslim community. Thus the Muslims form a strong and 
cohesive community. 
The majority of Hindus (78%) who have close friends from other 
communities hold jobs of low social standing in Social Classes VII or 
below (Table 3.16). More of these Hindus hold jobs of lower social 
standing than do those anchoring homogeneous zones. Although low social 
standing should not be taken as an indication of marginalisation, Hindus 
who have close friends from other communities are placing themselves at 
risk of having to reconcile commitments to their caste values with 
those to close friendship. Theoretically this need not pose any 
difficulty, in practice community pressure may persuade these Hindus to 
believe that they are marginal men. 
Table 3.16: Social Standing of Hindus Anchoring Heterogeneous Zones 
Classes 
I II III IV* V VI VII Other Total 
No. 4 2 2 1 5 18 9 41 
% 9.75 12.2 78.05 100 
* I have combined Classes IVa, IVb and IVc. 
The pattern of association of Hindus anchoring heterogeneous zones is 
similar to that of Hindus generally, but it differs from that of the 
Muslims in one respect: the social standing of the majority of the Hindu 
and their close friends suggests greater perceived social equality 
(Table 3.17). Thus, the flow of information is mainly between close 
friends of similar social standing. There are other similarities in 
Hindu and Muslim patterns of close friendship: the Hindus have 
established few close friendships with members of the other minority and 
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the white communities. The majority of their Gujarati close friends are 
Hindu, but they include twelve Muslim close friends. Most (48%) of these 
close friends hold jobs of similar social standing to the respondents. 
This pattern of association is typical of the close friendships of these 
Hindus. 
Table 3.17: Social Standing of Gujarati Close Friends of Hindus 
Close Friends 
Total: 199 
% 100 
Above 
48 
24.12 
Equal 
96 
48.24 
Below Respondents 
55 
27.64 
Again close friendships with people from minority communities reveals 
a pattern of Hindus befriending people of similar social standing to 
themselves (Table 3.18). Furthermore, the low numbers of close friends 
from these communities suggests that the establishment of such 
friendships is not considered to provide access to scarce resources. 
Nevertheless these data hint at the possibility of Hindus establishing 
strong ties with people of similar social standing from other 
communities, and that such social association might offer some form of 
upward social mobility. A significant feature of Hindus' pattern of 
association as compared with that of Muslims is the divide that exists 
between those who belong to higher social classes and those who belong 
to lower social classes. Hindus whose jobs are of high social standing 
placing them in social classes I, II and III have as close friends 
people who belong in similarly high social classes. For instance Mr 
Sandhu, Social Class I, has close friends whose social class positions 
are similarly high. Two of his Hindu and Sikh close friends are in 
class I, two other Sikh close friends are in class II and the remaining 
four Sikh close friends are in class IV. There is some evidence that 
points to a social class divide within the Hindu communities. 
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Table 3.18: Social Standing of Minority Community Close Friends of 
Hindus 
Close Friends 
Total: 34 
% : 100 
Class Position 
Above Equal Below Respondents 
7 18 9 
20.59 52.94 26.47 
The same pattern of social association that characterises Hindus' 
close friendships with other Gujaratis and members of other minority 
communities holds for their close friendships with white people. The 
majority of Hindus are of similar social standing to their white close 
friends (Table 3.19). This characteristic of social association 
distinguishes the Hindus' pattern of close friendship from that of the 
Muslims. While it appears to give Hindus opportunities to gain access 
to public resources, it may also lead to their stigmatisation and 
marginalisation within their own communities (Barth,1970:30-32,51ff). 
Although the theory of social exchange casts some doubt on the 
possibility of social exchanges between social equals, it is addressed 
to considering social exchanges between unequals. However, the 
probability of gaining through exchanges with social equals is greater 
than through social exchanges with people of unequal social standing. 
Exchanges with social equals can lead to greater losses than can 
exchanges with those who are unequals, since the temptation to gain may 
call for greater sacrifices than can be afforded. Thus the temptation to 
break caste rules can lead to outcasteing, but it is a sacrifice Hindus 
might consider worth making. This pattern of social association rather 
than binding Hindus into a close community divides them into fragments. 
Table 3.19: Social Standing of White Close Friends of Hindus 
Class Positions 
Close Friends 
Total: 68 
% 100% 
of: 
Above 
22 
32.35% 
Equal Below Respondents 
25 21 
36.76% 30.88% 
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Both Muslims and Hindus claimed to have more white close friends than 
close friends from other minority communities. This suggests the 
existence of an order of preference: fundamentally Muslims and Hindus 
preference is to establish strong ties with members of their own 
communities, then with members of the white community, and only then 
with members of other minority communities - a preference which is 
supported by the analysis of Gujaratis' perceptions of social distances. 
What also emerged is a strong disinclination on the part of Muslims and 
Hindus to welcome friendships with Gujaratis who do not share their 
beliefs. Not only are most of the primary zones of their social networks 
homogeneous in the sense that they prefer to establish close friendships 
with Gujaratis, but they are also restricted to those who share the same 
religious beliefs as they do. 
Although the high social standing of some Gujarati Hindu respondents 
and their close friends in Classes I, II and III may be interpreted as 
pointing to the breaking down of a social class buffer or to the 
reducing constraints of a process of social closure, there are some 
grounds for being more cautious before offering such an explanation. 
Firstly, these data are applicable to only those respondents who have 
predominantly Gujaratis as close friends and secondly, it may point to 
the existence of buffers within and between the Muslim and Hindu 
communities. In particular social association may have a 'dissociative' 
effect (Goldthorpe,1980:176) where Hindus and Muslims have established 
close friendships with people who belong to other communities. Low 
numbers of Gujaratis and their close friends in positions of high social 
standing lends some credence to the argument that a buffer separates 
Asian and black people from white people in Britain (Goldthorpe, 1980: 
46ff; Katznelson,1973). 
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These patterns of contact between Muslims and Hindus and their close 
friends conform to an ideal model of zone characteristics associated 
with one form of accessibility, namely investment in social 
relationships of high intensity within their own communities. The data 
show that leaders, who act as entrepreneurs or brokers, rely on 
relationships with members of other racial, ethnic and political groups, 
which are usually of lower intensity than close friendship. This would 
add support to the argument that those with power and lor wealth are 
unlikely to commit themselves to a relationship such as close friendship 
with people who do not share similar social status (cf. Lin, 1982:132-
135; Blau,1967:133-140). Members of the white community with power are 
unlikely to establish close friendships with Gujaratis. However, an 
analysis of their pattern of social association demonstrated that where 
they established close friendships with Gujaratis, these were between 
social equals. However, where close friends came from other communities, 
Muslim respondents established close friendships with those of lower 
social standing than themselves, whereas Hindus had as close friends 
those of similar social standing. 
The argument is that where like attracts like the pattern of social 
relationships that develops out of such interaction will form the basis 
of a strong and cohesive community structure. Gujaratis prefer to 
establish close friendships with those with whom they share most in 
common, that is those who belong to the same community, accept similar 
religious beliefs, live close to them and hold jobs of similar social 
standing. These social characteristics point to an exclusiveness of 
these two communities at one level and at another to the closeness of 
the Muslim community compared to a closed but more fragmentary structure 
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in the Hindu community. The analysis of structural characteristics of 
the primary zones will provide the step that links social 
characteristics of social networks to the social structures of these two 
religious communities. 
Structural Characteristics of Zones 
Two ideal types of social networks have been identified in the 
literature, namely those which are characterised by social closeness and 
are described as tightly-knit (Bott,1971; Mayer,1962) or completely 
interlocking (Laumann,1973:113) and those which are loosely-knit (Bott, 
1971; Mayer,1962) or radial (Laumann,1973:113). Some of the social 
consequences of these different network structures have been explored to 
show how those on whom the networks are anchored are receptive to or 
have blocked out new ideas (Leinhardt,1977; McKinlay,1973:275-292; Hart, 
1970/71:84-87). The aim is to investigate the notions of tightly-knit 
and loosely-knit by analysing the density, intensity and connectedness 
of the structures of the primary zones of networks and secondly to draw 
from this discussion conclusions about the pattern of social 
relationships with underlie these two communities. 
On the basis of the principle of homophily close friends in a zone 
who share the social characteristics are more likely to be acquainted 
with one another than are close friends who do not share them. Those 
Gujaratis who have close friends who are easily reachable share similar 
social activities and social values. Whereas those who are less easily 
reachable and usually belong to other communities are more likely to be 
isolated from those close friends who belong to either the Muslim or 
Hindu communities. The characteristics of a zone can reflect this 
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sharing of activities and values by social relationships that link the 
anchor to his close friends through a dense network of intense and 
closely connected relationships. Alternatively, the characteristics of a 
zone can show a lack of sharing of common activities and values amongst 
close friends by having a low density, comprising low intensity 
relationships and a low degree of connectedness. The extent to which 
close friends, whose social characteristics are same or different from 
those of the anchor point, form a unified group will give further 
indication of the strength or weakness of network zones. To analyse the 
structural characteristics of these primary zones of networks, I shall 
begin by analysing whether all close friends in a zone are acquainted, 
that is density/completeness; then I shall consider the intensity of the 
friendships between close friends, that is the intensity of the 
relationships, and finally I shall look at the internal mesh of these 
zones, that this the degree of connectedness. 
(a) Density/ Completeness 
One way to test this hypothesis is by calculating the density of 
primary zones of Hindus and Muslims [6]. It is implied that a dense 
network produces a high degree of conformity (Bott,1971: 208-210; Mayer, 
1962: Chaps.5 and 6). When the majority of close friends within a zone 
are homogeneous, that is are easily reachable and also are perceived to 
be acquainted with one another, this implies that the zone is complete 
and is bounded. It has a high density and promotes an all-Muslim or all-
Hindu social environment that encapsulates the anchor points (cf. Mayer, 
1962: Chaps:5 and 6). In a zone where all or some close friends are not 
perceived to be acquainted with one another, the density will be low. 
Calculating the completeness of Hindu and Muslim zones on the basis of 
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the anchor point's awareness of at least some degree of acquaintanceship 
of his close friends with each other, Muslims (72.6%) anchor a greater 
number of zones that are 100 per cent complete (Table 3.20) than do 
Hindus (54.2%) (Table 3.21). 
Table 3.20: Density: Completeness of Muslim Anchored Zones 
Nos. 2 
of 3 
Close 4 
Friends 5 
in 6 
Primary 7 
Zones 8 
9 
10 
Totals: 
% 
Density: Degrees of Completeness 
0- 10- 20- 30- 40- 50- 60- 70- 80- 90-
9.9 19.9 29.9 39.9 49.9 59.9 69.9 79.9 89.9 99.9 
1+ 100 Totals 6 7 
1 1 
2 1 
1 
1 1 
2 2 2 
1 1 3 3 3 4 
Incomplete 
2 1 
1 
1 1 
1 
5 1 1 
27.4% 
12 12 
11 11 
8 13 
2 6 
4 4 
1 18 
1 61 
72.6% 
3 
2 
26 
84 
100% 
* Zones comprising no, one close friend have been 
have no density. 
Complete 
excluded, because they 
+ The density of those with two friends is too low to 
measure. Twenty respondents had such network zones. 
provide a useful 
Table 3.21: Density: Completeness of Hindu Anchored Zones 
Density: Degrees of Completeness 
0- 10- 20- 30- 40- 50- 60- 70- 80- 90-
9.9 19.9 20.9 39.9 40.9 59.9 69.9 79.9 89.9 99.9 100 Totals 
Nos. 2 4+ 3 7 
of 3 1 2 14 17 
Close 4 1+ 1 1 1 18 22 
Friends 5 1 1 4 1 1 3 1 3 14 29 
ln 6 1 1 1 1 4 3 3 7 21 
Primary 7 1 1 1 3 
Zones* 8 1 1 1 2 1 3 9 
9 1 1 1 3 
10 2++ 1 1 1 6 3 17 31 
Totals: 7 2 4 5 6 4 8 7 11 11 77 142 
% 45.77% 54.23% 100% 
Incomplete Complete 
* Zones comprising one close friend or no close friend have been 
excluded. Twelve Hindus had such networks. 
+ A 11 of these zones have a density of zero, that is they are primary 
stars. 
++ One of these zones had a density of 6.67% and the other had a zero 
density. 
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The argument that less dense or loose-knit networks as opposed to 
highly dense or close-knit networks provide greater social advantages to 
those anchoring them has gained credence in the sociological literature 
(cf.Lin,1982:134; Rushing,1978; McKinlay,1973; Bott,1971:60). The notion 
of loose-knit networks is associated with the idea of greater dependence 
(emotional support) of a couple upon one another and therefore, by 
implication, their greater dependence upon their friends in the network 
(Bott,1971:60). This led to an argument based on the characteristics of 
close-knit social networks, which associates density with a greater 
dependence upon others, particularly kin, less inclination to seek 
solutions to problems, an awareness of the benefits of conformity, a 
lack of access to new ideas and to resources. This argument implies that 
for a person to be enmeshed in such a zone can be socially 
disadvantageous. In comparison the characteristics of a low density zone 
include a greater dependence upon individuals to find solutions to their 
problems, and a greater dependence upon non-kin, whose main obligation 
to help might come from their own realisation of the help that they may 
in turn require from others. Thus the pressure on such an anchor person 
to conform is reduced, and social relationships become a resource for 
tapping new ideas and gaining access to new resources. This has led to 
an argument that to be enmeshed in a low density zone is socially 
advantageous. However, in certain social situations where enmeshment in 
high density zones is more advantageous than enmeshment in low density 
zones, the argument is that 
with strong ties of support. 
those in weak positions surround themselves 
The analysis of the densities of Hindu and 
Muslim zones suggests that the zones of the former are less dense than 
those of the latter, which points to a more loosely-knit community of 
Hindus and a more tightly-knit community of Muslims. 
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Predictably the interrelationship between homogeneity/ heterogeneity 
and density of the primary zones shows that most complete zones (100% 
density) are homogeneous (Tables 3.22 and 3.23). The corollary of this 
is that more heterogeneous than homogeneous zones are incomplete. Where 
all close friends share social, religious and ethnic characteristics in 
common, they are also likely to be acquainted with each other. Where 
one or more close friends share less in common such as belonging to 
another ethnic or religious group, then they are more likely to be 
unacquainted with those who share more in common. A comparison of Muslim 
and Hindu respondents shows that the majority (85.7%) of former anchor 
zones in which their close friends are Muslims, and are likely to be 
Table 3.22: Association between Zone Density and Heterogeneity in Muslim 
Anchored Zones 
Character- Density Single Zones Totals 
istics of Incom- Complete Totals person with 
close plete zones less 
friends than 
five 
persons 
Homogeneous: 9 54 63 6 69 
14.29% 85.71% 100% 
Heterogeneous: 13 5 18 3 21 
72.22% 27.78% 100% 
Totals: 22 59 81 6 3 90 
27.16% 72.84% 100% 
Table 3.23: Association between Zone Density and Heterogeneity in Hindu 
Anchored Zones 
Character- Density Single Zones Totals 
istics of Incom- Complete Totals person with 
close plete zones less 
friends than 
five 
persons 
Homogeneous: 37 65 102 2 104 
36.27% 63.73% 100% 
Heterogeneous: 25 10 35 1 5 41 
71.43% 28.57% 100% 
Totals: 62 75 137 3 5 145 
45.26% 54.74% 100% 
close friends of each other. Although the same pattern holds for Hindu 
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anchored zones (63.7%), a significant minority (36.3%) anchor zones in 
which one or more close friends are strangers, who mayor may not be 
Hindu. In general like attracts like. 
The similarities in the tendency of Hindus (71.4%) and Muslims 
(72.2%) to include non-Gujarati close friends in heterogeneous zones 
that are incomplete is striking. By doing this, those who are not Hindu 
or Muslim or Gujarati are likely to be located in zones where one or 
more close friends are perceived to be not known to others. The higher 
number of Hindu (45.3%) as compared with Muslim (27.2%) incomplete zones 
supports the view that Hindu close friends, who mayor may not belong to 
other castes, are treated little differently from close friends who are 
not Hindu. This characteristic of the structure of Hindu anchored zones 
may make it easier for Hindus to establish close friendships with people 
who belong to different castes or are not Hindu. It also may account for 
an observation which has gained acceptance in Bolton among white people 
who work with the Gujaratis, which is that the Hindus appear to be more 
ready than the Muslims to accept the values of the white community. 
Though this conclusion may be unjustified, the fact that Hindu close 
friends are more often less well acquainted with each other than are 
Muslim close friends does lend some support to it. 
(b) Intensity of Relationships in Primary Zones 
Density is a measure of acquaintanceship which does not allow for 
distinctions to be made between different forms of friendships. For this 
purpose I shall use the notion of intensity. Respondents were asked to 
distinguish between those close friends whom they perceived to be kin, 
close friends, ordinary friends, acquaintances and strangers [7]. The 
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imprecision of the category stranger carries an inherent logical 
problem: on the one hand, all persons who are strangers to each other 
could comprise a single level of intensity in a zone [8]. On the other 
hand, 
complex 
such a collection of persons could be defined as comprising a 
set of levels, that is as many levels as there are degrees of 
stranger, including those who are perceived to dislike each other. 
Levels of friendship are ranked above that of stranger. The 
relationships of friendship can be ranked in order of levels of 
intensity from ascribed through to achieved ones with a residual 
category of strangers. If all of the relationships linking close friends 
in a zone are described as being similar, then this set of similar 
relationships forms a level of intensity, irrespective of the form that 
the friendship is perceived to take. For instance, where all close 
friends are described as being all close friends, then this is a single 
intensity level zone. Where more than one form of friendship are 
perceived by an anchor point to link close friends together, the zone 
will have as many levels of intensity as there are perceived forms of 
friendship. 
The cohesiveness of Muslims is reflected in the high percentage of 
100% dense homogeneous primary zones which they anchor, and is supported 
by the high percentage (68.3%) of zones which consist of one level of 
intensity (Table 3.24). Hindus anchor a much lower percentage (39.2%) of 
100% dense zones comprising one level of intensity (Table 3.25). In 
comparison with these, Muslims and Hindus who anchored heterogeneous 
zones perceive of friendships between their close friends as being of 
different levels of intensity. The presence of different levels of 
intensity of friendships suggests that people band together friends who 
share certain social characteristics, like religious beliefs and ethnic 
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identity, and separate those who do not share them. Few Muslim (23.8%) 
Table 3.24: Levels of Intensity in Muslim Anchored Zones* 
Number 1 
of 2 
levels 3 
of 4 
inten- 5 
sity 
Totals: 
Homo-
geneous 
No. % 
43 68.25 
11 17.46) 
4 6.35) 
4 6.35) 
1 1.59) 
63 100 
31.75% 
Hetero-
geneous 
No. % 
5 23.81 
4 19.05 
7 33.33 
5 23.81 
21 100 84 
*Excluded from the Table are 14 respondents who have no close friends 
and 6 who have only one close friend, as in the former instance there 
are no levels of intensity and in the latter there 1S one. 
Table 3.25: Levels of Intensity in Hindu Anchored Zones* 
Homo- Hetero-
geneous geneous 
No. % No. % 
Number 1 40 39.22 11 27.5 
of 2 23 22.55) 4 10 27 
levels 3 15 14.71) 60.78% 13 32.5 
of 4 16 15.69) 7 17.5 
inten- 5 8 7.84) 5 12.5 
sity 
Totals: 102 100 40 100 142 
* Excluded from the Table are 9 respondents who have no close friends 
and 3 who have only one close friend for reasons given above Table 3.10. 
and Hindu (27.5%) anchored heterogeneous zones are perceived as 
comprising one level of intensity. The clear difference between the 
structure of levels of intensity in Muslim and Hindu anchored 
homogeneous zones as compared with the relative similarity in the 
structure of their heterogeneous zones endorses the explanation that the 
Hindu community is more fragmentary as compared with the more cohesive 
Muslim community. This pattern of friendship suggests that it is 
difficult for Muslims particularly to integrate their Muslim close 
friends with close friends who belong to other communities. Whereas this 
superficially seems to be easier for Hindus. 
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What this analysis does not distinguish are forms of friendship 
within single level intensity zones, for instance the differences 
between best and good close friends. It is the single level zones which 
provide an important indication of social cohesiveness, since neither 
density or intensity alone enable these zones to be distinguished from 
one another. There is a difference between two zones where one consists 
of close friends who are all close friends of each other and one in 
which all are only acquaintances of each other. An analysis of zones 
consisting of one level of intensity provides a fine measure of the 
extent to which these two religious communities are socially cohesive. A 
detailed analysis of these zones shows that over 80% of Muslim anchored 
homogeneous and heterogeneous zones comprise close friends whom 
respondents perceived to be kin or close friends of each other (Table 
3.26). Only 67.5% of Hindu anchored single level zones are of this kind 
and they anchored no single level heterogeneous zones of this level of 
intensity. This serves to reinforce the argument that ideologically 
Muslims prefer to perceive themselves as forming a close-knit community. 
In comparison the Hindus perceive of social differences dividing them 
and their close friends. 
Table 3.26: Analysis of Zones of Single Levels of Intensity 
Respondents: 
Homo-
geneous 
Kin 2) 
Muslims 
Hetero-
geneous 
Close ) 88.37% 
Friends 36) 
Ordinary 
Friends 4) 
Acquain- ) 11.63% 
tances 1) 
4 80% 
Strangers __________ ~1L-~2~0~% 
Totals: 43 100% 5 100% 
48 
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Hindus 
Homo- Hetero-
geneous 
1) 
) 67.5% 
26) 
8) 
) 32.5% 
1 ) 
4) 
40 100% 
51 
geneous 
7) 
) 81.82% 
2) 
2 18.18% 
11 100% 
(c) Connectedness 
Ideally two models of primary zones can be identified: the first 
comprises close friends who belong to the same communities and live 
close together, are close friends of one another and form a close-knit 
group. The second model consists of close friends who are less well-
known to each other, live in different locations in Britain (and 
possibly overseas), belong to different communities and form a loose-
knit group. The connectedness of primary zones of the Hindus and Muslims 
is a further measurement for establishing the social characteristics of 
the structures of network zones. Connectedness of a zone is defined in 
terms of the ease with which one close friend in a zone can contact 
another given the perceived similarity or dissimilarity of the intensity 
of the relationship connecting them. This notion of connectedness is 
similar to that of reachability (Mitchell,1971:15-17), the difference 
is that the primary zones of Gujarati networks link them to existing 
community resources and to public resources, which mayor may not be 
reachable. In this sense connectedness or connectability is a 
characteristic of the structure of the zone as a whole and is not a 
characteristic of the individuals who comprise it. To derive a measure 
of connectability, I use the concept of an optimum spanning tree (Oeo, 
1974:39). This measure of connectedness builds on the size, density and 
the intensity of the relationships which link together close friends in 
a zone. An optimum spanning tree (OST) is the sum of the lowest number 
of relationships of highest intensity which link all close friends 
together (Appendix IV). 
In Tables 3.27 and 3.28 I have set out the size of the primary zones 
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of networks against the total weight of the optimum spanning tree [9]. 
An analysis of the connectedness of Muslim and Hindu anchored zones 
shows that those of the former are generally more closely connected than 
those anchored to the latter. Slightly more Muslim than Hindu anchored 
zones are connected by ties of the highest level of intensity, that is 
kin who are regarded as close friends. Moreover, over 60% of Muslim 
zones are connected by OST weights that fall within the close friend/ 
kinship range as compared with 42% of Hindu zones. Higher numbers of 
Hindu than Muslim zones are more loosely connected by OST links of lower 
social intensity, that is close friends who are perceived to be 
connected by ties of ordinary friendship, acquaintanceship and/or are 
strangers. Only one (1.3%) Muslim anchored zone comprises close friends 
all of whom are perceived to be not to know one another as compared with 
seven (4.8%) Hindu anchored zones. Five of these include some close 
friends who are perceived to be strangers and in two zones all close 
friends are perceived to be strangers, that is they are totally 
unconnected. Thus, overall the Muslim anchored zones of close friends 
are more strongly connected than are Hindu anchored ones. 
Table 3.27: Extent of Connectedness in Muslim Anchored Zones* 
No. of Close Range of 
Friends in Weight of Optimum Spanning Trees 
Primary Kin Cl.Frds Ord.Frds Acqs Stranger Total No. 
Zone: 1(2-9) 2(4-18) 3(6-27) 4(8-36) 5(10-45) of Zones 
3 10 2 12 
4 1 7 3 11 
5 7 3 2 1 13 
6 2 2 2 6 
7 4 4 
8 2 2 4 
9 1 1 
10 1 16 7 2 26 
Total: 2 46 18 10 1 77 
% 2.6 59.74 23.38 12.98 1.3 100 
Close Connectedness Loose 
* Zones comprising two or less people have no spanning tree, and are 
excluded from these Tables (see also Table 3.28). 
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Table 3.28: Extent of Connectedness in Hindu Anchored Zones 
No. of Close Range of 
Friends in Weight of Optimum Spanning Tree 
Primary Kin Cl.Frds Ord.Frds Acqs Stranger Total No. 
Zone: 1(2-9) 2(4-18) 3(6-27) 4(8-36) 5(10-45) of Zones 
3+ 10 2 12 
3+ 10 6 1 17 
4 1 13 6 2 22 
5 2 9 11 5 2 29 
6 6 12 2 1 21 
7 2 1 3 
8 1 4 4 9 
9 1 2 3 
10 9 17 3 2 31 
Total: 3 59 58 20 7 147 
% 2.0 40.1 39.5 13.6 4.8 100 
Close Connectedness Loose 
If the structure of a community is taken as a "persisting pattern of 
social relationships" (Laumann,1973:3-4), then on the basis of this 
analysis the Muslims form a more closely connected community than do 
the Hindus. The inclusion of close friends from other communities in 
Muslim anchored zones has not altered appreciably the degree of 
connectedness of the zones. They remain closely connected. Hindu 
anchored zones are more loosely connected than are the Muslim ones. The 
inclusion of close friends from other communities may have contributed 
further to the already low degree of connectedness. This structural 
characteristic has made it easier for Hindus to include members of other 
communities amongst their close friends. 
In conclusion, the findings show that Muslims generally perceive of 
their close friends being close friends of each other, that is they are 
all "brothers" in an Islamic community which stretches far beyond the 
boundaries of Bolton. Although Muslims may belong to different caste 
communities, sects and adhere to social identities that associate them 
with specific districts and factions, the ideology of brotherhood can 
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override these social differences. Furthermore, this ideology allows 
them at one moment to express and generate unity on a wide range of 
political issues, while at another to splinter or segment into sects or 
mosque based communities. However, such strong ties act as a form of 
social control by enmeshing individuals within a close-knit social and 
religious community. Close friendships with members of the white 
community and other ethnic minority groups are minimised. The 
combination of a shared set of religious beliefs, reinforced by strong 
ties of close friendship and bolstered by shared disadvantages of low 
social standing provides this Muslim community with a source of power in 
the form of a structure of support based upon an ideology of equality, 
be it real or fictitious. Thus they give the impression of forming a 
strong and cohesive political group which on the one hand potentially 
could present a threat to the political parties, on the other hand 
offers white politicians a visibly politically wooable group of voters. 
The structural characteristics of the primary zones of Hindus show 
that many are incomplete, comprise zones of lower level of intensity 
relationships, and are loosely connected. These characteristics ideally 
create a situation in which they can continue to support their caste 
values without having to weigh their commitment to caste status against 
their commitment to friendship. These social characteristics enable 
Hindus to separate and compartmentalise their relationships with close 
friendships who belong to other castes and communities. In practice, 
this is not easily done, since the Hindu community as a whole is a small 
one and an individual will still depend upon his caste equals for 
support. Thus Hinduism provides a central set of values and beliefs 
around which its adherents can rally, but in practice in supporting 
these beliefs they separate rather than unite themselves into a complex 
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of caste communities. Thus the Hindus do not act as if or give the 
impression that they form a cohesive community. Consequently they are 
not seen politically as wooable as the Muslim community. 
This Chapter has concentrated upon communities within a community and 
the way in which members of some of these communities define their 
social space through close friendship. 
So far the generally social disadvantaged socio-economic position of 
Gujaratis has been defined {Chap. I), the bases for the organisation of 
social movements have been identified (Chap.2) and the underlying 
structures of the Muslim and Hindu communities which provide structures 
of support for leaders as well as acting as networks of communication 
have been described and analysed (Chap.3). The next essential element in 
the analysis is to define the social meanings of the political situation 
through the notions of social distance and labelling which formed the 
substance of ethnic political debates about support and power (Chap.4), 
so the political behaviour of the Gujarati leaders can be understood 
(Chaps.5,6 and 7). 
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FOOTNOTES 
1. This is a crucial definition. I use the term bounded in the sense 
that the actor perceives his close friends to form a bounded/ 
exclusive group. The intensity of close friendships marks off close 
friends from less intense forms of acquaintanceship, such as 
ordinary friendship, and acquaintanceship. 
2. La Gaipa distinguishes between best friends, close friends, good 
friends, social acquaintances and casual acquaintances (1977:251). 
These distinctions between friends are identified as ones which are 
in general used by Gujaratis (see Chap.3 and Appendix I, Question 
Nos. 56-66). 
3. I restricted the number of close friends to ten, as this not only 
met La Gaipa's estimated number of best/ close friends, but it also 
was a convenient number with which to work. Any larger number would 
have increased the complexity of the calculations considerably. 
4. I saw no good reason for following up these responses. I had to 
accept their answers as they were given. In other circumstances I 
might have delved more deeply into their reasons for having no close 
friends. 
5. This version of the Hope-Goldthorpe scale is based upon a collapsed 
version of their more elaborate 36 class categories of "Social 
Standing" or "General Desirability of Occupations" (Goldthorpe, 
1981/1982:9). 
I 
II 
III 
IVa 
IVb 
IVc 
V 
VI 
VII 
Other 
Professional, administrative and managerial, higher. 
Professional, administrative and managerial, lower. 
Routine non-manual. 
Proprietors & self-employed with employees. 
Proprietors & self-employed without employees. 
Farmers & smallholders. 
Lower & technical supervisory. 
Skilled non-manual. 
Semi-skilled & unskilled manual. 
Unemployed, apprentices, students, retired. 
6. To determine completeness I used the formula for the.cal~~lation of 
density for undirected networks (Kapferer,1973:96; NlemelJer, 1973: 
46): where Density = 100 x Na 
1/2 N(N-1) 
Na stands for the actual relations between close friends in the 
primary lone, excluding those between the ~espondent and his close 
friends; N stands for the number of close frlends. 
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7. The weightings given are kin = 1, close friend = 2, ordinary friend 
= 3, acquaintance = 4 and not known = 5. These are arbitrarily 
attached weightings. 
8. Two Hindu respondents described the relationships between some of 
their close friends in terms of levels of hostility. The hostility 
aspect was removed from the analysis of friendship, since only two 
respondents mentioned that a few of their close friends were hostile 
towards each other. I regard these relationships as being equivalent 
to "not known" for the purposes of analysis. Theoretically, the 
model of homogeneity and heterogeneity would not sustain the 
inclusion of "hostile" relationships between close friends, since it 
would be inconsistent with the basic principle of like attracting 
like. 
9. "In its simplest form, a spanning tree algorithm yields one spanning 
tree in a given connected graph" (Deo,1974:277). It is the weight of 
one, and only one, tree that I have plotted against the size of the 
zone. As the number of people in a zone decreases, so to do the 
possible numbers of spanning trees that link them together. Zones 
comprising less than three people have no spanning trees. Wherever a 
zone includes relationships of different intensity, the algorithm 
will select a tree with the highest values (Appendix IV). 
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CHAPTER 4 
SOCIAL PERCEPTIONS AND COMMON SENSE RACISM 
The aim of this Chapter is to explore the political space that 
separates some communities within a community through perceptions of 
social distance and the social meaning of labels. The identification and 
definition of this space is achieved through an analysis of social 
constructions of communities based upon perceptions of social distance 
and common sense racism, as it is symbolised through the process of 
labelling. The space lies between Gujaratis and white British 
constructions of social and political life. Two bodies of social 
knowledge bridge this space: the one is that of the Gujaratis, which I 
shall define as "private" and the other is white British, which I shall 
describe as "public" and includes common sense racism. There is a 
continuum of social relationships that can be arranged in terms of those 
which are perceived by Gujaratis as being socially close and those which 
are perceived as socially distant. The former include ideas about the 
social distances between kin, close friends, and friendships of lesser 
intensity, and the latter include ideas about distances between Hindus 
and Muslims, between Hindus or Muslims and Pakistanis, white people, 
West Indians and Sikhs. These notions of social distances as perceived 
by Gujaratis underlie their ideas about what is private and public 
knowledge. Common sense racism is part of the body of public knowledge. 
This Chapter explores the relationship between social distance and areas 
of knowledge through the labels Gujaratis use in public places. 
The analyses of Gujaratis' social networks (Chap.3) showed that 
generally most of their close friends are Gujaratis, who belong to their 
factions, districts, castes, and belong to the same religious groups as 
202 
they do. Few of their close friends are not Gujaratis; however evidence 
showed that they are willing to accept people from other ethnic groups 
and white people in friendships of lower social intensity, such as 
acquaintances. Underlying these patterns of social relationships are 
ideas about social distances which are embodied in a hierarchy of social 
identities. A model of the hierarchy would be based upon the most 
intimate and specific social identities describing the family, faction, 
district, caste, and then become increasingly generalised, open and 
public describing religious beliefs and status through labels 
such as Muslim, Hindu, immigrant and alien. 
Earlier I defined common sense racism as a set of recipes for the 
explanations for racism that Gujaratis use to make explicit their lack 
of access to public resources. Common sense racism is a defined body of 
knowledge comprising social attitudes, values and prejudices, based upon 
past and present experiences of racism, which provide both white and 
Asian (and black) people with a guide to managing their social 
interaction in a racialised society (see Introduction Part I). This 
implies that for racism to exist there need to be differences in power 
relationships based upon perceptions of peoples who are differentiated 
on the basis of skin colour and associated ideas. These differences are 
not only made explicit through social relationships, as the analyses of 
social network relationships demonstrated, but they are also made 
explicit through social identities. The pattern of the hierarchy of 
social identities is an arrangement based upon notions of power, not 
always hidden power (cf.Willis,1979). 
Gujaratis' commitment to investment in social relationships within 
their communities can be explained in part by their social and cultural 
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perceptions of social relations and their social position in Bolton. 
These sets of perceptions enable Hindus and Muslims to develop 
responses to white common sense racism. Exchange theory suggests that 
those in positions of power develop and establish friendships with those 
in similar social positions to themselves (Lin,1982; Blau,1967). 
However, their strong commitment to caste and religious organisations 
predispose Hindus and Muslims, who are politically, economically and 
socially in a weak position, to place a high social value on these 
relationships and therefore to invest in relationships within these 
communities rather than to establish friendships with those in other 
communities of similar or higher social status. This commitment is 
logical since these are also the people with whom Gujaratis associate 
most frequently (Chap.3). 
This Chapter is separated into two sections: in the first section I 
shall analyse Gujarati perceptions of social community identities 
relating these to notions of kinship and friendship and in the second 
section I shall concentrate on the social meanings of selected labels 
which lie at the centre of common sense racism. 
Kin, Caste and Community 
Most people can identify three categories of friends, namely best or 
close friends, ordinary friends and acquaintances (La Gaipa,1977). What 
varies in urban societies is the social value that is placed upon these 
categories of friendship. Gujaratis have terms to identify these 
categories and they are kas dost (close friend), dost (ordinary friend) 
and aurkhan or pichan (acquaintance). With the addition of kin, 
GUjaratis were asked to evaluate these relationships in terms of five 
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social attributes, which they associated with these relationships: (1) 
can rely on, (2) can trust, (3) can obtain help from, (4) receive 
respect from, and (5) receive sympathy from. 
Although kin have a quite separate role from that of friends: as 
Gluckman reminds us, "blood is thicker than water" (1971: xxv), there is 
a difference in the social configuration of kin in these Hindu and 
Muslim communities (Table 4.1). Hindus perceive of kin and close 
friends as almost sharing attributes: 80% and over consider that both 
can be almost equally relied upon, kin are more trustworthy than close 
friends, but are slightly less helpful. They expect kin to show more 
respect and sympathy than close friends. What is striking about their 
perceptions is the dramatic distinction Hindus draw between, on the one 
hand, kin and close friends and, on the other hand, ordinary friends and 
acquaintances. Less than 15% regarded ordinary friends as reliable and 
trustworthy, although 40% thought that they could be helpful and over 
60% believed that they would offer respect and sympathy. The distinction 
Hindus make between these friends and acquaintances shows that such 
relationships carry little immediate social value. An explanation for 
this pattern of perceptions lies in the pattern of relationships within 
caste communities. If these are the people with whom a Hindu can 
interact as a social equal, then it stands to reason that most of his 
friendships will be with them. Within this community are kin, affines 
and people who are not related to him by blood or marriage with whom he 
can establish friendships (cf.Mayer,1973a:4). Friendship for Hindus can 
be established with any member of this community, whether they are kin, 
affines or neither. A close friend is a logical extension of kinship 
relationships within a Hindu's caste community. 
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Table 4.1 
Social Attributes Associated with Categories of Friendship 
Respondents: Muslims 
100 
kin 
90 close 
frie-
nds 
ordin-
80 ary 
frie-
nds 
70 acqu-
aint-
ances 
60 
50 
40 
30 
20 
10 
0 
rely trust help respect symp-
from athy 
Total = 100 
No Answers = 4 
Totals = 104 
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Hindus 
100 
90 
80 
70 
60 
50 
40 
30 
20 
10 
0 
rely trust 
Total 
No Answers 
Totals 
help respect 
from 
= 152 
= 2 
= 154 
kin 
close 
friends 
ordinary 
friends 
acquain-
, tances 
symp-
athy 
A few examples will illustrate points made above. It is kin who are 
obliged to help arrange marriages and, if they are able, financial help. 
For instance, many Hindus, like Mr P, who was eventually outcaste by his 
caste community (Chaps.2,6), rely on kin in Gujarat to find them 
acceptable wives. Although kin arrange marriages, the extent of this 
reliance on them emerges through the control the parents seek to gain 
over their children. Parents often withhold information about their 
caste membership, so that when their children reach marriageable age, 
they can be submerged into a state of dependence on kin from which it is 
difficult for them to escape (Taylor,1976). Thus kin can be used as a 
form of social control in a way that close friends cannot. 
Hindus rely upon their kin for financial support. A case which 
illustrates this is that of a Hindu, whom I shall call D.Patel, who 
looked to kin on both sides of his family for financial support to buy 
the rights to the management of a public house. His own brother could 
not help, as he could just support his family. When D.Patel wanted to 
borrow money, he asked his maternal cousin, who always seemed to have 
money. Then he approached his uncles and paternal cousins, some of whom 
lived in Bolton, some in Bilston in the Midlands and some in London. 
Only if he could not raise sufficient money from them, he informed me, 
would he turn to his close friends for help. On two occasions he 
referred to me as a close friend and then asked me if I could lend him a 
couple of hundred pounds. 
Hindus are more dependent upon kin than close friends, because there 
exist social controls that can be employed to ensure that kin will 
comply with the expectations and obligations of kinship. This same Patel 
on one occasion borrowed £500 from his maternal cousin. I was told that 
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in the past D.Patel's father, who lives in Gujarat, had borrowed money 
from this cousin's father. Months later, when D.Patel negotiated the 
purchase of a post office (before his purchase of a public house), he 
asked this cousin for money. The cousin told D.Patel that his father 
would collect the money owed him by D.Patel's father. By doing this, the 
cousin threatened the social status of D.Patel's father, since he knew 
that he unable to pay back the money. Thus the cousin put pressure on 
D.Patel to return the money that he and his father owed them. Such 
negotiations are everyday occurrences, when it is realised that these 
Gujaratis prefer to buy their homes outright and could not expect and 
preferred not to receive support from banks and building societies 
(Chap. I). Such complex negotiations can only exist in a society where 
kinship relationships are well defined. The only major difference is 
that kin are considered to be more likely to offer help than are close 
friends, because kinship carries sanctions, reciprocal and moral, that 
friendship does not (cf. Fortes,1970). Friendship is utilised where 
kinship is not available or to supplement it. 
These examples show that Hindus may perceive of an overlap between 
the social obligations and expectations of kin and close friends, but 
this should not be taken as evidence that they confuse the roles of 
these two categories of people. Analysis of those they define as close 
friends shows that Hindus include more kin as close friends than did 
Muslims (Chap.3). Furthermore, these examples demonstrate that Hindus 
can have pressure placed on them through the mobilisation of kin, but 
this pressure cannot be extended to close friends. No man can afford to 
risk alienating his kin. 
The differences in social values attached to kinship and close 
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friendship are illustrated by this anecdote told by a Mandhata Patel, 
who attended the wedding of a son of a member of his caste association 
held in West Bromwich. Kin of both the bride's and bridegroom's families 
received invitations to the wedding. However some Mandhata Patels, who 
did not receive invitations but who came from villages linked by ekadas 
to those of the young couple, assumed that they too were invited to the 
occasion. Though they were expected to give the newly wedded couple 
gifts, the gifts were formalised, that is they gave token gifts of one 
pound, and their names were written down in a book containing the names 
of all the guests. The perceived overlap between kin and close friend 
relationships is so close among Hindus, that one would not expect to 
find many of them having close friends of whom their kin disapproved. 
Hindus perceive of a social closeness between kin and close friend, 
which points to members of caste communities being seen as being social 
close, that is close enough for social relationships between members to 
act as a form of social control. However, there are no similar social 
controls between people who are not kin or close friends, that is they 
are not necessarily perceived of as social equals. The expectations and 
obligations associated with ordinary friends and acquaintances is low 
and is reflected in the high degree of social distance which separates 
them from kin and close friends. 
The Muslims' perceptions of kinship and friendship are based upon a 
different perspective. Their relationships are not bound by caste 
communities and notions of social inequality. Since Muslims are members 
of factions and caste communities which are not organised around 
ascribed status and accept a religion which claims that all members are 
"brothers", their perceived patterns of kinship and friendship are 
likely to differ from those of the Hindus. The majority of Muslims 
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distinguish clearly between kin and close friends. The former are 
perceived to be more reliable, trustworthy, helpful, respectful and 
sympathetic than the latter. For instance a family will expect kin to 
help them find spouses for their children. With the preference among 
Muslims being for first cousin marriage, this means that kin have to 
negotiate with kin when arranging a marriage: therefore kin are expected 
to be allies. This gives added meaning to an often quoted adage: "Those 
whom we marry are those with whom we fight". However, Muslims' 
dependence on kin enables them to separate kin from close friends. This 
also separates Muslims from Hindus, since the latter do not marry kin or 
distinguish as clearly between kin and close friendship. Close friends 
of Muslims may, and usually do belong to the same factions, caste 
communities and sects, but they are not regarded as potential affines. 
Close friends are expected to provide social and political support, 
occasionally to help with financial transactions, to relay information 
and to give advice. Probably their most important social role is to act 
as go-betweens in family feuds. 
Although the expectations and obligations associated with ordinary 
friends and acquaintances are seen by Muslims as being distinct from 
kinship and close friendship, they placed a higher value on these forms 
of friendships than did the Hindus. An explanation for this might be 
that as all Muslims are "brothers", they are obliged to help fellow 
Muslims. Both this philosophy and their social perceptions are in 
accord; this has enabled Muslims to develop a community that is to a 
degree united by belief and perception. This makes for a close, if not 
closed, community. 
Two examples illustrate this overlap. On one occasion I attended the 
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wedding of the son of a teacher in Blackburn. Although the host referred 
to his guests as close friends, many were present as members of the 
ekada of the father of the bridegroom. The term 'close friend' was used 
here as a polite but blanket term to describe the relationship between 
the host, his kin, his potential affines and his friends. As used here 
it is synonymous with one meaning of the word for cousin 
(cf.Peters,1976). The wedding guests included some totally unrelated 
friends, some of whom were Muslims from other parts of Gujarat and 
Pakistan, and a few white friends. The distinction between kin, close 
friends and other friends was clear; the former were invited to stay 
for the total duration of the wedding - three days - the latter were 
invited for a meal on one day. 
The second example relates to a funeral of a Muslim girl who had 
committed suicide. She was buried in Heaton Cemetery and only the men 
attended the burial. Some of them did not know the girl or her family 
personally, although they may have known of her father and brother. All 
some knew was how she had died. It was explained to me that Muslim men 
have a duty to attend funerals of members of the Muslim community. A 
funeral, irrespective of how the deceased died, becomes a public 
expression of unity. Taken in this way, all Muslims are acquaintances -
brothers. 
The social perceptions of Hindus and Muslims provide a guide to a 
cognitive social map of relationships and their associated expectations 
and obligations that form the basis for the establishment of friendships 
which extend beyond kin relations. These perceptions influence the 
number of friends that Hindus and Muslims claim to have (cf.La Gaipa, 
1977:251) and allow individuals to share in common knowledge embedded 
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in a Gujarati cognitive map. The perceptions that link them to their 
communities are expressed in terms of the number of close and ordinary 
friends they claim they have. Precisely because the social values 
attributed to ordinary friends and acquaintances set them apart from 
close friends, Muslim and Hindus' estimates of the numbers of their 
close and ordinary friends give an indication of how they perceive of 
themselves fitting into their own communities (see below). 
So far this analysis has implied that from an egocentred point of 
view the relationships which link an individual to his community radiate 
outwards from kin through the various forms of friendship to relations 
with strangers. Unlike Barnes (1971:55-57), rather than looking at the 
individual from the community inwards, I shall look at the community 
from the individual perspective. The importance of this for the analysis 
of social networks is that the model I am developing implies that 
individuals are surrounded by relationships of different levels of 
social intensity, that is in terms of relations with individuals in 
order of decreasing social expectations and obligations [1]. 
The number of kin surrounding an individual anchoring a network 
vary, but they are not of immediate concern. The reason is that these 
relationships are ascribed, and are not based upon the freedom of 
association. Of greater concern are the estimates of Hindus and Muslims 
of the numbers of close and ordinary friends they claimed to have (Table 
4.2). These estimates show that 78% estimated that they have between one 
and twenty close friends, and slightly more Hindus (17.5%) than Muslims 
(11.5%) estimated that they had more than twenty close friends. Their 
estimates of the numbers of ordinary friends show that 37.7% of Hindus 
perceive that they have about the same number of close as ordinary 
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friends. Hindu replies suggest that perceptions of numbers of friends 
varies across the sample. However, the Muslim estimates show more 
clearly that most of them (54.8%) perceive that they had hundreds of 
ordinary friends. This would be expected given their perceptions of the 
differences between close and ordinary friends and their view of the 
Islamic community. Having said this, almost a third (27.9%) claimed to 
have about the same numbers of close as ordinary friends. In general the 
zone of close friendship comprises fewer friends than the zone of 
ordinary friends. In all likelihood the number of acquaintances that 
both Muslims and Hindus would claim to have would be even greater than 
their estimates for ordinary friends. 
Table 4.2: Estimated Numbers of Close and Ordinary Friends 
No. of 
friends 
o 
1 - 10 
11 - 20 
21 - 30 
31 - 90 
100s 
Totals: 
Hindu 
Close Friends 
No. of % 
Respondents 
7 4.55 
108 70.13 
12 7.79 
2 1.3 
15 9.74 
10 6.49 
154 100% 
Respondents 
Ordinary Friends 
No. of %-
Respondents 
77.9% 
9 
34 
24 
6 
17.53% 31 
50 
154 
5.8 
22.1 
15.6 
3.9 
20.1 
32.5 
100% 
Muslim Respondents 
Close Friends Ordinary Friends 
No. of No. of % No. of % 
friends Respondents Respondents 
o 11 10.58 8 7.69 
37.7% 
24% 
32.5% 
1 - 10 72 69.23 77.88% 20 19.23 27.88% 
11 - 20 9 8.65) 9 8.65 
21 - 30 6 5.77 5 4.81 9.62% 
31 - 90 1 0.96 11.54% 5 4.81 
100s 5 4.81 57 54.81 54.81% 
Totals: 104 100% 104 100% 
(Hah 10, 1983) . 
It can be argued that as part of the urban experience, kinship 
relationships are giving way to more effective relationships of 
friendship. Since zones vary in size (La Gaipa,1977:251), the 
213 
individual's estimation of the sizes of the zones provides an indication 
of his perceived links with his community. On the basis of these 
perceived differences between various categories of friendship, it is 
possible to construct a model of a social network as a set of inter-
related zones, that can be distinguished on the basis of differing 
expectations and obligations. An individual can be visualised as being 
at the centre of a social network surrounded by a first kin, then close 
friends, ordinary friends, acquaintances and finally by various 
categories of people of lesser acquaintance and strangers. In theory a 
zone incorporates more people as the social obligations and expectations 
connecting them directly with ego become weaker. The primary zone 
contains the most effective relationships with individuals upon whom ego 
can rely, trust, seek help from, obtain sympathy from and be given 
respect, which directly influence an individual's freedom of association 
(Chap.3). The key to this model of zones within social networks lies in 
perceptions of social distances between kin and various categories of 
friends. 
Social Distances and Social Boundaries 
Observation and evidence suggests that generally people have fewer 
close friends than ordinary friends and fewer ordinary friends than 
acquaintances. An analysis of who Gujaratis befriend and the perceived 
intensity of the friendship should show where they perceive to be the 
social boundaries of their communities. The model of a social network 
should not only indicate differences in the intensity of the 
friendship, but also it should show with whom differing forms of 
friendship are considered to be appropriate. To reiterate a point made 
earlier, if Gujaratis are in a socially disadvantaged position, then 
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theory suggests that they should develop ties with those whom they 
perceive to be socially closest. Gujaratis share the same class niche as 
members of other disadvantaged minorities. In the circumstances, there 
are two possible arguments: (I) that the Gujaratis will perceive members 
of these minorities as being socially close, and therefore will develop 
friendships that cement ties that allow them to share common urban 
experiences; (2) that the Gujaratis will perceive of white people as 
being the most "desirable" of partners and allies, since their members 
have both the political power and are numerically the largest community. 
These two options underpin much of exchange theory (Blau,1967) and 
social network theory (cf.Lin,1982; Granovetter,1973). Inherent in 
Gujaratis' cognitive map of their social relationships are notions of 
social distance and power relationships and imbalances. 
To ascertain these aspects of their cognitive map, Gujaratis were 
asked whom they were prepared to accept as kin, close friends, ordinary 
friends and acquaintances. They also were asked to consider the 
possibilities of befriending people from particular minorities, namely 
Gujarati Hindus or Muslims, Pakistanis, West Indians (Afro-Caribbeans), 
Sikhs and white people (Table 4.3). With one or two exceptions, 97 per 
cent of Hindus and Muslims said that they would accept in marriage, as 
kin, a person who shared their cultural and religious background. The 
social constraints placed by Muslims on their members to marry Muslims 
have been taken to extremes with the express preference for first cousin 
marriage. 
believers 
married a 
However, during 1976 two cases of Muslims marrying non-
in Islam were reported in the Press; in one case a Muslim 
Sikh in Huddersfield, Yorkshire, and in another case in 
Nelson, Lancashire, a Muslim girl brought home her European boyfriend. 
In the former instance, the Muslim community forced the couple to 
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separate by threatening to kill the Sikh; and in the latter case, the 
girl's father shot and wounded the boy. When I asked a past president of 
the ICC and president of Tayaibah Mosque Committee, what would be the 
community's reaction if one of their members married a non-believer, he 
rep 1 ied, "We wou ld force them to separate, and k ill them if necessary". 
Table 4.3: Perceptions of Social Distances 
Hindu 
Respondents: 
Gujarati 
Accept as a: Hindu Muslims 
Kinsman: 150 6 
97.4% 3.9% 
Close 153 53 
friend: 99.35% 34.4% 
Ordinary 153 98 
friend: 99.35% 63.6% 
Acquaintance 153 118 
99.35% 76.6% 
Don't know 1 36 
0.65% 23.4% 
Tota 1 s: 154 154 
White 
Persons 
25 
16.2% 
89 
57.8% 
119 
77.3% 
129 
83.8% 
25 
16.2% 
154 
West 
Indians 
13 
8.4% 
57 
37% 
93 
60.4% 
105 
68.2% 
49 
31.8% 
154 
Paki- Sikhs 
stanis 
8 25 
5.2% 16.2% 
40 78 
26% 50.6% 
76 116 
49.4% 75.3% 
94 130 
61.1% 84.4% 
60 24 
38.9% 15.6% 
154 154 
100% 100% 100% 100% % ~10~0~%L-£10~0~%L-____ ~~~~~____ ~==~ __ ~~
Mus 1 im 
Respondents: 
Paki- Sikhs Gujarati White West 
Accept as a: Hindu Muslims Persons Indians stanis 
Kinsman: 13 101 19 10 39 9 
12.5% 97.1% 18.3% 9.6% 37.5% 8.7% 
Close 58 102 59 40 61 36 
friend 55.8% 98.1% 56.8% 38.4% 58.7% 34.7% 
Ordinary 88 102 88 69 90 68 
friend 84.6% 98.1% 84.6% 66.3% 86.6% 65.5% 
Acquaintance 98 102 97 84 97 81 
94.2% 98.1% 93.4% 80.7% 93.3 78% 
Don't 6 2 7 20 7 23 
know 5.8% 1. 9% 6.7% 19.2% 6.7% 22.1% 
Totals: 104 104 104 104 104 104 
% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
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Two further instances illustrate the divide between Hindus and 
Muslims: firstly, a 16 year old Hindu girl was married to a husband of 
45 years. He battered her and at first her parents refused to accept 
that the husband they had chosen was to blame. Eventually after being 
injured by him she took him to court, where he was found guilty of 
assault. She obtained a divorce, married a Muslim, and now lives in 
Blackburn. Her transition from her community to the Muslim one was 
uneventful and she was accepted as a Muslim. However, her family have 
outcaste her and she is no longer considered by her parents to be their 
daughter. Similarly a Leva Patidar Patel, who embraced the Islamic 
faith, was ostracised by his kin. By chance, I became well acquainted 
with his Hindu cousins, and when they were asked to name kin with whom 
they kept in touch in Bolton, this man was never mentioned. 
Regarding the other forms of friendship, both Hindus and Muslims are 
prepared to accept people of their own background and religious 
persuasion. The minorities which Hindus perceived to be most acceptable 
as kin are Hindus (97.4%) and the Muslims' reaction to accepting Muslims 
was similar. With the remaining forms of friendship carrying lower 
obligations and expectations, both Hindus and Muslims were ready to 
accept one another in these relationships. These data provide further 
support for the view that Gujaratis comprise two major religious 
communities, namely Hindus and Muslims. At one extreme some have argued 
that these two religious groups have the status of ethnic groups (Brooks 
and Singh,1978/79; Robinson,1979; Banton,1972), though I would not go so 
far as to make such a claim. Though Gujaratis recognise that they 
comprise two separate religious groups, in certain situations they act 
as a single group in relation to other groups, like Pakistanis or the 
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white community (cf.Desai,1963). 
Perceived relations with other communities reveal a number of trends. 
Muslims are more prepared to accept Pakistanis (37.5%) in marriage than 
members of any other community. To some extent this readiness supports 
that often rehearsed phrase: all Muslims are brothers, so any Muslim can 
marry another Muslim. As kin white people are regarded as the most 
acceptable from the non-Islamic communities (18.3%). In comparison, the 
Hindus are more reluctant to accept members of other communities as 
kin. Some 16.2% said that they would accept white people and Sikhs as 
kin. As close friends both Hindus (57.8%) and Muslims (56.8%) are 
prepared to accept white people, in addition the former found Sikhs 
(50.6%) to be acceptable and the latter Pakistanis (58.7%). This pattern 
of acceptability applied to ordinary friendship and acquaintanceship, 
where white people and Sikhs or Pakistanis are preferred to members of 
other minorities. In general as the social obligations in a friendship 
ease, the readiness to accept those who are perceived to be socially 
different increases. For instance the token recognition of the 
possibility of white people marrying Hindus was given some credence by 
an impression that I gained that more Hindus than Muslims married out of 
their own religious groups. The following comment by a prominent member 
of the VHP may be taken as evidence of concern over this trend: an 
executive member of the VHP whose daughter married a white man, said, 
liThe trouble with the white community is that it takes our girls, but 
does not give us any girls in return." The acceptability of Sikhs might 
be explained by the fact that Mr Sandhu, a Sikh, was chairperson of the 
VHP and therefore, the Hindu communities had, for a while at least, to 
recognise his leadership. 
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A number of anecdotes illustrate some of the intricacies of the 
social perceptions of social distances between these communities. One 
incident which illustrates the ambivalence that is part of weak 
relationships involved Hindus and the white community. A Kutchi family, 
whom I hardly knew, asked me to intervene in a dispute between a husband 
and a wife. The couple had separated; the husband lived alone, while his 
wife had gone to live with her parents or close relatives. The husband 
asked me to force the relatives to release her. When told that I had no 
power to do this, he said, "You can ask the police to go with you and 
then they will let my wife gO." He assumed that, I as a white person, or 
any other white person, could use the police to put pressure on 
recalcitrant relatives who fear the power of the police or more likely a 
possible threat of deportation. Had I tried to involve the police in 
this family dispute, then all Hindus would have accused me of meddling 
in private family matters that they saw as none of my concern. As I 
learnt later, the Kutchi families involved in this dispute had a "bad" 
reputation among the other Kutchis. This was not an isolated instance. 
I came across a number of instances when Hindus and Muslims found 
themselves in intractable social situations over which nobody had 
social, economic, legal or political control. Into these they tried to 
draw others who were not Gujaratis, so that the blame for failure could 
be placed upon them. In other words, they would become scapegoats (cf. 
Frankenberg,1957:19,43-44,66,98). 
An incident that occurred in 1972 demonstrates the complexity of 
social distance as perceived by a Muslim and a Pakistani. A Pakistani 
school teacher, took charge of a bus trip organised by the BCCR. He 
arranged the seating so that Hindus sat on one side and Muslims on the 
other. A Gujarati Muslim passenger argued that people should be allowed 
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to sit wherever they choose. If Muslims sat next to Hindus, then the aim 
of the trip to improve Hindu-Muslim relations might be seen to be 
achieved. However, the teacher insisted on separating the trippers. 
Later the Muslim argued that Mr K had acted against the aims of the BeeR 
and therefore should resign, which he did soon afterwards. The degree of 
social distance that separates these communities is fuelled by memories 
of the bitterness created by the Indo-Pakistani war and before that, by 
the partitioning of India in 1947. At a BeeR meeting (24/3/77), a young 
Pakistani said that "Pakistanis could not mix with Indians in religious 
places", this was said in response to a question about young Asians 
learning about other Asian religions. By the label "Pakistani", the 
Pakistani lad meant Muslim; by Indian he meant Hindu. 
Of those members of communities perceived to be least acceptable as 
kin or as friends, the Hindus perceived the West Indians to be more 
acceptable than Pakistanis, while the Muslims are more ready to accept 
Pakistanis than West Indians or Sikhs. In general, both Hindus and 
Muslims perceive of little that they have in common with West Indians, 
other than possibly their general position in British society. 
Perceived differences between Sikhs, Hindus and Muslims were expressed 
in a dispute when Mr Sandhu advertised his intention to sell liquor in 
his shop, stating that Hindus and Muslims had indicated their 
wi 11 ingness to support him. Representatives of both the Hindu and Muslim 
communities publicly took him to task for making such a claim, 
particularly since he had never sought their opinion. One Muslim asked 
Mr Sandhu if he was a Muslim or a Hindu; when he said no to both 
questions, the Muslim told him that as a Sikh he could not assume that 
he shared a common identity with these communities. For the Muslims 
this incident confirmed the distrust of Sikhs. 
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Another anecdote points to the tensions between Muslims and Afro-
Caribbeans. There is little evidence to suggest that the distance 
between Gujaratis and West Indians is likely to decrease, an idealistic 
view taken by some (Rex and Tomlinson,1979). The following example 
illustrates the depth of this division: in 1979 a seven year old West 
African Muslim child, whose father had come to Bolton to study, joined a 
class of Muslim children in a local primary school. She was labelled a 
West Indian. Even though she and her parents are Muslims, none of the 
children would play with her at school or in the street. When the 
children were asked why they did not play with her, they replied: "West 
Indians are black and dirty; we are not black, we are white [2]". Her 
parents likewise experienced racial discrimination from the local 
Muslims with the result that in the end they left the area and the town. 
In this instance "brother Muslims" are Asian and not Afro-Caribbean 
Muslims. 
Exchange theory suggests that Hindus and Muslims should befriend 
those with power, but this analysis of social perceptions of distances 
between communities shows that firstly, these communities perceive of 
Gujaratis as being closer to them than any other community, and 
secondly, that Gujaratis show little positive inclination to place 
themselves closer to the white community or the other minority 
communities. Thus Gujaratis stand alone. Therefore, they establish their 
ethnic identities through social interaction with others, and this is 
explored through an analysis of selected social labels. 
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Common Sense Racism and Labelling 
social Gujaratis' daily lives require them to manage their 
interactions through a range of social situations some of which involve 
Gujaratis alone, and others which involve members of other communities. 
In other words Gujaratis find themselves acting the roles of insiders 
and outsiders. In this section I shall concentrate attention upon 
the social meanings attached to commonly used labels that define the 
social boundaries of Gujarati communities within a community. Some of 
the social meanings are "private", that is are understood by Gujaratis, 
and some are public, they are shared by Gujaratis and members of other 
communities. 
Both Lawrence (1983) and Hall (1981) offer descriptions of white 
Britons' body of common sense racism. It is described as "down-to-earth 
'good sense'. It is thought to represent the distilled truths of 
centuries of practical experience ... The contradictory nature of common 
sense means that it should not be thought of as constituting a unified 
body of knowledge .... common sense is appropriate to 'the practical 
struggle of everyday life of the popular masses'" (Lawrence,1983:48-50). 
Brewer correctly observes, in my view, that Lawrence's analysis of 
common sense racism is based on firstly information gleaned from the 
media and other secondary sources with particular political biases 
(Brewer,1984:68); secondly that there is little empirical justification 
for the assertion that the racist maxims that he claims form part of 
this body of knowledge are in fact part of it; and thirdly, that he 
imposes the notion of common sense racism on white people by theoretical 
fiat (Brewer,1984:71-72). I defined common sense racism as: comprising 
social attitudes, values and prejudices, derived from past and present 
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experiences of both Asian and white people in Britain and her ex-
colonies, which today provide members of both communities with a 
shorthand guide to understanding the social actions of each other (see 
Introduction Part I above). 
However, the idea that white people have constructed a body of 
knowledge which they employ to guide them in their social interaction 
with Asian and black people is important, since it contributes to 
Gujaratis' experiences of urban life. Common sense racism is part of a 
larger body of knowledge which includes not only how white Britons 
understand the role of Asian and black people, but also how Gujaratis 
(and other Asian and black people) understand the role and social 
behaviour of white people. Since this is an ongoing process, Gujaratis 
construct their response as part of an ongoing process to white common 
sense racism. To analyse the aspects of Gujaratis' common sense racism, 
I shall ground this analysis in a study of social identities, which are 
based upon Gujarati notions of social distance between them and others 
within and without the Gujarati communities. This means that firstly I 
shall treat common sense as an empirical issue (cf.Brewer,1984:71). 
Secondly, shall assume that Gujaratis who have come to live here have 
acquired this knowledge on the basis of their shared experiences passed 
down by their parents, as exploited peoples, as immigrants perceived as 
"black" people. 
A recipe is a "precept for action", "a scheme of expression", and "a 
scheme of interpretation" (Schutz,1976:103; Barth,1969:15ff; Goffman, 
1970:64ff). In urban racial situations such recipes through usage become 
associated with key or trigger words and function as labels. At a 
cognitive level labels mark social boundaries between communities 
223 
within community (cf.Mitchell,1974). In racial situations these labels 
are used by labellers and labelled to signal knowledge about social 
relationships between racial groups. They mark social boundaries between 
minority communities and between minority and the white communities. 
They function as if they are symbols. Labels not only identify some key 
characteristic, often of a discrediting nature (Goffman,1970:14), that 
is associated with members of a category or group, but they also imply 
that the labelled are aware of their differences (Goffman,1970:64ff). In 
racial situations Gujaratis and white participants use labels to 
describe one another, but their meanings and appropriateness are open to 
negotiation and debate. Unlike much of labelling theory which is 
concerned with more formal processes of labelling, the racial situation 
shares more in common with an informal situation in which people label 
others. The process of labelling between Gujarati and white is more akin 
to a process of secondary labelling (Lemert,1972). What studies of 
labelling make clear is how labellers impose a label on a person or 
group of people, often choosing to ignore the labelled's interpretation 
of the label and the applicability of the label. Thus debate about the 
applicability of the social meanings of labels set in motion a process 
of negotiation (cf.Cicourel,1976) between Gujaratis and white people 
which crystallised around events that formed the core of ethnic 
politics. The labels which were in currency formed part of the culture 
which the Gujarati leaders and white politicians drew on in their 
efforts to negotiate social identities in relation to events that drew 
attention to the space between communities within a community (Chap.6). 
By analysing labels as if they are symbols, in a sense keys which can 
unlock different levels of meaning, they can be shown to be associated 
with Gujarati ideas about how to manage their social relationships in 
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conflict situations within and without their communities. If this 
system of labels is taken to represent a symbolic order of social 
identities, it is possible to analyse the social positions of the 
labelled by virtue of their perceived position in relation to the 
labellers. When this order of identities is related to perceived social 
distances between members of different ethnic groups, it is possible to 
construct a cognitive model of common sense perceptions of intra- and 
inter-racial relationships (cf. Mitchell, 1974). To a large extent, this 
cognitive model enables members of different ethnic groups to order 
their behaviour in face-to-face situations. Labels condense these social 
identities so that when they are used, they function as a process of 
categorisation, and also provide a structure of belonging [3]. 
It is possible to conceive of a hierarchy of social identities 
applicable to racial contexts as comprising labels which define 
specific social identities at one end and general ones at the other. The 
former are perceived to be socially closer to the labelled and the 
latter to be more distant. In formal and informal social situations 
labelling represents the outcome of a process of negotiation by publicly 
recognised and authorised people. Ordinary people, organisations, those 
in positions of authority and the media are labellers in everyday life. 
Social estimations of distance become associated with social identities 
through common usage. The Gujaratis (the labelled) and white people 
(the labellers) have each developed a set of labels, some of which they 
share (are public) and some of which are not shared (are private). These 
labels describe social identities, the meanings of which may be public 
or private, that is understood by members of more than one community or 
only one community. Continual public usage of these labels ensures their 
survival. 
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As such labels are not fixed; their positions in the hierarchy of 
social identities can be changed as the positions of communities are 
perceived by labellers and labelled to change. Labels have three major 
dimensions: firstly, they act as a cue to what is regarded as socially 
appropriate interaction as defined by labeller and accepted or rejected 
by the labelled; they are precepts for action. Secondly, they are 
directional, that is they act as a guide to the status positions in 
which the labelled perceive themselves to be in relation to the 
labellers and vice versa. Social interaction between labellers and 
labelled may be interpreted with a view to recognising or disputing 
meanings associated with these identities. Thirdly, the process of 
negotiation of the appropriateness of a label by labellers and labelled 
in public situations can support or undermine elements within the body 
of common sense knowledge and therefore lead to changes in social 
meaning. Evidence for this will be found in changes to the accepted 
hierarchy of labels. 
As a consequence of their origins in India, the Gujaratis are 
associated with a group of people with a history that embodies a 
particular set of social characteristics (Lawrence,1983:57-66; Rex and 
Tomlinson,1979). Evidence of this is provided by the labels which the 
media and people generally used during the 1970s to describe Asians and 
black people. For instance a label that does so much more than any other 
to identify this collection of people is that of immigrant. If the 
structure which is embodied within the labels reflects a system of 
socially approved "proper" relations between individuals and groups, 
then the label II immigrant" not only categorises the Gujaratis along with 
other Asian and black people as visually identifiable newcomers, but it 
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also invests them with a social identity that signifies their position 
in the local social system as people who do not have equal rights to 
public resources, such as local and national funds and services, access 
to space, to participation and influence over political decisions. 
Although Enoch Powell talked about the "invisible enemy withinll in 
his speech at Northfield during the 1970 election, the label immigrant 
identifies a highly visible "enemy" within British society. The context 
in which the "enemy within" is discussed is an historical one. It is 
closely allied to the 1970s and to the moral panic that characterised 
the implementation of often ill considered solutions to problems such as 
those posed by youths, immigrants and inner cities (Hall,1981:32-33) and 
law and order (Solomos et al,1983:21-26). Hall has taken this phrase 
which was originally used to describe how during periods of moral panic 
a condition, an episode, person or group of persons become defined as a 
threat to societal values and interests and applied it to governmental 
and establishment reactions to Asian and black people during the 1970s 
(Hall,1981:32-33). The notion of a moral panic adequately conveys the 
idea of an establishment which was experiencing difficulties coping with 
and controlling immigration and settlement of Gujaratis and others here. 
The migrant, who became an immigrant, became seen as a threat to 
society. The label immigrant developed into an umbrella label which 
incorporates a range of lesser social identities that include Indian, 
Asian and Pakistani amongst others. This label probably above all others 
symbolises the moral panic that the establishment expressed in actions 
towards these Asian and black settlers. 
Following in part Turner's (1962) analysis of levels of meaning 
possessed by symbols, I shall separate the analysis of labels into 
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operational, positional and negotiated. Underlying this analysis is one 
important social characteristic of symbols, namely their polysemous 
nature (Turner,1962: 125). 
The Label Immigrant: an Operational Definition 
People who are labelled immigrant symbolise a threat to the white 
labellers and to their access to public resources. It also reflects a 
vulnerability and lack of access to resources of those so labelled. This 
label is used by white people to describe any person who is identifiable 
as foreign born by virtue of their having a darker skin colour, wearing 
a different style of clothing, having obvious difficulties with spoken 
English, and possessing certain diacritical cosmetic marks (cf.Brah, 
1982). In the work context it is employed to describe workers who have 
dark skins and who tend to work night shifts. They may be divided by 
employers into two categories - "Pakistanis" and "Indians". One employer 
said: "I prefer to employ Indian immigrants, as Pakistanis cause too 
much trouble wanting time off to attend their religious festivals". The 
label Indian is used to identify Hindus as opposed to Muslims. The label 
Pakistani was inaccurately used to describe all Muslims as opposed to 
(Indians) Hindus without any realisation of the socially perceived 
differences that separate these communities. The label Indian was used 
by this employer to identify a particular religious group in terms of a 
white common sense understanding of the Asian communities in Bolton. 
This usage suggests that this employer's understanding of the term 
Indian is based on a misunderstanding. Of itself this is important, but 
it is also important to recognise that his application of the term as a 
white employer has enabled him to impose this interpretation of the 
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label upon Gujaratis and other Asians irrespective of its inaccuracies. 
The Gujaratis have learnt to recognise this usage, and as such has 
become part of Gujaratis' and the white community's body of common sense 
knowledge. Thus, in racial situations the social situation in which 
labels are used and the positions of the participants fix their meanings 
within a hierarchy of social identities that form part of common sense 
racism. Like any symbol, the label immigrant also stands for other 
labels such as Indian and Pakistani. 
Gujaratis meet fewer white people on night shifts work than on day 
shifts, and those white workers who have contact with them are employed 
in supervisory positions. Depending on the shift system used by a mill, 
be it the English, multi- or continental shift system, Gujaratis mayor 
may not come into contact with the white labour force. This formalised 
but limited contact means that reliance on visible characteristics is at 
a premium, and for the sake of identifying who works where, when and in 
what position with what skills, the skin colour of the Gujarati worker 
becomes an essential sign. On the basis of this sign, white workers use 
the label immigrant to describe all of their Asian co-workers, thereby 
conflating social identities of Gujarati Hindus and Muslims, Pakistanis, 
Bangladeshis and Sikhs into one single identity - immigrant - or into 
two related identities, Indian and Muslim. 
The importance of labelling in the work situation is illustrated by 
the following examples. An occupational advantage is gained by Gujaratis 
being classified by an employer as Indian rather than Pakistani. The 
latter are people who have become identified as those who tend to put 
their faith before their jobs. For instance, there is no general 
agreement between the members of the two Muslim sects, Deobandis and 
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Berelewis, and between them and Pakistanis exactly on which day eid 
falls, heralding the end of Ramadan. The decision on which day to end 
Ramadan rests with each group. Deobandis tend to accept the decisions 
made by Islamic authorities in Morocco, while the Berelewis and 
Pakistanis prefer to wait twelve hours. The former choose to take one 
day off work to celebrate the end of Ramadan and the latter choose to 
take the following day. Therefore employers, who know little about these 
sects, have to negotiate directly with the workers. Alternatively, the 
latter make their own arrangements and the employers are left to cope 
with an insufficient labour force without advance warning. 
Another factor which encourages employers to rely on such simple 
identification is that Gujaratis give an impression of being more 
committed to their families and religion than to their work in a way 
that the employers find difficult to associate with their own career 
values (see Chap.l). This work behaviour gives employers the impression 
that Indians (Hindus) as opposed to Pakistanis (Muslims) are not 
committed to their jobs. This apparent indifference to their jobs has 
not enabled them to construct a set of values in which their white 
colleagues could share. If anything, it divides them along a colour-
ethnic line. It provides grounds for the white employers' and workers' 
belief in the inadequacy and unreliability of their Asian co-workers. As 
the white union managers recognise the same body of common sense 
knowledge, they are reluctant to support their Gujarati members' calls 
for strikes. The result of this is that the unions are accused of racism 
by the Gujarati workers. 
For Gujaratis the application of the label immigrant in the work 
situation implies little chance of promotion, job insecurity, night 
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shift work, and difficulty in understanding white co-workers. Outside 
work hours Gujaratis have little contact with their white employers and 
white fellow union members. The kind of issues which arise in the work 
situation centre on promotion, pay, and religious holidays, issues 
which, with the general problem of language (Braham and Rhodes,1985:24-
31; Brown,1984) have become specific to immigrants. A typical comment 
made by a Hindu engineering mill worker was: "When we attend union 
meetings to discuss promotion, the white workers speak with a broad 
Lancashire accent. We cannot understand and then a white man gets 
promotion". As few employers choose to antagonise the union to which the 
majority of his white workers belong for the sake of a worker from a 
minority, they tend to turn a blind eye to racism at work. The 
employer's response is directed towards the label rather than towards 
the workers. 
In the 1970s most white Boltonians described immigrants as black 
people, who dressed differently, had different customs, lived in certain 
areas of the town, could not speak English, and worked in the mills. The 
label to which most white Boltonians responded was immigrant; many local 
councillors spoke of helping immigrants. At local elections, politicians 
spoke of capturing the immigrant vote. For instance, before the Derby 
Ward local election in 1974, a Conservative councillor with Asian 
connections went out specifically to capture the votes of immigrants. 
This meant going from door to door until the councillor found an Asian 
who had received help in the past. Then in return for this favour the 
councillor suggested that he should vote Conservative and persuade his 
friends to do likewise. After all, if the councillor and family, who had 
the interests of Indians at heart, could vote for the Conservatives, it 
showed that the Conservative Party was aware of and working towards 
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recognising the interests of Indians. Then the councillor informed party 
colleagues that all Indians in the Deane Road area of Derby Ward would 
vote Conservative. As it happened, most of this man's Hindu friends 
lived in Bradford Ward. Those who lived in Deane Ward never received 
the message; at least half of those living in the ward were Muslims and 
therefore did not know him. Anyhow most of the Muslims at this time 
supported the Labour Party, which won the seat. What is interesting 
about the event is that, again, the inaccurate usage of the label Indian 
by councillor separated him from the Gujaratis, whose vote was sought. 
The application of the label immigrant implies that those so labelled 
deviate in certain respects from what the label1ers, white people, 
perceive to be English culture. By referring to them as immigrants, 
white people show that they perceive of Gujaratis as different. The 
label serves to encourage white people to maintain social distance 
between themselves and Gujaratis. As for the Gujaratis, this only 
reinforces their belief that their position in Bolton (and Britain) is 
insecure and that they too are separated from the white community by 
social distance. 
Under certain circumstances white Bo1tonians respond to the label 
immigrant as they would respond to people who need help but whose help 
is not wanted in return. White people's response to the label is to 
adopt the role of a patron. Having become aware of this meaning, 
GUjaratis use it to their advantage when they require help or have made 
some kind of mistake. A successful Muslim butcher who owns two large 
businesses in Bolton, said to me, "When I need help, I tell people 
(meaning white people) that I am an immigrant. Then they help me". The 
GUjarati response to being labelled immigrant is to either ignore it, to 
232 
verbally reject it as inappropriate or even insulting or to turn it to 
their advantage to obtain help. On another occasion at an annual general 
meeting of the BCCR held during Ramadan, the Chief Constable was the 
guest and had just risen to speak. When a Muslim (who had a degree from 
a British university) stood up and asked the guest speaker to excuse his 
poor English, as it was not his first language. He then proceeded in 
flawless English to explain why all the Muslims present had to leave the 
meeting to attend to their prayers. For those present who knew this man, 
he was quite deliberately taking everybody to task for having held the 
AGM during Ramadan. For those who did not know him, his speech could be 
taken at face value for providing a genuine explanation for why the 
Muslims had to leave. 
When Gujaratis go for help with housing, educational, social welfare 
or employment matters to white officials, they provide as much 
information as they believe is required by white officials unless asked 
for more. Often this is inadequate. However, the tendency among white 
officials is to refrain from inquiring too deeply into Gujarati affairs, 
partly because they take the view that Gujaratis being immigrants 
cannot understand or speak English, that they would be unable to select 
the relevant details to mention, and that they do not know or are unable 
to comprehend the complexities of issues. The outcome of such 
interaction is that they rarely discover the real issues that lie behind 
problems. This gap in communication serves only to bolster stereotyped 
attitudes that are associated with labels, such as "they never tell you 
the who le story". 
For the Gujarati community the label immigrant not only allows them 
to plead ignorance but also, of greater importance for them, it implies 
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that their status is that of temporary settlers. As such, Gujaratis take 
the view that the less white people know about them and their social, 
religious, economic and political affairs, the better they can protect 
themselves against this insecurity. Most Gujaratis observed during the 
research that they had noticed an increase in the level of racial 
discrimination against Asian and black people. They control information 
about themselves, which is the only information that they can control as 
immigrants, since it enables them to conceal that part of their lives 
which is of the most value to them. This part comprises the personal 
side of their lives, their village relationships, village factions, 
caste associations and communities, sects and some aspects of Islam and 
Hinduism. To protect this side of their lives from white scrutiny, they 
provide as little information about themselves and their communities as 
possible, so as not to make their perceived insecurity any worse. This 
is the area of IIprivate knowledge ll that is accessible only to those who 
know and are part of its creation (cf.Emmett,1982:207-209) [4]. 
The Label Immigrant: a Positional Analysis 
The label immigrant is part of a complex of symbols which is used by 
various groups of people to describe Gujaratis and other minority 
communities. The labels most commonly used include immigrant, foreigner, 
Indian, Asian, Paki, Coloured and Blackie. Occasionally, the labels 
migrant, Hindu and Muslim are also used; rarely is the term Gujarati 
used. This list of labels shows that the more specific and accurate 
labels are avoided. Hindus and Muslims respondents ranked seven of the 
more commonly used labels in terms of acceptable, unacceptable and 
insulting (Table 4.4). Both Hindus and Muslims are in general agreement 
on the meaning of most of these social identities. The labels Indian and 
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Asian are considered to be acceptable; Paki and Coloured are 
unacceptable, and Blackie is regarded as insulting. A difference 
occurred in the evaluation of the labels foreigner and immigrant. Hindus 
regarded the former as unacceptable and the latter as insulting, while 
the Muslims could accept both. Possibly Hindus believed themselves to be 
closer to Britain and therefore preferred not to be seen as foreigners 
but as British, many having come from and regarded themselves as British 
while living in East Africa. The Muslims who saw themselves in the 1970s 
living in a country that was anti-Islamic preferred to accept this view 
as being in accord with the Islamic view of non-Islamic countries. 
Table 4.4: Acceptability of Social Identities by Hindus and Muslims 
Acceptable to: Hindu Mus 1 im Respondents. 
Indian Asian 
Asian Indian 
Immigrant 
Foreigner 
Unacceptable: Foreigner Coloured 
- - - - - - - - - -
- - - - -
-
Immigrant 
Insulting: Paki Paki 
Coloured Blackie 
Blackie 
The labels like Asian, Indian and Pakistani are acceptable and any 
misapplication is not taken as an insult; it is just seen as mis-
identification. The neutrality of these labels became apparent when I 
asked Hindus and Muslims what they thought of the label Paki; a number 
replied, "I am not a Pakistani, so why should I be insulted?". Then they 
usua lly added, "When I am ca lled Pak i by a wh ite person, I fee 1 
insulted." Similarly, Blackie and Coloured are considered to be 
insulting by all. Gujaratis would not normally use labels like Paki, 
Coloured or Blackie when speaking to other Gujaratis; the exception 
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occurs when young Hindus call Muslims Pakis. Then it becomes extremely 
insulting, since it can imply that Muslims are being allowed to live in 
India only by permission of Hindus. 
In other spheres of social life, the problem of teasing out the 
meanings of the label immigrant produces further associations. Reliance 
on outward visible identification was given a twist when a chairperson 
of BCCR said in his parting speech posed the question "When we speak 
of immigrants, we mean black or dark-skinned people, so why not say 
black people?" (Minutes of BCCR Annual General Meeting, 1976). The 
question of whether to acknowledge immigrants as black and therefore, as 
different from white, or to say that they are the same as everyone else 
but are recognised as immigrants, goes unanswered, although these 
connotations are subsumed under the label immigrant. Migrants are people 
who move to another country, but immigrants are people who are 
perceived as black who have settled in Britain. In the sociological 
literature some persist in using the label black as a blanket term for 
all coloured minorities (see Ball and Solomos,1990). Some of the people 
to whom this label is applied, such as Gujaratis, Pakistanis and 
Bangladeshis to name a few, do not as the above analysis shows consider 
themselves to be black (cf. also Modood,1988). Such a usage of the label 
black amounts to an insult, since it presumes that the labellers know 
more about the labelled than the labelled know about themselves. 
Such misapplications point to deeper more complex issues: firstly, this 
misapplication of the label is indicative of how some can perpetuate a 
misunderstanding from a position of superiority. Secondly, it can act as 
a politically emotive label to Asians and black people when used by 
black people in a political context. Thirdly, when used by white people 
in a political context it can point to the political space between 
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communities within a community. Finally, it is worth noting that the 
1991 Census places as much value, if not more, on skin colour in the 
question on ethnicity as any census did previously. 
A label, like a stereotype, defines a set of often disparaging 
characteristics which are associated with a particular group of people. 
When a label is used by labelled and labellers it may become associated 
with a set of social characteristics some of which may be factually 
inaccurate in a number of ways. Much of the literature on labelling is 
oriented towards demonstrating how such false beliefs survive despite 
their factual inaccuracy and form the bases of bodies of common sense 
knowledge upon which many people depend for survival [5]. For example, a 
black person who has lived in Britain for twenty years and is a British 
citizen has now to categorise himself as a Black African or a Black-
Caribbean, and an Asian has still to identify himself as an Asian, that 
is an Indian, Pakistani, Bangladeshi and so on (Census 1991: User 
Consultation, Topic Statistics, March 1990, Ethnic group and Country of 
Birth Proposals, OPCS, Paper TS4). What I am arguing is that when 
influential people accept such labels, they not only reinforce the 
inaccuracy of them with the result that they take on new meanings, but 
that they and their meanings become part of white and Gujarati common 
sense knowledge. However, white people's and Gujaratis' understanding of 
the labels in common sense racism is often different and the cues that 
labels alert participants to may be different. 
If Gujaratis wish to conceal their own differences, they will use 
labels which can be applied to themselves collectively, and which may 
also be recognised and accepted by members of other minorities. Although 
the usefulness of certain commonly accepted labels, such as black or 
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immigrant, as devices for recruiting black political support at a 
national level has been demonstrated to fail (Heineman,1972:79ff,136-
137), these labels were used with some success by local Gujarati leaders 
to recruit support on local issues (Chaps.6 and 7). A final instance of 
the acceptance of those in authority of a label, knowing it to be 
inaccurate, demonstrates how the possibility of negotiating its meaning 
can be conditioned by the social situation. I attended a hearing at an 
Industrial Tribunal Court in Manchester in 1975 at which a manager and 
two foremen from a local textile mill, referred to their Muslim workers 
as Pakistanis. The court accepted the label as correct. A couple of the 
Muslims in the court spoke and understood English, but none made any 
attempt to correct their employers. When asked why they did not correct 
their employers, they said, "Why bother; there is no need for them to 
know." Although the label Paki is recognised to be an insult, the label 
Pakistani is perceived by Muslims to be a misapplication which carries 
no overtones of an insult. Occasionally the label Pakistani is used to 
describe Muslims with no distinction being made between Gujarati Muslims 
and Pakistani Muslims. 
Labels and the Process of Negotiation 
It is part of the social process of interaction that participants in 
a social situation can dispute the appropriateness of labels used. Both 
the meaning given and the directional characteristics are open to debate 
and dispute by the participants. One individual's common sense 
d b th liThe perception of social position is not that possesse Y ano er. 
actor within the social world, however, experiences it primarily as a 
field of his actual and possible acts and only secondly as an object of 
his thinking" (Schutz,1976:101). Agreement between participants on the 
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appropriateness of a label implies that they also accept and recognise a 
meaning as well as the implied relationship. Here I shall consider the 
general aspects of negotiation and how it contributes to the 
construction of Gujaratis' common sense knowledge of the social world in 
which they live. 
Amongst themselves Gujaratis avoid using the label immigrant, unless 
they speak to white Boltonians. When this label is used by Gujaratis 
amongst themselves, immigrant means "illegal immigrant". Many Gujaratis 
consider that they are no longer immigrants, they are British citizens. 
For instance, a friend whom I shall call Mr KL and I met a Muslim friend 
in the town precinct; Mr KL's opening words were, "Let us talk to this 
immigrant". As all three of us were friends; Mr S accepted this form of 
address as a gibe. However, another Muslim I interviewed asked me if the 
purpose of my research was to obtain the addresses of immigrants. By 
this use of the term he meant "illegal immigrants" [6]. When Muslims use 
the word immigrant in a joking manner amongst themselves, they imply 
that some person is an II i 11 ega 1 immi grant" . If they do not use it 
jokingly, then they usually know or have good reason to believe that a 
person is an illegal immigrant. Once I was accepted by these Muslims, I 
could not refer to them as immigrants without insulting them, as I was 
regarded as sharing some access to their "private" social world. With 
Gujaratis, Pakistanis and Sikhs, whom I did not know personally, I could 
use the word immigrant without causing offence. Thus, the term immigrant 
as used by Gujaratis is rich in social meanings, meanings that are quite 
different from those given to it by white people outside these 
communities. 
Labels used by Gujaratis within the context of their own communities 
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define social relationships between and within caste communities, 
factions, sects and religious groups. The most obvious of these is that 
between Hindus and Muslims. Members of these two religious groups 
mingle in daily life, but they rarely go into each other's homes unless 
they are close friends and this seems to be rare. Hindus refer to 
Muslims and Pakistanis as Musula (Muslims). This label carries no 
insult, but when cause is found to give insult, then a Hindu will 
address a Muslim as bandia (circumcised). Likewise, Muslims refer to 
Hindus as Patels or Kutchis; again there is little scope for insult 
since Muslims may be Patels or Kutchis. If insult is given, then 
Muslims will address a Hindu as kanda (onions). Reference is made here 
to the bad smell onions give off. Though many Hindus do not eat onions, 
they can still be said to smell as bad as onions a double insult. 
Reference has been made above to Muslims' usage of the label Paki, but 
in certain contexts it carries no insult, since only a distinction is 
being made between two groups within the same Islamic community. 
Though most Hindus know that Muslims come from two different 
districts in Gujarat, they cannot identify them visually and therefore, 
they do not use district names as a form of address. A Sikh, when 
speaking jokingly to Mr KL, whom he had known for a long time said, "You 
Baruchi or Surti or whatever ... "; but I have not heard a Hindu or Sikh 
address a Muslim whom he did not know well in this manner. Similarly, 
Muslims will rarely use a caste name when addressing a Hindu. A Muslim 
shopkeeper allowed a Hindu lady to take some goods she wanted, but for 
which she had insufficient money to pay. When I asked him how he could 
be sure that she would return with the money, he said, "I can trust her; 
her caste are honest". The Hindu was a Mandhata Patel. He believed that 
she was honest, although he, being a Baruchi, would be less willing to 
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trust a Surti Muslim. 
The most specific labels are those which are used by members of one 
community to describe differences between their own members; these take 
the form of caste and district names. Among the Muslims the terms Surti 
and Baruchi are most commonly used to describe Muslims (Chap.2). The 
labels are also used jokingly as when my Surti interpreter threatened to 
castrate a Baruchi if he did not answer the questions in my schedule. 
What my interpreter implied was, do not be stubborn and stupid like 
other Muslims from your district. He knew that this respondent was a 
university graduate and therefore, should know better than to think that 
I was a police or Home Office informer. Even more specific labels than 
these are used. For instance Muslims speak of Naroli Muslims as having a 
reputation for being aggressive. 
Hindus use caste names as labels when they refer to Hindus as 
Mandhatas, Mistrys, Levas and Kanbis. Since caste labels are in a 
general sense neutral, it is the usage in exceptional situations that is 
of interest. I came across two such situations. The first was when a 
Hindu of higher caste implied that a Hindu of lower caste was 
untrustworthy or dirty. A Leva Patidar Patel complained to his Hindu 
drinking companions in a public house that he had on the previous day 
lent a Valand (barber) money to buy a bottle of whisky and a bottle of 
however, he did rum. The man promised to repay the money the next day, 
not appear. So the Leva Patidar Patel said to an audience of Patels, 
"What can you expect of a Valand?". On another occasion a Leva Patidar 
Patel pointed to a Mandhata Patel, who was playing darts in a pub 1 i c 
house. He said that the Mandhatas were rea 11 y Ko 1 is (Chap.2). When I 
asked the Mandhata Patel if he was a Koli he replied that he had never 
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heard of them. Some Mandhata Patels are aware that their caste name was 
once Koli, but they would never admit to this publicly. The application 
of a low caste name to Hindus whose caste has achieved higher status is 
a form of insult. 
To quote "these identities are categorical and are in fact a 
labelling process which relates primarily to expectations of behaviour 
in the public place rather than to basic customs, beliefs and practices" 
(Mitchell,1974:19). The label immigrant comprises a range of social 
identities that only become apparent in social situations, when 
participants debate and negotiate the meaning they are prepared to 
recognise. The complexity of meanings of a label like immigrant goes 
beyond its superficial meaning, its meaning in a situation involving 
white and Asian participants is quite different to that given to it in 
an all-Asian situation. Most white people are unaware of the meanings 
that Gujaratis attach to it, but Gujaratis are usually aware of the 
meanings that the whites associate with it. The perceived social 
distance between participants to some extent determines which range of 
meanings might be appropriate in a situation. 
By arranging social identities hierarchically in terms of generality 
and specificity and social closeness and social distance, it is possible 
to construct a model of social identities (Diagram 2). Thus the 
relationships between the labels symbolise the negotiable social 
boundaries between Gujaratis and the white community. The applicability 
of these labels formed the content of the debates between leaders and 
politicians about events involving either Muslims and Hindus or Muslims, 
Hindus and white people (Chap.G). These labels defined the political 
space between the Gujaratis and the white political structures. 
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Distance 
Social 
Identities 
Specific 
Generalised 
Diagram 2 
A Simplified Model of Gujarati Social Identities 
Close to 
Gujaratis 
Fami ly 
Village 
Faction 
Caste 
Sect 
Hindu 
Mus 1 im 
Gujarati 
Pakistani 
Bangladeshi 
Boltonian 
British 
Distant from 
Gujaratis 
Indian 
Pakistani 
Mus 1 im 
Asian 
Immigrant 
Foreigner 
Coloured 
Paki 
Black(ie) 
Non-British 
These labels, as symbols, are located within Gujarati experiences of 
white racism and incorporate ideas about how they manage their social 
relationships with other Gujaratis as well as with white people. Taken 
together the hierarchy of symbols represents a cognitive map of Gujarati 
political attempts to gain control of the space between their 
communities, the white community and wider British society. This is a 
Gujarati constructed cognitive map comprising a set of social identities 
that are negotiable and which literally and metaphorically can be 
redrawn in accordance with new social experiences. This body of 
knowledge provides Gujaratis with a guide to and explanations for the 
appropriate social behaviour in intra- and inter-community situations, 
they experience it as a "field of actual and possible acts" (Schutz, 
1976:101). As the product of social interaction in an urban situation 
within a multicultural society, it comprises experiences which through 
protest can lead to changes in social meanings and this is the subject 
of the remaining Chapters. 
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FOOTNOTES 
1. In a social network, a first order star, an individual is surrounded, 
metaphorically, a set of dyadic relationships which can be arranged 
in terms of levels of intensity into a number of zones (cf.Barnes, 
1971:58-60) 
2. This highlights an assumption in Milner's analysis of children's 
misidentification of colour (1975,Chap.4). He argues that 92 per 
cent of Asian children said that they "would rather be white" 
(Milner,1975:135). Although only 24 per cent of Asian children chose 
the white doll in an actual identity test, some 65% did so in a 
theoretical situation (Milner,1975:134). On the basis of this 
evidence, he suggests that Asian children, along with West Indian 
children, have to resolve a conflict between their own identity, as 
black people, and social reality in which white people have power. 
I would argue that Milner appears to be unaware that Asian children, 
particularly Gujarati children, do not think of themselves as being 
black; they think of themselves as being white or brown, but not 
black. For them, the obvious choice is the white doll. 
3. Although Cohen recognises the possible existence of hierarchies of 
social identities (1982:10), he does not explore the complexity of 
meanings of labels nor the potential for developing new meanings 
and new labels. Emmett explores the hierarchy of social 
identities but does not recognise their position within a body of 
common sense knowledge (1982:205-209). 
4. To some extent sociologists and social anthropologists have shown 
that it is possible to penetrate such social barriers with the 
support of the participant actors (see Drucker-Brown,1984; Goode and 
Hatt,1952). 
5. In a totally different context see the research done on the mentally 
disabled in the community e.g. Flynn,1989, Edgerton, 1971; Goffman, 
1970. 
6. Although Mr KL was with me, this Gujarati Muslim refused to 
provide the names of the streets where his close friends lived. 
Later, I learnt that a number of these close friends were illegal 
immigrants. 
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CHAPTER 5 
LEADERS AND POLITICS 
Having established that the Gujaratis have defined through settlement 
and employment (Chap.I), religious beliefs and organisations (Chap.2), 
social ties and friendships (Chap.3) and ideological beliefs about 
racism (Chap.4) some aspects of the space between their communities and 
the white community and British society, in this Chapter I shall look at 
the political space between these communities. As Lawrence observes, the 
question of power is crucial to an analysis of the relationship between 
the "ethnic minorities" and the majority community but is one which is 
rarely explored (I983:II5). In these final Chapters I shall explore 
power by grounding the study of race within a political framework (cf. 
Solomos et al,I983:13). The failure of the philosophy and policy of 
integration as a political end ensured that the Gujaratis and other 
minorities had opportunities to express their ethnicity, socially and 
politically. Not all recognised or, if they did, accepted these 
opportunities. Some did, and it bore fruits a decade or so later. 
This Chapter sets the political scene through describing and 
analysing political leadership of Muslim and Hindu organisations, that 
is the principal participants in ethnic local political activities. The 
arena in which ethnic political debates occurred was an informal one 
provided by the BCCR. It gave men in positions of leadership and 
influence opportunities to explore the space between formal political 
structures and the lack of any kind of political structure through which 
ethnic communities could achieve political recognition without having to 
loose their ethnic identities. Therefore, the role of the BCCR, which 
provided an informal political arena, was more than that of a buffer 
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(Katznelson,1973), it facilitated the participation of Muslim and Hindu 
leaders in local processes of decision-making without detracting from 
their ethnic identities. 
To understand the emergence of ethnic leaders, one needs to 
understand the background of racism in the 1970s, which has been 
described as "the result of the combined effect of economic, political, 
ideological and cultural processes" (Solomos et al,1983:11) in Britain 
generally. " indigenous racism of the 60s and 70s is significantly 
different, in form and effect, from the racism of the 'high' colonial 
period. It is racism 'at home', not abroad; it is racism, not of a 
dominant but of a declining social formation" (Hall,1981:26). This is 
symptomatic of the crisis arising from the reaction to the shift by the 
State from its emphasis on integration and more indirect forms of 
control to more direct forms of State control (Solomos et al,1983:17). 
For instance the emphasis in race relations legislation changed from 
being on integration to control (Solomos et al,1983:17-21). Against the 
background of the 1970s the emergence of Gujarati leaders seeking 
participation in local government amounted to another crisis to which 
local and national politicians reacted as if it was not a policy of 
integration but a problem of control. 
Since the time of their arrival in Britain, Gujaratis achieved 
positions of leadership either on the basis of their social standing in 
their communities and from their positions in social and religious 
organisations. They did not hold formally recognised political 
Positions, but found themselves having access to informal arenas in 
which they had opportunities to achieve influence over the councillors. 
During the early 1970s the issues which Gujaratis faced in the community 
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shifted from the problems of immigration, nationality and settlement to 
poverty, unemployment, housing and education. With no link between the 
ethnic organisations and the formal political machinery, the rank and 
file Gujaratis found themselves unable to communicate their views to 
councillors and MPs, unless they did so through their white elected 
representatives. From their point of view a political vacuum existed: 
there was no elected Muslim or Hindu who could represent their views in 
formal political arenas. From the point of view of the politicians 
there was no vacuum, since the electoral system which brought them to 
power gave them the right to act as decision-makers on behalf of the 
electorate. 
At the beginning of the 1970s few Asian and black people held 
positions in national political arenas. There were Asian and black 
councillors in Blackburn, Bradford and some of the London boroughs, but 
there were no MPs from these minority communities. In Bolton with the 
exception of two councillors, an Asian and a West Indian, who were 
committed to representing their political parties, the councillors and 
MPs were white. These two men took the view that their responsibility 
was to represent their constituents and not their communities. In 1970 
the Asian councillor lost his seat. The black councillor later lost and 
regained his seat, which he has held eversince. Although he too was 
committed to supporting his political party, he has consistently argued 
for equal opportunities for minority communities. Thus Gujarati leaders 
found themselves under increasing pressure to fill a political vacuum, 
which separated the growing Gujarati communities from political 
participation. Opportunities existed for those who took on this 
political function, to combine it with their existing roles as social, 
business or religious leaders. Therefore, to argue that CRCs functioned 
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as buffers to control Asian and black political demands is important, 
but what is more important is that these buffers supported the vacuum 
separating Gujaratis from the elected politicians and thereby created an 
environment in which ethnic politics could flourish. This gave ethnic 
leaders opportunities to establish relationships with the politicians 
and to begin a political dialogue. Though the argument that CRCs acted 
as buffers containing the demands of the minority communities is 
accepted, the local CRC by offering services as well as access to 
political arena far from controlling Hindu and Muslim demands provided 
opportunities for political participation, where none were supposed to 
exist. The process of containment through buffering served to encourage 
leaders to exploit the opportunities they had not had before. It ensured 
that ethnic politics was firmly on the local government agenda. 
Therefore in this Chapter I shall consider firstly, the CRC which 
provided the arena which gave ethnic leaders opportunities to 
participate as representatives, secondly, the development of leadership 
and two types of leaders, insider and outsider leaders, thirdly, the 
relationships between supporters and leaders, finally, partiCipation in 
local formal political structures. 
The racism of the 1960s and early 1970s was marked by debates about 
the status of immigrants, repatriation, control of numbers of people 
from New Commonwealth countries immigrating to Britain, and their access 
to public resources, namely housing, work, schooling for their children 
and political participation. Although these issues may be seen as 
precursors to the riots and disturbances of the early 1980s in Brixton 
and Toxteth, most SOCiological commentators on these events have ignored 
the development of grassroots urban social movements within the minority 
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communities in favour of grounding explanations for unrest in poverty 
and urban renewal 
- the trappings of disadvantaged t bl access 0 pu ic 
resources. For instance many pay lip service to the importance of black 
political participation in local and national government, but few 
concentrate on the political exclusion or marginalisation of ethnic 
leaders (e.g. Benyon and Solomos, (eds.) 1987: Chaps. 1-3,15,19 and 20). 
Most of the contributors to this debate explain the riots in terms of 
unemployment, poverty, housing, policing, racial disadvantage and 
discrimination. 
Therefore, my aim is to focus attention on the importance of 
grassroots politics, which some have rather derogatorily described as 
factionalism (Rex and Moore,1971:117). The argument offered is that the 
70s witnessed an emergence of micro-social movements associated with 
events that provided opportunities for the development of ethnic 
leadership. Without any formalised structures of support, social 
networks functioned as the vehicles of social communication between 
supporters and leaders. The development of a view of the quality of 
living as part of Gujaratis' urban experiences led to leaders protesting 
about the social disadvantages which they believed existed for Asians 
and black people resident in Bolton. Without any access to the formal 
political hierarchy other than through a white controlled political 
party system, these Gujarati leaders expressed the view that their 
people could not be adequately represented by white politicians, whose 
knowledge of the Gujarati communities was minimal. With no connection 
with the political party system, these leaders emerged as spokesmen for 
their community organisations. They came to be regarded and often were 
treated as leaders by the white politicians, officers and members of 
organisations who worked with members of these communities. The scene is 
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set by the dilemmas that faced the local (and other) CRCs, which was the 
main organisation offering ethnic minorities participation and being 
concerned with their interests and welfare. 
Bolton Council for Community Relations 
In most respects the racism experienced by Asian and black people 
elsewhere in Britain was no different from that experienced by Gujaratis 
here. Initially the role of the local CRC was to respond to racism by 
promoting harmony and goodwill. The CRC could achieve this in a number 
of ways through three broad but interrelated, policies: integration 
(Hill and Issacharoff,1971:164), equality (Gay and Young, 1988:17) and 
the elimination of racial discrimination. The first involved the 
development from the work of the welfare oriented organisations 
established to care for refugees and immigrants who came to settle in 
Britain 1n the decade after the war (Hill and Issacharoff,1971:1). The 
policy of equality owes much to the 1976 Race Relations Act and the 
third policy is a consequence of the recent review of CRC roles and 
objectives carried out on behalf of the CRE (Gay and Young,1988). It is 
with the second that I shall be concerned. Whatever CRCs did or did not 
achieve, one important aspect of their role, which now no longer seems 
to be crucial (Gay and Young,1988:33), was the opportunity which they 
inadvertently gave to leaders of minorities to channel their protest 
into informal political arenas. These arenas developed in political 
importance as Asian and black leaders became aware that they offered 
them opportunities to contribute politically. CRCs were central to the 
development of ethnic politics, but in the 1980s the importance of CRCs 
was diminished through the promotion of equal opportunities which led to 
the development of Asian and black caucuses. This development was 
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stifled politically (cf.Hall, 1985). 
In 1976 the advantages of a minority organisation joining the BCCR 
included gaining access to funding through the charitable status of 
CRC; benefiting from access to funds allocated by the CRE through the 
BCeR for special projects; having contact with Local Authorities; 
having a voice in an informal but semi-political arena; and working 
with an organisation whose aims were and still are to eliminate racial 
discrimination and promote equality of opportunity [1]. The issues that 
beset local CRCs, including the CRC in Bolton, have been well documented 
(Hill and Issacharoff, 1971). An organisation could become an affiliated 
member of the BCCR Council, if it could produce a constitution, an 
annual report and a written undertaking to support the objects of the 
Council (Hill and Issacharoff,1971:86). Not all members of the Council 
could become members of the Executive committee. The number of places on 
this committee were fixed by locally determined constitutions (later on 
this was fixed by a nationally determined constitution). Nevertheless, 
the chief weaknesses of the BCCR, like those of other CRCs (and Racial 
Equality Councils and Local Authorities today), were and still are: how 
can a representative cross section of ethnic community interests be 
obtained from organisations ranging from community organisations and 
religious organisations to ad hoc organisations comprising a collection 
of ethnic individuals? Should the selection comprise only organisations 
or organisations and individuals? What process of selection or election 
should be employed to achieve an acceptable representation of interests? 
Since the BCCR provided an arena in which leaders of organisations and 
communities could meet with representatives of the Local Authority as 
well as with each other, these men had the opportunity to represent the 
interests of their supporters with a view to influencing political 
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decisions. The argument has been made that as such arenas were used as 
buffers to constrain the political demands of black people (Katznelson, 
1973), their role was that of devices for the indirect social control 
(Hill and Issacharoff,1971:203). Therefore, the policy of integration 
could be construed as a negative device of social control: integration 
would bring acceptance, while maintenance of ethnic identities would 
bring rejection. 
Locally the failure of this "hidden" policy came with the expansion 
in the demands for greater representation from Gujarati, other Asian and 
black communities and organisations. For instance in 1970 - 1975 a total 
population of 13,000 Gujaratis were represented by two Hindus and two 
Muslims, while two small minority communities, the Pakistanis and West 
Indians, were each represented by three members an organisational 
representative, an elected officer and by an additional member elected 
or co-opted to the Council. This bias in representation in conjunction 
with haphazard selection and actual participation led to growing 
dissatisfaction with the representation of organisations and communities 
on the Council and its committees. This profile of membership changed 
drastically in the following year, when the representation of these 
small communities were reduced, the Muslims flooded the BCCR with 
representative and the Hindus slightly increased their representation. 
Over the next few years the population rose to 20,000 and the number of 
ethnic organisations almost doubled. These changes served to the 
question about the extent to which Gujarati executive members were 
representat i ve of their communities a question which remains 
unanswered (cf.Hill and Issacharoff,1971:143) [2]. 
Thus BCCR, like its counterparts elsewhere, was and is bedevilled by 
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a lack recognition by the formal political hierarchy and by a selection 
process which has never been clarified. Its effectiveness depended upon 
objectives which combined a mix of vagueness and precision (Hill and 
Issacharoff, 1971:163-164), and which could not and still cannot be 
translated easily into practical action (John,1969:37-38). This only 
served to reinforce the importance of its role in responding to 
individual cases arising from immigration and nationality difficulties, 
which in turn detracted from its ability to II conduct arguments about 
policy and practice ll (Gay and Young,1988:117) and to evaluate its role 
within the IIframework of local voluntary social action ll (Gay and Young, 
1988:121). In part this difficulty was made more apparent by the 
imbalance between the work CRCs had to conduct through the medium of 
meetings and that which had to be done outside meetings. This gave rise 
to a view that the subject matter of meetings which involved decision-
making and procedural matters could be best coped with by those members 
who were lIeducated, confident and urbane ll (Hi 11 and Issacharoff, 1971: 
283). However, it was during the early 1970s that the representatives of 
communities, such as the Indian and Pakistan societies, rather than 
ethnic organisations, withdrew from participation in the BCCR in the 
face of growing dissatisfaction from their members. This opened the way 
for the development of religious and social organisations with 
representatives committed to anti-racism and the maintenance of their 
ethnic identities to demand political recognition. Although the BCCR did 
not lose sight of issues connected with immigration and issues of 
nationality, attention was focused now on new issues which influenced 
the daily lives of Gujaratis, in particular poverty, unemployment, 
racism, crime, homelessness, underachievement in education, health and 
the role of the police (Howe,1988; Whitehead, 1987; Dalton and Daghlian, 
1989; Hann, 1988; 1987; Scarman, 1981). These issues served to highlight 
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on the one hand, the importance of local and ethnic politics and on the 
other hand, the importance of the ethnic vote and national politics 
(Layton-Henry, 1984: 148; Anwar, 1984; 1980; Anwar and Kohler, 1975). 
The BCCR found itself unable to cope with the sudden appearance of 
competing Muslim and Hindu leaders. By 1976 there were as many Muslim 
and Hindu leaders as there were organisations and associations in the 
Gujarati communities. Each organisation had elected officers who 
competed to perform the functions of leadership. Most of them sought 
membership on the BCCR, but did not always obtain it. This served to 
increase competition between ethnic representatives and to increase the 
political importance of representation on the CRC. Consequently, the 
selection of organisations into membership on the BCCR became a critical 
issue with those who were accepted but not always being recognised as 
leaders by those inside or outside their organisations. While the BCCR 
recognised all the organisational members as representatives, the local 
politicians were trying to establish who were and who were not leaders, 
so that they could target them for recruiting votes. Since most Muslim 
and Hindu organisations chose to seek membership on the executive 
committee of the BCCR, but only some of these won it, there were always 
some leaders whose organisations were not represented on the BCCR. 
Therefore, competition between the Gujarati leaders for a place on 
the executive committee and an opportunity to achieve political 
influence over the white politicians contributed to the emergence of 
ethnic identities. This often fierce exposure of ethnic interests led to 
the emergence within the BCCR of a group of members who were assumed to 
support the policies of the establishment, and an opposition group who 
were committed to Gujarati and minority representation in all spheres of 
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local government. Thus Muslim and Hindu leaders became aware that their 
commitment to the maintenance of their ethnic identities was interpreted 
by white politicians as a rejection of the policy of integration and as 
attack upon the establishment. Thus the scene was set for the BCCR to 
provide a forum in which these leaders could compete with each other for 
funds and support for their organisations, could debate local and 
national government policies and could assert their ethnic identities 
within a political context. The key issues that faced both the Muslim 
and Hindu communities, BCCR and politicians included: who were the 
leaders? What kind of politically acceptable relationships could be 
developed between them? How could the politicians make political space 
for demands from the Gujarati leaders for political representation? 
Leadership in the Gujarati Communities 
In the context of race relations most work on leadership focuses 
attention on professional, business oriented and educated middle-class 
individuals (Anwar,1979; Werbner, 1979). To gain an understanding of 
Gujarati leadership and their relationships with the politicians, it is 
necessary to recognise that, as a transformation took place amongst the 
Gujarati (and black) leadership the political arena provided by the BCCR 
increased in importance. This saw the removal of leaders who were 
~confident, educated and urbane" and their replacement by men who had 
jobs often of low social standing, if they had jobs at all, lived 
amongst their people, and above all placed great importance upon social 
friendships and religious and ethnic identities. 
Anwar distinguishes between three types of leaders: formal, 
integrationist and traditional. Formal leaders depend" upon their 
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occupation and status in British society" and "their role is mainly 1n 
inter-ethnic situations" (Anwar,1979:172,183). Integrationists are men 
mainly involved in forms of community work, have often experienced a 
longer period of education, have an urban background and wish to 
integrate with the white community (Anwar,1979:173). Traditional leaders 
are the biraderi elders who depend for the ir support upon "age, length 
of stay in Britain, and the number of relatives sponsored and 
patronised" (Anwar,1979:1973-174). Their power derives from their 
kinship groups. These criteria are unhelpful when trying to identify 
Gujarati leaders, since he provides little information about leaders' 
political relationships with their community. The characteristics of 
formal leaders and integrationists, as described by Anwar, are little 
different from those distinguishing formal leaders from traditional 
leaders. The differences between these two types of leaders is that 
formal leaders and integrationists have weaker ties with those whose 
support they claim, but stronger ties with those they seek to join, the 
white middle class. The traditional leaders have strong ties with their 
kin groups but weaker ties with other potential supporters and with the 
white politicians. This means that another type of leader can be 
identified, who has strong ties with members of his community - a wider 
group than just kin - and weaker ties with other leaders and white 
politicians. I would argue that this typology is not useful, since the 
development of ethnic politics depends upon non-kin based structures of 
SUpport and upon changing functions of leadership. 
However, Anwar argues that "the question of leadership cannot be 
understood unless the divisions within the Pakistani population are 
grasped" (1979:171). With this I concur, since the same can be said 
about the Gujaratis. Without an understanding of the monolithic 
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structure of the ICC and Islam generally as compared with the more 
fragmentary, divided structure of the Hindu communities, it is difficult 
to understand the positions leaders occupy and their relationships 
within and without their Gujarati communities. Therefore, any analysis 
of Gujarati leadership needs to take account of the social identities of 
each community. To understand the change in the character of ethnic 
leaders of organisations, it makes sense to begin with an analysis of 
the leaders of ethnic organisations from the 1950s onwards, the second 
phase of settlement. By relating the development of ethnic organisations 
to the three phases (excluding the first) of settlement (Chap. 1), it is 
possible to analyse the development of ethnic leadership in terms of an 
evolution in the functions of leadership rather than in terms of an 
evolution of types of leadership. 
First and Second Phases of Settlement: Men of Influence or 
Integrationists 
Bearing in mind that the first phase of settlement is pre-war, I am 
more concerned with the second phase. Gujaratis came to Bolton seeking a 
better life. Linked by their membership to particular communities, they 
supported each other in what was an alien environment. Initially, 
individuals who had abilities to communicate with these settlers and 
those in official positions quickly rose to positions of influence, 
since the people looked to them for help with finding accommodation, 
jobs and dealing with Local Authority Departments, the Home Office and 
the police. Such people were usually prominent doctors, teachers and 
businessmen. By social standing many were middle class and adopted the 
social trappings of a middle class life style (Anwar, 1979:173; Hill and 
Issacharoff,1971:146). Some who were educated were looked up to and 
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became men of influence by virtue of the respect they received from 
their fellow Gujaratis and white colleagues. Others achieved positions 
of high standing by establishing businesses upon which many Gujaratis 
depended for essential ethnic items, like food and clothing. For 
instance they included an eye specialist, a teacher, two businessmen, 
and ACRO in the BCeR. Not only did Gujaratis seek help from them, but 
Asians belonging to other minority communities also sought their help, 
advice and support. The eye specialist chaired the first Indian 
Association, whose members were mainly Hindus. Since they were able to 
speak English and claimed to speak for Asians, they were treated by 
white Boltonians as if they were leaders. 
These men shared the view that most Asians experienced similar 
disadvantages, that is they lacked essential information about the 
society they had just jOined, they could not speak English adequately 
and their support for their ethnic and religious identities would only 
impede their absorption into British society. Furthermore, they also 
held the opinion that Gujaratis coming to or already living in Bolton 
should and would become increasingly integrated with the passage of 
time. They interpreted their role of leadership in terms of assisting 
their fellows through this process of change by helping them to find 
jobs, send 
settlement. 
money home, cope with problems of communication and 
In this spirit they devoted time, effort and money to 
establish associations, like the Pakistani and Indian Associations. They 
did not regard it as necessary to be informed about the opinions of the 
people whose support they claimed, nor were they interested in finding 
out what these were. Their main and overriding aim was to promote 
integration. Whether or not they were structurally in the most effective 
Positions to do so is not relevant (Anwar,1979:171) or important. There 
258 
is no evidence that they believed themselves able to do this and it was 
not their aim. The answer to the question: did they assist the process 
of integration of individual immigrants is in the affirmative. 
Paradoxically, they proved to be unable to perform or even to convince 
the members of the organisations they represented that integration was a 
useful goal, if a goal at all. 
An important question is: how relevant was their role to the 
development of ethnic politics as a force in local politics? By having 
social standing in both their communities and in the white community, 
they became members of BCCR and found themselves assuming some of the 
functions of leadership. Some of them were entrepreneurs who hoped to 
gain clients, business or support from their communities in return for 
rendering what they considered to be a social service. However, in 
return they were being asked to take on the promotion of ethnic 
identities. Others were motivated by simply the desire to help their 
fellow countrymen. As these concerns gave way to new and more immediate 
ones, like unemployment, housing and poverty, the realisation that they 
were not interested in filling what was becoming an increasingly 
political function, only persuaded these men that they had failed as 
integrationists. Furthermore, Gujaratis were becoming aware that they 
lacked ethnic political representation. 
Dissatisfaction with the integrationist leaders grew as the 
SUpporters rejected the philosophy of these leaders, which for most 
GUjaratis involved aims which were unrealistic, and failed to convey the 
problems and difficulties that they faced in their everyday lives. Most 
GUjaratis shared little in common with these so-called leaders. As the 
belief that integration might lead to a decline and disappearance of 
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racism proved to be false, it was replaced by a new and emerging view 
that strong social, religious and political identities needed to be more 
closely related to the ideals of the Gujarati-in-the-street (cf.The 
Empire Strikes 8ack, CCCS,1983). Thus the very social and religious 
identities that were antagonistic to the policy of integration now 
became important to the newly emerging Muslim and Hindu leaders of 
social and religious organisations. This change of view led to the 
downfall of the integrationists, who over time have become absorbed into 
the white community, only to be disowned and forgotten by their own 
communities. The personal difficulties which led to the development of 
relationships of dependence of Gujaratis upon them have been likened to 
that of patron or broker, which are reminiscent of that between jajman 
and kamin (Desai,1963:57-60). Generally, few of these old style leaders 
chose to concentrate on issues that emphasised ethnic identities, such 
as halal food in the schools, cremation or burial of the dead within 24 
hours. However, it was these issues which became increasingly important 
as members of these communities no longer saw their futures here in 
terms of a return to "home". Home was Britain. 
The integrationists paved the way for the more politically acute 
members of minorities to gain political experience. As the ethnic vote 
became an important issue in local politics, the Local Authority 
had to confront the growing criticism of racism from Gujaratis. This 
gave local politicians the opportunity to seek votes by purporting to 
give leaders of Gujarati organisations access to political discussions 
about access to public resources. These discussions could only take 
place in the informal arena provided by the BCCR. These changes heralded 
the rise of a new style of leader, one of whose functions of leadership 
were regarded by supporter and politician as being overtly political. 
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Muslim and Hindu leaders took this opportunity to exploit the ethnic and 
religious differences between themselves to force upon local 
politicians an awareness of the importance of Gujarati participation 
local politics. 
The Third and Fourth Phases of Settlement: Alternative Leaders: Imams 
and Priests 
In Bolton the third and fourth phases of settlement are more 
distinctive than the second. The second phase of settlement was a period 
of consolidation which witnessed the emergence and establishment of 
religious organisations (R.and C.Ballard,1977:35ff) that did not 
represent the interests of a single Islamic community, but rather of 
one of a number of Islamic communities. The same process took place 
amongst the Hindu organisations. Now community has a particular focus on 
a faction, caste or sect (see Chaps.2 and 4). By the end of this phase a 
number of the Hindu and Muslim communities were looking for suitable 
buildings to use as temples and mosques. The Muslims had established 
their base at Zakariah (Peace Street) Mosque as well as at a number of 
other mosques, but the Hindus were struggling to find suitable places. 
Where suitable places could not be found, religious worship took place 
in private homes or rented halls. Most of the religious developments 
amongst the Hindus and Muslims took place during the third phase 
settlement. During this phase cultural differences were beginning to be 
valued. This view was in sympathy with the approach that was being 
taken nationally to education, to religious beliefs, and to political 
participation of minorities generally. 
Before discussing the rise of the ethnic leader, there were other men 
who held positions in organisations and thus in theory had the potential 
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to fulfil the functions of leadership. Although a Brahmin doctor might 
seem to be the obvious choice as a leader, none have chosen to take on 
this role since the eye specialist did so in the 1950s and 1960s. A 
reason for their lack of involvement could be that they do not wish to 
establish a patron-client type relationship with people in various 
castes and religious communities. 
Superficially, religious leaders held positions of authority and 
therefore, were in a good position to perform some of the functions of 
leadership. Within the Muslim and Hindu communities, the positions held 
by imams and priests potentially incorporate some aspects of 
leadership. Since imams in particular pronounce on the acceptability of 
social and religious behaviour, it is often assumed by white persons 
that they function as leaders. However, in the Muslim community, imams 
are the employees of individual mosque committees. Unless they have 
exceptional ability, they cannot take on the functions of community 
leadership. The appointment of persons with religious qualifications to 
positions in mosques (or temples) used to be regarded as a sufficient 
ground for the Home Office to give them permission to enter Britain 
without going through the full immigration process [3]. A religious 
leader's permission to reside in this country was to a large extent 
dependent upon his continuing employment by a religious community. For 
instance the position of the imam in relation to the mosque committee 
and members was and is that of a servant to the congregation. Like a 
Baptist minister, an imam must lead his congregation in prayer. For an 
imam to lead socially or politically, he needs to possess or develop 
qualities that go beyond those required for imam-ship [4]. 
With such power mosque committees could pay their imams a bare 
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minimum. By doing this they not only saved themselves the cost of a 
living wage, but they also forced imams to seek employment outside the 
mosque. The net effect of this form of contract was that imams were at 
the mercy of their mosque committees. Consequently, there was little 
opportunity for them to rise to positions of leadership outside their 
rigidly interpreted role as prayer leaders. No imam in Bolton, with one 
exception, has succeeded in rising to a position of leadership, 
religious or political. The one man who managed to achieve a position of 
religious influence was the founder and prinCipal of the darul-ul-
100m at Ramsbottom. Infighting between Baruchis and Surtis drove him 
from the position of imam at Peace Street Mosque to establish his own 
religious school. Since it is located outside Bolton, his influence over 
local Muslims has decreased (see Chap.6). Though I met, spoke to and 
interviewed a number of imams, I met only two visiting swamis during the 
period of research. During this time no full-time priests were resident 
in town. One priest to whom I spoke, worked in a local paper mi 11 and 
performed the appropriate rituals when ca lled upon to do so for a fee. 
My impression was that priests played a small part in the political 
affairs of the Hindu communities. All of these organisations invited 
priests to spend time at and provided facilities for them to live in 
their temples. Two of these organisations later employed a full-time 
priest, but the others cannot afford to support such an appointment and 
usually their priests have stayed here for short periods. As priests 
were also employees of their communities, there was little likelihood 
of them taking on the role of political leader. 
Both the Muslim and Hindu religiOUS leaders had and have 
opportunities to establish strong ties with their religious 
CORlnunit ies, but the formal trappings of the employer-employee 
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relationship ensure that such a development of social ties could not 
easily occur. This relationship distances them from those who might 
become their supporters. Therefore, neither of these religious leaders 
was likely to become a political leader, unless they assumed the role of 
a charismatic leader. In general, opportunities for leadership fall to 
the temple and mosque committee members, since they have the power to 
control the imams and priests, and the opportunities to influence the 
views, attitudes and values of their members who depended upon them for 
a range of religious, social and community services. It is to such 
leaders that I wish to turn attention. 
The Emergence of the Ethnic Leader in Local Politics 
The emergence of ethnic leaders in the Hindu and Muslim communities 
owes much to the proliferation and consolidation of socio-religious 
organisations. Men were elected to positions in these organisations 
which gave them power to control priests or imams and to influence the 
attitudes and social values of their members. Since their positions were 
not religious but politically determined, the additional demand upon 
them to perform the function of leadership was a simple extension to 
their eXisting offices. Moreover, the existence of the informal 
political arena provided by the eRe to which they had access made the 
assumption of this function straightforward. Hereafter, when I use the 
term leader I shall mean an officer of an ethnic organisation who has 
in addition to his other responsibilities has taken on some of the 
functions of leadership. This raises a number of questions: one is to 
what extent could officers who represented an organisation chose to take 
on this function? Some like the Swaminarayans and the followers of 
Saibaba chose neither to seek positions on the BeeR nor to participate 
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in political debates. Another is: could any elected officer other than 
the chairperson take on the functions of leadership? The answer to this 
is that they did, if they believed that the situation warranted it and 
they could profit by doing so. A further issue is were these so-called 
leaders insiders or outsiders? 
Leaders and officers of organisations which chose not to be 
represented on the BCCR by choice excluded themselves and their 
organisations from participation in ethnic politics. Those who sought 
participation but were excluded on the grounds of belonging to factions 
were less satisfied and often their officers found other ways of gaining 
access to the BCCR. The proliferation of factions, castes and sects 
that was taking place in the Hindu and Muslim communities (Chap.2 above) 
found a sympathetic ear in the BCCR, since it was taken as evidence of 
integration. Therefore, the men who were accepted as representatives on 
the CRC belonged to organisations which, the officers and members of 
BeeR believed, represented community interests as opposed to factional 
interests. Any person who was elected to a recognised position in such 
an organisation and volunteered to act as a representative for it on the 
BeeR gained access to this political arena. Without any formally 
recognised system of selection of leaders from the ethnic communities or 
operated by the CRC, the distinction drawn between the acceptable 
leaders and those not considered acceptable was both a fine one and one 
open to dispute. Unless a Gujarati could be accepted as a formally 
recognised councillor or MP there was and still is no way in which 
leaders from the ethnic communities can be identified other than by 
haphazard and idiosyncratic selection systems. 
Without repeating the argument about competition between leaders for 
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places on the BCCR, this created a situation in which representatives of 
organisations and individuals found themselves competing with one 
another and with no recognised means for resolving it within the BCCR or 
externally (see above). This system provide an underlying dynamic that 
matched the emergence of factions, mosques, sects and caste 
organisations. The issue of representation on CRCs, which was critical 
before 1970 (Hill and Issacharoff,1971: Chap.6) became much more 
contentious after 1970, since not only were the majority of Hindu and 
Muslim organisations seeking representation on the BCCR, but also the 
Bolton West Indian Society, Bangladeshis, Pakistani Association, Somalis 
and Kashmiri Workers Association were demanding places. The decision on 
whom to admit depended upon the professional judgement of the CRO and 
the existing members of the CRC, whose knowledge of ethnic organisations 
varied greatly. This dilemma over selection or election of 
representatives and organisations ensured that Gujarati leaders would 
become committed to competing for influence in the BCCR, with its 
members and with one another. 
Officers of organisations considered representation on the BCCR as 
desirable for at least four reasons: firstly, it could help them obtain 
funding, directly or indirectly, for community projects. Secondly, it 
could provide them with access to a much sought after resource - a 
political arena. Thirdly, recognition by the BCCR implied recognition by 
some other organisations, such as the Local Authority. Fourthly, it 
provided them with a source of advice and help for a wide range of 
problems. Not being able to provide such assistance for themselves, the 
demand for representation on the CRC seemed to give those who had it an 
advantage. Therefore, officers from organisations representing different 
sects or castes or mosques belonging to the same religious community 
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could swamp the CRC. To create this situation was advantageous. Being 
aware of this, it made it all the more important for those who had 
representatives to win places for more representatives from their 
religious community. Since no one organisation could have more than two 
representatives, the way to increase representatives was to create new 
organisations whose officers would owe allegiance to the umbrella 
organisation. 
One community whose leaders understood the dynamics and deployed it 
to advantage were the Muslims. The already existing factions, caste 
communities and sects, initially under the umbrella of the ICC, could 
separate into smaller units through a process of proliferation, or more 
precisely detachment. Detachment is a process by which a larger 
organisation can split into a number of smaller ones whose relationship 
to the larger one can range from co-operation to competition [5]. At one 
level these organisations share a common social/religious identity; at 
another they can develop their own identities. Depending upon the 
situation, leaders and members can opt for one of a number of possible 
social identities. Evidence of detachment can be seen in the structure 
of the Islamic community (Chap.2, Diagram 1). As the officers in charge 
of each mosque demanded representation on the BCCR, a situation 
developed in which there were more mosque representatives looking for 
more places on the BCCR than existed. In other words, the Muslims could 
have taken over the CRC. Within the monolithic structure of the ICC the 
facility of detachment allows for the proliferation of mosques without 
endangering the unity of the host organisation. If anything, this 
process strengthened the position of the ICC. 
Although this process of detachment could be seen to operate in other 
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communities, such as the Hindu community, they were unable to make as 
good use of it as did the Muslims. An explanation for this is that there 
was no unitary structure around which the Hindus could unite. Another is 
that they had a strong leader in the form of Mr Sandhu, who dominated 
Hindu participation in the eRe without seemingly having to look for 
support from smaller Hindu organisations. The process of detachment 
works well when the community using it is a large one, ideally with 
members sharing a common set of beliefs. For small communities, such as 
the Pakistanis and West Indians, the process of detachment was of little 
use, since they were too small to accommodate more than one 
organisation. However, the Pakistanis and other small Islamic 
communities could be drawn into the process of detachment or unification 
through immersing their social identity under the umbrella identity of 
Islam. On the one hand, the weaknesses of this form of representation is 
that it provides an opportunity for a leader to become a "big man", 
an idea which all Gujaratis seemed to reject as unacceptable. On the 
other hand, detachment is a particularly suitable form of representation 
for the Muslim and Hindu communities, since as a process it opens the 
way for a religious community to segment into many parts and thereby 
exploit the process of democracy by swamping the eRe with their men. 
I have claimed that the social characteristics of the men who 
functioned as leaders are similar to those of their supporters. Such a 
process of detachment would not work well unless those acting as leaders 
were similarly entrenched within their communities. However, it might 
also be argued that for leaders from different religious communities to 
co-operate, similarity of social background is not an advantage. An 
analysis of the social characteristics of leaders should enable me to 
distinguish between the different kinds of leaders. 
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Social Characteristics of Gujarati Leaders 
In the course of the survey, I collected completed schedules from 
forty men who had been or were officers in Gujarati organisations. 
Twenty-five of them were Hindu and fifteen were Muslim. The majority of 
them had acted as representatives for their organisations on the 
Executive Committee of the BceR. 
In an urban society, race provides a way of expressing ideologies 
about economic and political relationships in such a way that they 
encapsulate a self justifying circle of explanations about conditions, 
problems and contradictions faced by Asian, black and white people 
(Hall,1981:35). Though the recession in the textile industry and related 
industries on which many Gujaratis depended for livelihoods was 
experiencing a crisis, it forced leaders to assess their interdependence 
upon one another and this encouraged the development of ethnic 
identities. To concretise their ethnic identities each community sought 
to establish a visible symbol of community togetherness, namely a mosque 
or temple. Competition for space became more intense than competition 
for jobs. This meant finding funds to purchase land and buildings, which 
led to even greater demand for the services of, and therefore access to, 
the arena provided by the BCCR. Gujarati leaders required a public and 
political arena in which to represent the needs of their supporters, and 
to compete with one another and the white community for public 
resources. 
The aim of Hindu and Muslim leaders to establish the ethnic 
identities of their communities in a wider political arena in one sense 
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stood in direct opposition to the policies of integration, in another 
sense it was a logical step towards integration. From a white 
perspective integration implied the recognition and acceptance of 
cultural differences but with the acceptance by the Gujaratis of 
British political processes and goals. From the Gujarati point of view 
such acceptance meant a relegation of Gujarati social and religious 
identities to non-political arenas. That is there was no room for a 
Gujarati (or brown or black) identity within the local political 
processes and structures. This created a political vacuum or space 
between the Gujaratis and the white politicial hierarchy. It was into 
this space that these ethnic leaders stepped and the arena in which they 
could do so was that provided by the local CRC. Thus the ethnic leaders 
found themselves in a new political environment which militated against 
the philosophy and policy of integration, but which lent towards ethnic 
politics. While the integrationists stood outside the communities they 
represented, these ethnic leaders had to be deeply embedded in the 
social, economic and religious fabric of their communities in order to 
understand the needs and ethnic identities of their supporters. Their 
social characteristics were different to those of the integrationists. 
These men were responsible for the property and funds owned by their 
community, for any personnel they might employ, for decisions about 
certain essential services upon which their members depended, such as 
the quick release of a dead body by the coroner, the washing and 
preparation of bodies for burial, the burial or cremation itself, access 
to burial grounds, religious tuition for children of members, a place 
where social and religious gatherings of the community could take place. 
Competition for public resources to enable their organisations to 
SUpport these commitments placed these leaders in positions where they 
had to become political. 
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One aspect of ethnic leadership is that political activity in the space 
between their communities and the white community does not necessarily 
separate these men from their communities. To be community based could 
be of greater advantage than to have close friends in the white 
community. Therefore, it is important to examine the social and 
structural characteristics of their networks to assess the extent to 
which they are similar to those of their supporters. An analysis of the 
structures of the primary zones of networks of leaders showed that they 
are similar to those of the people to whom they look for support. The 
average size of the zones of these Muslim and Hindu leaders are larger 
(7.6 and 7.08) than those of the total sample of Muslims and Hindus (5.1 
and 5.6). A higher percentage (86.67%) of Muslim leaders' zones are 
complete compared to those of Muslim respondents (73%) generally. 
Whereas slightly fewer Hindu leaders' zones are complete (48%) as 
compared with those of the Hindu sample (54%) as a whole. Hindu leaders' 
zones include fewer (68%) homogeneous close friends than do those of the 
Hindus sampled, whereas more zones (80%) of Muslim leaders are 
homogeneous than are those (76.6%) of the Muslims sampled. The 
characteristics of these zones of Muslim and Hindu leaders enable them 
to better utilise ties between their members or to cross caste and 
ethnic boundaries than can their respective supporters. The 
characteristics of the Muslim leaders' zones suggest that they were at 
least as deeply entrenched, if not more so, than their supporters within 
the Muslim community. In other words they were in good positions to 
benefit most from the ideology of all Muslims being brothers. They could 
establish or lay claim to having strong ties with their supporters. In a 
different way the Hindu leaders, given the loose-knittedness of their 
primary zones, could establish more wide ranging and stronger 
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relationships with Hindus across caste boundaries than could their 
members. 
To maintain strong relationships with supporters leaders have to 
meet them frequently. The average number of places where Hindu leaders 
meet their close friends (2.49) is above the average for that of the 
Hindu sample (2.12), and the same holds for the Muslim leaders 
(3.3, for sample = 2.84). A comparison of levels of intensity of zones 
of close friends of leaders shows that the proportion of Muslim leaders 
(73%) anchoring zones comprising a single level relationship is markedly 
higher than that for the Muslim sample as a whole (57.14%). However, 
only 36% of Hindu leaders anchored such zones, which is identical to 
that of the sample as a whole (35.92%). Further analysis of leaders' 
zones of one level of intensity shows that all Muslim leaders 
Table 5.1: Degree of Connectedness of Leaders' Zones 
Muslims: 
1-9 
Weight 
10-18 
2 3 
4 
5 
7 
8 
10 
Totals: 
%: 
Hindus: 
4 
5 
6 
10 
Tota 1 s: 
%: 
1 1 
1 
1 
6 
1 11 
6.67 73.33 
Closely 
Kin Close 
Friends 
Weight 
1-9 10-18 
2 
3 
2 
3 
10 
40 
Closely 
Kin Close 
Friends 
of Optimum Spanning Trees 
19-27 28-36 37-45 Totals 
1 
1 
2 
13.33 
connectedness 
1 
1 
6.67 
Ordinary Acquain-
Friends tances 
2 
2 
1 
1 
1 
8 
15 
100 
Loosely 
Stranger 
of Optimum Spanning Trees 
19-27 28-36 37-45 Totals 
1 1 4 
1 1 5 
2 1 1 6 
5 1 1 10 
8 3 4 25 
32 12 16 100 
connectedness Loosely 
Ordinary Acquain- Stranger 
Friends tances 
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interviewed perceived of their close friends being linked by either ties 
of kinship or close friendship (100%) as compared with a lower 
percentage for the sample as a whole (87.5%). A higher proportion of 
Hindu leaders anchored strong single level zones (55.6%) as compared 
with a lower proportion of respondents in the sample as a whole (52.9%). 
The degrees of connectedness of leaders' zones as measured by the weight 
of the optimum spanning trees indicated that more Muslim leaders' zones 
are closely connected than are those of the Muslim sample as a whole 
(see Tables 5.1 and 4.29). Generally the connectedness of the Hindu 
leaders' zones are similar to that of the Hindu sample as a whole, 
except that more zones anchored by leaders' zones are loosely connected 
(see Tables 5.1 and 4.30). 
The social standing of these men is of a similar range to those of 
the sample as a whole. Most of them are employed in jobs that fall 
within Class VII, that is "semiskilled and unskilled manual". These data 
bear out what has been said above about the characteristics of leaders 
and their close friends: the majority (60%) of the Muslim leaders are 
employed in similar occupations to those of their close friends (81.3%) 
(Tables 5.2a and 5.2b). More Hindu leaders belong to lower social 
classes (64%) than do their close friends (56%). These data are 
Table 5.2a: Social Standing of Muslim Leaders and their Close Friends 
Class of and 
No. of Respondents: Class of Close Friends 
Class: Resp. % I I I III IV V VI VI I Other 
II 1 6.67 1 1 7 1 
III 2 13.33 1 1 17 1 
IV 3 20 4 8 16 
VII 9 60 3 2 47 2 
Totals: 15 100 3 6 12 87 4 112 
% 2.68 5.36 10.71 81.25 100% 
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Table 5.2b: Summary of Table 5.2a 
Close Friends: Above Equal 
Tota 1 s 112 9 56 
% 100% 8.04% 50% 
Below Respondents 
47 
41.96% 
confirmed by the analysis of the social standing of leaders in relation 
to their close friends (Tables 5.3a and 5.3b). Above I suggested that 
Table 5.3a: Social Standing of Hindu Leaders and their Close Friends 
Class of and 
No. of Respondents: Class of Close Friends 
Class: Resp. % I II III IV V VI VII Other 
I 2 8 5 3 6 1 
III 2 8 2 3 4 6 
IV 5 20 2 3 3 5 12 14 
VII 15 60 1 4 11 22 45 15 
Other 1 4 3 7 
Tota 1: 25 100 8 12 20 37 64 36 
% 4.52 6.78 11.3 20.9 56.5% 
Table 5.3b: Summary Analysis of Table 5.3a 
Close Friends: 
Totals 177 
% 100% 
Above 
51 
28.81% 
Equal Below Respondents 
65 61 
36.72% 34.47% 
177 
100% 
the traditional leader whose support is kin-based is atypical of Muslim 
and Hindu leaders. Rather these leaders share with their close friends 
similar social standing within and without their communities. They are 
not seeking to join the white middle class, they are rejecting such aims 
in favour of aligning themselves with the grassroots in their own 
communities. This pattern of a return to grassroots to awaken religious 
and ethnic identities is the opposite of what one might expect. However, 
the change in the pattern of leadership between the 1960s and the 1970s 
can be explained partly as a reaction to the integrationists, partly a 
reaction to the new hardships of the 70s and partly as a return to 
grassroots politics as a consequence of their shared urban experience. 
From this analysis it is clear that the social characteristics of Mr 
Sandhu's social network are different to those of the other ethnic 
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leaders. At the time he was the only outsider leader, and as such shared 
this characteristic with the integrationist leaders. 
An outsider as Leader 
The search for identities gave rise to the emergence of a variety of 
ethnic organisations. Their members looked for men who would assume the 
functions of leadership without becoming IIbig menll. The majority of 
Muslim and Hindu leaders were not "big men", although some aspired to 
being IIbig menll. This allows for at least two extreme types of leaders 
to take on the role of leadership as opposed to the function of 
leadership: the one is the insider who becomes a dominant leader; the 
other is the outsider who is recruited to a position of leadership, 
because he is recognised as having certain qualities. Both Muslim and 
Hindu organisations can accommodate such individuals, but some can 
accommodate them more easily than others. It fell to the VHP to elect 
one such person to a position of leadership. 
For some years before 1972 Mr Sandhu, a member of the BeeR, had 
spoken on behalf of the Hindus. He was the most prominent Sikh, a 
Punjabi, from a largely hidden small group of Sikhs. Although he 
lectured at a Manchester college, he lived in Bolton. Unlike most 
leaders of the day who moved into a Gujarati area of the town, where 
they rema i ned, 
cum-Bre i ghtmet. 
he moved from such an area to a white area, Darcy Lever-
His occupation gave him high social standing and as an 
articulate and well educated man, he was accepted as a leader by members 
of the BeeR, 1 eaders of other As i an and black commun i ties, 1 oca 1 
councillors and MPs. He was quickly elected vice-chairperson of BeeR. In 
this position he rose to prominence through his involvement in helping 
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Ugandan Asian refugees settle in Bolton. In 1973 he was invited to join 
the VHP, whose committee members stated that they wished to meet the 
needs of all Indians. He was elected to the position of chairperson; 
position he held until 1979. 
a 
The election of Mr Sandhu brought a temporary cessation to the inter-
caste rivalry that had bedevilled relationships between VHP members. As 
a Sikh, he could not be identified with a particular caste, although he 
was identifiable as an Asian. Of his ten close friends, only two were 
Hindus, the remaining eight being Sikhs. He maintained that his close 
friends were unacquainted with each other. In terms of connectedness, 
the primary zone he anchored was exceptional: it had an optimum spanning 
tree weight of 45. This made it the largest and most loosely connected 
zone of all in the sample. Like the leaders he replaced, he got on well 
with white politicians. However, a weakness was that he could not 
associate himself with caste issues. Some of those who elected him, such 
as the Mandhata Patels, found it difficult to reconcile his general 
approach to supporting the VHP with his inability to identify with caste 
issues. To the white politicians, he fitted their notion of what a 
leader should be: well spoken, politically acute, tactful and hostile 
as appropriate. 
As chairperson of the VHP, Mr Sandhu was called upon to play a 
prominent part in many activities and projects. One of the most notable 
achievements being the uniting of members from disparate castes to 
generate sufficient funds and commitment to purchase and establish a 
community centre. In 1973 the VHP required a leader who could handle 
the complex negotiations between themselves and whoever had property to 
sell which might meet their needs for a community centre. As events 
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transpired, one building they favoured was St.Barnabas Church, owned by 
the Church of England. These negotiations brought Mr Sandhu into contact 
with white representatives of the Church and Charity Commission. They 
also brought him face-to-face with the public face of racism, through 
the public opposition he experienced to the purchase of the building 
from local people and a local vicar (see Chap.6). He persuaded the 
Church of England to sell St.Barnabas to the VHP, and in 1976 the 
building was purchased. The Press claimed that it was the first ever 
sold to Hindus by the Church of England. A few years later, it was 
opened with due pomp and circumstance before invited guests, who 
included the local MPs, the Mayor, councillors and many other prominent 
persons. During this time, he probably received more publicity in the 
local press than any other Asian or black leader before or after him. 
Consequently, he became the most respected and widely known Asian 
leader in Bolton. 
Although it would seem to be difficult for a person who was not a 
Hindu to become a leader of a Hindu organisation, the VHP, of all the 
Hindu organisations in Bolton, was the one which could have accepted 
most easily an outsider as a leader. It claimed to be a multi-caste 
organisation. Although Mr Sandhu and his wife had personal contacts with 
members of the VHP, these were insufficient to provide him with the kind 
of support he required to overcome the inter-caste disputes that 
existed. He was fortunate in having the support and close friendship of 
the vice-chairperson, who was a well educated man holding a job of high 
social standing and a member of the largest caste in Bolton, the 
Mandhata Patels. He could provide the kind of support which was 
essential to Mr Sandhu, if he was to succeed as a leader of the VHP. 
They made a good team. 
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There were advantages and disadvantages to be gained by the VHP 
electing an outsider as chairperson. The main advantage was that they 
could hand-pick their leader; the main disadvantage was that without 
being tied to a caste he could develop the role of leader into 
something greater than just that linked to one ethnic organisation. This 
is precisely what he did later on. The position of leader of all 
Gujaratis or all Muslims or Hindus is one to which some leaders aspire. 
However, such a leader would attract criticism and hostility on the 
grounds that he wanted to be "big man". In this respect Mr Sandhu was no 
exception: he wanted to be recognised as a "big man". Eventually, some 
influential members of the VHP began to turn caste support away from him 
by criticising his handling of VHP matters, such as his management of 
issues arising out of a visit the VHP members made to the Isle of Man 
(Chap.6). This also gave some members the opportunity to allege that he 
might have misappropriated funds, an accusation which was never proved. 
He alone of all the minority leaders tried to form an association of 
leaders - a forerunner of todays Minorities Joint Consultative Committee 
(MJCC) -, but they were suspicious of his motives and failed to give him 
the support he required to become a leader of leaders. The result was 
predictable; he severed his links with the VHP in 1979 and moved away. 
The Muslim organisations could also have chosen an outsider as a 
leader, but in practice they were reluctant to do so. When they do 
accept advice from an outsider, they are quick to disown or blame him 
for their misfortunes. Although during my period of research no such 
person emerged as a leader, in 1983 a Bangladeshi doctor began to playa 
prominent part in the Bangladeshi Association and as a representative of 
Muslims generally on the BCCR and in the local Labour Party. However, at 
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the 1989 annual general meeting of the BCCR he lost his seat, because 
the Gujarati Muslim representatives chose to vote against him. He 
believed that as a Muslim and a doctor holding a respected position in 
Bolton, his quest for overall leadership of the Muslim community would 
be unopposed. For an outsider who has no roots in a community to become 
a successful leader, he has to dominate the organisation and the 
community that chose him. This doctor assumed that deference to his 
position was sufficient to attract the support he sought. 
For men, like Mr Sandhu and the Muslim doctor, who set out to be 
leaders without ties other than those that bind a voter to his/her 
candidate, support is determined solely by a tenuous thread which 
supporters can recognise or break at will. For leaders with ties in 
their communities the freedom to achieve success is limited by the 
constraints exercised by supporters through these same ties. In the 
1970s the adage that most Gujarat i leaders quoted was: "big men are 
bad". It revealed their deep distrust of other ethnic leaders and a 
recognition of the temptation on the part of leaders who aspire to 
being "big men" to be drawn away from their communities and towards the 
white community. To some extent these attitudes are supported by an 
analysis of the relationships between leaders and some their supporters. 
Relationships between Gujaratis and their Leaders 
I need to sound a word of caution. Those in this sample mayor may 
not include one or more supporters of a leader. In the analysis to 
follow, the depth of support for a leader will not be reflected in the 
analysis. What the analysis will give is an indication of Gujaratis' 
knowledge of and readiness to support their and other ethnic leaders. In 
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theory leadership could take a number of forms. For instance it 1S 
feasible to recognise three kinds of leaders: a pan-Gujarati leader, a 
leader of the Muslims and the Hindus, or leaders of various community 
organisations. These kinds of leaders could coexist or one or two kinds 
could predominate. So far the analysis has shown that only the third 
kind of lead exists. One explanation for this is that "big men 'l are 
distrusted. Another explanation lies in the attitudes of supporters who 
themselves could not accept a leader who does not come from their 
community. Therefore, before concentrating on a detailed analysis of the 
relationships between leaders and supporters, I shall briefly discuss 
these other kinds of leaders beginning with the pan-Gujarati leader. 
Generally, the leader who recognised the constraints of the ties 
within which he operated could remain in a position of authority in his 
ethnic organisation for a considerable time. The skills of leadership 
seemed to rest with the ability to administer to the needs of ethnic 
organisations and to function as leaders within the wider arena of the 
BCCR and the local political community. To replace a leader was a simple 
process, since in part the effectiveness of his removal depended upon 
the depths of his roots in his community. Muslims and Hindus believe 
that they can control leaders through social relationships. Implicit in 
their beliefs is the opinion that successful big men cannot be 
controlled through kinship and social ties. Such men achieved a 
prominence that enables them to rise above such control, since their 
support is drawn from a wider circle of people than those of their 
community. Thus leaders came and went, many hoping that events might 
bring them into prominence, a few seeking to work for the benefit of 
their own communities. Since neither the Gujaratis as a totality, nor 
their organisations, individually or together, are recognised as a 
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political entity, there was no political sense in establishing a pan-
Gujarati leader. Furthermore, there was no political process available 
by which a pan- Gujarati leader could be elected. 
Consequently, as a minority community they have no single leader and 
no single Hindu and/or Muslim leader. They are hydra-headed in the 
sense that there is no single identifiable structure of leadership, but 
rather a number of leaders competing for recognition as leaders. 
Gujarati leadership has been characterised by the rapid turnover of 
leaders since their arrival here to the present day. A number of the 
present leaders who were in positions of leadership in 1976, disappeared 
and later returned to prominence. As the political arena in which they 
strove for influence over the white politicians was an informal and 
developing one, their strength lay in the relationships between 
themselves and their supporters, between each other, and between 
themselves and the formally elected white politicians. Two factors 
increased the chances of becoming known: firstly, the size of their 
organisation and secondly, their presence on the BCCR. The larger the 
organisation and the broader its basis for recruitment, the more 
opportunity its leader had to raise issues of political interest to 
supporters and politicians. An attraction for the politician who took up 
a cause for a leader was the potential reward that might accrue in the 
form of support. 
Competition between Muslim and Hindu organisations for public 
resources implied competition between leaders for support and for 
influence over those who controlled them. The supporters' ideas of how 
they and their organisations could obtain such resources were dependent 
upon their relationships with and knowledge of their elected officers. 
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Since the organisations developed initially in response to the social, 
cultural and religious needs of their members, elected officers had 
control over their members and the resources of the organisations. In 
theory and to some extent in practice they could control the social 
values and attitudes and beliefs of members of their communities. For 
instance, the leader of a caste association could try to control dowry 
payments, and with support he could outcaste members who failed to 
accept caste values (Chap.6). The ICC provided a range of facilities 
that formed a central part of the lives of its members, such as 
facilities for burial, control of a burial ground for Muslims, 
facilities for the young to learn the Koran, and appointment of imams. 
Likewise the VHP also endeavoured to offer a similarly large range of 
facilities and services, including a library, at one time certain health 
services for women and children, a place where its members could hold 
private functions, and employed a priest to look after the religious 
needs of the community. Thus elected leaders had considerable influence 
over the lives of their members. 
The above analysis of the social characteristics of elected leaders 
showed that most, with the exception of Mr Sandhu, were more deeply 
entrenched within the social fabrics of their communities than were many 
of their supporters. They recognised the importance of having deep 
kinship and friendship roots within their communities to their holding 
on to positions in their organisations. Thus supporters' knowledge of 
leaders is an important indicator of their social standing as leaders. 
The absence of a pan-Gujarati leader or leader of Muslims or Hindus 
can be explained by firstly, Gujaratis deep distrust of such men, 
secondly, by the absence of any kind of recognised electoral or 
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selection process, and thirdly, by Gujaratis commitment of support to 
their own communities. A detailed analysis of respondents' acquaintance 
with and knowledge of their leaders supports this conclusion. A 
high percentage of Muslims claimed some form of acquaintance with 
chairperson (75.28%) and vice-chairperson (64.04%) of the ICC. Well 
over half of the Muslim respondents (65%) did not know the other Muslim 
leaders of organisations. Many had not heard of the chairperson of the 
Pakistani Association, who received as much press coverage during 1972-
76 as did Mr Sandhu. As the manager of the first Muslim bank to be 
established in Bolton, his picture appeared in the local newspaper where 
his bank and its services were advertised. Yet 74 per cent of the sample 
had not heard of him. Only a small number of respondents (32%) had heard 
of the chairperson of Lena Street Mosque. He was the least well known of 
the Muslim leaders to Muslims and yet became one of the best known to 
the white politicians and BCCR (Chap.6). This bears out a point made 
above that generally the majority of leaders of Asian organisations are 
known only to members of their organisations. 
Hindu respondents were relatively unacquainted with their leaders. 
The majority (63%) of them knew or knew of Mr Sandhu, which is not 
surprising given his prominence as a leader of the VHP and the one 
leader who received the most publicity. Under fifty per cent of 
respondents were acquainted with his vice-chairperson and they were 
barely acquainted with the other leaders of prominent Hindu 
organisations. Only 24 per cent of respondents claimed acquaintance with 
the chairperson of the Saibaba movement, even fewer knew of the 
officers of the Mandhata Patel Association (24%), the Shree Kutch 
Swaminarayan (21%) and Shree Swaminarayan Mandir (18%). Hindus knew the 
leaders of their organisations and a few had heard of the other Hindu 
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leaders. 
Knowledge of leaders across religious groups was even poorer. No 
leader was as widely known to both Hindus and Muslims as Mr Sandhu, 10 
per cent of Muslims knew of him as compared with less than 5 per cent of 
Hindus who knew of chairperson of Lena Street Mosque, the best known of 
the Muslim leaders. Most of the sample had not heard of the remaining 
Hindu and Muslim leaders, which points to many leaders having little 
contact with Gujaratis outside their organisations. 
When respondents were asked whether they would be prepared to accept 
a leader from one of the four ethnic minority communities, most 
respondents expressed a preference for a member of their religious 
community. Thus the majority of Muslim respondents expressed a clear 
preference for a Gujarati Muslim as a leader as opposed to a Pakistani 
leader. Their lack of willingness to accept a Hindu was matched by an 
equally great reluctance to accept a Pakistani. This reinforces findings 
referred to above (Chaps.3 and 4), that Gujarati Muslims perceive 
themselves as being different from Pakistanis. The Muslims gave the 
impression that they would rather have anyone but a Sikh. Those who knew 
Mr Sandhu considered him to be anti-Muslim, a reputation he acquired 
when he expressed his opinion in the BCCR on how the Lena Street Mosque 
community should view the Local Authority's order to close their mosque 
(Chap.6). Even those Muslims who did not support the chairperson of 
Lena Street Mosque regarded Mr Sandhu's behaviour as evidence of his 
duplicity and were not prepared to accept him as a pan-Gujarati leader. 
A minority of Hindus expressed a willingness to accept a Hindu as a 
leader. Generally Hindus gave the impression of not being committed to 
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having a Hindu as an overall leader, which suggests that for most Hindus 
the basis of support is confined to their caste and sect communities. 
For instance this was reflected in the views of members of the Mandhata 
Patel Association, who were unwilling to join the VHP in a combined 
venture to establish a religious and community centre. With each one of 
these organisations having a considerable membership, together they 
could have generated sufficient funds and manpower to establish a 
centre. However, separately they had to approach the BeeR or other 
funding bodies for support. Therefore, when the VHP took the decision to 
buy a building for use as a temple and community centre, it made sense 
to chose an outsider for chairperson. 
Leaders who represented their organisations on BeeR came to see 
themselves as an elite. As such to some extent they became acquainted 
with each other and with the politicians and others in positions of 
influence in the Local Authority. They were asked how well they knew 
the chairpersons and secretaries of eight prominent Hindu and Muslim and 
Pakistani organisations. Eight organisations were selected because, 
firstly, they are independent of each other; secondly, the chairpersons 
and secretaries with one exception live in Bolton. The vice-chairperson 
of the VHP lives in Blackburn, but had and still has roots in Bolton. 
The findings suggest that generally the Muslim leaders are better 
acquainted with other Muslim leaders than Hindu leaders are acquainted 
with other Hindu leaders. Most Hindu leaders (80%) for instance had not 
heard of the chairperson of the Shree Kutch Swaminarayan Mandir and 92 
per cent had not heard of the chairperson of the Shree Swaminarayan 
Mandir. Furthermore, few Hindu leaders are acquainted with Muslim 
leaders, but almost a third of the Muslim leaders had heard of Mr 
Sandhu. Since these leaders had so little knowledge of each other, there 
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was little co-operation between them, even though their organisations 
shared similar interests, such as burial within 24 hours. Common 
interests brought the Muslim leaders together: they represented 
organisations which shared the same religious needs, and most of whom 
shared a common identity as members of the ICC and as Muslims. The 
strong ties of close friendship which linked them to their communities 
enabled them to develop weak ties with those who did not belong to their 
organisations and communities, that is with leaders and members of other 
Gujarati and Pakistani organisations as well as with white politicians 
and other white people holding positions of influence, such as those in 
the BCCR. The strength of these weak ties lay in the ease and little 
commitment with which leaders could establish them and then break them. 
In practice, neither the Hindus nor the Muslims have a politically 
acceptable procedure by which they can elect a leader to represent them 
as Hindus or Muslims or as Gujaratis. This has proved to be the most 
difficult obstacle they have faced in their attempts to develop a 
structure of leadership. In effect, there exist as many structures of 
leadership as there are ethnic organisations. A difficulty that lies 
at the root of this issue of leadership is the view that no CRC could 
define or oversee an election system by which ethnic communities elected 
leaders. Communities have to devise their own electoral systems. 
Election to the BCCR involved a separate process which was not to select 
a leader but rather to select from amongst a collection of organisations 
a set of representatives. The decision to help ethnic organisations 
develop an electoral system would fall outside the responsibilities of a 
eRe. No political party wished to participate in this exercise, because 
it could lead to the creation of separate political units outside the 
party system, that is in the political space between these communities 
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party sY':l Lelll, Llld L l':l III Lne po 111.1 ca I space between these commun i ties 
within a community. The boundaries of this space can be inferred from 
the extent of Gujaratis' participation in recognised political 
processes. 
Participation in Local Politics 
The element of elitism derives from weak links that leaders 
established with the two MPs and local councillors. Direct access to 
councillors and their officers was viewed by Gujaratis as a desirable 
asset that should be possessed by their leaders. Though access to MPs 
and councillors within the forum provided by the BCCR did not guarantee 
that a leader's views would be heard, it did provide opportunities for 
leaders to negotiate with politicians. Thus an analysis of leaders' 
views of their relationships with the two MPs is instructive. Fourteen 
(92%) of the fifteen Muslim leaders questioned had heard of Mrs 
A.Taylor, and all had heard of Mr D.Young, then MPs for Bolton. Nine 
considered themselves to be acquaintances or ordinary friends of these 
two MPs. Whereas 76% (I9) of Hindu leaders had at least heard of Mrs 
Taylor MP, but only 44% (II) had heard of Mr Young. Only eight Hindu 
leaders claimed acquaintance with Mrs Taylor and three claimed 
acquaintance with Mr Young. In 1976 an explanation for greater personal 
acquaintance of the Muslim than Hindu leaders with these MPs was that 
(a) they had called upon them at their surgeries more often for help 
than had the Hindus, (b) the MPs were always being invited to visit 
mosques and (c) after the Lena Street Mosque event (see Chap.6), the 
Muslims believed that these two MPs were more ready to support them than 
were the Conservative councillors. 
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Muslim and Hindu opinions about Conservative and Labour Party 
policies may have been based upon misapprehensions; but broadly speaking 
they were similar: they supported the Labour Party, believing that it 
was sympathetic to their cause. Most respondents gave two major reasons 
for supporting this Party: first that the Conservatives had been against 
India becoming independent in 1947. The second reason was that many 
believed that the Labour Party was not opposed to immigration and was 
not responsible for the immigration laws (Layton-Henry, 1984: 152-156; Rex 
and Tomlinson,1979:87; Lawrence,1974:138-140). This latter reason was 
the most commonly given one for their dislike of the Conservatives. 
As the ethnic vote became increasingly important (Layton-Henry and 
Rich, 1986:104; Anwar,1986:Chap.5; Layton-Henry, 1984: 146; Anwar,1980:14-
15; Anwar and Kohler,1975:10), the political parties not only sought to 
capture this vote, but some also supported Asian and black candidates in 
an effort to win ethnic votes. The power of the ethnic minority vote was 
felt for the first time in the 1974 election. In many towns where Asians 
voted, their votes swung control away from the Conservative Party to the 
Labour Party (Anwar and Kohler,1975). Bolton experienced a similar 
swing which saw the Labour Party wrest control of the town from the 
Conservatives. It brought to the political scene Mrs A. Taylor MP and Mr 
D. Young MP, each of whom contested and won a seat in the two elections 
held during 1974, which they held until the constituency boundaries were 
redrawn in 1983. 
Evidence of the respondents' support for political parties and the 
reasons given for voting show that these Muslims and Hindus voted 
Labour, a trend which they shared with Asian and black voters elsewhere 
(Anwar,1984; Lawrence,1974:138). This was borne out by the main survey: 
288 
the majority of respondents stated that they supported the Labour Party 
(Table 5.4). By 1976 both Hindus and Muslims supported the Labour Party. 
Table 5.4: Political Party Allegiances of Respondents 
Do you usually think of 
yourself as a supporter of:-
Hindu 
Labour 105 
Conservative 26 
Liberal 6 
No Party 6 
Don't know 11 
Total No. of Respondents 154 
(Hahlo,1983). 
Mus 1 im Total 
67 172 
21 47 
1 7 
6 12 
9 20 
104 258 
% 
66.8 
18.2 
2.7 
4.6 
7.7 
100% 
Generally, voting is a form of political participation available to 
all British citizens. In contrast to the large percentages of "don't 
know" and "do not vote" answers given by candidates to a Conservative 
Party canvasser in the 1974 election in Bradford Ward [6], the majority 
of Muslims and Hindus sampled said that they had voted in the General 
Election of December 1974. High percentages of both Muslims (81.7%) and 
Hindus (77.9%) sampled claimed to have voted in this General Election 
(Table 5.5). This commitment to political participation is reflected in 
a survey of electors of Asian origin carried out recently (Bolton Racial 
Equality Council, 1990, Bolton Metropolitian Borough: Survey of the 
1990/91 Electoral Registers for Electors of Asian Origin). The 
commitment of this sample to voting in elections was comparable with 
Table 5.5: Respondents who voted in the Second 1974 General Election 
Respondents Hindus % Muslims % Totals % 
Voted 120 77.9 85 81.7 205 79.5 
Did not vote 32 20.8 13 12.5 45 17.5 
Can't vote 1 0.6 1 1.0 2 0.7 
Just arrived 4 3.8 4 1.6 
No answer 1 0.6 1 1.0 2 0.7 
Tota 1 samp le 154 99.9% 104 100% 258 100% 
(Hah 10, 1983) . 
that of white electors. The number of respondents who did not vote was 
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small Muslims (12.5%) and Hindus (20.8%) - and even fewer could not 
vote. This bears out the conclusion that Gujaratis' commitment to vote 
was (and still is) strong. 
The Labour and Conservative Parties made concerted efforts to 
capture these votes. The problem they had was to find arguments to 
persuade Gujaratis to vote for them, while not alienating their white 
supporters. It is a trite observation that political parties depend 
heavily upon the involvement of their supporters, paid and unpaid, for 
their success in local and national elections. The involvement of 
Muslims and Hindus in political parties in 1976 had not led to the 
election of a Gujarati MP, although the Conservative Party had supported 
two Gujarati candidates in local elections (see below and Chap.7). 
Reference has been made earlier to two councillors, an Asian and Afro-
Caribbean, who had been successfully elected (see above). Dr S had been 
elected in 1967 as a councillor in Little Lever, Bolton. He had stood as 
an independent, but in the 1973 local elections he stood as a Liberal. 
As events turned out, he lost the contest to a Conservative candidate. 
Since his success no Asian has stood successfully in any election in the 
town. The town has had only one other minority black councillor, Mr CB, 
a West Indian. Although he lost his seat during the early 1970s, he 
regained it and has served as a councillor ever since. Neither of these 
men represented minority communities, they represented their political 
parties. 
Political parties were, d t ·ll are reluctant to nominate an s 1 , 
GUjarati candidates in local elections. When they did, they put them 
into wards with established opposition majorities. Since 1972, the 
Conservatives have nominated two candidates, a Hindu man and a Muslim 
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woman. The lady and her family have been staunch members of the 
Conservative Party and have participated ln party activities. For 
instance, they regularly canvassed for the Party in wards that had high 
numbers of Asian residents. Although the lady in question participated 
in BCCR activities, she was not directly linked to any Muslim 
organisation. Her work as a nurse and her attitudes towards the local 
Muslim communities separated her from them. She spoke English better 
than most of the men; attached little importance to notions of caste 
community membership, arranged marriage, the customary role of women and 
purdah, relationships between mother-in-law and daughter-in-law, dowry, 
cousin marriage, and she was opposed to Islamic attitudes towards 
contraception. However, she regarded herself as a much stricter and 
better Muslim than most local Muslims. Thus, she was unlikely to attract 
the Muslim male and female voter, both of whom were committed to these 
social values and beliefs. Moreover, she was unlikely to pose a threat 
to other Conservative councillors, since she stood little chance of 
winning a seat in a ward in which the majority consistently voted 
Labour. Nevertheless, her nomination by the Conservative Party was both 
interesting, unusual and innovative. 
The Labour Party has not nominated a single Gujarati to stand in an 
election, although it has provided financial and political support for 
GUjarati organisations. The Conservative Party has offered little direct 
support to these organisations, but it has provided opportunities for 
GUjarati candidates to stand in local elections. Overall there is little 
support for Gujaratis within the white dominated structures of these 
parties, therefore it is not surprising that the majority of them 
considered that they were "not strong supporters" of any party (Table 
5 6 1 . th H· d were II strong .). The data show that more Mus lms an ln us 
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Table 5.6: Respondents' Support for Political Parties 
Would you call Hindus % Muslim % Total % 
yourself a:-
Strong supporter 44 28.6 50 48.1 94 36.4 
Not strong 89 57.8 42 40.4 131 50.8 
supporter 
Don't know 3 1.9 3 1.2 
No Answers 18 11.7 12 11.6 30 11.6 
Totals: 154 100% 104 100.1% 258 100% 
(Hahlo,1983). 
supporters". To some extent this has been explained by the belief of 
Muslims in the Labour Party and the support they had received from it. 
Whereas the Hindus, possibly by coincidence, were not involved in events 
which could have been turned by either Party to political advantage. 
Another form of political involvement open to them was as unpaid 
party workers. No more than 10 per cent of the sample stated that they 
were willing to be publicly associated with a specific party and only 
3.9 per cent were willing to contribute to the work in a party office 
(Table 5.7). The difference between the kind of involvement of Hindus 
and Muslims is important; more Hindus than Muslims were involved in 
party offices, but more Muslims than Hindus identified with a particular 
party. The Conservative Party relied on them to use their personal 
influence to bring them votes in return for supporting two candidates in 
local elections. The Labour Party depended for support on the goodwill 
that their councillors and MPs could win through resolving personal 
problems and organisational difficulties. 
The importance respondents attached to personal contact with MPs and 
Councillors can be gauged from their responses to a question asking whom 
they would contact or what they would do if dissatisfied with a locally 
taken political decision (Table 5.8). Both Muslims and Hindus took the 
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Table 5.7: Respondents' Form of Political Participation 
HINDUS Yes % No % No % Total % 
answer 
Wear a rosette 
put a poster in a 
window of house 12 7.8 141 91.6 1 0.6 154 100 
attend party 
meetings 
Canvass & campaign 5 3.2 147 95.5 2 1.3 154 100 
for candidates 
Work part-time in 6 3.9 146 94.8 2 1.3 154 100 
the party office 
MUSLIMS Yes % No % No % Total % 
answer 
Wear a rosette 
put a poster in a 
window of house 11 10.6 91 87.5 2 1.9 104 100 
attend party 
meetings 
Canvass & campaign 8 7.7 94 90.4 2 1.9 104 100 
for candidates 
Work part-time in 2 1.9 100 96.2 2 1.9 104 100 
the party office 
(Hah 10, 1983) . 
opportunity to attend the surgeries of Mrs A.Taylor MP [7] and Mr o. 
Young MP. The majority of Muslims stated that, if they had a problem, 
they would contact the MPs first (79.8%) and then the local councillors 
(78.8%). It is significant that between 40 and 50 per cent of Muslims 
were willing to consider attending protest meetings and marches, 
campaigning against candidates and refusing to obey the law. If 
dissatisfied they were willing to become politically active and believed 
that they could count on a reasonably wide degree of agreement amongst 
themselves, as they are more ready than Hindus to consider positive 
forms of political protest [8]. 
An explanation for the lower percentage of Hindus who were prepared 
to contact their councillors (61.7%) and MPs (55.8%) should recognise 
that they had less contact with these politicians (Table 5.9). Unlike 
the Muslims, the Hindus have not chosen to confront local politicians 
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Table 5.8: Dissatisfaction with a Locally taken Political Decision 
MUSLIMS 
Action: 
Approve Depends Dis- Don't know Totals 
No. % No. % 
Contact MPs 83 79.8 1 1.0 
Contact 
Councillors 82 78.9 4 3.8 
Take part in 
protest meetings 
and marches 25 24 45 43.3 
Campaign against 
candidates 20 19.2 49 47.1 
Refuse to 
obey the law 17 16.3 52 50 
(Hah 10,1983) . 
approve no answer 
No. % No. % 
10 9.6 10 9.6 
10 9.6 8 7.7 
16 15.4 18 17.3 
13 12.5 22 21.2 
15 14.4 20 9.3 
No. % 
104 100 
104 100 
104 100 
104 100 
104 100 
over decisions taken by the Local Authority. Most of their planning 
applications succeeded without requiring additional political support or 
the need to mobilise political opposition. However, many still 
experienced some feelings of insecurity, since coming here as refugees 
from Uganda, which may account for their reluctance to take a more 
positive political view. 
Table 5.9: Dissatisfaction with a Locally taken Political Decision 
HINDUS 
Approve Depends Dis- Don't know Totals 
Action: approve No answer 
No. % No. % No. % No. % No. % 
Contact MPs 95 61.7 6 3.9 27 17.5 26 16.9 154 100 
Contact 
Counci llors 86 55.8 4 2.6 32 20.8 32 20.8 154 100 
Take part in 
protest meet i ngs 
and marches 25 16.2 43 27.9 43 27.9 43 27.9 154 99.9 
Campaign against 
candidates 17 11 45 29.2 39 25.3 53 34.4 154 99.9 
Refuse to 
obey the law 21 13.6 25 16.2 74 48.1 34 22.1 154 99.9 (Hah 10, 1983) . 
To influence locally taken political decisions, Gujarati leaders had 
to establish personal relationships with local councillors and MPs. In 
general, the degree of contact between MPs and their Gujarati 
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constituents was low, this restricted the knowledge that the former had 
of the latter. The leaders and the led had commitments with which the 
politicians were unfamiliar. For instance some Hindu caste associations 
expressed a need for separate religious and community facilities from 
those of the VHP. This was interpreted as an example of factionalism by 
the politicians. Some Muslims expressed the view that the town ought to 
provide them with a community centre. This was dismissed as wishful 
thinking by the councillors. Many respondents expressed a need to have 
their own political representatives in local government. The response to 
this was that they had elected their representatives, mainly white 
councillors. When the respondents were asked if they considered the 
representation of their interests by local councillors to be adequate, 
the majority stated that they were inadequately represented, and most of 
these were Hindus (Table 5.10). These findings suggest that the Hindus, 
who give the appearance of being less involved with local politicians, 
are acutely aware of political issues. A small percentage (21% and 11%) 
of Muslims and Hindus thought that the councillors performed their jobs 
adequately and an almost similar percentage had no opinion to offer on 
the performance of the councillors. Both the Muslims and Hindus 
recognised their political disadvantages. 
Table 5.10: Adequacy of Representation by Elected Councillors 
Representation: 
Adequate 
Inadequate 
No answer/Don't know 
Totals: 
(Hahlo,1983). 
Hindus 
17 11.04% 
112 72.73% 
25 16.23% 
154 100% 
Muslims 
22 21.2% 
62 59.6% 
20 19.2% 
104 100% 
Totals 
39 15.1% 
174 67.4% 
45 17.5% 
258 100% 
That the Muslims and Hindus were aware of their political position 
is borne out by their response to the form of representation that they 
considered acceptable. When respondents were asked to comment on the 
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form of representation they would like, their response rate was low 
(Table 5.11). If the IIdon't know ll and "no answer" categories are 
combined, then between 42 per cent and 54 per cent of Hindus and Muslims 
respectively did not know, were not aware of or were uninterested in 
their achieving some form of positive representation in local politics. 
However, a significant number of Hindus (33.8%) and Muslims (34.6%) 
believed that co-opted Gujarati representatives would provide a solution 
to representation on local committees. 
Table 5.11: Political Representation on Local Authority Committees 
Hindus Muslims Totals 
Asian elected 
counc ill ors 36 23.4% 11 10.6% 47 18.2% 
Asian co-opted 52 33.8% 36 34.6% 88 34.1% 
members 
Don't know 12 7.8% 5 4.8% 17 6.6% 
42.8% 54.8% 
No answer 54 35% 52 50% 106 41.1% 
Totals: 154 100% 104 100% 258 100% 
(Hahlo,1983). 
The election of one person to represent all Gujaratis, all Asians or 
all Asian and black people presented an insurmountable problem. 
Gujaratis could not accept a Gujarati who belonged to a different 
religious group nor a person who was not a Gujarati as a leader or 
representative. Gujaratis could not win representation in an election, 
since they did not dominate the voting in any ward. They also could not 
be considered for co-option which was politically possible, because 
neither the Labour nor the Conservative Parties were willing to support 
such a tactic on the grounds that they were unwilling to give anyone a 
political advantage without their having to contest it democratically. 
The political party leaders resolved this dilemma by arguing that to co-
opt a Gujarati would undoubtedly encourage factionalism. Barred from 
representation by the accepted political process and prevented from 
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selecting their own representatives for co-option, the Gujaratis were 
rendered politically ineffective. A solution to this situation lay in 
the implementation of the equal opportunity policy of the 80s and 90s. 
This only exacerbated the problems of representation, since it focused 
attention upon appointments and representation within Local Authorities, 
but failed to provide the minorities with political representation, 
power or even an agreed process for the selection of representatives. 
The majority (62%) of Gujaratis expressed the view that they were 
inadequately represented nationally by MPs (Table 5.12), but a minority 
(21.3%) took the opposite view. More Muslims (31%) than Hindus (14%) 
Table 5.12: Adequate National Political Representation 
Representation 
Adequate 
Inadequate 
Don't know 
No answer 
Totals 
(Hahlo,1983) . 
Hindu 
22 14.3% 
101 65.6% 
26 16.9% 
5 3.2% 
154 100% 
Mus 1 im 
33 31. 7% 
60 57.7% 
9 8.7% 
2 1.9% 
104 100% 
Totals 
55 21. 3% 
161 62.4% 
35 13.6% 
7 2.7% 
258 100% 
considered that they were adequately represented by the MPs. The greater 
use the Muslims had made of the MPs would explain this. When asked to 
give the reason why they thought that representation was inadequate, 
the majority of respondents did not answer the question (Table 5.13). 
Of those who did give a reason, the majority (20.2%) gave as their 
Table 5.13: Reasons for Inadequate Representation 
Reasons: Hindus Mus 1 ims Totals 
Freedom of choice 
to vote for anyone 2 1.30% 4 3.8% 6 2.3% 
No representation, 
52 20.2% discrimination, 28 18.18% 24 23.1% 
Language problems 3 1.95% 1 1% 4 1.5% 
No answer 118 76.62% 70 67.3% 188 72.9% 
Don't know 3 1.95% 5 4.8% 8 3.1% 
Totals: 154 100% 104 100% 258 100% 
(Hahlo, 1983). 
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reasons: "No Asian Members of Parliament", "They - Members of Parliament 
-don I t 1 i sten" , "They on ly come when they want votes", "0 i fferent 1 aws 
apply to us ", "Members of Parliament discriminate" and "They are 
prejudiced and misguided". 
The Political Dilemma 
During this decade changes occurred in the pattern of leadership of 
the Muslim and Hindu communities which saw the emergence of leaders who 
supported the promotion of the social and political identities of their 
organisations. This led to to an increase in the demands made by 
Gujarati organisations, singly and collectively, for a greater share of 
public resources at a time when, on the one hand, racism was becoming 
more overt through the policies of the Government and Local Authorities, 
the activities of the National Front, and on the other hand, when the 
new concerns about poverty, inner urban renewal, underachievement and 
unemployment were being associated with the presence of Asian and black 
communities. Furthermore, politicians were actively looking for Gujarati 
and other minority community votes and there was a recognised shortage 
of funds for community projects. 
The buffer that prevented Muslim and Hindu leaders from becoming more 
active participants in the local political process was provided by the 
BCCR. Politicians regarded ethnic leaders on the CRC as representing 
the social, religious and economic interests of their communities; they 
considered the community organisations to be non-political. The issues 
with which these men were concerned were political. Although they were 
in the best position to represent ethnic political interests, they could 
not gain access to a formal political arena, other than through white 
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councillors. However, the MPs and councillors who were less familiar 
with the concerns of the Gujarati communities had access to the 
appropriate political arenas. Gujaratis considered this representation 
to be unsatisfactory at the local and national levels, but they could 
find no acceptable alternative. There was no possibility of the 
Gujaratis, alone or together with other Asian and black minority 
communities, marshalling sufficient support for a candidate of their 
choice in an election, local or national. Therefore, those Gujaratis who 
had thought about this difficulty could only suggest co-option as a 
solution. 
Thus the only access Gujaratis had to positions in the formal 
local political hierarchies was through local political parties. One 
consequence of this for these ethnic leaders and organisations would be 
a submerging of their ethnic identities and replacing them with white 
British political identities. Another would be the exclusion of their 
organisations and leaders from the formal political process. To expose 
the political space between ethnic organisations and local politically 
recognised structures, Gujarati leaders had to find issues which made 
explicit their exclusion from political activities. These issues were 
derived from events that involved members of the Gujarati communities. 
These events form the subject of Chapter 6. Debates about political 
responsibility for these events enabled Gujarati leaders to expose the 
political space between the formal white British political structures 
and the informal ethnic political structures of the Gujaratis: these 
debates form the essence of ethnic politics. In a sense they became 
micro-social movements, since in many instance those opposing a decision 
or seeking influence mobilised movements, real and fictitious, based 
upon alliances between leaders and supporters. 
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FOOTNOTES 
1. The MJCC functions just li~e a.buffer, but having the advantage of 
appearing to give mlnorlty representatives more direct 
representation. 
2. Such issues as these encourage the militancy of Asian and black 
leaders t~en and since then. The equal opportunities legislation 
~as don~ ~lttle to resolve this difficulty. Although recognition of 
lnequalltles by members of Asian and black communities have 
continued, the kinds of leaders who are emerging today are 
different from those of the 1970s and 1980s. 
3. Within the la~t few year~ the Home Office has changed its position 
on the requlrements lald down for the processing of applications 
from religious persons immigrating to Britain. Previously, a 
religious community could identify their particular religious need 
and a person possessing the appropriate qualifications. The Home 
Office would agree to the person's entry, so long as he remained in 
the employment of the community that had requested him. Now such 
religious persons have to go through the same immigration 
procedures as other prospective immigrants. 
4. The qualifications for imam-ship comprise a demonstrable ability to 
recite the Koran by heart. They have no need of additional 
qualifications, such as a knowledge of Islamic law or philosophy and 
are not required to hold a teaching qualification. Every adult 
Muslim should be able to recite passages from the Koran. Thus the 
skills of the imam are little different from those of any other 
adult Muslim, except that they they have chosen to teach children 
the Koran. 
5. I prefer the term detachment to factionalism. Factions have been 
defined as possessing five characteristics: they are conflict 
groups, political groups, not corporate groups, recruited by a 
leader and recruited on the basis of diverse principles (Nicholas, 
1965:28-29). I use the term detachment to describe organisations 
that in establishing their social identities develop an 
organisational structure, are corporate, are not necessarily 
political but could become so, are not conflict groups and are not 
recruited by a leader and are not recruited on the basis of diverse 
principles. 
A number of CRCs experienced disruption as a result of factions 
attempting to take control of them by establishing 
representatives from their detached organisati~ns as members, .and 
thus gaining majority control on Executive Commlttees and Counclls. 
CRCs that were disrupted include Rochdale, Sheffield and Brent; 
Local Authorities threatened others like Liverpool, Scunthorpe, 
Tower Hamlets and Cleveland with a withdrawal of their funding 
unless particular ethnic organisations ceased attempting to gain 
control of the CRC. The proposed new partnership between the CRE and 
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~~~s .a~LempLS LO slae step ~n~s issue by placing the onus of glvlng 
mln~r~tles gr~ater opportunltles f~r political participation on the 
P01~tlC~1 partles and other approprlate organisations by making the 
monltorlng of such progress a duty of CRCs (Commission for Racial 
Equality, Community Relations Group of MSF and National Association 
of C~mmunity Relat~ons Councils, A New Partnership for Racial 
Equallty, 1989). EVldence that the new partnership has avoided this 
issue is to be found in Bu~y, Lancashire, where a chairperson has 
refused to stand down, havlng been voted off the committee and now 
Bury REC has two chairpersons and two executive committ~es. The 
funding for this REC is due to be withdrawn shortly. 
6. In the first 1974 General Election, during the fieldwork period, the 
voting intentions of Asians as compared with white voters in 
Bradford Ward (Table 5.14), a Labour-held ward, indicated that more 
intended to support the Conservative Party (22%) than the Labour 
Party (16.2%). However, these figures were collected by a 
Conservative Party canvasser; I have no comparable figures of 
voting intentions collected by a Labour Party canvasser. What is 
interesting about these figures is the large number of "don't 
knows" and lido not vote" responses, which is slightly below a 
similarly high set of responses received by a Marplan survey in 
Birmingham in 1977 (Layton-Henry,1984:146). As in this by-election, 
the Asian voters in Bradford Ward were in a position to influence 
the outcome of the election. The canvassers took the view that the 
large number of undecided Asians pointed to a body of floating votes 
ready for capture. In the end, Bradford Ward remained firmly held by 
Labour. 
Table 5.14: Voting Intentions of Europeans and Asians in Bradford Ward 
Cons. Lab. Lib. Don't Do not 
know vote 
Euro- 19.6% 19.2% 1.8% 28.1% 1041 30% 
pean 
Asian 22.2% 16.2% 3.5% 33.5% 217 22.5% 
Totals: 1258 28.5% 
(Hahlo,1983). 
Source: Conservative Party Records of Returns 
Others 
45 1.3% 
16 1. 7% 
61 1.4% 
Total 
3469 100% 
949 100% 
4418 
7. Mrs A.Taylor MP kept records of persons who attended her surgerie~ 
to get her advice and obtain her support. She estimated that durlng 
the year 1975-76, she held thirty surgeries and that of the average 
number of twenty persons who attended them, six were Asians 
(personal communication). 
8. Recently the Muslims in Britain have shown that this is preci~ely 
the way that they are prepared to ac~, .if they do ~o~ agree wlth a. 
decision, such as in their Opposltlon to Rushdle s The SatanlC 
Verses. 
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CHAPTER 6 
LEADERS, LABELS AND EVENTS 
In the first Chapter I began by arguing that Gujaratis established 
themselves in geographical space by settling in particular areas of the 
town and in British society through finding work mainly in the textile 
industry. In the next Chapter I show how they establish separate 
religious communities an extended their domination of the space in which 
they resided by purchasing buildings for religious and community 
purposes. In the third Chapter I argue that socially they have not 
extended their more intense relationships beyond their religious 
communities. However, I suggest that they reserve friendships of lower 
intensity for relationships with of other Gujarati religious communities 
and for non-Gujaratis. In the fourth Chapter I argue that underlying 
these friendships are social perceptions of distances which enable 
Gujaratis to define who is a member of and who is not a member of their 
community. The concept of community as it is used here applies to a 
particular group of people who share the same place of origin (faction), 
a wider place of origin but the same religious beliefs (sect) or 
membership of the same caste (caste community/ association. In the 
previous Chapter I mapped out the extent of Gujarati participation in 
local politics suggesting that they were politically stifled by having 
their political activities confined to an arena (BCCR) which could be 
deployed by the white politicians as a buffer. Thus they were separated 
from the recognised political arenas. However, in this Chapter I shall 
argue that this gave them an opportunity to develop ethnic politics in 
the space that separated their Gujarati communities from the wider 
community. This was one way in which their leaders could begin to 
establish themselves in the political space between these communities. 
302 
The aim of this Chapter is to analyse the events that provided the 
essence of ethnic politics which enabled Muslims and Hindu leaders to 
develop a political dialogue between themselves and the politicians. 
Events as used here are linked to occurrences that took place within the 
Gujarati communities and/or between Gujaratis and members of the white 
and other minority communities. It is not just what happened but also 
how the occurrence was debated by Gujarati leaders, the councillors, 
officers and other members of the BCCR and the Local Authority and other 
key people. It is the content of the debates that are critical to the 
analyses of events, because the content reflects perceptions of power 
and powerlessness. As such it points to the way that Gujarati leaders 
were seen to be trying to change social meanings. That is they were 
protesting about their lack or unequal access to public resources. The 
dialogue drew upon the language and symbolism of racism, open or closed, 
which was typical of the period between 1972 and 1976. 
Katznelson rightly observes: "It is at the local level that the 
newcomers, individually and collectively, have attempted to fashion new 
economic, social and political relationships that affect their lives 
directly" (1973:152). For too long the effects of racism in local level 
politics have been ignored or interpreted in terms of national level 
politics. Local authorities have succeeded in concealing ethnic politics 
within the wider political context, thus by implication devaluing the 
contribution and demands of local Gujarati leaders and the Asian vote 
on local issues. In the 60s local authorities were powerful 
organisations controlling vast resources and employing large labour 
forces. Those who made decisions on how these resources were to be 
apportioned to local residents had considerable power. The consequences 
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of decisions made by councillors had to be borne by these residents. 
Though such decisions were typical of all towns and cities in Britain, 
the decisions made by one town or city council effected only those who 
lived in its area. Therefore this Chapter is concerned with events that 
affected the everyday lives of Gujaratis, and were typical of events 
effecting Asian and black people in towns and cities elsewhere. 
The question needs to be asked: to what extent are these events 
typical or untypical of Asian or black populations living in other 
British towns? By typical I mean that these events serve as a 
representative example of a particular type of response by a minority to 
decisions made by a white councillors representing the majority of an 
electoral community. Many of the concerns raised by these events are 
shared by Asian and black Britons generally. Connotations associated 
with the participants and/or their motives in some of the events are 
typically racist. The events involving Gujarati communities point to 
how they become targets for racism and how the language and labels 
associated with them symbolise racist notions about their social and 
political standing in the wider society. Typical, therefore, is a 
relative term and has levels of applicability. To what degree the 
"typical" events are unique to this Gujarati population is difficult to 
say without adequate comparative data. However, the kind of issues that 
provided the content of events seem to be similar to those that have 
been described by Gifford (1989), Ben-Tovim et al, (1986), Katznelson 
(1973), Beetham (1970) and those reported in the media, such as 
conflicts over planning permission for mosques, the single school 
debate, and halal food in schools. The events are centred on protest 
against local decisions, about unequal access to local public resources 
and to local power positions. 
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Furthermore, concentrating on local events meets the criticism that 
an analysis of racial and ethnic divisions firstly needs to be grounded 
and secondly needs to be located within a political economy framework 
(Solomos et al, 1983:12-13). By relating the analysis of racial and 
ethnic divisions to the negotiation of social identities and the 
allocation of political responsibility based upon local events, I am 
grounding this analysis in a political economy framework. 
In Hall's view the features of "moral panic" that accompanied the 
experiences of British society, reacting to the problems of youth during 
the decades of 50s and 60s, could be extended into the 70s to account 
for the emergence of racism (1981:33-34). " ... the moral panic 
crystallises popular fears and anxieties which have a real basis and by 
providing them with a simple, concrete, identifiable, simple, social 
object, seeks to resolve them" (Hall,1981:33). The language that was 
used to identify Gujaratis reflected some of the meanings associated 
with this panic and were given credence by the mass media and others who 
"man the moral barricades". What is not clear from Hall's analysis is 
that labels imposed by the white community had to be accepted, however 
willingly or reluctantly, by the Gujaratis. The time was right for 
Gujarati leaders to challenge the definitions of white common sense 
racism by asserting their political presence on the space between their 
communities and the wider political community. Since their politics 
did not take the accepted form of party politics, it is best described 
as ethnic politics. 
On the one hand as a buffer separating the white politicians from the 
political demands being made by Gujarati leaders, and on the other hand 
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providing an arena in which politicians could debate these demands, the 
BeeR opened the way for leaders to challenge the power relationship 
between Gujarati and white and to argue that racism provided an 
explanation for their lack of access to public resources. Thus the 
extent of the politicians' involvement in these events is used by 
leaders to debate the degree of public commitment to the elimination of 
racism. As the critical position of the Gujarati vote in local and 
national politics became increasingly recognised as important, the 
leaders were able to exert influence over the politicians. Thus the 
logistics of the situation are that the politicians recognised a 
definable source of support, while the leaders became aware of their 
potential to "develop their own politics of resistance" (Hall, Guardian, 
15/7/85). The relationship between the white politicians and their 
supporters could alter: to give too much support to Gujarati demands 
could lead to their alienating their white supporters and giving too 
little support to Gujarati demands might attract accusations of racism 
and lead to a loss of Gujarati support. Since there were no guidelines 
or policies or even a political wish which might have produced some 
commitment to involving minority representatives in local government, 
the debate about the allocation of political responsibility set 
parameters for the exclusion of ethnic leaders in local politics. 
In addition to bidding for greater participation, local events 
allowed leaders to express the political needs of their organisations. 
Although national events stimulated thought and action, generally they 
bore little relevance to issues which highlighted the political needs of 
local ethnic organisations. National events made manifest racial issues 
with which most Asians and black people could sympathise and agree, for 
instance those associated with immigration and nationality. Local events 
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made manifest the imbalance in power relations. 
The events themselves were not formalised in the sense of specific 
groups of people being invited to a public political event such as those 
described by Scott (1972/3:39). These occurred in the community and were 
brought to CRC meetings, because they raised issues of concern both at a 
practical and political level. Importantly, no national political 
decision could be taken to resolve them, they demanded some form of 
local decision. It is this locally arrived at decision that is of 
crucial importance, since it reveals an underlying pattern of racism 
that characterised Gujarati - white relations in Bolton. Irrespective of 
what local politicians said, the political decisions made by them showed 
that most favoured the white section of the community, even though at 
times councillors from one or other party may have given the impression 
of supporting the Asian and black section of the community. 
The events selected illustrate four contexts of interaction to which 
Gujaratis attached importance in their negotiations over the allocation 
of power, at the root of which lie definitions about social and 
political boundaries (see Chap.4, Diagram 2). These boundaries are 
associated with social identities, those which are internal to the 
Gujarati communities and those which are external to them. The former 
relate to specific Gujarati social identities, and the latter relate to 
general social identities applicable to many minority communities. The 
second aspect of social identity is concern with a distinction between 
GUjaratis' conception of their community and the conceptions of others 
of minority communities - the "us" and "them" (Wallman,1978:207; also 
Chap.4). These boundaries can be arranged conceptually along the two 
dimensions: namely perceived social distance in terms of specificity/ 
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generality and community/minority. Thus four conceptual contexts emerge 
whose social boundaries divide or unite Muslims with Muslims, Hindus 
with Hindus, Muslims and Hindus (Gujaratis), Gujaratis with other 
minority communities (as black people) and with the white community (as 
Boltonians or Britons). What links these contexts together are ascending 
and descending orders of social identities. 
Symbolically, these contexts provide leaders and politicians with a 
framework for interpreting and labelling events with a view to 
allocating political responsibility. The intersection of these two 
continua creates a model comprising four categories (Diagram 2 above). 
In the first context are communities perceived by Muslims and Hindus 
respectively as both socially close and sharing identities that are 
specific the "us". In ascending order in the second context are 
communities which are perceived to be socially close but whose 
identities are more generalised - the "us". In the third context are 
communities which are perceived as being socially more distant but whose 
social identities are perceived to be specific by others - the "them". 
Finally, in the fourth context are communities that are perceived by 
others to be soc i ally distant and genera 1 i sed - the "them"; ina sense 
these are not really communities but racial targets minorities. In 
terms of these contexts details about families and family names, and 
vi llage, district, caste and sect organisations are regarded by 
Gujaratis to be a private world of their own - the "us". These labels 
indicate a level of community interaction to which only Muslims and 
Hindus who are "in the know" have access. Muslims and Hindus do not have 
access to knowledge about factions, castes and sects to which they do 
not belong. Outsiders' access to knowledge about various communities 
increases the contexts change from the "us" to the "them", that is 
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ascending the order of social identities from the specific/community to 
the general/minority. 
One of the characteristics of common sense bodies of knowledge is 
that they comprise a language and labels which have a directional 
function. They carry implicit meanings about the social standing of 
those perceived to be Asian and black in relation to other minority and 
white communities. This knowledge provides participants in social 
situations with cues about the perceived dominant role of white people 
and the inferior role of those perceived to be black. If this view of 
power relations is to be challenged, the direction of change needs to 
redefine the language and labels. Since labels are attached to 
participants in public everyday situations, to change their directional 
content or meaning of a label, someone has to challenge and define them 
in a public arena, such as that provided by the BeeR. Since the BeeR was 
recognised and used by politicians as a buffer to control and contain 
the political demands of the leaders, this was also the appropriate 
arena in which to challenge labels that formed part of the trappings of 
social and political control [1]. 
A set of events were chosen because they involved Gujarati leaders 
and to a greater or lesser extent other Asian, black and white 
participants. Some events that attracted the attention of the media 
failed to attract the attention of leaders, others did not achieve media 
attention but found enthusiastic advocates amongst the leaders. Those 
events which the leaders championed were ones which they believed gave 
them opportunities to define power relationships. These events allowed 
leaders to marshal support, real or fictitious, of other leaders and 
other supporters. In this sense they were micro-movements within a much 
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larger political movement by Gujaratis to obtain political recognition. 
Thus, I have selected events for analysis on the basis of the following 
criteria: 
i) they were public, 
ii) their interpretation provided opportunities for the public 
definition of the power relationship between white and black, 
iii) they provided Gujarati leaders with opportunities to challenge 
these interpretations and to negotiate for new identities, 
iv) the aim was to allocate political responsibility. 
During the period of the research a number of events occurred which 
failed to attract the attention of the leaders and white politicians. 
For instance a number of rape, assault and drug cases involving Asians 
and whites were publicised, but, apart from some leaders and politicians 
expressing feelings of condemnation, they attracted little attention. 
Some of the events which leaders and politicians debated made the 
headlines in the local press, and a few even made the national press. 
Fifteen events were selected which illustrate the range of negotiations 
of leaders in their attempts to challenge power relationships. The 
dynamic element in these contexts is the process of negotiation of 
labels that enabled Muslim and Hindu leaders and white politicians to 
define the political space between them and their relative political 
statuses (cf.Miles,1982:60). 
This political space is not neutral; it carries a high value based 
upon the experiences of Gujaratis and white peoples' ideas about common 
sense racism. The role of the buffer organisation is to devalue Gujarati 
ethnic politics and to stress the value of the recognised political 
system. Therefore, as a model for analysis I shall argue that the space 
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closest to the Gujarati communities carries the lowest political value 
(community/specific) and the space closest to the white community 
carries the highest value (minority/general). I shall analyse these 
events beginning with those that the leaders perceived to be closest to 
them, that is community/specific and shall conclude with those that 
raised concerns about racism which leaders believed were shared by other 
black communities, namely those that are minority/general. 
(1) Community/Specific Events 
Four events occurred during the period of fieldwork that were 
perceived by leaders to be matters to be resolved internally within the 
respective communities that few, if any, politicians heard of. 
Nevertheless, they all required outsiders to participate in the process 
of negotiation which led to their resolutions. They are as follows:-
Context: Community/Specific - "us" 
(i) Baruchi vs. Surti take-over of Peace Street Mosque (1969-76). 
(ii) Burial of a Hindu girl in Muslim part of Heaton Cemetery (1975). 
(iii) The Outcasteing of Mr P (1975, 1976). 
(iv) The Lena Street Mosque Issue (1973, 1974, 1975, 1976). 
Baruchi vs. Surti take-over of Peace Street Mosque: 
Much of the background to this dispute has been discussed (Chap.2: 
Muslims). The Deobandi Surtis sought to wrest control of all mosques 
under the authority of the ICC from the Deobandi Baruchis by gaining 
control of Peace Street Mosque (Zakariah). The position of Zakariah 
mosque was particularly important since it was both the first to be 
established in Bolton and the one which became the headquarters of the 
ICC. With individual mosques being controlled by either Baruchis or 
Surtis, whoever was in the majority in the area, Peace Street Mosque was 
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the only one which was not clearly controlled by either one of these 
factions. Therefore, the control of this mosque and the ICC implied 
control of Islamic affairs. Each faction sought to impose its will upon 
the management of affairs. For instance, with Baruchis supporting their 
view of how prayers should be conducted, who should lead the prayers and 
who and how their children should be taught Islam, control of the ICC 
became of vital importance. Surtis took a slightly different view of 
these matters. As each faction gained control of a particular mosque 
committee, they would remove the incumbent and invite an imam of their 
choice to take office. 
Conflict between these factions goes back, at least to my knowledge, 
to 1969 if not earlier. Mr MD was the first imam of Zakariah Mosque 
appointed by a Surti committee. A year later open conflict erupted in 
the mosque between members of these factions and culminated in assaults, 
broken windows and the take-over of the mosque committee by Baruchis. Mr 
MD was denounced by the Baruchis and was removed from his position as 
imam. With the control of the mosque in the hands of the Baruchis, the 
Surtis were removed from positions of control on the ICC. 
In 1976 the conflict between these factions again became the focus 
for a dispute which concerned the appointment of a Surti as an assistant 
imam to Peace Street Mosque. He was the nephew of a prominent local 
Surti, Mr Y.P. It began with a seemingly unrelated incident in which 
Mr L, a member of the Surti Muslim community, who came from the same 
village as Mr Y.P, was caught by the husband of a woman, it was claimed, 
he intended to rape. It was known to this community that he had had a 
long standing affair with her. It was reported that the husband of the 
woman found Mr L in his house and made him walk home without his 
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trousers. The husband, who also came from the same village as Mr Y.P and 
was a friend of his, was the paternal uncle of the prospective imam. The 
accusation of rape and the public humiliation of Mr L was interpreted by 
other Surtis as a way of settling an old feud between Mr Land Mr Y.P. 
The Surtis argued that by being with this woman, Mr L had hoped to bring 
dishonour upon Mr Y.P and to besmirch the character and credentials of 
his nephew, thus blocking his appointment to the position of assistant 
imam. This would have made him unacceptable as an imam in the eyes of 
the appointing Baruchi mosque committee. 
To endorse their view of this imam's undesirability a few Baruchi 
members of the mosque committee wrote to the Home Office and the local 
CRC, with the intention of involving them as unwitting outsiders in the 
dispute. However, neither the Home Office nor the CRC responded to the 
letter. The CRC stated that this matter was an internal mosque affair 
and that the Baruchis and Surtis would have to settle it. The efforts of 
faction leaders to involve the Home Office, the CRC in their dispute 
failed, because in part the Home Office and the CRC had sufficient 
experience to avoid being drawn into such disputes, and in part the 
groups involved were recognised by the CRC (and possibly the Home Office 
too) as factions, and in part the CRC was aware that they would be 
blamed by the faction that lost the decision. 
In his description of a similar dispute, Anwar observes that no 
solution satisfactory to both sides was found (1979:163-165). Both 
descriptions of disputes point to weaknesses in the conditions of 
employment of imams (see Chap.6; and Anwar,1979:164), who are at the 
beck and call of the mosque committee that appoints them. He also notes 
that outsiders like the CRC and police were involved. The crucial 
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difference between the course of the event in Rochdale and that 
described above is that in the former instance the mosque leaders were 
educated men with the knowledge and financial support to go to court 
(Anwar, 1979:164), whereas in the latter they were leaders with little 
education, unable to speak, read and write English fluently, with little 
financial support, but socially deeply entrenched within the social 
fabric of their communities. They appealed to no one person or 
organisation for a final decision, rather they endeavoured to manipulate 
influential outsiders into taking up a specific position. In this they 
failed. 
This conflict continued into the 1980s when the ICC chairman, who 
first held the position of chairman in 1976, decided to charge Surtis 
£25 for funeral services while making them free to Baruchis. This 
prompted some Muslim factions and sects to dissociate themselves from 
the ICC on the grounds that the wording on the board that identified the 
Muslim part of the cemetery implied that the ICC had sole authority to 
decide who could be buried there. They argued that the words referring 
to the ICC should be removed from the board. Since no agreement could be 
reached within the ICC, this issue was brought to the BCCR to resolve. 
In debate this matter was referred to the ICC representative who 
reluctantly conceded that the ICC did not control burials in the 
cemetery. It was agreed by the ICC representatives to remove the 
offending words. However, the reluctance of the Muslims to settle this 
matter amongst themselves lends support to the argument that without any 
recognisable structure for political leadership, the laying of blame for 
such disputes on others - scapegoating - offered the only reasonable 
solution. 
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More recently, these two factions clashed again in the ICC over the 
election of officers to manage Makki Mosque. Not unlike the event 
described above, the police and CRC were involved initially at the 
invitation of members of one or other faction. Both organisations 
withdrew when they became aware of how they were being deployed. For 
reasons set out above, the imams were and are the least influential 
participants, although some have tried to take on role of peacemaker 
without success. When an ICC representative was invited to comment on 
this dispute in the CRC, he merely expressed his shame at the behaviour 
of his fellow Muslims. He indicated, however, that he would make no make 
attempt to help resolve the lssue. As a Baruchi, he had led the debate 
to force Surtis to pay for burials, had participated in other faction 
disputes in the ICC, including the one at Makki mosque, and if anything, 
had helped to maintain disputes rather than seeking to resolve them. 
The involvement of outsiders in these community/specific events has 
became a recognised tactic amongst both Muslims and Hindus, since in the 
space closest to the Gujaratis there are no internal or external 
community or political controls, such as an overall Muslim or Hindu or 
Gujarati political structure of leadership. Therefore leaders try to 
involve outsiders in such events, such as the local CRC, the police, the 
Local Authority and the Home Office. 
(ii) The Burial of a Hindu Girl in the Muslim Part of the Cemetery: 
This event was not unlike the previous one; it highlighted the lack 
of political controls within and between the Gujarati communities and 
leaders shifting such decisions on to outsiders in positions of 
influence. In 1975 funeral arrangements made by a firm of undertakers 
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for the burial of a stillborn Hindu child resulted in her being buried 
in the Muslim part of Heaton cemetery. The mistake came to light some 
six months later. Mr C.P, a member of the mosque funeral committee, 
protested that their part of the cemetery had been desecrated by this 
burial. He demanded that the body be exhumed and buried elsewhere. The 
Swaminarayan leaders responsible for the burial pointed out that nothing 
would be left of the child to exhume as the body had been buried in a 
sheet. When the parents of the child were told of the demands made by 
the Muslims, the mother collapsed with grief. Then Mr C.P threatened to 
use violence unless his demands were met. The Swaminarayan leaders 
suggested that as the child was stillborn, it was no more a Hindu than a 
Muslim. If the Muslims felt so strongly, to avoid causing grief to the 
parents and relatives, the child could be accepted into the Islamic 
faith without anyone being the wiser. 
This event also never reached the open agenda of the BCCR or any 
other decision-making body. The BCCR mediated between the Swaminarayan 
leaders and the Muslims, primarily Mr C.P, and eventually brought about 
a reconciliation. The understanding was that the corpse would stay 
buried and treated as if it were that of a Muslim. The blame was placed 
on the undertakers. To prevent a recurrence of such an event, the CRO 
invited both parties to visit the cemetery to ensure that the sign 
boards clearly demarcate the boundaries between Hindu and Muslim areas. 
No solution was found to satisfy both the Swaminarayans and the Muslims 
and no decision was taken by the BCCR or the politicians. Both the CRO 
and the white politicians considered that an aspect of the role of the 
BCCR was the prevention of and control of intra-Muslim and Hindu 
conflict. In performing this role the BCCR acted as a semi-political 
decision-making body. 
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(iii) The Outcasteing of Mr P: 
This event involving a caste association reached a climax during the 
period 1975-76. It can be separated into three stages first, the 
decision of Mr P to separate from his second wife, and to marry for a 
third time; secondly, the family conflict that was set off by this 
decision, and thirdly, his decision not to go through with the third 
marriage, followed by the decision of the caste association to outcaste 
him and his family. The first and second stages have been discussed 
(Chap.2:Hindus), so the discussion will be confined to the third stage. 
By the third stage Mr P had decided to withdraw from the marriage, 
but knew that his caste association, Shree Sarvodaya Samaj (UK), on 
learning of his decision not to marry this woman would outcaste him. In 
an attempt to avoid this he approached a variety of people for help, 
such as Mr Sandhu, who told him that the VHP could not influence a 
decision made by Mr pIS caste association. Mr P approached the 
chairperson of the ICC, but the latter declared that as a Muslim he 
could not interfere in the affairs of an Hindu caste association. By 
this time, overtaken by events, his caste association had outcaste him 
and his family. The letter sent by the caste association (Appendix III) 
instructing caste members to avoid contact with him and his family. In 
the opinion of a Pakistani barrister, to whom Mr P was referred by the 
chairperson of the ICC, the letter was libellous, but he chose to take 
no further interest in the case. Finally Mr P approached the CRO, who 
sent him to a local solicitor. The solicitor decided that the letter was 
libellous, but Mr P decided not to proceed with the case. He left the 
country for India in despair. 
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This event illustrates a number of pertinent issues. Firstly, it 
shows how a dispute between members of a caste community was seen by 
other Hindus and Muslims to be no concern of theirs. Secondly, this 
lack of willingness on the part of others to become involved points 
again to a lack of political controls, in this instance within the Hindu 
communities. Thirdly, it illustrates how outsiders were drawn into the 
dispute, so that they could be cast in the role of scapegoats. Finally 
it illustrates how a caste association attempted to exercise some 
control of the political space between communities. Like the previous 
event this one was not debated in the CRC, as it fell outside its remit. 
To resolve it the man and his daughter involved outsiders. This event is 
typical of others in this context. They are community/ specific events 
which cannot be settled by any organisation inside or outside the 
Gujarati communities or the white community. Instead disputants invite 
outsiders to impose a settlement favourable to them, so that the former 
might become unwittingly scapegoats. Frequently, such participants are 
kept in a state of ignorance, so that the Gujaratis can manoeuvred them 
into positions of support. Without any politically acceptable leader who 
or ethnic political structure for making political decisions, Gujaratis 
cannot resolve such disputes themselves. 
(iv) The Lena Street Mosque Issue: 
In 1973, the Planning Committee of the Local Authority considered a 
request from the Secretary, Mr A, of the Anjuman - E Islamma branch of 
the Muslim faith, to use a house in Ulleswater Street for the purposes 
of prayer until they could find suitable land on which to build a mosque 
[2]. The members of this group, who belonged to the Berelewi Sect, 
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wished to separate themselves from the Deobandi Muslims and become 
independent of the ICC. Till now they had attended for prayers at 
Tayaibah Mosque, a Deobandi mosque. Their application for planning 
permission was made, they claimed, in an effort to resolve growing 
conflict between the two sects who had to share the mosque. At their 
first attempt, the Planning Committee refused their request 
(BEN,24/3/73) and this decision was upheld by the Bolton Corporation 
(Council after 1974) (BEN, 5/4/73). The sect reapplied for permission to 
use a house in December 1973, and again planning permission was refused. 
In some towns Muslims have been allowed to use houses as prayer 
centres, but Bolton Corporation resisted this trend. Embittered, Mr A 
left town and Mr C took over responsibility for these Berelewis. Now 
known as the Anjumane-Ahle-Sunnat-W-Jumat and numbering about 200, they 
again sought planning permission to use a house as a mosque. This was 
again refused, so Mr C, who owned an old 'Co-op' store at the corner of 
Ulleswater Street and Lena Street, proposed that his sect should use it 
as a mosque. When he applied for permission for change of use of the 
property, the Planning Committee rejected his application. The sect were 
told to find other premises (BEN,13/8/74). In defiance of the decision 
of the Planning Committee, these Muslims continued to use the Co-op 
premises, which now became known as Lena Street Mosque. Bolton Council 
served notice on Mr C to close these premises in Lena Street (BCCR 
Minutes, 23/8/74). 
Now others became involved; the local white residents protested about 
the cars, noise and broken bottles in the area surrounding the mosque. 
In December 1974 an enforcement notice to close the mosque was served by 
the Council; the effect of which was that the sect had 56 days in which 
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to find alternative premises. Apparently, the Council should have served 
this notice on Mr C in August, 1974, but they were uncertain as to who 
owned the premises. Thus it was not served on him until December 1974. 
The penalty for ignoring it could be the imposition of heavy fines. Mr C 
said, "We are prepared to move to another building, if the Corporation 
will find us one" (BEN,8/1/75). A few weeks later, Granada TV filmed the 
mosque and publicised the plight of Mr C and his sect (BEN,23/1/75). The 
Conservative Chairperson of the Planning Committee criticised Granada 
for showing this film on their local evening news slot. What had begun 
as a community/specific issue had escalated into a major political event 
involving the Local Authority, the politicians, political parties, the 
sect and the residents. 
The Conservative Council were politically embarrassed by the issue 
of Lena Street Mosque. Finally, when they served an enforcement notice 
on the sect, Mr C was advised by his growing band of supporters, who 
included the Labour MPs and councillors, to lodge an appeal against the 
order with the Department of the Environment. This had the effect of 
staying the order until a public inquiry could be held which could take 
a year or more. With help the sect effectively placed legal and 
political constraints on the Local Council. Thus a small powerless 
Muslim sect had defied the might of the Council. 
Then the Trades Council joined in arguing that the sect ought to be 
allowed to stay in the Lena Street premises. They gave as a reason a 
letter they claimed to have received from Muslims suggesting that it 
was the National Front who were stirring up opposition amongst white 
residents living in the neighbourhood (BEN, 20/2/75). By now the dispute 
was three years old. The issues had become clear-cut: as one councillor 
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put it, "Can a minority of the immigrant community do just what they 
please?" and "Do planning regulations apply equally to members of all 
sections of the community?" (BEN,6/3/75). Towards the middle of 1975, 
the Housing Committee were authorised to negotiate with the sect over 
the terms of the lease for a plot of land nearby on which they could 
build a mosque. The sect agreed to these terms, but it took a further 
five years before they had collected sufficient funds to begin the 
construction of the mosque. The building of the mosque was completed 
some five or more years later during which time they continued to use 
the "co-op" as a mosque. 
The Lena Street Mosque event demonstrates how an event that began as 
a community/ specific issue can blow up into a racial issue with 
political implications for the Muslims, the politicians, the Local 
Authority and the residents of the neighbourhood. Like other events in 
this context, the solution in part lay with the sect, and in part with 
outsiders. In this event it became clear early on that political 
intervention by the Local Corporation, councillors and MPs was 
unavoidable. Above all this event showed how ethnic politics can overlap 
with local politics. All the events required involvement by the CRC, 
which in a sense is part of the local political structure. In this 
instance no solution was possible without Local Council intervention. In 
the other events mentioned outside involvement was necessary, even 
though it did not always lead to a resolution. These events lie on the 
border of ethnic and local politics. 
(2) Community/General Events 
Unlike the events described above, the overlap of ethnic politics and 
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local politics in the resolution of events in this context was often 
necessary and often invited by the leaders. These events lay further 
away from the Gujarati communities in that community specific identities 
were submerged within more general religious identities. These events 
involved what from the white political point of view were recognisable 
organisations with some structure of leadership. On the one hand they 
appealed to the white politicians as organisations they could tap for 
votes; on the other hand they held a political threat for the 
politicians. Any move towards unity across a religious community, such 
as the Islamic or Hindu community, could provide ethnic leaders with a 
powerful structure of support. No politician wished to encourage such a 
move. Therefore, these events lie in the middle of this political vacuum 
between communities within a community. Five events which occurred are 
as follows:-
Context: Community/General - "Us" 
(v) 
(vi) 
(v i i ) 
(viii) 
(ix) 
Issue of Ramadan (1974). 
Muslims' request for facilities for 24 hour burials (1974, 1975). 
The Bearded Schoolboy (1974, 1975). 
The Hindus' purchase of St. Barnabas Church (1975, 1976). 
The establishment of a Darul Uloom Al Arabiya Al Islamiya at 
Ramsbottom (1973, 1974). 
(i) The Issue of Ramadan: 
In the textile industry employers have to recognise that not all of 
their workforce accept the same religious holidays. The presence of a 
considerable number of Muslim employees means that they recognise 
holidays which were not part of the British calendar. The most 
important of these are the holidays associated with Ramadan. The 
difficulty with the fast of Ramadan arises from the interrelationship of 
firstly, the desire on the part of Deobandis and Berelewis to establish 
their separate religious identities. Secondly, as Ramadan is fixed by 
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means of a lunar calendar, the date of the beginning of the fast changes 
each year, and therefore, the date of the end of the fast varies 
accordingly. Finally, the days when they celebrate the end of Ramadan 
are particularly important and these take precedence over other 
activities. These holidays they take in addition to those fixed by their 
employers in accordance with local traditions and a Christian calendar. 
However, Deobandis and Berelewis cannot agree on the precise moment when 
Eid-u-Fitr begins. Berelewi workers prefer not to identify beforehand 
the day or hour when Eid-u-Fitr will begin, while the Deobandis accept 
the word of authorities in Morocco as to when Ramadan ended. The 
Berelewis claim that to be sure that the new moon had been sighted they 
should wait a further twelve hours before recognising the end to their 
fast. In effect this means that from the employers' point of view that 
on two consecutive working days a lower than normal rate of production 
will be achieved as a consequence of the observance of the same holiday 
by apparently the same group of people. 
This issue should have involved the trade unions as much as if not 
more so than the employers. However, the unions keep themselves aloof 
from such issues, following a policy of non-involvement, although most 
of their Asian workers were members. The effect of this is that 
discussions about issues connected with Muslim workers have been treated 
by management and unions as unrelated to work. This strategy was 
perceived by leaders to be a form of racism. Thus the resolution of 
issues concerned with Ramadan have involved management, union officers, 
sometimes the CRC and the Muslim workers. 
In 1977 and 1987 the CRO was again drawn into discussions with some 
mill managers over Muslim observances of Ramadan (BEN,4/6/77) and on 
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neither occasion received support from the unions. A Muslim worker who 
had taken time off to pray during Ramadan in 1987 was sacked from his 
job and discussions failed to bring about his reinstatement. Thus, the 
situation of Muslim workers in the mills has changed little since 1974, 
when Mr Jim Browning, President of the United Textile Factory Workers 
Association, said in his opening speech of Pakistanis when they walked 
out en masse: "They are operating as a union within a union" (BEN, 
26/4/74). Both councillors and MPs were involved in the discussions 
with the management of the mill who had sacked the Muslim worker in 
1987. By excluding the Muslim workers from discussions about religious 
holidays, the management and the unions rejected the idea of Muslim-
worker participation and have imposed their ideas about what is 
appropriate behaviour during working hours. Though the issue regarding 
Ramadan is raised each year, the mill employers have steadfastly refused 
to accede to the Muslims' demands. Muslims' protestations about the 
treatment they receive from mill employers have gone largely unheeded. 
In a climate where work is difficult to find, workers cannot afford to 
throwaway their jobs. For the present there is little that these Muslim 
workers can do. 
(ii) Muslims' request for facilities for 24 hour burials: 
This event was initially of concern to the Muslims, but as it 
developed the Hindus, other Asian communities, the white community and 
the white controlled Local Authority were drawn into the debate. 
Although the Muslims made the demands, they shared an interest in 
obtaining a favourable decision with the Pakistanis, other Muslims and 
most Hindu sects, The Holy Prophet (peace be unto him) strongly urged 
Muslims to bury (Muslim Burials,CRC,1975:6) or, if Hindu cremate, the 
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dead within twenty-four hours of death. During the week facilities for 
burying the dead within twenty-four hours are available, but this 
service does not function over weekends. Thus it is difficult for 
Muslims to meet this religious requirement. This prompted them to 
request facilities for burials to be extended over weekends. 
In 1974 the Parks and Recreation Committee received a letter from the 
ICC requesting facilities throughout the week for twenty-four hour 
burials according to the requirements of their faith (BEN,24/4/74). Two 
factors influenced the decision made by this committee; firstly they 
were under pressure to economise on the service, and secondly they were 
providing over weekends a forty-eight hour burial service, which seemed 
to meet the needs of most people. No decision was reached at this 
meeting. 
At their next meeting the Parks and Recreation Committee decided by a 
6-5 majority to support in part the Muslim request by allowing burials 
to take place until 12.30 p.m. on Saturday. They decided to extend this 
facility to all religions (BEN,29/5/74). However, two months later, the 
same committee ignoring the protestations of a Labour councillor 
reversed their decision to allow Saturday burials (BEN,17/7/74). It was 
argued that this facility would add a further £4,000 to the ratepayers' 
bill. In support of the decision a Conservative councillor argued that 
industry was reducing its working week and not lengthening it. The vote 
overturning their decision in favour of Saturday burials was supported 
by a vote of 8 to 5. A month later, this decision was upheld by a 
Conservative controlled Bolton Council stating that they could not 
afford to add £4.000 to the rates bill (BEN,15/8/74). Most of the 
votes supporting the Muslims were cast by Labour councillors. Such 
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patterns of voting led Muslims to believe that the Labour councillors 
supported them, while the Conservatives were opposed to them. 
A year later the CRC published a paper which advocated that local 
councils accept the additional cost and provide Muslims (and other 
religious groups) with Saturday burials (Muslim Burials,CRC,1975). This 
policy paper also suggested that local authorities should employ a 
Muslim on their staff at cemeteries as well as giving Muslims a separate 
burial plot. Bolton Council provided the Muslims and Hindus with 
separate plots, but adhered to its decision not to provide Saturday 
burials and has not as yet employed a Muslim on its staff of 
gravediggers. The Muslims in Britain were interpreting unfavourable 
decisions such as the one made by Bolton Council as an "example of white 
prejudice and discrimination" (BEN,13/3/75). The Council interpreted 
their decision as ensuring that the majority Christian community 
received the same facilities as the Asian one. 
(iii) The Bearded Schoolboy: 
This event involved a Muslim student in the final year of his CSEs 
who grew a beard as a sign of his intention to become an imam. Although 
the headmaster drew his attention to an unwritten rule prohibiting young 
men from wearing beards, at his father's behest the young man left his 
beard untrimmed. Then the headmaster asked him to trim his beard to what 
was described as scissors depth. With the young man's permission, the 
headmaster demonstrated what he meant by this. This act the boy's 
father's adviser, Mr C, construed as assault and argued that the 
headmaster ought to be charged accordingly. Though the boy was agreeable 
to removing his beard, on Mr C's advice his father refused to allow him 
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to do so. 
The headmaster asked the father to provide written evidence that the 
student had to be allowed to wear a beard as a sign of his intention to 
become an imam. On receipt of this evidence he then agreed to allow the 
young man to return to school wearing a beard. If the evidence could not 
be provided, then the boy could return to school only after shaving it 
off. As conclusive written evidence could not be produced and as the 
boy was not allowed by his father to shave his beard off, a 
confrontation situation developed between the boy, his father, his 
father's advisers, the headmaster and his advisers from the Local 
Authority Education Department and the BCCR. 
Acting as adviser to the boy's father, Mr C used this event to draw 
on the support of a local MP and a few Labour councillors to condemn the 
decision of the headmaster as being intolerant and discriminatory. Mr C 
sought the support of all Muslims arguing that the headmaster's decision 
was anti-Muslim and proposed that the Muslims should hold a public 
demonstration against the decision outside the local Education Offices. 
Because he could not provide conclusive written evidence in support of 
his argument, and he received neither the support he wanted from the 
politicians nor that which he sought from the Muslim communities, the 
event fizzled out. Some three or four months later, the boy's father was 
persuaded to send his son without a beard back to school to complete his 
schooling. 
For both Muslims and headmasters the question remains unanswered: 
what should they do if a Muslim schoolboy chooses to wear a beard 
contrary to the rules of the school? In the above instance had the 
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headmaster agreed to the boy wearing a beard, under school rules he 
would have discriminated against white boys who were not allowed to wear 
beards. At a meeting of headmasters held in 1975, they established a 
ruling which left headmasters to deal with each case on its own merits. 
It did not satisfy the Muslim minority, who in turn were perceived by 
the headmasters, BCCR and politicians to be seeking rights over and 
above those of the white Christian community. 
This event reached the BCCR committee agenda on three occasions and 
the religious subcommittee's agenda on two. The CRO, acting as mediator, 
intended to control the event so that it should not develop into a 
political issue. None of the councillors or MPs, who were drawn into 
this dispute, supported either the headmaster, the father or Mr C. The 
BCCR supported the headmaster in so far as recognising his right to make 
the appropriate decision. Furthermore, the mosque committee were aware 
that what Mr C intended was to develop this event into an anti-Muslim 
issue to show how the Local Authority Education Department imposed their 
ideas upon a Muslim minority. Furthermore, he had hoped to label the 
BCCR as being anti-Muslim and racist by their refusal to become involved 
in the dispute. This was the only dispute which reached the stage of 
becoming a protest march, albeit a small one. 
(iv) The Purchase of St.Barnabas Church by Hindus: 
The Bolton branch of the VHP was established in the early 1970s at 
a time when the Hindus had no centre of any kind in the town. Until 
1974 they hired the Spinners Hall and other large halls for celebrations 
of social and religious occasions. As the Hindu population expanded the 
VHP expressed the need for a community centre, so they began their 
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search for a suitable building to convert into a community centre. Thus 
began the negotiations for St. Barnabas Church have been described 
above (Chap.2, Hindus). 
The VHP planned to use the building for social, community and 
religious purposes. Later, Mr A, a founder and trustee of the VHP in 
Britain, was quoted as saying that he hoped the building would be used 
by other faiths as well (Guardian, 7/5/75). A week later a canon in a 
neighbouring parish sent a strong objection to the Church Commissioners, 
arguing that the church was a consecrated building. If the Hindus were 
allowed to use it for worship of their deities, doubt would be thrown 
upon the principles of the "absolute supremacy of Jesus Christ as God 
the Son" (BEN,13/5/75). In the same newspaper Mr Sandhu is quoted as 
saying that the purchase of the church could only "promote racial 
integration and racial harmony in Bolton" (BEN,13/5/75). A day later a 
white teacher criticised the views of the canon (BEN, 14/5/75). In June 
the building was sold to the Hindus and the Guardian newspaper hailed 
the event as setting a precedent for the Church of England (Guardian, 
27/6/75) . 
The following year the VHP with the support of the BCCR obtained a 
grant of £10,000 from the Job Creation Scheme to improve the building 
(BEN,24/6/76). Criticisms continued. Some objected to "immigrants" 
being given money to develop their religions; others complained of the 
nOise, litter and parked cars, which were a nuisance whenever 
festivities were held there (BEN,2/10/76). Finally after the alterations 
had been done, invitations were sent to councillors and MPs, heads of 
schools, members of other organisations and friends to attend the 
official opening by the Mayor on 23rd October 1976. Supporters and 
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critics of the scheme were publicly invited to attend the opening (BEN, 
4/8/76) . 
In his welcoming speech Mr Sandhu talked about the position of the 
Hindus in Britain. "As a Boltonian today," he said, "I am very proud 
that my community, the Hindus, have contributed to the social and the 
cultural life of Bolton". Now we are in a position "to contribute more 
to the way of life of the town ll • We are prepared to lIoffer the services 
of this centre to Boltonians for integration which is so badly needed". 
We are "not here to assimilate" but to lIintegrate into the British way 
of life". By an "assimilationist" he meant an "immigrant" who "knows ll 
his place and is a "Yes, sir, thank you sir ll person. He then went on to 
say that the building would be used for the same purpose for which it 
was originally built. However, he said, the IIChurch Commissioners had 
missed a chance to donate this building to us, we had to pay for it". 
Later he said, IIThis country is a haven, we are not carbon copies of 
assimilationists but we are integrationists. Give us a chance to show 
you what we stand for and are proud of". In his speech he described an 
"integrationist" as a person who keeps his own ethnic identity, but who 
through this Community Centre can contribute to the general social and 
cultural enrichment of the life of the people of Bolton. 
What is interesting about these comments is that they show how Mr 
Sandhu stood as an outsider in the VHP and how he saw Hindus in relation 
to the white community. He referred to limy community", meaning the 
Hindus including Sikhs. By using the phrase "we as Boltonians" or "as a 
Boltonian", he was endeavouring to close the gap between the Hindus and 
the white Boltonians. The complaints about noise and cars at weekends 
prompted him to stress that Hindus were no different from any other 
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people. He referred to the complaints and said, "We are human beings, 
and we are learning to live in this centre." 
Nevertheless, Mr Sandhu argued that there was a need for Hindus to 
establish their rights and their role. They could do this through 
integration. To assist Hindus through this process, those with property 
and wealth should help those who have nothing. He drew attention to the 
status/wealth gap with his remark that the building should have been 
given to them. It was not a sign of tolerance on the Commissioners' part 
to allow the Hindus to purchase the building, it would have shown 
tolerance had they made a gift of it. Similar views to those expressed 
by Mr Sandhu were also shared by Muslims, for they too believed that the 
town ought to have provided them with a building which they could use as 
a community centre and possibly as a mosque. In the eyes of the Hindus 
the relationship between immigrant and whites is one between unequals, 
in which the whites hold all the wealth and power and the Hindus and 
Muslims perceive of themselves as poor and powerless. However, none of 
the politicians or other representatives of the white community accepted 
this interpretation. They argued that all were equal and that the white 
community was not so well off as to be able to afford to give community 
centres to the Gujaratis. 
This event involved an interest group, the VHP, with which 
councillors politicians and the CRC could sympathise. All could 
understand the need of the Hindus for better social and religious 
facilities. However, Mr Sandhu pointed to the changing position of the 
immigrant in British society and also stressed the differences in 
wealth between Hindus and the white community. However, the only 
OPPosition at the time came from local residents, who lived close to the 
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building and racists who lived elsewhere. Unfortunately the racists had 
a target now which they could attack; it suffered a series of arson 
attacks. 
(v) The Establishment of Darul Uloom Khaleeliya Rasheediya: 
This event had its roots in the struggle between Baruchi and Surti 
factions for control of Zakariah Mosque and the ICC (see above). When 
the Baruchis took control of Peace Street Mosque, the senior imam, Mr M, 
a Surti, resigned. With the support of the Chief Imam of Manchester he 
and some others worked on the idea of establishing a school to train 
imams. At first he approached Bolton Council for a site on which to 
build a school, Darul Uloom Khaleeliya Rasheediya, but they were unable 
to provide a site (BEN, 21/12/72). A year later the Muslims found a 
suitable site: the old Aitken Sanatorium above the village of 
Holcombe, Bury, which was surrounded by lovely grounds on the edge of a 
desirable residential area, some ten miles outside Bolton. They found 
themselves in competition with people looking for housing on the edge of 
the countryside. The situation was set for a conflict of interests: the 
Muslims wanted a building nobody else wanted to use as a religious 
school, people looking for housing. Other participants included 
Lancashire County Council who were looking for a buyer for the 
sanatorium, and local councillors who were looking for votes for a local 
election and the National Front were looking for an opportunity to 
express their racist views. The Council approved the scheme and the 
Sanatorium was sold to the Muslims for a reported £115,000 (BEN, 
18/12/73). 
Before the sale could be ratified, a Bury councillor collected 
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signatures on a petition protesting against the sale of the hospital. 
The efforts of this councillor were matched by the National Front, whose 
members distributed pamphlets describing the sale as bringing a "Plague 
on Holcombe Brook" (BEN, 10/1/74). The Muslims replied to these 
allegations through the press by suggesting that the National Front 
should concentrate their attention on the vandals who were destroying 
their new premises (BEN, 18/1/74). An inquiry was called for over the 
price being asked for the hospital. It was claimed that had the 
sanatorium been sold publicly and not to a private buyer the price might 
have been considerably higher. Neither the petition of the above 
mentioned councillor, nor the activities of the National Front, or a 
request for an inquiry into the methods used by the OHSS (OSS) to value 
its property held up the sale of the Sanatorium to the Muslims. 
The National Front claimed that the presence of and demands by Asians 
had become a political issue. With national elections being held early 
in 1974, they made much of their racist stance to gain the support of 
voters' (cf.Le Lohe,1976). Meanwhile, the Muslims obtained a building 
for the purposes of establishing a darul uloom, having successfully 
negotiated the purchase of a property for religious purposes. The fact 
that the sale went through suggests that many residents in the area 
chose not to support the National Front or the councillor who petitioned 
against the Muslims. The County Council and Health Authority who sold 
the property had no other interested buyers. By acting quickly they 
enabled the Muslims to purchase the property before local opposition 
could be mobilised. Many residents who were asked to protest lived some 
distance from the sanatorium; thus they were indifferent to it. 
This event illustrates how the County Council, Health Authority and 
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many of the local politicians chose not to impede the process of the 
sale. An important factor was the desire on the part of the Council and 
Authority to sell the building. Having said this, Muslims united in an 
effort to see that the deal was successfully concluded. The event 
brought together all Muslims. 
(3) Minority/Specific Events - "Them ll 
These events fall into the space that is even further removed from 
the minority communities. It is associated with community identities 
that are vague, and includes labels like Gujarati and Asian. It lies 
closer to the white community but carries neither the ethnic nor racist 
connotations associated with the space closest to the white community, 
such as the minority/general (see below). During the period 1972 to 1976 
two events occurred which required Gujaratis and Muslims in particular 
to consider their positions within the wider society. These also caused 
some sections of the white community to assess their positions in 
relation to Gujaratis and Muslims. The two events are as follows:-
Context: Minority/Specific - IIThem ll 
(x) The Asian Grocers' Dispute (1974). 
(xi) Children playing in the grounds of mosque (1974). 
(i) The Asian Grocers' Dispute: 
This dispute arose among the customers of a number of Hindu owned 
grocers' shops, who claimed that the shopkeepers were profiteering by 
raising their prices on rice and oil, two foods which are consumed by 
the majority of Asians. The prices had soared far beyond the rate of 
inflation by as much as 400%. Muslim customers wrote letters of 
complaint to the press (BEN,7/1/74), and formed themselves into an Asian 
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Consumers Watch-dog Committee (BEN,7/1/74; Guardian,8/1/74). The 
shopkeepers responded by forming themselves into the Association of 
Asian Traders (BEN, 24/1/74). The accusation of price-raising by Asian 
shopkeepers was taken up by Asians allover Britain; here it took the 
form of Muslim accusing Hindu. The matter was brought to the BCCR and 
the members of the Asian Watch-dog Committee were advised to contact the 
Prices Commission in Manchester. Subsequently, the Asian Watch-dog 
Committee wrote a letter to the Prices Commission; a copy appeared in 
the local press. A month later the CRO reported to the committee that he 
had sent a letter on this matter to the Consumer Protection Committee in 
Greater Manchester Council. 
It was decided to elect a Gujarati to represent the CRC on the 
Consumer Protection Committee, so that he could bring complaints from 
the Asian Watch-dog Committee to them. The intention was to advise 
Asians complaining of exorbitant prices on rice and cooking oil to write 
to the Consumer Protection Committee. This was done, but no letters were 
ever received by the Committee. Without letters from consumers, the 
Committee could do nothing and the issue faded away. This illustrates an 
event, which involved Gujarati complaining against Gujarati and which 
could be settled by an outside body, the Consumer Protection Committee. 
However, this intervention fizzled out, because the Gujaratis did not 
wish an internal matter to be resolved by an external body. The matter 
was dropped by both Gujarati and white and in time forgotten. 
(ii) Children Playing in the Grounds of a Mosque: 
An event which revealed the difficulties in labelling and defining of 
the socio-political positions of white and Muslim was an incident that 
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occurred at Zakariah Mosque in 1974. White children played cricket in 
the grounds of the mosque and some windows were broken. Mr C, a member 
of the mosque committee, had remonstrated with the children and 
complained to some of their parents and the police. The police ignored 
his complaints. So one day he took hold of a boy and attempted to remove 
him from the grounds when the boy's mother attacked him. This time the 
police went to the boy's home. Nothing further happened, as the police 
were reluctant to become involved in conflicts between the white 
residents, the mosque committee and the Muslim worshippers. 
The problem was that by playing cricket in the grounds of the mosque 
the children might intentionally or unintentionally damage the mosque. 
The question was who would be liable for damages. The Muslims said that 
the mosque was not insured for damage as it is God's house. When this 
issue was raised in the BCCR no decision was reached by the executive 
committee, the mosque committee or the ICC. Other than the total 
exclusion of white children from the grounds of the mosque, no other 
suggestion seemed to be acceptable to the Muslims. Although this event 
involved Muslim and white participants in a power struggle, the argument 
that a mosque could not be insured seemed to put this debate into the 
realms of ethnic politics. It was difficult for the Muslims to establish 
that the onus for repairs for damages rested with the parents. 
At the same time it was difficult for the executive committee or 
councillors to grasp the idea of property that cannot be insured. Having 
reached a stalemate all participants lost interest in the event and no 
decision about recouping damages was reached or pursuit of the 
accusation of assault followed up. 
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(4) Minority/General - "Them" 
This final set of events fell within the space closest to the white 
community and the space most loaded with values associated with common 
sense racism. This was also the area that lay furthest away from the 
Gujarati communities and over which they had the least social and 
political control. By comparison the white community had the greatest 
social and political control over this space, which lay closest to this 
community. Four events can be identified as being initially labelled 
"immigrant ll • All of them raised issues about the definition of the power 
relationship between the Gujaratis and the white community. They are 
important since they highlight the link between the labels of immigrant, 
black, and the social identity of minorities and racism. These are:-
(xii) 
(xiii) 
(xiv) 
(xv) 
In-Company Language Training Scheme (1974). 
The Arrival of the Ugandan Asians (1972). 
The Vishwa Hindu Parishad trip to the Isle of Man 
"Farnworth girl paid to marry immigrants ll (1976). 
(i) The Arrival of the Ugandan Asians: 
(1975). 
In 1972 Britain was faced with the prospect of receiving an estimated 
30,000 Asian refugees, many holding British passports, from Uganda 
(Bristow, 1975:155-157). The political reaction to this ranged from 
hysteria to little more than a IIdefensive squeakll (Bristow, 1976:265). 
The policy for the reception of these migrants by the British Government 
has been summed up as comprising two opposing ideas: IIno privileges but 
equal rightsll and "stand on your own feet as soon as possible ll (Ward, 
1973:374). Other than providing settlement camps with some language 
support, the British Government offered little support to these refugees 
(Ward,1973:372-375, 377-378). 
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Once here the intention was that these refugees would settle in towns 
with low concentrations of Asians and not in towns with high ethnic 
concentrations designated "red areas" (Ward,1973:376). The Government's 
policy implied that once the refugees left the settlement camps, they 
were on their own. liThe problem", as Mr D.Lane the Minister responsible 
for the Ugandan Asian Relief Operation remarked, "is now in the 
community" (quote by Ward,1973:377). The responsibility for settlement 
was passed onto Local Councils and local communities (Ward, 1973:376-
377). Any help offered by Local Councils was welcomed, but this ranged 
from "fear of racial reprisals" and the inability of Local Councils in 
"red areas" to varying offers of support in "green 1 and 2" areas 
(Bristow, 1976:274-276). Time demonstrated that this policy of dispersal 
of refugees to Green areas was an unattainable ideal particularly as 
suitable housing was not available (Bristow,1976:276). Although Bolton 
had an Asian population, it was classified as a Green 1 area (Bristow, 
1976:274-276). So it could expect to receive refugees. 
The white racist feeling in Bolton crystallised when someone set fire 
to a house that had been prepared for a Ugandan family. Together with a 
hoax letter (see below), this arson attack confirmed for some the real 
threat of white racism. This response was typical of that in many towns 
and cities and of many people from all walks of life (Bristow, 1976:267-
270), supported by the activities of the National Front (Le Lohe,1976). 
A former Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations, Arthur 
Bottomley, was reported as saying that Britain could not be expected to 
continue to accept refugees (BEN,18/1/72) and in neighbouring Blackburn 
the National Front invited families to join a family march to protest 
against the decision to allow Ugandan Asians to come to Britain (BEN, 
29/9/72) . 
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Bearing in mind that the textile industry was experiencing a 
recession, the influx of more people in search of work only served to 
feed fears on greater hardships to come. It came as no surprise when the 
local Trades Council expressed the belief that the town could not 
accommodate more people (BEN,27/9/72). Like similar fears expressed by 
councillors and MPs elsewhere (Bristow, 1976:269), the issues which 
worried white Boltonians were clarified in a letter to the local press 
(BEN,22/9/72): there was no space, no accommodation and no jobs and, 
above all, Boltonians not the Government should be allowed to choose who 
should or should not come here. 
Letters to the local Press raised questions ranging from why Bolton 
had not been designated a "red" area because it already had a large 
Asian community (BEN,20/9/72), to those like that from the chairperson 
of the BCCR who argued that Bolton should lead the way by welcoming 
these refugees (BEN,23/9/72). One person who signed himself "another Ex-
Tory" suggested that these published letters revealed strong support for 
Powell MP's views (BEN,21/10/72). Bolton Corporation stated that only 30 
refugees had arrived by the beginning of October (BEN,2/10/72). A week 
later the CRO reported that 60 had arrived (BEN,7/10/72), and ten days 
later it was reported that this figure had passed the hundred mark (BEN, 
17/10/72). In February of the following year it was reported that over 
300 refugees had come to Bolton (BEN,1/2/73) and the last family had 
arrived towards the end of the month (BEN 21/2/73). Attention has been 
drawn to the role of the Press in keeping racial issues on the public 
agenda (cf. Troyna,1981). Here the Press played an important role in 
maintaining the public's awareness of racial issues by publishing 
reports (BEN, 7/10/72; 13/10/72; 17/10/72; 24/10/72; 7/11/72; 14/11/72; 
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24/11/72; 1/2/73) on the numbers of refugees arriving here. After the 
arrival of the last refugee family (BEN,21/2/73), the interest of the 
Press declined suggesting that matters to do with these refugees were no 
longer newsworthy. 
The resident Gujaratis welcomed these refugees: at a BCCR meeting Mr 
Sandhu offered to show refugees round the town. He made a plea for help 
and clothing, and invited local politicians to show a positive approach 
to the refugees by welcoming them. The question of assimilation of the 
refugees raised no fears amongst the Gujaratis, as they made it clear 
that they were no different from themselves. Most of the refugees were 
Gujaratis and many of these were Hindus (Chap.1; Bristow, 1975: 160). 
Language tuition classes were organised for them, and members of local 
Muslim and Hindu organisations helped refugees become acquainted with 
the town. 
During this time an incident which involved two individuals bringing 
some refugees to Bolton and the conflict over housing served to maintain 
racist feelings. An apparently unique decision was made by a Muslim, Mr 
Suleman, and his friend, Mr Pomfret, who on their own initiative 
collected twenty-two Asians from a Resettlement Camp at RAF Stradishall, 
Suffolk, and brought them to Bolton (BEN,26/9/72). These two men pleaded 
that they thought Bolton was ready to provide accommodation and that in 
their eyes it would be "a good deed". The following day the Borough 
Solicitor stated that Bolton would tolerate no more surprises. Both of 
the Conservative MPs stated publicly that no such occurrences would be 
tolerated. One MP asked the police to investigate the affair and the 
other asked Mr Carr, then Home Secretary, what he was going to do to 
stop the unauthorised entry of Asians into cities and towns 
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(BEN,18/10/72). Both MPs were perceived by the public to have the 
interests of the white and not the Gujarati voters. 
The quite extraordinary decision by Mr Suleman and Mr Pomfret 
described as "another man" (BEN,18/10/72) - forcibly raised questions 
about the power relationship between Gujarati and white. This event 
showed clearly how public debate led to the labelling of Mr Suleman, but 
not Mr Pomfret, as the culprit. It was unthinkable that two individuals 
could act on behalf of a town without consulting anybody, and that they 
could presume to confront the Government was even more astounding. One 
letter to the Press talked of "our immigrant friends" (BEN,29/9/72), 
although one was a white person. The police at the request of one MP 
investigated Messrs Suleman's and Pomfret's actions with a view to 
prosecuting them, but the charge was dropped on a legal technicality 
(BEN,18/10/72). Mr D.Lane, Parliamentary Secretary at the Home Office, 
assured Redmond MP, when asked in Parliament on whether or not 
individuals could take refugees from these camps on their own 
initiative, gave a detailed answer "making clear just what he thought of 
this irresponsible behaviour" (BEN,18/10/72). 
Although these two individuals removed at their whim some refugees 
from a resettlement camp - a decision which was technically one which 
only the Government could make - the refugees could not be asked or 
ordered to return to the camp or directed to settle elsewhere. This 
showed that the Government had not prepared plans for settlement of the 
refugees and that here black Robin Hoods were not acceptable. It served 
to remind the minority communities that not only did many white people 
see Asians as subordinate and inferior, but also that their apparent 
acceptance was superficial and reversible. The Government chose not to 
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become embroiled in this affair and the perpetrators of this act were 
neither reprimanded officially nor prosecuted. 
This event above others pin-pointed the space between communities 
within a community. It demonstrated how two individuals, the Gujarati 
being the man remembered for the deed, made a decision on behalf of the 
white community, the town and Parliament by going to a settlement camp 
and bringing to Bolton, an area not identified as a reception area by 
the Government, some Ugandan refugees. This served to force the 
politicians to face the reality that Gujaratis were part of the local 
population and wanted a say in decisions and to an extent this action 
also gave notice of Gujaratis lack of acceptance of the existing 
political structures of representation. Like with the three other areas 
of space between communities, nobody had direct control over this space. 
This event made apparent the weakness. 
Racism surfaced when the eRO and the Local Housing Department began 
identifying suitable housing. It was the shortage of suitable housing 
that made local racism manifest: white Boltonians were on lists awaiting 
council housing but the refugees were going to be given preference 
without having to queue for months. The outcry from those white people 
waiting for housing provided racists with ammunition. One form of racism 
which fed on these fears was that of a hoax letter sent to the Withers, 
a family who lived in Breightmet. The letter purported to be from the 
Asian Resettlement Board and Local Housing Department informing them 
that they were to provide accommodation in their home for an Asian 
family consisting of three adults (two parents and a grandmother) and 
two children. If they refused to comply, the letter threatened that 
"proceedings will be instituted under the Race Relations Act" (BEN, 
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16/9/72). The family were frightened and eventually approached the Press 
for advice. This letter turned out to be a hoax and was apparently 
intended as a joke (BEN,20/8/72). As the real name of the hoax letter 
writer never became known, it was assumed that a racist was responsible. 
None the less, it was symptomatic of the fear felt by many people and to 
which few gave expression: that Bolton was going to be swamped with 
black refugees against the wishes of the majority of the residents (cf. 
Lawrence,1983:Chap.2; Bristow, 1976: 267). 
While some houses were made available immediately to refugees, many 
had to wait their turn in housing queues. Frequent reports appeared on 
the decisions of neighbouring local authorities on the availability of 
housing. A climax was reached in December 1972, when Asians were accused 
of harassing old folk in order to force them to sell their homes. Mr 
Redmond MP (Bolton West) was reported in the Press as saying that Asians 
were "waving wads of notes under the noses of old people in an effort to 
persuade them to sell their homes" (BEN, 1/12/72). In an attempt to 
substantiate the claim the CRO searched for an old person who had been 
pressurised into selling his/her house; none was found. Two leaders, 
who were asked to comment on the MP's statement, condemned it. Both Mr 
Sandhu and Mr M (ICC) argued that it branded "Asians as old folk 
harassers" and as such could only harm white-Asian relations (BEN, 
7/12/72). Both made public statements saying that if they learnt of such 
behaviour, they would use their influence to stop it (BEN, 7/12/72). 
This issue gave leaders opportunities to become publicly involved in 
the debate over the refugees, since it labelled the Gujaratis as 
exploiters of the weak. By siding publicly with the white voters and 
the racist vote the two Conservative MPs damaged their personal and 
party image in the eyes of the Gujarati voters, who sympathised with the 
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refugees. The consequence of this was that in the first General Election 
held in 1974 Reed MP lost his seat to a Labour Party candidate. Mr 
Redmond's hold with a majority of 603 votes on his constituency was 
tenuous. He had taken a strong line in the accusation of Asians' 
harassment of old folk, and his constituency included four large Asian 
wards, Derby, Halliwell, West Ward and Rumworth. At the second General 
Election in 1974 he lost his seat to A.Taylor, a Labour Party candidate, 
and Bolton became Labour represented at Westminster. 
An outcome of the arrival of these refugees was that Bolton remained 
Labour controlled nationally until 1981. When after another local 
government reorganisation, Bolton was reorganised into three 
constituencies, one being a safe Labour seat and the other two 
supported new Conservative MPs. At one time it appeared that the two 
Conservative MPs lost Gujarati and white support whenever they responded 
to racial issues. However, the pattern of support is changing and now 
the Conservatives are attracting both white and Gujarati support, which 
suggests that the pattern of voting in the Asian and black communities 
is changing. From a class perspective, certain changes in the pattern of 
voting can be traced to an upward trend in home ownership and 
privatisation of health and education in the white, Asian and black 
communities (cf.Hamnett,1989:209; Saunders,1989; Harloe and Paris,1989). 
For many years Asians have been committed to home ownership (Dahya,1974; 
Desai,1963) and give the impression of being committed to a similar 
philosophy in their attitude to private education for their children. 
344 
(ii) The In-Company Language Training Scheme: 
In 1974 an event occurred which highlighted the Gujaratis' hostility 
to decisions that associated them with the status of "black immigrants". 
A discussion was held at a BCCR meeting on the proposal of the textile 
industry to mount what became known as the In-Company Language Training 
Scheme. The scheme was intended to provide English tuition for Asian 
workers in their time. They were assumed to be unable to speak English 
and therefore to require tuition in English. The complexity of the event 
was compounded by the participation of leaders from the Gujarati, the 
Pakistani and Afro-Caribbean communities. The labels that were used by 
these leaders in the discussion were politically oriented towards 
defining the political status of Asians and black people in terms of 
their powerlessness. 
On learning of the scheme, the leaders protested because it supported 
their experiences that white employers assumed that they knew what was 
best for their workers. Implicit in the debate was the assumption that 
all those who were not fluent in English could be labelled immigrants 
and as such were perceived as black, inferior, uneducated and should be 
grateful for all the help and the support the white community offered 
whatever the price. The debate began with Mr F, a West Indian and vice-
chairperson of the BCCR introducing the issue of representation: 
Mr Sandhu: 
"The textile industry is discussing the possibility of 
offering classes in English to immigra~ts.in th~ir own 
time. The industry is not interested ln lnvolvlng the 
religious organisations in these discussions. 1I 
IIWhy haven't the management ~pproach~d.us about this scheme? 
The Indian and the Pakistanl communltles are the people to 
go to.1I 
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The employers' perception of Asians did not include discussing the 
scheme with them or their representatives. Mr Sandhu made the point 
that, if these employers wanted to discuss schemes that concerned 
Asians, even if they were regarded as workers with little knowledge of 
English, they would still have to deal directly with them. The attitude 
of the employers was a positive indication of the low standing in which 
they held these workers. He rightly assumed that no employer would be 
keen to approach Asian organisations, because firstly, they were not 
part of the work situation, secondly this would not involve union 
representation and thirdly, this would place the discussions outside a 
trade union framework. Locally, many Gujaratis spoke of how the unions 
and employers worked together against them. While the unions reaped the 
benefits of Gujarati membership, they ensured that their views would be 
represented by white officers. Thus employers continued to discriminate 
against these workers, since a non-union organisation could not come 
between management and unions. At the same time this strategy placed 
organisations whose role it was to represent the interests of Gujaratis 
and Pakistanis, such as ethnic religious organisations and the BCCR, on 
the outside of the work situation. The political implications of this 
management strategy were that by not recognising leaders of different 
community and religious organisations, employers forced those working 
for them into joining unions and thereby coming under the control of the 
unions. 
Both Mr F and Mr Sandhu suggested that the view held by workers was 
that their trade union would represent their interests, while management 
would oppose them. However, the trade unions were seen by most Gujaratis 
to side with management against them. Therefore to accept this proposed 
language scheme would be tantamount to accepting racism as practised by 
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the management but through the offices of unions. As Mr F made clear: 
these employers were prepared to involve and recognise the CRC, which 
they saw as a white organisation with no influence in the work context, 
but they were not prepared to approach the Asian workers' organisations. 
The BCCR was asked to select two Asians to sit on the committee that 
would manage the training scheme. This raised the question IIWhy should 
the BCCR be seen to be responsible for selecting Asians to represent 
workers from the Gujarati and Pakistani communities on a committee to 
manage a scheme designed by white employers?1I 
Mr Sandhu: IIWho are they? Who will select them? They will be just rubber 
stamps. They represent nothing." 
The idea of two Asians representing the interests of all the Asian 
communities was unacceptable (see also Chap.5). No leader could accept 
the idea that another leader could represent the interests of a 
community to which he did not belong (Chap.6). Above all, the idea of 
one Gujarati leader or representative representing all Gujaratis was 
totally unacceptable. 
Mr Sandhu reiterated what other leaders had said: "Big men are not good. 
No Asian can represent the interests of all Asians and even 
those, such as himself, cannot adequately represent the 
members of the organisation who elect him. This underlines 
another recurrent theme which is that Gujaratis and other 
ethnic minority groups cannot be adequately represented by 
white politicians, locally or nationally." 
The independence of various ethnic minority groups from each other and 
the CRC was recognised by the following comment: 
Mr C.P and Mr Smith: "Immigrant communities go their own separate ways." 
It was decided that the selection of the two representatives should be 
passed back to the employers. The employers were sent a list of 
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addresses of Asian organisations, so that they would could contact the 
very organisations they were endeavouring to avoid. 
Mr F's next question about the composition of the committee 
reaffirmed Mr Sandhu's point: would the Asian representatives just 
become rubber stamps? If these two did not represent workers from the 
Asian communities, what would be their role on the committee? 
Mr W (wh i te) and a West I nd i an: II Are a 11 the other members on the 
committee to organise the scheme white? Send them the 
addresses of the various Asian organisations in town." 
Then Mr F asked the questions that most of the leaders present at the 
debate might also have asked: 
IIWhy are there no Indian foremen?" 
"Why are there no immigrant representatives on management?1I 
These questions reiterated what everyone present knew: the majority of 
employers and unions would not accept the appointment of an Asian or 
black person as a foreman, manager or union representative. They 
recognised this as an area in which racism was institutionalised. The 
debate had the effect of confirming publicly that the BCCR would not 
support these employers without recognising the racism that they 
accepted and practised, even though the project sounded like a good 
idea. 
The debate now moved to a discussion of leaders' understanding of 
employers' views of the status of Asians generally. The employers were 
suggesting that Asian workers should attend classes in their own time 
and not during working hours. The implication of this was incorporated 
in Mr Sandhu's next remark: 
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"The training should be in the firm's time, not in that of 
the immigrants. Why shouldn't the firms pay for this 
training?" 
He went on to say that if the employers wished their workers to have 
training, then whether or not they were immigrants, the firms should 
have to pay. It would be to their benefit if their workers could speak 
English. If the role of the unions was to oppose management on behalf of 
the workers, why had not the unions opposed this scheme which was taking 
advantage of the inferior position of the black workers? This issue had 
already been touched on. 
Mr Wand Mr Sandhu: "We should see the management as in the role of the 
opposition and the unions in the role of benefactors". 
Mr F went on to dissociate the BCCR from the stance taken by the 
textile managers and to make an important point about how these white 
employers might conceive of the Asian worker: 
"English is just a charity commodity. It would not 
be offered for the sake of the immigrants but for 
the management's convenience". 
This drew a remark from one of the Muslim leaders, who observed that he 
could survive within the confines of his community without any need to 
use English. 
Mr M: "Why should I learn English? I can manage my job and shopping 
without it. So why worry about English". 
The question about English being treated as a charity commodity made 
the point that the status of the givers was superior to that of the 
receivers. Employers considered Asian workers to be of such low status, 
that they could be seen as recipients of charity. This highlighted for 
the leaders the difference in socio-political status between white and 
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Asian and black as understood by employers who were seen 
This was taken by the leaders to be the ultimate insult. 
as racists. 
Now the leaders addressed the issue of their response to the offer 
by the employers. Mr W argued that any negative response by immigrants 
to a white designed scheme would be interpreted unfavourably as a 
rejection rather than as an invitation to be treated as equals. He went 
on to observe: "Were immigrants to fail to respond to the scheme, they 
would be considered to be uninterested by management. It is a white 
scheme". In other words Asian workers who are perceived as being black 
are not regarded by employers as sharing the same rights as white 
workers, since it was expected that their response to a white employer-
led initiative should be to treat it as a favour. 
It was left to the VHP leader to make two highly significant remarks. 
He was the first and only person to point out that Asian women worked in 
the mills and that they might benefit from such a scheme. 
Mr Sandhu made a further observation: "What about women? They would also 
benefit from such a scheme. It is a better life for those people 
who can speak English than those who can't". 
Nobody had thus far made any reference to women. He went on to suggest 
that the lives led by those who could not speak English might be as 
satisfying, if not more so, than the lives lived by those who could 
speak English. With no women representatives present and no other leader 
who was willing to take up the concern expressed about women workers, 
their point of view was not voiced and Mr Sandhu's concern for them did 
not endear him to the other Asian leaders. 
His next observation summarised the sentiments of all those present: 
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patronisation works best when the patronised can express their gratitude 
in a language that is understood, English. 
Mr Sandhu: (ve~y angry) liThe ~cheme was p~oduced because we immigrants 
:an.t spea~ Engl1sh. There 1S a fair representation of 
1mm1grants 1n the community who can't just say "Yes sir' 
thank you, sir". ' , , 
He was in favour of the scheme only if it was paid for by employers in 
terms of time and cost and would be made available to women. At the same 
time he regarded it as an attempt by employers to belittle Asians 
by placing the onus on them to commit themselves in their time and with 
their money to learning English. Then they could demonstrate their 
subservience through their presumably inadequate usage of the language. 
Mr Sandhu's sentiments were endorsed by all of the other leaders. 
The final resolution accepted by the committee took account of this 
view and it also contained the following suggestions: that all language 
training be given during a period of induction; that any language 
training given to workers already employed should be given in the firm's 
time; that the minorities should be adequately represented - names and 
addresses of all organisations be attached to this resolution and 
finally, that Asian women working in industry should also be included in 
the scheme. 
The employers accepted some of the opinions expressed by these 
leaders and the scheme was brought into being. The workers could attend 
during work hours and it was financed in part by employers with the 
Local Authority Education Department providing premises for the staff. 
Once in operation it was held up as one of the best in the country. It 
still exists and offers appropriate language tuition to both men and 
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women within and without the firm's time but funded by them. In 
addition, it offers cross-cultural communication and anti-racist 
training courses to managers and supervisors. A further development has 
been business courses offered to Asian and Chinese businessmen. This 
was one of the first of such schemes to take their teaching to the 
factory floor. 
To reiterate, all the leaders were intent upon making clear their 
views on the strategy employed by the employers. Therefore, some leaders 
used labels like black or immigrant or Asian to describe the workers. 
Had more specific labels been used, the discussion might have led to a 
fragmentation of support. 
(iii) The Vishwa Hindu Parishad Trip to the Isle of Man: 
This event relates to an accusation of racism that was made against 
the Isle of Man police arising out of an incident that occurred on a 
trip members of the VHP made there in 1975. Among places visited by the 
Hindus on the island was a church in which there was a statuette. After 
the Hindus had left the church on their way to another place, the 
statuette was discovered to be missing. When the party of Hindus arrived 
at the quayside to board the ferry, they were "searched" by the police 
looking for this statuette. 
Mr G and Mr A, who led this party of six hundred Hindus, gave the 
police permission to search the party and told them that they would 
assist wherever possible. Mr G reported later that the search was 
carried out with everyone's agreement. When it was concluded, he asked 
the constable in charge of the search for a letter stating that the 
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statuette had not been found. On the 30th of June, 1975, Mr G and Mr A 
received copies of a letter containing the required statement and 
thanking them for their co-operation. At a meeting of the VHP 
committee, Mr Sandhu was told by these men that they were satisfied with 
the conduct of the police. Mr G said, "The police are all powerful, so 
why resist?" However, Mr Sandhu (who did not go on this trip) rejected 
this explanation and took up the issue of the police search at a BCCR 
meeting. 
At a July 1975 meeting, Mr Sandhu complained that a party of Hindus 
had been searched by the police, but that the white couriers and other 
European visitors, who were also there, were not searched. "This was 
therefore a blatant instance of discrimination." The CRO suggested that 
Mr Sandhu make a complaint in writing to the Chief Constable of the Isle 
of Man. This he did sending copies of the letter to the BCCR, the MPs, 
councillors, the Mayor and the Home Office. In it he argued that the 
search of the Hindus was not only racially discriminatory, but that it 
was also an insult to Boltonians. This argument persuaded the 
councillors at the meeting to support him; they too felt insulted by the 
conduct of the Isle of Man police. "After all," he said, "the women and 
children were searched by the police in full view of everyone on the 
pier". He regarded the search to be an insult to himself, to the women 
and to any self-respecting person. So he persuaded the meeting to 
instruct the BCCR to send letters in support of his protestations to the 
Governor-General and Chief Constable of the Isle of Man. 
This event also needs to be seen in terms of tensions in the 
leadership of the VHP. The course of action proposed by Mr Sandhu 
contradicted that of the two men in charge of the excursion. Mr G hinted 
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at this when he said that Mr Sandhu's wish to make an issue of it was an 
indication that he was not prepared to listen any longer to the members 
of the VHP. Mr G took this opportunity to express the view that the VHP 
were becoming dissatisfied with Mr Sandhu's leadership. He also claimed 
to have visited a Lohana member of the VHP committee to discuss how they 
could combine to remove Mr Sandhu from the chair. IIAfter all,1I said Mr 
G, IIhe is a Sikh, he is not a Hindu. His religion is different from 
ours. So we shall let him buy the temple (St.Barnabas Church) for us and 
then we shall remove himll. After Mr Sandhu had negotiated the purchase 
of St. Barnabas for use as a community centre, he resigned from the 
position of chairperson voluntarily. A few years later, he left town and 
went to live elsewhere. He had served the Hindus well. 
Mr Sandhu's management of this event is both complex and his 
tactics ensured that the councillors and BCCR would support him. 
His quest for decisions which underlined the inferior-superior power 
relationship between Gujaratis and white people was a form of protest. 
Suffice it to say that this event, like the previous one, raised issues 
with which most of the leaders could agree. As an outsider leader Mr 
Sandhu's use of labels and identities was different to those of leaders 
who shared identities with their supporters. 
(iv) IIFarnworth Girl Paid to Marry Immigrants ll : 
This event focused the attention of all of the leaders and the white 
members of the BCCR on immigration and all that it symbolised in common 
sense racism. From the point of view of the Asians immigration control 
is associated with queuing and hardships for the families concerned. For 
the white community immigration is linked to ideas of control of the 
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immigration of Asians to Britain. This event associated ideas of 
control with local fears of large numbers of Asian migrants waiting to 
come to Bolton. Thus it served to rekindle these fears. 
In 1976, an emotive headline appeared in the local press, which read: 
"I was paid to wed immigrant - girl" (BEN,7/4/76). It was reported that 
a white girl in Farnworth was being paid to marry immigrants, so that 
they could establish their right to remain in Britain. This was followed 
by another story on a local Pakistani, who stated in court that he had 
paid £1,000 to obtain a passport to provide him with entry into Britain 
(BEN,15/6/76). Although these reports were mentioned at CRC meetings, 
they were not discussed and no comment was made by the politicians or 
leaders. Both events might have provided opportunities for leaders to 
protest against establishment racism. Had they done so, they might have 
been in danger of confirming white fears that the entry of Asians into 
Britain was not being effectively controlled. It served no useful 
purpose to heighten people's awareness of attempts being made by some 
migrants to avoid immigration controls and to enter the country 
illegally. Therefore the leaders avoided all discussion of such events. 
Had some identifiable hardship been mentioned, then their reaction might 
have been different. 
Any discussion of these events by the politicians could only serve 
one of two ends: firstly, it could result in their becoming identified 
as racists and secondly, it could show them up as representatives of the 
people who are prepared to overlook irregularities, which might have 
antagonised their white supporters. Therefore, no one could profit from 
a debate on these two events. This held for many events that involved 
immigration to Britain and the conduct of the Home Office and its staff. 
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The uncertainty of the outcome of events in this context was highlighted 
in 1976 when leaders and BCCR members debated what a Mr F. Patel, a 
Muslim, was reported in the press as having said. He stated that 
II immigration should be stopped, because there are not enough jobs to go 
round ll (BEN, 28/5/76) . It was reported that he favoured a reduction in 
the numbers of immigrants coming into Britain, so that those already 
here might experience greater security. This would clarify the position 
as to who is a migrant and who is British. IIIf immigration were allowed 
to continue ll , he was reported to have said, II rac ial clashes could result 
and resentment would arise between the employed and the unemployed. 
There were not enough jobs to go around and he was in agreement with 
some of the things Enoch Powell MP had said ll (BEN,28/5/76). 
Most leaders' attitudes to Mr Patel can be summed up by Mr Sandhu's 
comment: IIMr Patel has a choice. He can pack his bags and leave and give 
other people a chance. People from East Africa holding British passports 
have nowhere to go except here. At least the people from India and 
Pakistan have a choice. We must allow Asians in even if it means cutting 
down immigration from other countries ll • Mr Patel was cast in the role of 
virtually a traitor to his people. Other leaders, including Mr M (ICC), 
joined Mr Sandhu in criticising Mr Patel. It was reported that he was 
threatened with assault by Muslims if he ever repeated such statements. 
Not one of the white councillors participated in this debate, because 
the leaders were in effect criticising one of their own people for 
making statements that echoed those of racists. 
Events, Contexts and Decision-Making 
These events are a collection of apt illustrations of a number of 
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small protest movements by Gujarati leaders of various organisations 
about their lack of access to public resources as a consequence of their 
being excluded from positions of political control. The dimensions of 
this debate can crudely be separated into events which highlighted the 
space between Gujarati communities within a community. This space can be 
separated in relation to the labels used by Gujaratis and white 
politicians into four areas, two which are closer to the Gujarati 
communities and two which are closer to the white community. Nobody has 
any political control over this space and therefore it invites 
intrusion by ethnic leaders. As such it offers scope for ethnic 
politics and places a political emphasis on "us" and "them". 
"Ethnicity is the recognition of significant difference between 
'them' and 'us' II (Wallman,1979:3). Such apparently simple notion of a 
complex symbolic system of identity when associated with a notion of 
boundary generates further apparently simple notions of boundaries 
between two social systems (cf.Wallman,1979:6). If this notion of social 
boundary, or of any boundary, is followed through to a logical 
conclusion, then it should surround an entity, be it a social system or 
a group of people or a body of knowledge. In this sense the social 
boundary separates those who share a system, community and body of 
knowledge from those who do not. A further implication of the concept of 
social boundary is, Wallman suggests, "subjective in that it inheres in 
the experience of participants" (1979:6). She argues that these 
experiences arise from interaction involving those who are located on 
both sides of a boundary (1979:7). The labelling process involves at 
least two sets of participants and two bodies of common sense knowledge. 
Labels enable leaders and politicians to concentrate upon the 
interrelationship between their social identities and their experiences. 
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The urban experience of Gujaratis has underlined the political 
separation of their organisations from those in formal political 
hierarchy. This in turn reinforces their awareness of powerlessness 
in relation to the power of the white community. Thus any protest by 
people perceived of as black which avoided the creation of a negative 
image had to take place within a closed and informal political arena, 
such as that provided by the BCCR. The constraints of this arena 
ensured that protest marches and demonstrations were difficult to 
stage, but controlled protest about the ways in which Gujaratis found 
themselves treated could be made. Ethnic politics is not just about 
riots, but about peaceful debate which is aimed at changing social 
meanings in the public sphere. Thus the events elected highlight 
different aspects of protest over issues that are beyond the control of 
Gujarati leaders and politicians to those which lie within their remit 
as well as that of the MPs and the Government. 
The aim of the final Chapter is to consider how Gujarati protests 
have been constrained by their community organisations, by the local 
political hierarchy and to what extent this has led to changes of 
meaning of common sense racism. 
358 
FOOTNOTES 
1. The contexts of events presuppose that there are internal and 
external labels. The internal ones are used mainly by Gujaratis and 
others who are in "the know"; the external labels are used mainly by 
members of the white community. Over time and through friendship or 
knowledge an outsider can become acquainted with labels used by 
Gujaratis. Such knowledge is shown through the correct usage of 
labels. 
2. Bolton Corporation did not approve of sects or religious groups using 
private premises for religious gatherings and worship. Therefore, 
they did not approve the use of the house in Ulleswater Street as a 
mosque and insisted that the sect find either more suitable premises 
or land suitable for the building of such premises. 
359 
CHAPTER 7 
ETHNIC POLITICS. PARTY POLITICS AND RACISM 
The aim of this Chapter is to provide a conclusion to the previous 
Chapter and the thesis. I shall treat these two aspects of the 
conclusion as one. I shall take the view that the strategies adopted by 
various Gujarati leaders were in part constrained by their own ethnic 
organisations, in part by the existing political structure, in part by 
the BCCR and in part by their initiative and lack of political 
experience. The events described above (Chap.6) are the culminations of 
a number of grassroots protest movements by Gujaratis which separated 
them from the political parties by virtue of their colour and culture, 
their lack of participation as party members, and their commitment to 
their own ethnic organisations. A difficulty with grassroots movements 
is assessing their success; analysing the strategies used by leaders 
forms part of this assessment. Therefore I shall begin this Chapter by 
analysing the strategies of Gujarati leaders, and then consider the 
wider aspects of the social constraints imposed upon them by their own 
organisations, perceptions, social networks and the general political 
situation. 
Events represent grassroots protest movements in microcosm: they 
began with an incident which sparked off a debate about power in terms 
of some aspect of social control. Thus in part these debates can be 
regarded as learning experiences (Firth,1957) of Gujarati leaders and 
in part an astute testing of the power relationship between white and 
Gujarati by Gujaratis. As a consequence of these debates some Gujarati 
leaders removed themselves from the debate and debating arena, e.g. the 
chairs of the ICC and Saibaba; while others thrust themselves into the 
360 
political limelight, e.g. Mr Sandhu and Mr C. An analysis of the 
strategies of these leaders shows how the Muslims and Hindus differed in 
their approaches to protest. 
Protest within a multiethnic society about power relationships 
between white and those often labelled as "black" invariably hinges upon 
an essential element, that is the ability of protesters to focus on the 
asymmetry of power. In this case a protest movement involves labelling 
by the protesters as well as those against whom the protests are made. 
As in any labelling context, labels take on the qualities of status for 
labellers and labelled. Since the context is a political one, the 
purpose of labelling is to make apparent an imbalance in power, to make 
claims for support and to obtain access to public resources. Separated 
by colour and culture from other Boltonians, the Gujaratis have to 
submerge their social identity as Gujaratis when participating in a 
white protest movement. They would share a common aim with the other 
protesters, such as they might with white anti-poll tax payers. In a 
society such as this one which claims to be racially tolerant, but where 
evidence continues to show that racial discrimination in its diverse 
forms is widespread, perceived racial differences remain an important 
element separating those who are labelled "black" with no or little 
power from those who are white and hold power. 
Therefore, the labels in ascending or descending order which 
describe Gujarati factions, sects, organisations and communities define 
not only the specificity and generality of groups, but also implicitly 
identify their potential relationships with groups in the Gujarati 
population and white community as a whole through varying degrees of 
social distance. Some labels divide Gujaratis from members of other 
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minority communities, from white people, other labels divide Gujarati 
from Gujarati along social and/or religious lines. Thus the strategies 
employed by leaders vary with the size of their organisations, their 
positions in them and their perceptions of support. 
In debates about participants in events in terms of Asian-white 
relationships in the CRC, the dynamic is provided by the flexibility of 
claims of attachment to a social identity from a range of identities 
that could lead, at least in theory, to the mobilisation of support for 
a protest movement. The strength and duration of the protest would 
depend upon the size of the claimed support for it. What is particular 
to this period of ethnic politics is that Gujarati leaders were (and 
still are) able to make claims for support without having to produce 
politically acceptable evidence for it. In part this is a consequence 
of a political system that is unwilling to recognise the political role 
of ethnic leaders who are not part of the formal political structure. In 
part this is a consequence of absence of Asian and black sections 
within political parties. Therefore, the negotiations for influence 
arising from events involve claims by leaders of racial discrimination 
as a consequence of their lack of power and representation in formal 
political structures. Thus the success or failure of these depend upon 
the extent to which leaders could claim support from within and without 
the Gujarati communities. The task facing these leaders is to make the 
social values that are questioned in events the property of as wide a 
body of supporters as possible. These events are essentially protest 
movements in microcosm which depend upon support, which was not 
political in origin or character, although it is political in terms of 
its expression. During the decade of the 1970s, a period marked by the 
emergence of a form of British racism that was different from that of 
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the 'high' colonial period (Hall,1981:26), the mobilisation of support 
might well have had the opposite effect to that sought, in other words 
the actualisation of a protest could have attracted even more white 
hostility than it did. The reason that it did not attract such hostility 
was that the form the protest took could be controlled and limited to an 
informal arena where the audience was generally anti-racist. 
The strategies of the leaders of these movements varied with the 
social constraints imposed by the social characteristics of the 
structure of belonging of their communities, their ability to 
communicate their concerns, their social perceptions of distances 
between their and other organisations and communities, and the social 
characteristics of their social networks. These factors contributed to 
the differences in the way in which Muslim and Hindu leaders sought to 
maximise their claims for support. 
Strategies of Gujarati Leaders 
(1) Muslim Leaders: 
The leaders of factions and other small organisations, such as Lena 
Street Mosque, drew their support initially from small Muslim 
communities. The events involved members of factions, caste communities 
and sects (community/specific), that is they highlighted areas over 
which nobody seemed to have control. They involved issues which Muslims 
regarded as pertaining to their culture and therefore as being separate 
from the predominantly white culture of the town. Difficulties 
highlighted by these events could not be resolved within the Muslim 
communities, thus the leaders looked outside their communities for 
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solutions. As these events were usually specific to a faction, caste 
community or community, some Muslims could identify with them and most 
could not. The absence of rules governing relationships between such 
organisations and between them and the white community meant that no 
leader had authority to resolve these events. They were transformed by 
leaders into protests about their lack of control over issues which they 
considered should be resolved by others. The politicians regarded these 
small organisations as "factions" in the worst political sense of the 
term. Since the events highlighted areas of culture conflict, no one 
chose to take responsibility to resolve them. 
The strategy of leaders was to identify an appropriate outsider, such 
as a white person, an official in Local Authority, police or BCCR 
officer, as a scapegoat. Then the frustration at not being able to find 
solutions could be shifted on to a person outside the Gujarati 
population. Examples of such events were the burial of the stillborn 
Hindu child, the Baruchi-Surti conflict or the outcasteing of Mr P and 
his family. This was the least rewarding strategy, since it failed to 
extend the influence of the leaders over their supporters and 
politicians. Furthermore, it showed up areas over which they had no 
control. This is precisely what happened in the event of the burial of 
the child. It was too late to exhume the body, the undertaker having 
made a mistake, but equally Mr P was restrained from taking action 
against the parents of the child on the grounds that they too could do 
nothing. Mr P was looking for support, but failed to get it. Thus he 
lost influence with his own supporters, before losing the support of the 
politicians. 
Where an event was restricted initially to members of a small 
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organisation, the involvement of others politically was often restricted 
by circumstances. Thus no one could become involved in the Baruchi-Surti 
conflicts for control of the mosques, unless they belonged to one or 
other of these factions. To involve others meant that leaders had to 
redefine events in terms of broader political issues. Generally, events 
which were resolved by identifying a scapegoat, remained where they had 
started as community/specific. The onus of resolution was left with 
leaders, since they affected nobody else. 
Leaders' strategies varied for extending commitment to issues. Much 
of their success depended upon whether an issue could be developed into 
one belonging to other communities. Two such events were Lena Street 
Mosque and the "bearded schoolboy". A comparison of the way in which Mr 
C managed the Lena Street Mosque event and Mr P the "bearded schoolboy" 
event reveal two strategies for amplifying events, so that they drew in 
a wider group of people than those immediately involved. In the bearded 
schoolboy event Mr P tried to cast the headmaster in the role of 
aggressor and then use this as a pretext for turning the event into an 
anti-Muslim one, believing that this would bring out Muslims in protest 
against the Education Department. His strategy was to move an event 
which initially concerned only Gujarati Muslims (community/ general) to 
a wider context (minority/ specific), where it could become the concern 
of all Muslims. The drawback was that most of the Muslim members of the 
ICC labelled the event as Baruchi (community/specific), since they saw 
Mr P's thrust for leadership in terms of the Baruchi-Surti conflict. 
Thus he failed to persuade his fellow Muslims to have some ownership in 
the event and was left politically isolated. He is a good example of a 
leader who had ambitions to become a big man, but was constrained by the 
lack of support from his potential supporters. 
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Like most events involving competition between factions for control 
of mosques and access to public resources, "The Lena Street Mosque 
Event" began with a faction, Berelewis, attempting to detach themselves 
from Deobandis's control of Tayaibah Mosque. The Berelewi community is 
Baruchi in origin, but most Baruchis were Deobandi (Chap.2). At first 
sight Mr C stood to lose in his tussle with the Corporation for 
permission to use the co-op, since his community were one of the 
smallest. His first concern was to build up support and this he did by 
placing the onus for resolving the difficulty on the Corporation. He had 
identified a scapegoat. His strategy was no different from that of other 
small organisation leaders. However, his fortunes changed when the 
Labour councillors realised that this confrontation offered them the 
chance to support Muslims against a Conservative controlled Corporation 
(Local Council). Thus they spoke of the need for Muslims (minority/ 
specific) to be able to fulfil their religious requirements. The 
objections by the local white residents provided a racial dimension 
which confirmed the applicability of wider ownership by all Muslims in 
the outcome of this event. The social identity of the small community 
was submerged within that of all Muslims. This allowed Mr C to argue 
that the refusal of the Council to their plea amounted to discrimination 
against and victimisation of Muslims. 
The result of this event was that with positive support from the 
Labour politicians, this small Muslim sect achieved more than it 
bargained for. The Council found them an alternative site for a new 
mosque, approved planning permission and allowed them to continue using 
the co-op until their new mosque was built. The interrelationship of 
ethnic and local politics had produced a political situation in which a 
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Muslim leader was able to influence the white political decision-makers 
and obtain access to public resources. The Labour politicians gained the 
support of all Muslims. They countered local white opposition by 
grounding the event in an issue over religious tolerance and made it 
look as if the Conservative Council were unable to stop a small sect 
disobeying them. They also made it appear as if the opposition of the 
Conservative Party to the usage of the co-op as a mosque was symptomatic 
of their general opposition to Muslims. At the next local election the 
Labour Party won this ward. 
The strategies used by most Muslim leaders were initially applied to 
Gujarati Muslim (community/general) and not all Muslims, since they were 
associated with the largest Muslim organisation, the ICC. Events like 
24 hour burials, Ramadan, and the establishment of the darul uloom 
concerned all Muslims, since they all lacked these facilities. The 
strategies used by the Muslim leaders in these events were similar, they 
claimed support from all Muslims (minority/specific). In the instance of 
the 24 hour burial event, Labour politicians supported the Muslims as 
they were in the minority in the Council. The point about this event 
was that neither the Muslims nor the Labour politicians realised that 
the Hindus were equally interested in this facility. Had the strategy of 
the Muslim leaders been to label the event as Gujarati, thus involving 
the Hindus, total Gujarati opposition to the Council might have changed 
the balance of the votes particularly as the Conservatives believed that 
the Hindus supported them. 
The event concerning Ramadan was pursued unsuccessfully, mainly 
because the key decision-makers were not politicians but employers, who 
could not be drawn into a public arena. No Conservative politicians 
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wanted to alienate the support of businessmen. In the event involving 
children damaging the mosque, the political ramifications were too 
obscure for it to attract wider political attention. The strategies of 
Muslim leaders in the In-Company Language Training Scheme, the Arrival 
of Ugandan Asians, and the Girl Who Married Immigrants did not carry 
sufficient political weight to dominate these debates. For instance, in 
the debate about the language scheme none of the Muslim leaders 
commented on the possibility of women not benefiting from the scheme or 
supported Mr Sandhu's argument that the women should also benefit. No 
Muslim leader supported Mr Sandhu, partly because the strategy he 
suggested Mr C use in the Lena Street Mosque event was regarded as 
unacceptable, partly because he was the leader of the largest Hindu 
organisation, and partly because his style of leadership proved him to 
be the most effective politician of all the leaders. 
An inspection by the local Fire Division resulted in the building 
being pronounced a fire hazard. The question was raised in debate in the 
BCCR as to whether the sect should abandon the building. Mr Sandhu 
suggested to Mr C that he ought to be seen to put the welfare of the 
children attending his mosque before the structure of the building. 
Mr Sandhu asked: "What about the children who attend mosque in the 
building?" 
Mr C: "You argue like an Englishman. None of us can alter at will a 
building. We cannot get permission,to alter the build~ng. We 
cannot obtain the use of classrooms 1n the local school. 
Mr Sandhu: "Children, whatever their colour, culture or religion, are 
children." 
Mr C: "Beggars can't be choosers." 
Mr Sandhu then suggested that any person could put a match to the 
building, even a white person, given the hostility of the residents. 
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"Is it worth losing lives of children for continuing resistance to the 
Local Authority?" asked Mr Sandhu. This question Mr C interpreted as 
implying that he should accept the ruling of the Local Authority. He 
never forgave Mr Sandhu for this and other Muslims learned of Mr 
Sandhu's apparent support for the views of the white community. Even 
those Muslims who did not support Mr C regarded Mr Sandhu's behaviour as 
evidence of his duplicity. 
(2) Hindu Leaders: 
Only a few Hindu leaders of small organisations joined the BCCR. Some 
chose not to join the BCCR because they were not sufficiently fluent in 
English to feel confident enough to participate. Others let Mr Sandhu 
speak for all of them. For instance members of the two Swaminarayan and 
Saibaba sects made use of the services offered by the BCCR, but only the 
leader of one Swaminarayan sect sought membership of it. One event in 
which leaders of Shree Kutch Swaminarayan sect were involved was that of 
the burial of the stillborn Hindu child. Even then they remained in the 
background and accepted the lead given by BCCR officers. Decisions on 
the outcasteing of Mr P were confined by the leaders of his caste 
association to the association alone. Mr P failed to persuade any other 
organisation or individual to become involved. The decision by his 
association leaders separated the event from the concern of other 
associations and thus preserved their social identity and authority. 
This strategy is the opposite to scapegoating employed by most faction 
and sect leaders. Generally the strategies used by these Hindu leaders 
were the same as those adopted by Muslim leaders of small organisations. 
At this time only one Hindu leader of a large organisation was active 
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on the BCCR and this was Mr Sandhu. His leadership and strategies 
dominated Hindu ethnic politics. Therefore, an analysis of his 
strategies of leadership amount to an analysis of Hindu leadership. 
Being a leader of a large organisation, he rarely became involved with 
small organisations. The event of the burial of the child did not 
concern him and he accepted the final resolution. The outcasteing of Mr 
P did involve him since Mr P sought help from him, but he pOinted out 
that the VHP could not be involved. The event for which he was elected 
to a position of leadership was the purchase of St. Barnabas. Within the 
VHP Mr Sandhu had to cope with inter-caste rivalry between members, 
while he himself had no such support. His success as a leader depended 
upon his ability to convince these representatives, who had the support 
of their castes, of the wisdom of his strategies to promote the 
interests of VHP over and above those of the caste associations and 
sects which they represented. If he failed to achieve what some of the 
VHP committee members considered to be adequate results, he was in 
danger of being accused of being an outsider with an outsider's 
interests. Thus he trod a narrow path between the "manager" and the 
outsider with nothing in between the two. 
His strategies were to argue for all Hindus and in particular for the 
rights of members of all minority communities. By doing this he hoped to 
unite not only the members of the VHP committee irrespective of caste 
membership and support, but he also hoped to attract wider support from 
the other Asian and black communities, such as Sikhs, Gujaratis, 
Pakistanis and West Indians. At the opening of St. Barnabas, he spoke of 
the Hindu community and of Hindus as part of Bolton society. He shifted 
the social identity of Hindus from being Gujaratis (community/ general) 
to that of Boltonians (minority/specific). Thus he avoided making 
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reference to Hindu castes whose members either belonged to the VHP or 
were opposed to it. He could state that Hindus were Boltonians and 
should be accepted as such, so bridging the gap between those perceived 
as black and the white community. 
Four events gave Mr Sandhu opportunities to exploit the connections 
between ethnic and local politics. These were the arrival of the Ugandan 
refugees, the In-Company Language Training Scheme, the VHP trip to the 
Isle of Man and the Girl Who Married Immigrants. At the time of the 
arrival of the Ugandan Asian refugees he publicly asked the questions 
which the politicians were unwilling to ask, let alone answer. His first 
question invited Boltonians to compare their relatively comfortable 
existence with the hardships experienced by the Ugandan refugees. Then 
he asked them to consider how those who were better off could help those 
who were less well off. Meanwhile Boltonians were asking themselves how 
they could manage to survive at a time when opportunities for employment 
were diminishing due to the recession in the textile industry, and still 
have to accept newcomers who would only increase the numbers competing 
for them? Mr Sandhu's approach called for generosity and tolerance from 
Boltonians for the refugees at a time when the political parties could 
not offer a clear lead. 
Another event which gave Mr Sandhu an opportunity to bridge the 
divide between ethnic and local politics was in the debate about the In-
Company Language Training Scheme. The points he made were firstly that 
employers should deal directly with the Indian and Pakistani communities 
to which their workers belonged, rather than dealing through white 
people whom the employers regarded as the spokesmen for them. The 
political importance of this point went far beyond this debate with 
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echoes deep in colonial history. The idea of white people speaking for 
Asian and black people is part of the corner-stone of colonialism. His 
second point was that two representatives could not represent the 
various communities. Neither the Muslims, Hindus nor Pakistanis could 
agree on one leader, let alone one for each community. All leaders 
participating knew this. Therefore, he rightly asked the question: who 
will select them? If selected, who will they represent? In ethnic 
politics there was no agreed electoral system by which these communities 
could elect representatives. He said in the debate: "Big men are not 
good. No Asian can represent the interests of all Asians." Thus his 
point that if two representatives could be found, all they could do 
would be to rubber stamp decisions on behalf of the employers. 
Thirdly, he identified an attitude held by the employers which led 
them to suggest that all training should be in the workers' time. Had 
they been white workers the training would have been in the firm's time. 
Because employers regarded Asian workers as inferior, the implication 
was that their time was of little value. Furthermore, he pointed out 
that the unions, who should be helping workers, were noticeable by 
their absence. When he stated that the Asian women workers could also 
benefit from this scheme, he lost the support of the Muslim leaders who 
rarely spoke up for the rights of women. By doing so Mr Sandhu indicated 
that he was aware of the disadvantages which Asian women experienced. He 
won this point and it was included in the resolutions that were sent to 
the employers. 
His final observation that the Asian communities were seen by 
employers as immigrants who were only sufficiently educated to say 
"Yes, sir; thank you, sir." This remark summed up the debate, which was 
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about patronisation. It made obvious the differences in the power 
relationship between the powerless Asian worker and the powerful white 
employer. However, it also pointed to the overlap between ethnic 
politics and aspects of local politics which went beyond the narrow 
purview of local government and racism. His strategy throughout was to 
bridge the differences between the Asians by stressing their shared 
powerlessness as immigrants in the white controlled sphere of work. The 
resolutions to this debate brought real changes to Gujarati and other 
Asian and black workers, by providing them with tuition in English at 
work during work time. 
In the event of the trip to the Isle of Man he took this strategy to 
its limits, when he first questioned the right of the police to search 
the women in a manner that implied disrespect to them as women and as 
people. This observation implied that the men who led the trip had 
failed to safeguard the respect of the women. Secondly, he argued that 
the Hindus had been treated in this way, because they were regarded as 
immigrants. This action could be expected of a police force who had 
made an error of judgement. The Hindus had become their scapegoat. The 
final insult he claimed was that they were not immigrants but 
Boltonians. So the manner of conduct of the police was an insult to 
Boltonians. None of the councillors could find fault with this argument 
and so letters from Bolton Council and BCCR were dispatched to the 
Governor General and Chief of Police on the Isle of Man protesting about 
the conduct of the police. 
Mr Sandhu took every opportunity to make the point that if the 
politicians claim that all Boltonians are equal, then they must show 
they are treated as equals. This is precisely what local politicians did 
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not do. This strategy submerged the social identity of Hindus within a 
general identity of Boltonian. However, by doing this he lost sight of 
the interests of the VHP, which was interpreted by some of his opponents 
as an attempt to make himself more important than he was. In other 
words, he was trying to become a "big man". This observation by one of 
the leaders of the expedition to the island suggested that there were 
underlying tensions in the VHP leadership. 
In the debate about the Farnworth girl who married immigrants to give 
them the opportunity to come to Britain, mention was made of a Muslim 
Patel who was reported in the Press as saying that the immigration of 
Asians should be stopped, as this would both make Asians living here 
feel more secure and it would reduce competition for the jobs that were 
still to be had. This gave Mr Sandhu the opportunity to say that Asians 
from the subcontinent had a choice, they could stay where they were or 
they could go to another country. Those in East Africa had no choice, 
they had to leave. They should be allowed into Britain even if it meant 
restricting immigration from other countries. By now Mr Sandhu was 
confident enough to suggest strategies which linked local ethnic 
politics to local and national politics. 
His strategies often showed political insight, such as when he 
emphasised his disgust for the white opposition to the usage of the 
premises as a mosque, while accepting the fire risk as being real and 
important. He argued that Mr C should be seen to value the safety of the 
Muslim children who attend mosque, over and above the racial antagonism 
of the complaining white residents. What he began to see as politically 
important was a united Asian and black leadership. He held a meeting for 
all leaders and tried to persuade them to form a committee and to elect 
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one of their number as chairman. He saw that a gap existed between the 
organisations that represented the minorities and the political parties 
and thus proposed the development of a new ethnic organisation with a 
decision making role to play in local politics. At the time no other 
ethnic leader shared this view. Some twenty years later Asian and black 
representatives are endeavouring to establish the very all Asian and 
black caucus that Mr Sandhu struggled to develop. He was ahead of time 
in his appreciation of racism and local politics, his perception of a 
political role for Asian and black leaders within the local formal 
political structures, and above all he was a particularly adroit 
political operator. Having said this, due to his impatience with the 
politicians, he occasionally went too far making political statements 
calling for support but without the formal backing of a political 
organisation. 
Strategies, Ethnic Politics and Local Politics 
An analysis of the strategies of ethnic leaders and politicians 
produces a map of areas of activity which shows that on some occasions 
leaders will define certain activities as political, while on other 
occasions politicians will describe them as non-political. Ethnic 
politics is not only about achieving representation on local government 
bodies, but is also about influencing decisions which involve access to 
public resources. Leaders see decisions about Ramadan as political 
issues: if Muslims have a right to live here and to practice Islam, they 
also have a right to observe the recognised Islamic religious days. 
Employers have an obligation to accept these observances, since the 
right of people to practice Islam is accepted. The same argument 
surrounds the issue of access to 24 hour burials. What the ethnic 
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leaders challenged was the notion of cultural normality, and the only 
way in which they could do this was through ethnic politics. 
The analysis of strategies used by leaders and politicians identifies 
four decisions which were associated with these events and marked the 
space between communities within a community, that is the divide 
between ethnic politics and formal Party politics (Diagram 3). Where 
issues appear to confined to organisations and groups that individual 
members could not resolve, and which lay outside the experience of the 
politicians, the only two options they had were to identify a scapegoat 
or to accept the consequences. Issues concerning large organisations, 
like the ICC and VHP, lay at the centre of ethnic politics and on the 
borderline of local politics. In this context major matters about 
political control of large organisations and authority over members were 
contested by the leaders. Therefore, the politicians viewed such debates 
as politically profitable, some involvement could produce political 
support. However, the issues lay outside the scope of local politics, 
because by implication the aims and ideals behind them were not shared 
by Muslims or Hindus. Where minority communities could be treated as 
one by submerging individual social identities, the politicians believed 
that they were supporting the political aims of an equal opportunity 
community. Since there was no structure of leadership behind which this 
disparate collection of minorities could unite, the decisions made and 
access offered were irrelevant and ineffective. The final context of 
events brought out extreme categorisation: all the minority communities 
were defined as outsiders or the leaders used it to define themselves as 
powerless victims, patronised or discriminated against. 
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Diagram 3 
Ethnic and Local Political Options for Decision Making 
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Not one of these options allowed for the development of ethnic 
structures of leadership and ethnic politics. The overriding political 
aim was to submerge ethnic differences within the wider political aims 
of society, but there was also a commitment to recognising and 
tolerating ethnic differences. So long as ethnic differences are 
accepted, there is no way in which politics and politicians can ignore 
them. The efforts of politicians to suppress ethnic political activity 
served to feed on their own fears of the emergence of Asian sections 
within or without political parties. Gujarati leaders challenged the 
central political values of the white politicians, and in doing so they 
created grounds for the development of racism which fed upon these 
fears. Thus politicians from both of the major political parties argued 
that it was their duty to resist the development of black sections in 
the name of democracy. The notion of multiculturalism implies a sharing 
of central values and the Gujarati leaders through ethnic politics 
opened up these values to scrutiny and debate. In this these leaders 
were far ahead of their time. 
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The Strategies of the Labour and Conservative Parties: 
Events I have argued are embryo urban social movements. To reiterate, 
they do not meet all the criteria that Castells suggests need to be 
present for them to be described as successful urban social movements. 
They do not "connect three dimensions: goals of collective consumption, 
goals of political self management expressed through attempts to build 
local political autonomy and goals of cultural identity" (Castells, 
1985:3-4; Lowe,1986:47). Characteristics which these events do not share 
with urban social movements include a clearly defined arena and a tacit 
acceptance of the existence of supporters of leaders. However, they do 
share many of the other characteristics. Cultural identity lies at the 
grassroots of these movements and the goals of political self management 
are recognised as desired outcomes by the leaders. The cross-cultural 
aspect of these movements is self-evident; many politicians believed 
that this aspect could be controlled through the medium of the BCCR. The 
goal of most movements is to achieve change, motivated by those in the 
movement believing that their urban experiences are not shared by 
others in the community. Gujarati leaders of all organisations believed 
that the wider community did not share or understand the consequences of 
being seen as racially different, subject to racial discrimination and 
in a position of powerlessness. Castells (1985:10) makes the point that 
change occurs in the twilight zone between parties and movements. This 
thesis and other research has shown that politicians courted the Asian 
and black votes, but that rather than opening up political opportunities 
to members of these minorities or even creating Asian and black parties 
within political parties, most white politicians used CRCs as buffers. 
The argument in this section is that some change did occur in Bolton and 
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that this change had as much to do with the politicians as with the 
Gujarati leadership. 
Any recognised participation by Gujaratis in local politics had to be 
conducted within the constraints of the established political machinery. 
This meant that Gujaratis as individuals could participate as electors 
and party workers. For Gujarati leaders to participate as politically 
recognised leaders, they had to work within the constraints imposed by 
the political structure. To win political recognition they had to 
receive party support to be selected to stand, they had to be allocated 
a ward to fight, and finally they had to win an election to gain 
recognition as councillors (or as MPs). Without going through this 
process, they could not muster sufficient support within a ward to win 
it as independents. Located on the fringes of political parties 
Gujarati leaders could be a political threat or provide considerable 
support. The establishment of an Asian or black caucus within or without 
one or both major political parties was regarded as unacceptable by the 
politicians. Thus ethnic politics was (and still is) perceived by 
politicians contrary to the interests of the local and national 
politics, since it symbolises the interests of a minority within a 
majority community. 
Nevertheless, leaders acted as if they were participants in local 
politics. They behaved as if political decisions could be taken as a 
result of debates in the BCCR. They also acted as if they were supported 
by a body of supporters and that their support could be regarded as 
politically viable and made politically visible. The interplay between 
the emergence of ethnic politics and the constraints of local politics 
provided a forum for debate which enabled them to define the power 
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relationship between those perceived as ASian, black and those perceived 
as white. This debate also identified an area of cultural conflict over 
which no one was prepared to accept political responsibility. Seen as a 
provider of services and an arena the BCCR was placed in an ambiguous 
position: it could be seen either to act as a buffer or as a pressure 
group. The politicians favoured the former role and the leaders the 
latter. Although the strategies employed by politicians from the two 
major parties to achieve this end were different, together they created 
a political buffer that went beyond the role and remit of the BCCR. 
These two perspectives of local politics brought the leaders and local 
politicians into confrontation and produced some change. 
Labour Party: 
The strategies of the local Labour politicians differed from those of 
the Conservatives, primarily because at the time this research was done 
they were the opposition party. Furthermore, the support they received 
from Gujaratis can be traced to a belief held by the latter, like Asians 
elsewhere, that this political party favoured a reduction in immigration 
controls (Layton-Henry,1984:170: Chaps.lO and 11). Thus their strategy 
was to attack decisions made by the then controlling Conservatives. From 
the events that Muslim and Hindu leaders brought to debate, Labour 
politicians selected those which brought them the greatest political 
rewards. For instance the Lena Street Mosque event gave Labour 
politicians the opportunity to show how a powerful Council could take 
advantage of a small and powerless sect by refusing to help them, 
implying that they preferred to respond to local white pressure than to 
support Muslims. This strategy suggested that they considered it 
politically profitable to work to attract Asian voters rather than to 
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try to identify white floating voters or to persuade those voting 
Conservative to vote for the Labour Party. This strategy served to 
alienate the supporters of the Conservatives. The interest shown by 
Granada Television helped to publicise the plight of the sect, the 
supportive role of the Labour politicians and the unhelpful role taken 
by the Conservatives. The result was that Muslims became convinced that 
Labour politicians supported them. Such a strategy in all likelihood 
lost them some of their entrenched white supporters as well as those who 
supported the Conservative Party, but who possibly withdrew their 
support on being persuaded of the ineffectiveness of the Conservative 
Party. Such white voters could become disillusioned with the efforts of 
both the major parties but for different reasons. For them the options 
included becoming floating voters or joining peripheral racist 
organisations, such as the National Front. 
As the opposition party, Labour politicians did not have to find 
reasons for rejecting decisions precipitated by events. They could 
restrict their involvement to events which in their judgement would 
produce the greatest political profit. They restricted their involvement 
to events which would produce the least antagonism from all sections of 
Bolton society. They hoped to capture Gujarati votes but also to 
persuade the anti-racist middle class voter to support them. Their 
strategy was to avoid taking sides where events involved the larger 
organisations and communities, and particularly those with clear 
religious identities. They opted for strategies which led to decisions 
that favoured amorphous groups like Asians, Gujaratis and Indians. For 
this reason these politicians could accept Mr Sandhu's proposed role of 
St. Barnabas as providing a base from which Hindus could make a 
contribution to Bolton life. 
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However, these politicians found themselves having to face the view 
that they too were regarded as taking advantage of Gujaratis and black 
people or allowing others to do so, when Mr Sandhu described their 
strategies as exploiting the position of Asian and black communities in 
formal local politics. To emphasise his point he would describe Asians 
and black people as immigrants or foreigners. In other words the Labour 
politicians were little different to the Conservatives. He described the 
strategy of this Party as racist. Thus he was able to persuade them to 
support him in his complaint against the Isle of Man police, in his plea 
for help for the Ugandan refugees and for an In-Company Language 
Training scheme to help all Asian workers. A number of years later a 
Labour controlled Council tried to close down this training scheme. This 
was precisely the kind of ethnic politics which these politicians did 
not want and wished to control. Therefore, they invariably supported 
events which promoted co-operation between major religious organisations 
or groups which were ineffective. In so doing they had to accept the 
dangers of being cast in the role of discriminators, patronisers and 
victimisers. 
The strategies of Labour politicians were to manipulate social 
identities which combined the Hindus and Muslims with other Asians thus 
separating them from the white community and from their own 
organisations. By doing this they treated them as if they were no 
different from any other interest group. Consequently they could stand 
on the political and racial fence from which position they could condemn 
racism while not actively supporting anti-racism. Their support for this 
strategy suggests that they believed that it could attract political 
support without openly antagonising their ethnic or white supporters. 
It can be inferred that the continuing local support for the 
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Conservative Party was due in some part to the defection of white 
supporters from the Labour Party. To minimise such defection, Labour 
politicians were ready to establish personal relationships with 
Gujaratis, while not committing themselves politically. Their closest 
relationships were with Muslims, whom they believed to be more united 
than Hindus and therefore more politically dangerous. Evidence for such 
beliefs were based on the readiness of Muslims to protest, as in the 
case of the bearded schoolboy, or their opposition to the Conservative 
Council's decision to close down Lena Street Mosque. More tangible 
evidence emerged during the late 1980s when in a local election the 
Muslims fielded candidates. The most concern was shown by the Labour 
candidates in whose wards these Muslims stood. Thus they had no 
intention of encouraging the development of a politically powerful 
Muslim section within or without their Party. The willingness of the 
Party to include Muslims (and Hindus) is not in question. What is 
questioned are the grounds on which the Party refused to support 
Gujarati candidates. Possibly, these politicians feared that to 
encourage such a candidate might precipitate the formation of a 
Gujarati, Asian and/or black political section. 
The preferred decision-making options of the Labour politicians were 
those which submerged individual social identities and implied unity 
across the various Asian communities which was of little political worth 
to Gujarati leaders. From the point of view of this Party their 
strategy was calculated to divide these communities while supporting a 
false unity and keeping the leaders outside the political party 
structure. However, this Party's awareness of the need to capture the 
Gujarati vote and of some of the racial issues that accompanied events 
suggests that some change had occurred. 
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Conservative Party: 
Much of what has been said about the Labour Party applies to the 
Conservative Party politicians. Like the former, the latter were made 
aware of the importance of the Asian votes at the time of the arrival of 
the refugees from Uganda and at the two general elections of 1974. 
Furthermore, in 1976 the Lena Street Mosque event had made apparent some 
of the difficulties faced by a controlling Council who were expected by 
a Muslim minority to find solutions to their problems. Since they argued 
that they did not have the power or resources to resolve these 
difficulties, they were seen as racist and anti-Muslim in particular. 
Between 1972 and 1976 the Conservatives did not encourage or support 
any demand made by Gujarati leaders on the one hand for fear of 
encouraging factionalism within the Gujarati communities, and on the 
other hand for fear of losing white support if they made decisions which 
resulted in increases in the rates. Their lack of support for the ICC 
was based upon a belief that were a Muslim candidate to be successful, 
he might use the position to advance his personal career at the expense 
of the Party. This unspoken threat was tacitly accepted by Party members 
as a reason for not supporting a Muslim as a candidate. 
Likewise when Mr Sandhu raised the matter of unequal treatment of 
Hindus and Gujaratis generally in the Isle of Man and In-Company 
Language Training Scheme respectively, their representatives on the 
BCCR could do little but agree with him. If they, as the controlling 
Party on the Council, agreed to any of the demands made by these 
leaders, they had much more to lose than the Labour Party. To have 
publicly supported the Gujarati leaders would have alienated many of 
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their white supporters, thus reducing their majority and probably losing 
for them their control of Bolton. [Almost two decades later the Labour 
Party controls the Local Authority. They follow similar fence-sitting 
tactics now to those employed by the Conservatives in 1976. They are 
unsupportive of the efforts of Asians and black people to develop a 
politically meaningful arena in which the latter can participate.] 
Consequently, they studiously avoided supporting the leaders in the 
debates over Ramadan, burial facilities, the bearded schoolboy. Thus 
they too preferred strategies which submerged the social identities of 
Gujaratis within more neutral ones which linked them to Asians or 
Indians. 
The need to counteract their negative image and the attraction of 
Gujarati votes was considered by some Conservative politicians to be 
sufficiently important for them to consider a more radical strategy. 
This strategy was to support Gujarati candidates in two separate local 
elections with the express aim of courting the Gujarati and Asian vote. 
In doing this they were following the example set by a London based 
branch of their Party who supported a Major Saroop, a Kensington and 
Chelsea councillor, in the establishment of an Anglo-Indian society with 
the intention of "wooing the Asian vote" (The Sunday Observer,18/8/76; 
Layton-Henry,1984:148). The difficulty which faced the local Party was 
not just the nomination of a Gujarati as a candidate, but from which 
community to select a candidate and to assess the risk of this person 
not supporting the Party line. Aware of their lack of support amongst 
the Muslims, they selected first a Hindu on the grounds that he was a 
member of a minority Gujarati community, that did not show obvious 
support for the Labour Party. 
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The Conservative Party selected Mr L, a Kutchi Swaminarayan who was 
also a member of the VHP and BCCR, to stand in Bradford Ward, which was 
and still is a traditional Labour stronghold. The results of the 
election showed that the Labour candidate received 86% of the votes, Mr 
L received 9.8% (165 votes) and the Social Unity candidate received 
4.22% out of a total of 1,687 votes cast (Table 7.1). Basically, the 
strategy appeared to be workable: an Asian candidate standing in a ward 
with a 20% Asian vote should have dented the support given to the 
established Labour candidate. Although the strategy appeared to be sound 
on two grounds: first that a local major political party was openly 
supporting an Asian candidate, and secondly that a large number of 
Asians lived in the ward. It failed here because it alienated Hindu, 
Muslim and white voters, just as it did a few years later in the 
national elections of 1979 (cf. Layton-Henry, 1984:152). 
It is difficult to ascertain accurately to which ethnic communities 
the 18% of Conservative voters belonged who took their votes away from 
Mr L. The ward in which he stood comprised white, Hindu and Muslim 
voters. As a Hindu he was unlikely to attract Muslim votes and as a 
Conservative unlikely to draw Labour votes. He was also unlikely to 
attract the white vote because of the hostility Asians experienced when 
they moved into the ward. The Hindu vote which he hoped to draw failed 
to materialise: some Hindus chose not to support him because he was a 
Swaminarayan; others claimed that he was not a member of the sect. Some 
members of his caste and sect said that, because he did not pay them a 
personal visit, he had not fulfilled the social obligations which 
political support required (cf. Mayer,1966). For a number of reasons he 
failed to attract the votes his Party needed. Possibly he also stood 
little chance of succeeding, since he stood for a Party which most 
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Gujaratis considered to be in favour of the control of immigration. 
Although by supporting an Asian candidate, they provided him with an 
opportunity to achieve a position in the formal political hierarchy and 
thereby publicly claimed that they were anti-racist. 
Table 7.1: Results of Three Elections in Bradford Ward 
New Metropolitan 
Borough Election 
1973 
Labour won 3 seats 
with votes:-
1,119 77.3% 
1,046 76.3% 
1,011 77.5% 
Conservatives 
obtained votes:-
329 22.7% 
325 23.7% 
294 22.5% 
Local Election 
1976 
Labour re-elected 
Votes:-
1,205 68.5% 
Conservatives 
gained votes:-
498 28.83% 
Independent Social-
ist votes:-
56 3.2% 
Local Election 
1978 
Labour re-elected 
Votes:-
1,451 86% 
Conservatives: 
Mr L:-
votes:165 9.8% 
Social Unity votes: 
71 4.2% 
In local elections a year or two later the Party selected a Muslim 
woman to stand as a candidate in the same ward. She too polled a small 
number of votes. While in one sense this was a bold choice; it also 
showed a lack of understanding of ethnic politics, which at this time 
was dominated by men. Being a woman and a professional she shared little 
ln common with Gujarati voters and was perceived as IIblack li by white 
voters. Clearly the voters were not ready to accept a Muslim woman as a 
councillor. In a sense she was doubly, if not triply, disadvantaged. 
Consequently she fared a little better than the Hindu candidate. 
Although she trebled the vote for the Party, she still received only a 
small number of votes. These strategies show that this Party recognised 
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the need to take a positive view of Gujarati, other Asian and black 
members of the wider political community. However, by giving such 
candidates unwinnable seats the Party ensured that they had all to win 
and little to lose. Their fears about such candidates using their 
positions to promote their own careers remained untested. Thus to some 
extent that this Party supported two Gujarati candidates can be taken as 
evidence of change. Neither political party was committed to supporting 
Gujarati, Asian or black candidates. One West Indian candidate [he 
consistently argues that he is not an Afro-Caribbean] who did succeed as 
a Labour Party candidate later experienced racial abuse from the members 
of his own Labour Club members. 
To conclude this section. Successful movements die as a result of 
their success. These Gujarati movements did not die, because they failed 
to create sufficient space for the development of a Gujarati, Asian or 
black caucus. The demands of these Gujarati leaders for political 
recognition were not granted, because neither political party was 
prepared to support Gujarati candidates or willing to facilitate the 
development of a Gujarati/Asian and black caucus within or between the 
parties. Thus these communities and their leaders have continued to 
exist. 
The next and final section of this Chapter shall provide a conclusion 
and consider how ethnic politics laid the basis for contemporary racism 
and for the demise of the concept of ethnicity. 
Conclusion: Ethnic Organisation to Political Power 
The aim of this thesis is to relate the migration and settlement of 
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Gujaratis in Bolton in the 1950s to the development of a Gujarati 
community and its response to racism in the 1970s through the 
mobilisation of political leadership and support (ethnic politics) in an 
informal political arena (the local CRC). 
The period between 1950 and the present can be separated into two 
broad periods, the first covering the period from 1950 to 1970 and the 
second covering time from 1970 to the present. This thesis falls 
between the two. The first period was one of intense immigration and 
the second is associated with recessions (cf. Sarre,1989:125). The 
majority of Gujaratis came here during the first period and their ethnic 
political activities including urban movements fall within the period 
of recession. In particular the years of the research fell between the 
first major recession in 1974 and 1979 when the second major recession 
occurred. In part this gives this study both an individuality which is 
not to be found in other research and a commonality which is found in 
other research, such as Katznelson (1973) and Rex and Tomlinson (1979). 
Most of those sampled came here during the period of immigration, when 
citizens of the Commonwealth could enter Britain with relatively 
freedom. Political pressure for control on immigration was met by the 
passing of the Commonwealth Immigration Act of 1962, which restricted to 
"former colonial citizens whose skills and/or qualifications were 
needed" (Sarre,1989:134). From now on immigration was increasingly 
controlled, thus reducing the flow of migrants into the country. 
A decade later the Gujaratis were reacting to these controls by 
voicing fears about their insecure position here (see Appendix I). 
Against this background they settled in Bolton's inner area, moving into 
houses vacated by white landlords. Gujarati migration did not fluctuate 
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with changes in employment in Bolton or Britain; it increased until it 
was curtailed by various immigration controls. The two-up and two-down 
housing, so characteristic of northern industrial towns, provided these 
settlers with a flexible form of housing. It lent itself to alterations 
that met their needs: these houses could be adapted to the requirements 
of nuclear or extended families, to usage as shops, offices, mosques and 
temples. These settlers changed their immediate environment by 
establishing services which met their needs, namely shops which 
specialised in Gujarati foodstuffs, household goods, clothing and 
culture (music, books, religious items), and in religious and community 
centres. As their surroundings changed and more migrants joined the 
community, they moved into neighbouring areas looking for housing and 
buildings which they could purchase, change and adapt. Their increasing 
physical visibility matched their spatial expansion and within a few 
years they had surrounded the town centre (see Chap.l, Map.l). This 
expansion was accompanied by requests for planning permission for new 
shops, temples and mosques, by demands for places in schools for their 
children, for support for their children to become equal achievers 
alongside other pupils in schools and for better and more focused health 
services. As Smith observes: "residential segregation is a medium for 
the reproduction of racial inequality" (1989:105). 
Gujaratis can be defined as a population living in a particular 
territory, housing and outwardly sharing a similar life style. Their 
pattern of settlement epitomised that of other migrants from the Indian 
subcontinent. Like these others, Gujaratis were able to find employment 
mainly in the textile industry; most of their jobs were semi- or 
unskilled, of low social standing, low paying, and insecure. In 1976 
most of those sampled were employed with only a few being unemployed. 
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Their socio-economic position placed them within the working class. 
Though I do not address the question of the relationship between class 
and race (see for instance Sarre,1989), their work careers (see Chap.I) 
ensured that most would stay in this social class and continue to accept 
whatever manual work was available to them. They formed a racialised 
group within the working class, partly because they gave the impression 
of placing their commitments to their kith and kin, living here and 
abroad, above those to their jobs. With an apparent lack of motivation 
to acquire higher skills and/or qualifications in association with the 
gradual disappearance of manual jobs, these Gujaratis held jobs that 
over time would become vulnerable to the effects of recessions. Time and 
recessions did put them, and others like them, at risk of unemployment 
and today they comprise a group experiencing one of the highest rates of 
unemployment (District Trends, 1990:13; see also Sarre,I989). To some 
extent they exercised their own form of status group closure. This 
seems to support the argument that they form a racialised class 
fraction (Miles,1982). Since they contribute to their formation as a 
status group, this would suggest that race under these circumstances 
predominates over class. Rather than being the victims of a class 
closure strategy (Parkin,1979), they could be regarded as participants 
in the closure process. At this point in their settlement in Bolton, I 
would argue that together with other Asian and black ethnic groups, they 
could not be regarded as forming an underclass (Rex and Tomlinson,I979). 
The reason for this being that Rex and Tomlinson's approach ignores the 
interactionist perspective which would take account of the racial 
division that separates Asian from black person, and Asian and black 
person from the poor white. The concept of the underclass also suggests 
that those in it formed some degree of cohesion. These authors make it 
clear that the reactions of these ethnic groups to racism could take 
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different forms (Rex and Tomlinson, 1979:Chap.8). This implies a sharing 
of racial, economic and political experiences across ethnic groups, 
which was not apparent in 1976. Since they share jobs of similar social 
standing, a similar life style, similar housing and participate in the 
closure of their group within the working class, I would argue that 
Gujaratis form a racialised status group. 
There are two points that I would make about class, the first is that 
insufficient attention has been given to black peoples' career 
aspirations (I have used the term black in its widest sense to include 
Asians and Afro-Caribbeans). Observation suggests that even Gujaratis 
who are successful do not always choose to alter their life styles to 
show their new found wealth. Secondly, some Gujaratis remain committed 
to pursuing paths that confine them to manual work (also Sarre,1989:147-
149). Racism may support such career trajectories and it may also 
increase the difficulties faced by young black people who live in inner 
towns and cities looking for work (Sarre, 1989:144-147). In these early 
years of the second period, a few Gujaratis moved into white areas and 
into white businesses. A decade or two later these Asians and more 
like them were being described as forming a new group of entrepreneurs 
(Waldinger et al,1990), but the signs of change were present in the 
1970s. The lack of change in Gujaratis' life styles with or without 
changes in their occupations suggests that there is a cleavage between 
their position as a racialised status group and their class. It is this 
cleavage which provided the bases for religious and political collective 
action. One advantage of this notion of a status group is that it allows 
account to be taken of ethnic differences without losing sight of black 
groups' responses collectively or singly against racism. 
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Set apart by their skin colour, their style of life, their 
occupations, housing and culture, Gujaratis experienced in the early 
1970s a period of intense ethnic identification. This was brought about 
by on the one hand, competition between themselves for scarce resources 
to meet their own community needs, and on the other hand, an awareness 
of the importance of their vote to white politicians. I define a 
community as a group of people who share the same place of origin, 
belief in the same religion and membership of the same faction, caste or 
sect, and live within the same area of town. Competition between 
communities for scarce resources, such as space, planning permission, 
and bids for funds for community projects intensified the development of 
separate social identities between Gujaratis and between Gujaratis and 
members of other ethnic communities (ethnicity). A complex of 
communities came into being within the Muslim and Hindu populations; 
each one was committed to meeting the social and religious needs of its 
members. Within a short period of three or so years, two organisations 
emerged as being larger and better resourced, and better led than 
others; these were the ICC and the VHP. Some of the smaller 
organisations each representing a community flourished, because their 
members here and abroad supported their development into real estate. 
Others that could not muster such support either disappeared or joined a 
larger organisation. Each community became aware of its social 
similarities to and differences from other communities within the 
resident Gujarati population. 
Underlying and underpinning these communities are social networks of 
friends, that is 
(Laumann,1973:3-4). 
"persisting patterns of social relationships" 
The social distances between these communities were 
embedded in social perceptions of Gujaratis of themselves and members of 
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other communities, Asian, black and white. Based upon these perceptions, 
Gujaratis in theory were prepared to include or exclude members of 
different Gujarati, Asian black and white communities. In practice, the 
principle of homophily, "like attracts like", held for close friendships 
and therefore the primary zone of social networks were comprised of 
friends belonging to the same ethnic and religious communities as the 
anchor points. The social and structural characteristics of Muslim 
anchored zones allowed for greater cohesion of Muslim organisations 
and the Islamic community. The characteristics of Hindu zones 
contributed to the fragmentation of Hindu organisations and the Hindu 
community. What also became apparent was that less intense 
relationships, such as ordinary friendship and acquaintanceship, were 
reserved for relationships with people from communities that were 
separated from the Gujaratis by greater social distances, such as white 
people, Africans and West Indians. These social networks comprising a 
core of Gujaratis surrounded by zones of relationships of lesser 
intensity with people who were perceived as being socially distant 
served to concentrate community and ethnic social identities, social 
commitment and support into the Gujarati communities (Chap.3). The 
effect of this was to define more clearly than their class position 
their separation from others. The argument that those in weak positions 
establish exchange relationships with those in strong positions does 
not hold for this minority group in a racialised society. Gujaratis 
invested in their own communities rather than weaken their position by 
investing in strong relationships with those in more powerful positions 
than themselves (Lin,1982). 
This awareness of their ethnicity took the form of separating the 
'us' from the 'them' (Wallman,1979; 1978) with the result that the 
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Gujarati population was reducible to a 'bricolage' of communities 
(Chap.3). One important consequence of this competition and conflict for 
survival was the effect it had upon community leaders (see below). 
Another consequence of this schism between communities was the 
development of a hierarchy of social belonging. Individual Gujaratis 
identified with members of their immediate family, with the community in 
which were their kin, with larger communities within which their 
community could be submerged, with the largest of the religious 
communities of Muslims or Hindus, and finally with others who shared 
their skin colour and racial experiences. The advantage of this 
hierarchy of belonging was that ethnic leaders could use it to mobilise 
or reduce support in relation to individualised or shared ethnic and 
racial experiences. I draw distinctions between community, ethnic group 
and ethnicity. Where two Gujarati communities distinguish between 
themselves in terms of 'us' and 'them', they are establishing their 
social identities. Where this process occurs between Gujaratis and 
members of other Asian or black minority communities, I would refer to 
the definition of social identities as ethnicity. The reason for this is 
in the former instance the process of definition occurs within the 
ethnic group; in the latter instance it occurs between ethnic groups. 
The labels associated with social and ethnic identities are merged into 
a hierarchy of belonging which has become part of the vocabulary of 
common sense racism (Chap.4). 
With such a growing population of potential voters without any 
established or formalised commitment to a political party, politicians 
from different parties competed for their votes. The politicisation of 
immigration encouraged such competition, since it gave politicians 
opportunities to claim or disclaim responsibility for their party either 
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increasing or reducing controls on immigration or supporting or 
undermining better race relations in Britain. Aware of their strategic 
importance, the Gujaratis discovered that there was a discrepancy in how 
they viewed themselves and how the politicians saw them. Gujaratis saw 
themselves as at least comprising two religious communities with 
sufficient members to warrant political representation in formal 
political arenas. The politicians viewed the Gujaratis as at best a 
collection of religious interest communities and at worst a collection 
of voters. This generated a feeling of dissatisfaction with politicians 
and their representation of the concerns of Gujaratis, evidence for 
which was found in the views of those sampled (Chap.5). These views were 
formed through debates in the only arena accessible to Gujaratis, namely 
that of the local CRC. Furthermore, such debate made Gujaratis aware of 
the need for them to have representatives in the formally recognised 
political arenas of the Local Authority. 
As the importance of representation became apparent and became linked 
to Gujarati demands for a range of local services (Chap.6) to meet their 
needs, the functions of representatives of Gujarati organisations took 
on a political character that was missing from the roles of earlier 
leaders. Unable to establish a presence in either of the main political 
parties, they had to rely upon their own ethnic organisations adopting a 
more political role than they had previously done. Thus the political 
space between these communities and the white community in which events 
occurred became value loaded, that is events that could be located 
within this political space were linked to racism, political 
powerlessness and disorder. The identification of participants in these 
events ranged from the less familiar labels of factions, castes and 
sects to the more familiar ones of Muslim, Hindu, Paki, Blackie and 
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immigrant. These events gave ethnic leaders opportunities to define the 
political relationship between Gujaratis and the white community in 
terms of powerlessness and power. As the largest of the local ethnic 
communities with the most leaders, it stands to reason that many of 
the events involved Gujaratis. Such events involved conflict between 
factions in the mosque, Ramadan and facilities for twenty-four hour 
burials. Where interest went beyond the confines of this ethnic group, 
other communities and ethnic groups participated. For instance, Muslims, 
Hindus and West Indians participated in the debate on the In-Company 
Language Training Scheme in which all were being labelled as 
"immigrants", with all that this implied (Chap.6). Therefore, ethnic 
politics in the middle 1970s showed how leaders from different ethnic 
communities could form alliances against white politicians in informal 
political arenas in a way that suggests that they were ready to share 
racial experiences and an embryonic common culture. This was the 
forerunner of a more complex culture which is shared today by Asians, 
West Indians and Africans living in Britain, USA, West Indies and Africa 
(cf. Gilroy, 1987: Chap.5). 
These alliances could not be regarded as communities (cf. Gilroy, 
1987:235-236), because the identities the Gujaratis shared with members 
of other ethnic communities was political. I do accept that such 
alliances signified not just a distinctive political ideology but a 
particular set of values and norms in everyday life: mutuality, co-
operation, identification and symbiosis (Gilroy, 1987:234). Gujaratis 
still ensured and continue to ensure that they retain their Gujarati 
culture and individuality. These alliances contributed to the 
protestations of black people about their political position and to 
their experiences of racism. The decisions that were reached on events 
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showed that both the major political parties were intent upon muzzling 
the ethnic leaders by using the local CRC as a buffer. The overall 
effect of this strategy on ethnic communities has been to coerce them 
into uniting as a black caucus without giving the ethnic leaders 
opportunities to achieve political recognition. This strategy has also 
had the effect of separating the political functions of leadership from 
leadership of the religious organisations. This has reduced religious 
organisations to interest groups and in the process has eroded all forms 
of ethnic politics, leaving the black communities in Bolton with no 
opportunities for political participation other than as non-ethnic 
members of political parties. 
Therefore, this study draws attention to the importance of ethnic 
politics in contributing to the development of contemporary racism and 
ethnicity. What started as a mainly Gujarati ethnic political activity 
was widened to include other local ethnic minorities. Although by the 
1970s the broadening of political interests was not achieved, even 
though one leader, Mr Sandhu, had attempted to establish a council of 
ethnic leaders, the foundations for such an alliance were laid. A decade 
or so later such a council was formed. Thus this study falls in between 
those of Katznelson (1973), Rex and Tomlinson (1979) and Gilroy (1987). 
The importance of ethnic politics remains: black people do not have 
equal access to local or national political arenas. The political system 
does not allow for a black party, a black caucus or any representation 
based on colour. The cleavages between race and class, race and 
politics, race and government, and race and democracy remain. This 
allows political parties and governments to continue to politicise race. 
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APPENDIX I 
DATA COLLECTION AND QUESTIONNAIRE 
The aim of this Appendix is to provide additional background 
information on the methods and difficulties experienced collecting data, 
and in particular to focus attention on the construction of the 
questionnaire. In doing this certain biases arising from the research 
methods used become clear. The subject matter of this Appendix should be 
linked to the section on methodology (Introduction, Part II), thereby 
providing an overall view of the collection of data. It brings together 
the way in which knowledge of the communities and people gained through 
participant and nonparticipant observation supported and constrained the 
construction of the questionnaire. This report will address firstly 
selection of the sample, secondly construction of the questionnaire, 
thirdly piloting of the questionnaire, fourthly recruitment of 
interviewers, fifthly difficulties interviewing, sixthly research issues 
and finally representativeness, reliability and validity. 
Methods used to collected data involved micro- and macro-techniques, 
namely participant and nonparticipant observation and use of a 
questionnaire (Introduction, Part II). Both forms of observation were 
employed as techniques to become acquainted with Gujaratis and to 
collect data. The information gathered by observation gave direction and 
substance to the collection of data on case studies on decision-making 
events and to the questions that formed the questionnaire. The 
questionnaire was used to collect data on ethnic background, faction, 
caste and sect membership, family structure, friendship networks, 
occupations and occupational history of employment, education, political 
involvement and commitment, and leadership. This had the virtue of 
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allowing for the collection of more formal data, as opposed to informal 
data collected by participant observation. By using participant and 
semi-participant observation first, Gujaratis had an opportunity to 
become aware of the research project and acquainted with the researcher. 
Secondly, it provided crucial information for the construction and the 
administration of the questionnaire. The combination of techniques of 
observation with the case study and survey enabled me to enrich the 
data collected in a away that the survey method alone cannot offer 
(Goode and Hatt, 1952: 121). 
The research project was carried out in two overlapping stages: the 
first stage involved the use of nonparticipant observation (1971-76) and 
in the second a survey (1975-76). Time was spent with Gujaratis in 
their homes, temples and mosques, shops, businesses, in some of the 
schools their children attended, political meetings, electioneering, 
weddings, funerals and other social events. Data were collected on 
social, economic, religious and political relationships within and 
without the Gujarati communities, using the case study method to collect 
data on particular political events and on leaders. 
1. The Selection of the Sample 
Initially, I selected randomly from the electoral register 400 
addresses of people with Asian names with the intention of interviewing 
200 Hindus and 200 Muslims distributed residentially across the town. 
This did not guarantee that all 400 were Gujaratis, since some Gujarati 
names are similar to names of people from Pakistan and some other Indian 
states. For reasons given below this proposed sample could not be 
achieved. The final sample comprised 258 adult men, the majority being 
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over the age of eighteen; a minority of seven were aged sixteen (2) and 
seventeen (5) and one Muslim, who was older than eighteen, refused to 
give his age. The sample comprised 104 Muslims and 154 Hindus. The 
majority of Hindus were Gujaratis; four came from other parts of India, 
one was a Sikh, chairperson of the VHP during the time of the research. 
All but two of the Muslims were Gujaratis. Thus this is a study of 
Gujaratis and no attempt was made to include other minorities. The size 
of the final sample was determined partly by the difficulties I 
experienced recruiting interviewers, partly by the constraints of time 
and costs and partly by the physical impossibility of one interviewer 
carrying out a random sample alone. 
A sample of 258 schedules out of a sample universe of an estimated 
8,000 households is a 3.23% sample. At the time no adequate population 
lists were available. Cross-checking the circulation of lists of members 
of Gujarati organisations with the electoral register would have been a 
long and difficult task. Some organisations did not wish to make their 
lists of members available to me, and some individuals belonged to more 
than one organisation. Although I cannot for statistical reasons argue 
for randomness, this sample can at least be regarded as an aggregate. 
Statements can be made about the Bolton community, which would bear 
generalisation. 
This study of ethnic politics involved only men, since no women at 
that time held positions in social and religious organisations which 
might have brought them into prominence and into informal or formal 
political arenas (Introduction, Part I, footnote 2). Therefore, little 
mention is made of women; this is a bias in the sample. In the 1970s 
men held all the key positions in political organisations and women 
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appeared to be disinterested or were constrained by men from becoming 
more involved. Although I came across the odd woman teacher in a mosque, 
she has had no influence in mosque politics. Hindu women held positions 
within caste associations, sects and the VHP, but few were in prominent 
positions in Bolton. In Gujarati communities here there was and still 
is no evidence of the emergence of voluntary and self-help groups, which 
in other parts of Britain have given women opportunities to play more 
public roles. Given the social values surrounding the role of women in 
Gujarati society, as a man, I could not have gained access to the views 
of the women. Furthermore, by the time the interviewing began I still 
knew too little about women's involvement in community affairs. Later I 
learnt that Hindu women belonging to certain caste organisations had 
their own committees, elected their own chairpersons and that they 
joined the men's caste association committees when taking decisions on 
caste matters. Unfortunately none of these women lived in Bolton, so 
they could not be interviewed, but this does not mean that they are not 
prominent in Asian communities elsewhere in Britain. Indeed, recent 
literature points to the roles played by Asian women in industrial 
disputes, in work, business, self-help organisations and in local 
politics. 
2. Construction of Questionnaire 
The questionnaire was based upon data collected by participant and 
nonparticipant observation, and has allowed much of the observed data 
to be presented in a more structured form. Not only does this mean that 
quantitative and qualitative data could be brought together, but also it 
meant that this made possible a formal analysis of data which, at first 
sight, might appear unstructured. For instance a formal analysis of 
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Gujarati social networks is to be found alongside an analysis of data 
based on nonparticipant observation, such as that on ethnic political 
events. The blending of qualitative and quantitative analysis occurs in 
many parts of the thesis, such as in the analysis of religious 
organisations, perceptions of social distance, friendship, and ethnic 
politics. 
Taking one of these areas as an example, it is possible to show how 
each approach supported the other. For instance Gujaratis' ideas about 
friendship, communities and common sense racism depended upon the 
collection of data that could be analysed by both formal and informal 
processes. Data on the qualitative aspects of friendship were formalised 
through the use of a questionnaire, thus making it accessible to 
quantitative and formalised network analysis. Data on who has access to 
social information, where they meet, how frequently they meet and who is 
excluded from sharing "public knowledge" was initially obtained using 
micro-techniques. Then it was formalised into questions that appeared on 
the questionnaire. Data such as that on perceived social equivalence of 
knowledge, and the deployment of this knowledge in the context of the 
political arena by leaders could not be formalised. Nor was it possible 
to formalise the collection of data on negotiations which took place in 
the BCCR. This was part of a co-operative process which led to the 
creation of an oral history that in turn gave depth and complexity to 
community life (Emmett,1982:208). 
The questions for the questionnaire were based on the knowledge I 
acquired during the first two years research, which was carried out 
during evenings and weekends when I learnt about the communities and 
their members. The construction of the questionnaire became closely 
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associated with the selection of interviewers. Individuals and 
organisations, whom I approached for help with interviewing, sought to 
have questions they did not approve of modified or deleted, before they 
were willing to assist with the interviewing. The process of 
modification became closely linked to a process of approval, because 
using an anthropological approach the balance between community 
acceptance and totally independent inquiry is open to negotiation. This 
process formed the pilot stage. The questionnaire was modified on at 
least four occasions before it was administered. A pilot survey was 
carried out in October 1975, and as a result certain questions were 
modified. Then, having discussed the schedule with Dr Abrams [1], it was 
again modified. He estimated that it would take about an hour to 
administer; trials proved that it took three to four hours to complete. 
It was destined to take even longer to complete with Gujaratis who spoke 
no English. 
The first people whom I approached for help with interviewing were 
some Muslim acquaintances from Blackburn, one was a teacher, one a radio 
announcer, and one the secretary of the Indian Workers' Association. 
They objected to questions on nationality, length of residence in 
Britain, questions which too obviously distinguished between Hindus and 
Muslims, and questions which went too deeply into political involvement. 
The reasons they gave were that some of the questions would elicit the 
kind of information, which many believed could be used against them. 
Asians, they argued, felt insecure in Britain, since they were not being 
accorded equal rights: "If we ask for what are regarded as general 
rights, white people at us as if we have demanded special rights. We 
are not asking for favourable treatment, just for fair and equal 
treatment. II One cited the case of an Asian drug smuggler that had 
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appeared in a local newspaper: "Not only was he sentenced to four years' 
imprisonment but he was also to be deported. Had he been white, he would 
only have been sent to prison for a couple of years. When an Asian 
breaks a law like any other Briton might, he is dealt with more harshly 
than the transgression warrants" [2]. It later became apparent that 
their fears were shared by other Muslims and Hindus. 
In their opinion the questions should reflect general opinions and 
not those of particular Asian communities. Not long after these 
discussions, in the North West some 200 Asians had been arrested by the 
police on the grounds that they were illegal immigrants. Such 
occurrences continued to support Asians' fears about their insecurity in 
Britain and served to make them even more wary of answering questions 
about their backgrounds and political opinions. Generally they were 
unhappy about answering questions and many who answered the questions on 
my schedule believed that there would be repercussions. There was no way 
in which I could alleviate their fears and suspicions. 
It was noteworthy that the vice-chairperson (VHP) and a committee 
member (VHP) criticised the same questions and for the same reasons as 
had the three Muslims. However, the former criticised a number of other 
questions: any question which appeared to reflect differences in caste 
and religion among Hindus had to be eliminated. Questions which implied 
that members of different castes could or would not support members of 
other castes had to be deleted. These Hindus adhered to the principle 
that the VHP, as a multi-caste organisation, could not support the view 
that social differences between castes was important. Other VHP 
committee members thought that the questions were important. These 
concerns reflected the vice-chairperson's support for a Sikh as 
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chairperson of the VHP and his awareness of the potential 
destructiveness of caste identities for both his support of a Sikh and 
the VHP as a mUlti-caste organisation (Chaps.2,5,6). The evidence has 
shown that Hindus still attach great importance to caste differences. 
One question that was singled out as problematic was that on the 
length of time a person had lived here. In the opinion of those Hindus 
and Muslims I consulted, respondents would not give such information. 
They argued that illegal immigrants and their relatives and friends 
would not wish to be identified. Any Gujarati could believe that by 
answering a question on length of residence in Britain, he was providing 
the police with the relevant information about his status in this 
country, albeit through an alternative channel. Those Gujaratis who knew 
me and knew of my research were prepared to answer this question. These 
Hindus stressed that the less educated Gujarati might not be able to 
understand the purpose of a survey, and might refuse to accept any 
assurances about confidentiality that I might give. Moreover, no 
Gujarati organisation was prepared initially to accept responsibility 
for confidentiality on my behalf. Therefore, however valuable the 
question was on length of residence, it had to be deleted. The omission 
of this question has detracted from the analysis of settlement patterns. 
Another question to pose problems was that relating to information 
about the home village. Although most respondents answered it, many 
expressed fears about answering it. Some feared that this information 
would find its way to the Indian Government, which would check on 
ownership of property in the villages. They said that the Government 
had the right to seize property owned by Indians living here, who were 
British nationals. Some Gujaratis answering this question feared that by 
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giving the names of their villages, their families in India might be 
made to suffer. The question was asked and was answered. 
Further questions which raised fears were on close friends (No.65 and 
66). The majority of the respondents argued that to give this 
information was being too personal. Although they acknowledged that I 
did not ask for the names or initials of friends or exact addresses, 
they felt that all close friends could be traced. This could be taken as 
a measure of the closeness of these Muslim and Hindu communities. They 
also felt uneasy about answering some of the questions on politics, such 
as (no. 122) Do you think that people like you have too much political 
power, too little or about the right amount? Certain parts of the 
following question (no.123) were condemned for the same reason. All the 
questions were subjected to intensive scrutiny and as a result many were 
modified and in a few instances parts were deleted. To my knowledge 
these fears turned out to be groundless. 
This did not mean that I altered the questionnaire, rather it pointed 
to the importance of making apparent the differences between Hindus and 
Muslims, between friends and acquaintances and information. The 
questions about villages remained in the questionnaire. However, 
ignoring their criticism of the questions on length of stay and 
nationality could have proved to be insensitive and given their fears it 
was tactful to modify them [3]. 
3. Piloting of the Questionnaire 
Two Muslim friends came from Blackburn to help me pilot the 
questionnaire. We did one interview, but this highlighted some of the 
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major difficulties: firstly, I learnt how difficult it was to translate 
some of the questions into Gujarati, and secondly, after shortening the 
questionnaire, how it could still take three hours to complete. It took 
this length of time to complete even in the hands of an interviewer, who 
understood the questions, and an interviewee who was not suspicious 
about how the information might be used. This interview proved to be 
instructive in other ways; the issues it raised were typical of the 
problems that I met throughout the duration of the survey. 
For instance from the addresses I had drawn on my random sample, they 
selected the addresses of one's brother-in-law and the other's brother-
in-law's brother-in-law. They explained to me that they felt happier 
interviewing people who were related to them, came from the same 
village, from the wife's village, or villages of close friends. This 
meant that respondents could trust them with answers to personal 
questions [4]. These respondents could not ask the interviewers to leave 
the house, if they did not wish to continue with the interview. The 
point was made that a Muslim interviewer would not voluntarily go into 
the house of any Muslim with whom he could not establish a social link. 
The implication of this was that I should have identified every 
family selected and then found interviewers who knew them. This was 
impossible, since I could never be certain that I could match an 
interviewer with a family selected in terms of similar religious beliefs 
and acquaintanceship. This required a depth of knowledge of the 
community which I did not possess. Thus it became apparent that a random 
survey would fail. Consequently, one solution was that I interview as 
many Hindus and Muslims as possible. The other solution lay in trying to 
obtain support from Gujarati organisations to assist with interviewing. 
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In the end I settled for both of these solutions, but it meant 
abandoning the idea of a random sample [5]. 
4. Recruitment of Interviewers 
Recruiting interviewers is supposed to be a simple task; the problem 
is to train them. In this instance recruitment of interviewers presented 
the biggest problem. Initially I found a group of 'a' and 'A' level 
Gujarati students at Bolton Technical College (now Bolton Metropolitan 
College), who said that they were willing to interview. When they saw 
the questionnaire they began to express doubts. Initially, they said 
little, a few indicated that they had never heard of some of the caste 
groups. Payment was discussed along the lines suggested to me by the 
Social Science Research Council Survey Unit. The students said that 
their lecturer would inform me of their decision. Some weeks later I 
received a message stating that the students were unwilling to help, but 
no reasons were given. Then I learned that some thought that I should be 
offering £2/ questionnaire instead of 50-60 pence. Later a few students 
informed me that they had refused, because they were unwilling to ask 
people whom they did not know and who were older than themselves 
questions, which they considered to be too personal. The question of the 
rate of pay was just a way of saying that they were not prepared to do 
the interviewing [6]. 
At this stage I had drawn a random sample from the electoral 
register. I had also seen lists, such as that of members of the VHP, 
the Mandhata Patel Samaj and some mosques. The addresses of all 
respondents were ready for handing over to the interviewers. The refusal 
of the students to do the interviewing ensured that I would have to do 
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most of the interviewing myself and would not have the time, manpower or 
finance to carry out a random sample. To an extent another issue was 
resolved: when I knew that I would have to do the bulk of the 
interviewing, I decided against translating the questions into Gujarati 
and/or Urdu. Apart from this, some of the questions proved to be 
difficult to translate and had to be simplified. 
After the refusal of the students to help, the search for other 
interviewers raised a new set of difficulties with regard to the 
construction of the questionnaire. I approached some Muslim friends and 
members of the VHP for help and support, in particular to act as 
referees for me. Before, they would help with the interviewing, they 
examined each question. As a result further questions were modified, 
changed or removed from the questionnaire. I approached the VHP for 
help, when I realised that I could not complete a survey of 200 Hindu 
heads of households without assistance and community support. Three 
influential members agreed to help, they included the vice-chairperson 
(VHP), a national organiser of the VHP, and two members of the executive 
committee. One was vice-chairperson of the Mandhata Patel Association 
and the other was a supervisor at a local mill, whose father was an 
influential Kanbi in the Kutch community. He had links with the three 
sections of the Hindu community, including through the VHP with people 
who did not come from Kutch, with Leva Kanbis through his mother and 
late father and with Kadva Kanbis through his uncle and a distant 
cousin. These men proposed that the VHP would do the interviewing. Once 
the questionnaire was edited to their and my satisfaction, a proposal 
was put to the VHP that I would pay the interviewers £1/ questionnaire 
and that the interviewers would donate the money to the VHP. The 
proposal was accepted. 
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They outlined the problems of interviewing: no Hindu interviewer can 
interview a Muslim; no Hindu interviewer of student age can ask anyone 
but his father to answer personal questions about home village, caste 
and subcaste membership, religious affiliations and politics; no Hindu 
student is likely to know the answers to these questions, as his parents 
will not have told him; no Hindu of student age can ask Hindus who are 
both unrelated and also his seniors such questions; and no Hindu would 
feel happy asking his close friends such questions. Given these 
parameters of social distance, logically no Hindu could interview anyone 
but members of his own family of his own age with any predictable degree 
of success. As the VHP supported the venture, at least I was assured of 
some success. The VHP Committee gave Mr K the task of organising the 
interviewers and interviewing, and he recruited younger members to do 
the interviewing [7]. He gave questionnaires to interviewers who 
represented the range of Hindu organisations, castes and religious 
communities, so that householders who were not members of the VHP could 
also be interviewed [8]. 
Judging, however, from the range of questionnaires completed by 
Hindus, they give the appearance of having drawn on a wide range of 
Hindus from wide range of backgrounds, castes, sects and beliefs. Where 
it can be demonstrated to be non-random is in the selection of 
respondents in relation to the area in which they live. The majority of 
the Hindus who completed questionnaires live in areas surrounding the 
town centre. I attempted to remedy this by interviewing Hindus who lived 
in some of the other areas of the town, most of them were usually 
doctors or successful businessmen and they would, as Mr K observed, 
refuse to complete the questionnaire, particularly if the interviewer 
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belonged to a lower caste and/or was less educated than themselves. 
A total of 130 schedules were returned to me by the VHP in June 
1976; about 108 were complete and the remainder were in a state of 
incompleteness. It took them almost five months to do this. When I 
interviewed Mr Sandhu, the Chairperson of the VHP, he said that the 
questionnaire was innocuous and that he could easily interview 250 
people on his own. When I gave him three questionnaires to complete, he 
never even attempted to complete them. A possible explanation may be 
that he was more of an outsider in the Hindu communities than was 
apparent from his position of leadership. 
On one occasion Mr K and I together approached the secretary of the 
Shree Kutch Swaminarayan Mandir organisation to obtain help. I was 
acquainted with their secretary, and had also interviewed him. He and Mr 
K came from the same village in Kutch, so we thought that he might feel 
obligated to help. However, he made it clear that he wanted nothing to 
do with Mr K and he refused to do anything for me too. Nevertheless, 
later on members of his organisation did complete some of the 
questionnaires. The reason for his refusal emerged later on, he was 
opposed to the VHP and to Mr Sandhu. Unlike the VHP, the Swaminarayans 
and Shree Kutch Swaminarayans were committed to maintain differences of 
caste and sect. 
In comparison with the VHP, the Muslim organisations large and small 
made no offer to help with the interviewing. If anything they obstructed 
it. Thinking that I could follow a similar strategy, in February 1976 I 
arranged a meeting with four influential Muslim members of the ICC to 
ask them for support, these were Mr AD, Mr B, Mr Sand Mr A.R .. I 
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thought that I had convinced one of the four; however, I learnt later 
that I had been unsuccessful. They represented the views of those most 
opposed to my research. At a meeting in Mr AD's house I gave my reasons 
for conducting a survey and for wishing to interview Muslims. I also 
told them that a few questions had been deleted or modified. I also 
mentioned that Mr M, a past president, and Mr U, the president of the 
ICC supported me. Four issues crystallised as the discussion progressed, 
but they were never resolved. After looking through the schedule, Mr A.R 
said: "When we left India, we left it behind us. Now we are British, we 
have British passports. There is no point in asking us about Baruchi and 
Surti and our differences. We live here". These very differences that I 
later found divided the Muslim community, these men argued were 
irrelevant to their lives in Bolton [9]. 
An issue arose from my stating that I should interview as many 
Muslims as possible, if I intended my survey to be scientifically 
acceptable. The idea of my interviewing individuals was rejected. Mr B 
said: "We can tell you all about Indians, you don't need to interview 
them". Later on when I attempted to interview him, he was loathe to 
answer the questions and refused to name the streets in which his close 
friends lived. He also argued that his answers would become data and 
that this would be later used against him and the Muslim community. Mr 
B argued that I was getting information from the Muslims, but what were 
the respondents getting in return? Although the respondents were helping 
me, I could do nothing for them. Later on a Muslim 'A' level student 
refused to complete a schedule for this very reason. He turned around an 
old adage: "one man's poison is another man's profit". 
Related to this issue was another: who would take responsibility for 
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the survey if they agreed to help me? I aimed my request at these four 
men as individuals and as members of the ICC. Following the discussion 
about why I should interview as large a number of Muslims as possible, 
Mr A.R said IIWe can ask Mr AD to take responsibility for the decision to 
interview the community". Although all four men were old friends, Mr A.R 
picked on the one man who came from a different district to the others; 
Mr AD was a Surti while the other three were Baruchis. It was 
interesting to reflect on the first words that Mr AD spoke at the 
beginning of this meeting, he said: "We four are old friends. We 
organised the purchase of the first mosque in Bolton. Although we have 
had our bitter differences, we have remained friends". In reply to Mr 
A.R's question about who would take responsibility, Mr AD said: IINo, I 
can't do that. We must ask all of the members of the ICC committee to 
support us ll • Though all four then agreed to being interviewed, none 
volunteered to be interviewed and they never put their request for 
support for my project to the ICC committee. It was weeks later that 
through another Muslim friend I was able to persuade Mr AD to agree to 
an interview and months before I again met Mr Band Mr S. Mr B refused 
to complete a questionnaire. The ICC refused to co-operate, although I 
did later receive help from a few individual members. This placed the 
bulk of interviewing of Muslims on me. 
5. Problems with Interviewing 
Gujaratis were reluctant to answer questions on their personal and 
political life, and to overcome this reluctance was not easy. With the 
VHP taking over some of the interviewing, these fears were to some 
extent diminished. Nevertheless, the questions which were incomplete 
were the ones thought to be too personal, such as the one on close 
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friends. Some respondents wrote on the questionnaires: this question is 
too personal. The only way that I as an interviewer could allay peoples' 
fears was by referring them to someone whom they knew, and whom I had 
already interviewed. This was not always possible, since it depended 
upon my knowledge of the interviewee prior to interviewing them. An 
element of luck became associated with the exercise: if I could mention 
the name of a person the interviewee respected, then he might agree; if 
not, he was likely to refuse. It also meant that I had to find an 
interpreter to enable me to interview the Muslims. Help came in part 
from Gujaratis' personal knowledge of me, since this gave some of them 
confidence to answer the questions and me the knowledge of who might 
prove to be of the greatest help with a particular interviewee. The two 
years I spent as a participant observer proved to be invaluable. 
Of the 104 Muslims interviewed, 16 were interviewed by Muslims who 
had offered to help. Mr M, a prominent member of the ICC [10], 
interviewed 5 and then refused to do more, because he said that he could 
not ask his friends to complete some of the personal questions, such as 
the one on close friends. He too reiterated the problems which the two 
Blackburn friends had mentioned to me, no Muslim will or can ask friends 
or strangers to answer personal questions. Mr Y, whose family I knew 
well, completed five interviews at work, and Mr S.K, an 'A' level 
sociology student, completed six schedules. The difficulties that beset 
this survey were again made explicit by the strategy adopted by Mr S.K. 
His family who came from the village of Barbodhan, Surat, were amongst 
some 150 members of this village who lived here. Of the 35 houses of 
relations and co-villagers that Mr S.K visited in the hope of completing 
some interviews, only one person said that he required time to consider 
the request. The rest refused outright. An explanation for this would 
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need to take account of his being too young to be given the personal 
answers by his elders to some questions. 
Help also came from my choice of interpreter. It was easy for me to 
interview persons whom I knew. However, I was told and found out that to 
enter the houses of people who did not know me or had a mutual friend 
whom I could identify, resulted in being rejected. This occurred with 
one family who spoke fluent English but with whom I could not establish 
a link. After talking to a friend, Mr G, about these problems, he agreed 
to help me. Both of us were members of the BCCR. It was Mr G who told Mr 
AD after Friday prayers at mosque that he should stop playing and should 
complete a questionnaire. Mr AD completed one soon afterwards and he 
also gave me some names and addresses of relatives whom he thought would 
probably agree to being interviewed. 
I interviewed the remaining 83 interviewees with support from Mr G. 
He accompanied me to about 70 houses. He also took me to Hindu families 
who were opposed to the VHP, so I did in practice cross the divide. As 
an interpreter, he was able to communicate with respondents; he knew 
exactly when and how to joke with them and how to phrase the questions 
in Gujarati. Furthermore, he was well known to Muslims for two reasons: 
first, he was a prominent member of the Muslim community and a member of 
the BCCR. Secondly, he spent time helping Muslims and Hindus with their 
personal and immigration problems. Consequently, with his support I was 
able to obtain answers to all of my questions; in fact, I could even 
have asked those questions which I had to delete. 
Generally, my experience showed that the few Muslim interviewers, 
who helped me with the interviewing of Muslims, experienced far more 
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difficulty persuading Muslims to answer these questions than I did (see 
Footnote 3). This provides some indication of the difficulties that a 
Gujarati researcher might encounter doing research on Gujaratis. Being 
a Gujarati and carrying out research in his/her own community is not 
necessarily an advantage. Sometimes being quite different and easily 
distinguishable is more of an advantage. At least then people can hide 
their views without being placed in compromising positions [11]. 
6. Research Issues 
The issues raised by difficulties I encountered bring into question 
certain fundamental assumptions that most sociologists make who use 
surveys or questionnaires to obtain data. The first assumption is that 
respondents can trust the author of a survey with their answers. However 
often the word confidential may appear in a covering letter, it still 
remains to be demonstrated that confidentiality can be maintained. Trust 
is a notion open to many interpretations and where this does not occur, 
answers may be tailored by respondents to protect themselves. There is 
no easy way to overcome such fears, except where a major organisation is 
prepared to support the project, as in the case of the VHP, and to a 
lesser extent among the Muslims where one or a number of individuals 
will stand surety for an interviewer/researcher [12]. 
Though having trained interviewers is highly desirable, they should 
be seen to be sufficiently detached from the community to be above 
personal gain and yet, as members of it, still be able to engender 
trust. Possibly, in conducting a survey in a small, tight-knit community 
such as this one, strangers, including a Gujarati who belongs to a 
different caste or sect to that of the interviewee, would be regarded 
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with suspicion. Even those Hindus and Muslims who assisted me came under 
suspicion within their communities. There was no solution to this 
dilemma. Consequently, a community supported project was the solution 
the VHP accepted and, under the circumstances, I believe it was the only 
way that I could carry out the interviewing of Hindus. Many of the 
answers Hindus gave to questions about caste are more "accurate" and 
"realistic" than might generally be expected, since the interviewees 
knew that they had the protection of the VHP. The Hindus turned my 
project into one from which they could all benefit; the money they 
received was used to improve their community centre. They also intended 
asking me to provide them with information about themselves, but as yet 
they have not done so. 
Confidentiality is impossible to demonstrate. Although during the 
period of the survey nobody who was arrested in Bolton as an illegal 
immigrant could trace links to me, the fear that I might divulge 
information was strong. I told all respondents that the questionnaires 
would be destroyed. They agreed that this should be done. The second 
aspect of the problem of confidentiality was that when I began the 
project, people raised the issue of confidentiality. When I stopped 
interviewing, Gujaratis wanted to know why I had ceased interviewing. In 
other words, if I had continued with the survey, this would have proved 
to them that I was trustworthy. The cessation of interviewing proved 
that I was untrustworthy. By just breaking all my contacts with them, I 
was breaking their hold over me. I had to promise Mr G that I would 
continue interviewing, otherwise both his and my standing in the 
community was endangered. 
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7. Representativeness, Reliability and Validity 
I obtained questionnaires from a broad section of the Gujarati 
population. Though it is possible to carry out a random sample in an 
Asian population, it requires a considerable financial outlay [13]. 
Therefore, arising out of the non-randomness of the sample are certain 
biases. Possibly the sample reflects the opinions of young Hindus as 
opposed to older Hindu heads of households. However, this is balanced by 
a sample of Muslims who were predominantly older heads of households. 
Generally I would argue that anyone who anthropological fieldwork 
techniques could obtain the similar answers to the same questions as I 
did. Reliability depended more upon my relationship with Gujaratis than 
it did upon their interpretation of questions. A further problem was 
that my relationship with the Gujaratis became closer and my knowledge 
of them increased noticeably at the time when the questionnaire was 
produced. Consequently, there were certain errors in questions which I 
was unable to rectify, such as the question about valued attributes of a 
job and the lack of questions about whom respondents go to for help. 
Most respondents, to my knowledge, endeavoured to give the most truthful 
answers that they could. 
The validity of the questions varies from question to question. 
Answers to questions about personal details are, I believe, valid since 
the fear of giving such details was to a large extent overcome by the 
VHP and personal sureties given in support of the project. Questions of 
a generally accepted type comprised the majority of questions on the 
schedule. Some questions like that on valued attributes of jobs (No.lll) 
are probably less valid than other questions, since they were not really 
419 
applicable to persons who held jobs other than those in mills. The 
validity of answers to questions in which general scales were used, such 
as a lot, some, not much, none, or more often, regularly, less than once 
a week, or generally satisfied, satisfied, dissatisfied and generally 
dissatisfied are difficult to assess, since such measures provide 
individuals with some freedom for interpretation. The responses to 
questions on political issues appear to be valid in that the answers 
were apparently truthful. To some questions about attitudes some 
respondents gave behavioural answers: for example, to the question 
"Could you accept a West Indian as a close friend?", they replied, "I 
have none. II To some extent this could be interpreted as a form of 
cultural dissonance. Those respondents who understood the assumptions 
made by interviewers often replied that they trusted everybody; in 
practice, they only trusted their own kin. To assess the validity of 
individual questions raises such issues which can only be resolved by a 
discussion of reliability of the schedule. In general, questions aimed 
at eliciting an opinion are less valid than questions which demanded 
answers about social behaviour. 
420 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
FOOTNOTES 
I .discussed the survey with Dr Abrams, then Director of Social 
SC1ence Research Council Survey Unit before finalising the schedule. 
Research shows that generally black people who break the law 
receive harsher sentences than those received by white offenders 
for similar crimes (Hudson,1989). 
For a detailed and humourous account of fieldwork see N.Barley, 
1986, The Innocent Anthropologist, Harmondsworth, Penguin Books. 
The argument that interviewees are often more reticent with people 
they know, because the answers are 'on the record' in the community 
no doubt holds in certain circumstances. However, as Barley shows, 
even when a person is known to the interviewer this may inhibit 
responses, because the respondent may be placed in the position of a 
gatekeeper, who has to consider whether or not to give the 
interviewer access to knowledge that is not normally accessible to 
him/her (1986). The difficulty arises from the interviewer being 
attributed by the interviewee or attributing a position to him/ 
herself, that the interviewee considers to be outside his/her social 
world. This is the more common experience and was the one which 
applied to this research project. 
Reliance on paid volunteers from outside the Gujarati communities 
may have helped me overcome some of the interviewing problems. 
However, my finance was limited and I could not afford to employ 
interviewers from outside the area and communities. This is not 
always an answer. 
Students may be diffident and then turn out to be good interviewers. 
However, in this instance they had to overcome certain social 
barriers which formed part of their own upbringing and could also 
have compromised them as members of the communities of which the 
respondents were members. As insiders they believed that they might 
be seen as flouting community rules. 
Most of the interviewers recruited were adults who could be regarded 
as social equals by the.resp?nde~ts as op~o~ed ~o stu~ents who would 
be seen as socially 1nfer10r 1n commun1t1es 1n Wh1Ch the older 
members believe that age should be revered. 
This may have created a bias in so far as I targ:ted those 
Hindus who were members of organisations but would not p1ck up those 
who did not belong. At the time of the researc~ I ~elieve that the 
majority of Hindus and Muslims belonged to organ1sat10ns. 
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9. Though I did not rely on respondents to specify how the survey should 
be done, to have done the survey with no knowledge of the 
communities would have resulted in my not knowing about many of the 
social distinctions which proved to be sociologically important, 
such as caste and sect differences, the importance of village 
identities, and perceptions of friendship. In the Introduction Part 
II I argue that I cannot speak for Gujaratis; therefore to have 
ignored what potential respondents told me would have draw 
accusations of tactlessness, if not, racism. 
10. He was invited to weddings to read poems he had written praising 
the bride, the bridegroom and their families. 
11. I must reiterate the point that I did not rely on what potential 
respondents thought, rather experience proved that to ignore the 
social divisions which potential respondents brought to my 
attention, would have been foolhardy and irresponsible. Then nobody 
would have co-operated with this project. 
12. Though using the wrong guarantors can make matters worse, selecting 
guarantors may be a matter of trial and error. 
13. See the Open University research on Asians in Bedford. 
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APPENDIX II 
QUESTIONNAIRE 
To be completed for all households and occupants selected in the sample. 
All information given by respondents will be treated as confidential. 
Street 
Ward . 
. . . . . . 
. . . . . . 
Date of interview . 
Time of interview . 
Recalls ..... . 
It is important for the purpose of my research that only Indians answer 
the questions. 
Every adult Indian male over the age of 16 years should complete a 
schedule. 
Topic 1 
I would like to ask you for some information about yourself and your 
fami ly. 
1. How many persons, adults and children of all ages, live in this house 
at the moment? 
2. How many persons, who usually live here, are away at this moment? 
3. How many families and/or persons as well as you/your family live 
here? 0 or 1 2 3 more 0 or 1 2 3 more 
(Interview the heads of these families and mark the schedule, so that 
the information on one household can be kept together) 
4. Are you the owner of this house ? 
Yes No 
1- Are you a member of the owner's fami ly? 
ii. Are you a tenant? 
iii. Are you a guest (paying)? 
iv. Are you a guest (non-paying)? 
v. Are you a lodger? 
5. Are you the head of this household? 
Yes No 
i. Are you a member of the owner's family? 
ii. Are you a relative? 
iii. Are you a friend? 
iv. Are you a guest? 
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6. If you are a relative or a member of the owner's family, what is your 
relationship to the head of the household? 
Symbols for relationships: Father - F; Mother - M; Brother - B; 
Sister - Z; Daughter - D; Son - S; 
Wife - W; Parents - P. 
Instructions: 
Use any combination of symbols 
to describe a relationship. 
7. In which year were you born? 
8. Where is your home village (India) ? 
9. What is the name of the nearest large town or city? 
10. In which state is your village? 
11. Are you: 
married with 
your wife 
living with 
you? 
married with 
your wife 
living else-
where? 
widowed? divorced? separated? single? 
1 2 3 4 
12. In which year was your wife born? 
13. Where is your wife's home village (India)? 
14. What is the nearest large town or city? 
15. In which state is your wife's village? 
16. Yes Is your wife a relative of yours? 
Use Symbols below: 
Father - F; Mother - M; 
Brother - B; Sister - Z; 
Son - S; Daughter - D. 
What is the 
relationship? 
17. What languages does your wife speak? read 
English 1 2 
Gujarati 1 2 
Urdu 1 2 
Hindi 1 2 
Punjabi 1 2 
Swahili 1 2 
Other (specify) 1 2 
5 
? 
6 
Go to 
question 25 
No 
write? 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
18. How many years did your wife spend at school? (years) 
19. In which country{ies) was your wife educated? i. U.K. 
1l. India. 
iii. East Africa. 
i v. Other (specify). 
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20. What qualification(s) did she obtain? i. None. 
i i. sse. 
iii. Ma t ric. 
iv. "0" Levels. 
v. "A" Levels. 
vi. Other (specify). 
21. Did your wife go to college, university or take any kind of 
educational or industrial course(s) after she left school? 
Yes 
What course(s) did she take? 
Where did she take the course(s)? 
What qualification(s) did she obtain? 
No 
22. How long has she lived in Britain? 
23. Did she come to Bolton straight from: i. Another British town. 
(specify) 
i i. I nd i a. 
iii. Kenya. 
iv. Uganda. 
v. Tanzania. 
vi. Other (specify). 
24. As well as housekeeping, does your wife do a job? 
Yes 
What is the job? 
(description or specific name of job) 
Where does she work? 
No 
I would like to ask you the same questions. 
25. What languages do you speak? read ? write? 
English 1 2 3 
Gujarati 1 2 3 
Urdu 1 2 3 
Hindi 1 2 3 
Punjabi 1 2 3 
Swahili 1 2 3 
Other (specify) 1 2 3 
26. How many years did you spend at school? (years) 
27. In which country(ies) were you educated? i. U.K. 
11. India. 
28. What qualification(s) did you obtain? 
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iii. East Africa. 
iv. Other (specify). 
i. None. 
11. sse. 
iii. Matric. 
. "a" Levels. 1 v . 
v. "A" Levels. 
Vl. Other (specify). 
29. Did you go to college, university or take any kind of educational 
or industrial course{s) after leaving school? 
Yes No 
What course{s) did you take? 
Where did you take the course{s)? 
What qualification{s) did you obtain? 
30. How long have you lived in Bolton? 
31. Did you come to Bolton straight from: i. Another British town. 
(specify) 
i i. India. 
iii. Kenya. 
iv. Uganda. 
v. Tanzania. 
vi. Other (specify). 
32. What job do you normally do? (Get exact name of job) 
33. Where do you do this job? 
34. Are you employed at the moment? 
Yes No 
For how long have you been unemployed? 
35. Are there any children living in this house? 
Yes 
How many are boys? 
What are the ages of the boys? 
How many are girls? 
What are the ages of the girls? 
36. School-going children: 
Which schools do they attend? 
No 
Are any of your children 
living elsewhere? 
Yes No 
How old are Go to 
these children? question 38. 
. . . . . . . . . 
37. Children who are no longer at school: 
At what age did 
they leave 
school? 
. . . . . . . . . 
What qualifications 
did the child{ren) 
obtain? 
. . . . . . . 
. . . . . . 
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What is{are) the child{ren) 
doing at this moment? 
(obtain exact title and place 
of job or, if unemployed, for 
how long?) 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . 
. . . . . . . . . . 
38. No~ that you.liv~ in Bolton, do you feel that caste differences 
(Hlndus) or dlstrlct customs (Muslims) are worth keeping? 
Yes No 
Can you give a reason? 
39. Hindus only 
40. 
To which castes do you belong? 
Brahmin Mistry 
Kshatriya Lohana 
Vaishya Tailor (Darji) 
Shudra Halpati 
Don't Know Solanki 
Valand 
Harijan 
Kumbar 
Luhar 
Amin 
Rajput 
Patel only for Patels Leva Matia Kadva 
Other (specify) 
Into which of these castes would you 
caste marrying? 
Patel If a Patel 
Mistry then also 
Lohana 
Tailor (Darji) 
Halpati 
Solanki 
Other (specify) 
Kanbi Charotar 
Mandhata Koli 
Other (specify) 
approve of members of your own 
Leva 
Kadva 
Rajput 
Amin 
Charotar 
Kanbi 
Patidar 
Matia 
Ko 1 i 
Mandhata 
Other (specify) 
41. Muslims only 
To which caste community do you belong? Vohra 
Khojah 
Memon 
Miabhai 
Nagori 
Daudi Bohra 
Other (specify) 
42a. Do you regard yourself as a Baruchi Muslim or Surti Muslim? 
b. Into which of these caste communities would you approve of your 
own people marrying? 
Vohra 
Khojah 
Memon 
Nagori 
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Miabhai 
Daudi Bohra Other (specify) 
For all persons who are or were married 
43. Does your wife belong to the same caste t or cas e community as you? 
Yes No 
If no, which one does she belong to? 
Topic 2. 
I would like to ask you some questions about Bolton, your neighbourhood 
and neighbours. 
44. Who or what persuaded you to come to Bolton? 
i. Relatives. 
ii. Friends. 
iii. Gujarati Community. 
iv. Job Opportunities. 
v. Other (specify). 
45. Who or what persuaded you to live in this neighbourhood? 
1. Relatives. 
i i . Friends. 
iii . Gujarati Community. 
iv. Job Opportunities. 
v. Other (specify) . 
46. How long have you lived in this house? 
House Owners and Tenants. 
47. Where did you live before you moved into this house? 
48. Were you the owner, lodger or tenant? 
49. Before this, where did you live? i. Bolton (specify area). 
ii. Britain (specify town/city). 
iii. India. 
iv. East Africa. 
v. Other (specify). 
50. Generally speaking, would you agree that: It is better to live 
among your own community than to live in parts of the town that 
are strange to you? 
strongly agree agree disagree strongly disagree 
Give reasons: 
Topic 3 
I would like to ask you about your neighbours and friends. 
51. How many neighbours do you know well enough to visit? O. 
1 - 3. 
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4 - 6. 
7 - 9. 
10 and over. 
52. How many of these neighbours are: 
Indian Muslims 
Indian Hindus 
Pakistanis 
White Persons 
Others (Specify) 
Few Half Most 
· ....................... . 
· ....................... . 
· ....................... . 
· ....................... . 
· ....................... . 
53. (a) Can you name the different religious and cultural groups to 
which people with whom you work belong? 
(b) Can you name the different cultural groups to which people 
with whom you pray in church/temple/mosque/guru dwara belong? 
(c) Do you meet people who belong to different religious and 
cultural groups to your own as a member of any other 
organisation or in any other place, such as a social or 
political club, a pub, at a sporting or holiday club, or as a 
member of some educational committee? 
Yes 
As a member of which organisations? 
or in what places? 
No 
To which religious, cultural or racial groups do these people 
belong? 
(d) Do you have as ordinary friends persons who belong to 
different religious and cultural groups? 
Yes No 
To which religious and cultural groups do they belong? 
54. Can you identify a maximum of five relatives living outside Britain 
with whom you keep in touch? 
Relationship 
Father - F 
Mother - M 
Parents - P 
Brother - B 
Sister - Z 
Daughter - D 
Son - S 
. . . . . 
Place of Residence 
Village/Town - if 
India, then also 
largest town in 
district 
. . . . . . 
. . . . . . . 
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How often do you visit 
them? 
. . . . 
. . . . . . . . . . 
55. Can you identify a maximum of five relatives living in Bolton and 
Britain whom you see most often? 
Relationship 
Father - F 
Mother - M 
Parents - P 
Brother - B 
Sister - Z 
Daughter - D 
Son - S 
Place of Residence 
in Bolton: 
Street 
Elsewhere 
Town 
. . . . . 
How often do you visit 
them? 
56. Are you the kind of person who thinks of himself as having a few 
really close friends or as having a large number of persons with 
whom you are close and friendly? 
a few a large number 
57. How many really close friends do you think you have, including 
relatives? 
58. Taking a guess, how many ordinary friends do you think you have? 
59. Where do the majority of your friends come from? 
i. Kutch. 
ii. Kathiawar. 
iii. Broach. 
iv. Surat. 
v. Navsari. 
vi. Other (specify). 
60. How do you tell the difference between your close friends and your 
ordinary friends? 
61. During the past two weeks, how often have you visited friends or 
been visited by friends? i. 0 times. 
62. 
can you: rely on a: 
i i. 1 - 3 time s . 
iii. 4 - 6 times. 
iv. 7 - 9 times. 
v. 10 and more times. 
relative 
. . . . 
a close 
friend 
an ordinary 
friend 
. . . . 
an aurkhan 
or pichan 
trust in a: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
expect 
expect 
expect 
respect from a: 
sympathy from a:. 
help from a: . . . 
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. . . . . . 
. . . . . . . . 
. . . . . 
63. 
Can you 
accept as: 
a relative: 
a Gujarati a White a West a Paki- a Sikh 
Hindu Muslim Person Indian stani 
. . . . . . . . . . 
. . . . . . . . 
a close friend: . 
an ordinary 
friend: . 
an aurkhan 
. . . . 
. . . 
. . . 
. . . . 
. . . . . . 
. . . . . . 
or pichan: . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
64.(a) Generally speaking, would you say that: It is best to have close 
friends who belong to your own cultural and religious community? 
Yes No 
(b) How strongly do you agree with this? 
strongly agree agree disagree strongly disagree 
65. Information about a maximum of ten close friends: 
Name,initials, 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
symbols: 
Address (if Bolton): 
if elsewhere (town 
or city) 
Sex male/female: 
..................................... 
..................................... 
Related(R)/unrelated(N): .................................... . 
Where do you 
usually meet? at home: .................................... . 
at wo rk : .................................... . 
at the cinema: .................................... . 
at church/temp 1 e/mosque: .................................... . 
ina pub: .................................... . 
at sports/hobby: .................................... . 
at Islamic Culture 
Centre: .................................... . 
at Vishwa Hindu 
Parishad: .................................... . 
at Hindu Sevak Sangh: .................................... . 
at clubs/social 
gatherings: .................................... . 
other places (specify): .................................... . 
Are they: 
Gujarati Muslim: .................................... . 
Hindu: .................................... . 
Pakistani: .................................... . 
White: .................................... . 
West Indian: .................................... . 
Sikh: .................................... . 
Other (specify): .................................... . 
What jobs do they do? .................................... . 
(if possible exact 
name of job) 
How often do you see them? .................................... . 
(daily,weeklyetc.) 
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66. Close friends: 
Copy out list of a maximum of ten initials given in Question 65 in 
the same order along row A and down column B 
A 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 B 1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
(Can you please tell me how well your friends in your oplnlon know 
one another using the following values to indicate the appropriate 
relationship: 
Relative Close Ordinary Just Does not Unfriendly Hostile 
Friend Friend Know Know 
1234567 
Topic 4 
I would like to ask you some questions about your own interests in the 
political affairs of the Asian community in Bolton. 
67. I would like you to select one problem which in your opinion would 
require attention, if Asians are going to continue living 
peacefully in Bolton. 
68. Who in your opinion can handle this problem? 
Bolton Council for Local Authority 
Community Relations (Town Hall) 
Commission for Government 
Racial Equality 
69. What would you like to see this organisation do about it? 
70. How likely do you think it is that this organisation will do what 
you want about the problem? 
very likely quite likely 
71. Just how strongly do you feel about this 
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unlikely 
problem? very concerned 
fairly concerned 
a little concerned 
unconcerned 
72. Now I would like to ask you how satisfied you are with some of the 
main services the Local Authority and Government provide for the 
residents of Bolton. 
Generally Satisfied Dissatisfied Generally Don't 
Services: Satisfied Dissatisfied Know 
Cemetery: . . .. .................. . 
Educational: ........... . 
Quality of 
Schools: ..... 
Police 
Protection: 
Coroner's 
Of f ice: . . . . . . . . . 
Protection 
from 
. . . . 
. . . . . 
Discrimination: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Council Housing 
for Rent or 
Purchase: ........ . 
Social Welfare 
Services: 
National Health 
Services: ...................... . 
73. Thinking about these services, do you think that Asians get better, 
about the same, or poorer services than most people living in the 
town? 
better about the same poorer 
If poorer, why do you think this is? 
74. Do you agree that Asians living in Bolton are adequately 
represented on Local Authority committees by the elected 
representatives? 
Yes 
Can you give reasons? 
No 
Who do you think should represent the 
interests of the Asian people on these 
committees? 
Elected 
councillors 
Co-opted 
members 
Other 
(specify) 
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Whom should these 
Asians represent? 
All Asians Own Religious 
groups 
How do you think all Asians 
should select their 
representatives? 
75. On which Local Authority committees would you like to see an Asian 
representative? 
76. Do you agree that Asians living in Britain are adequately 
represented in British politics? 
Yes No 
Can you give reasons? 
77. Have you heard of any of the following persons who are regarded as 
leaders? 
Mandhata 
Patels 
Saibaba Lena Street 
Mosque 
Vishwa Hindu 
Parishad 
(1) Mr Mehta (2) Mr Sharma (3) Mr Chadat (5) Mr Sandhu 
(4) Mr Ibrahim (6) Mr Anand Patel 
Swami -
narayan 
(Deane Rd.) 
(7) Mr Darji 
Shree Kutch 
Swaminarayan 
(8) Mr Tailor 
Islamic 
Culture 
Centre 
(9) Mr U.Patel 
(10) Mr Ahmed 
Pakistani 
Association 
(11) Mr Atcha 
(12) Mr Chana 
MPs (13) Mrs A.Taylor (14) Mr D.Young 
(a) If any of these persons are relatives of yours, can you name 
them and describe the relationship? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
(b) If any of these persons are close friends of yours, can you 
name them? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
(c) If any of these persons are ordinary friends of yours, can you 
name them? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
(d) If you are not friends with any of them, who do you just know? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
78. Are there any persons whom you know who you think should have been 
included in this list? 
Yes 
Who are they ? 
Why should they have 
been included? 
No 
Go to next Question. 
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79. Have you ever approached any of the above for help or advice? 
Yes 
Whom have you approached? 
(names) 
Can you tell me very briefly 
what help or advice you required? 
No 
Go to next Question. 
80. There are many ways for people to show their dissatisfaction or 
disagreement with Local Authority policies and decisions. I am 
going to read to you some ways and you can tell me whether you 
approve or disapprove of each way. 
(a) Contacting Local 
Councillors by 
writing to them or 
meeting with them: 
Approve Disapprove Depends Don't Know 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
(b) Contacting Members of 
Parliament by writing 
or meet ing with them: ..................... . 
(c) Taking part in protest 
meetings or marches: . 
(d) Campaigning against 
certain political 
candidates up for 
election: 
(e) Refusing to obey a law 
one thinks is unjust:. 
81. Do you ever listen to 
TV? 
Yes 
. . . . . 
political 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
talks or news of public affairs 
No 
on 
82. Here is a list of daily newspapers which are available in Bolton. 
Do you ever read any of them daily, occasionally, never? 
Guardian 
Bolton Evening News 
Times 
Daily Telegraph 
Bolton Journal 
Sun 
Daily Mirror 
Daily Mail 
Asian newspapers (Milap) 
Others (specify) 
Da i ly Occasionally Never 
· . . . . . . . . . 
· . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
· . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
· . . . . . . . · . . . . 
· . . . . . . . . . 
. . . 
· . . . . . . . · . . . 
· . . . . . · . . . . . . 
· . . 
. . . . . . . . 
· . . . . . . . . . 
· . . . . . 
. . . . . . . . . 
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83. Now I am going to name some organisations. Do you belong to any 
organisation concerned with: 
Race Relations? Yes No Go to next question. 
To which organisation{s)? 
Do you sit on any committees? 
84. Sport and other leisure time activities? 
Yes No Go to next question. 
Which ones? 
Do you sit on any committees? 
85. Are you a member of the Vishwa Hindu Parishad? 
Yes 
Do you sit on any committees? 
Yes 
On which committees 
do you sit? 
Are you chairman, 
secretary or treasurer? 
also 
No 
also 
No 
Did you sit on any committees 
in the past? 
Yes No 
On which committees 
did you sit? 
and when? 
Were you chairman, 
secretary or treasurer? 
Go to next 
question. 
86. Are you a member of the Islamic Culture Centre? 
Yes 
Do you sit on any committees? 
Yes 
On which committees 
do you sit? 
Are you chairman, 
secretary or treasurer? 
also 
No 
also 
436 
No 
Did you sit on any committees 
in the past? 
Yes No 
On which committees 
did you sit? 
and when? 
Were you chairman, 
secretary or treasurer? 
Go to next 
question. 
87. Do you belong to any youth organisation or other voluntary groups, 
such as the Hindu Sevak Sangh? 
Yes No 
Which ones? 
Do you sit on any committees? Go to next question. 
Yes No 
Which ones? 
88. Which religion do you believe in? 
Christian 1 
(specify 
denomination) 
Islam 2 
Sunni 1 
Hinduism 3 
Sikhism 1 
Other 4 None 5 
Shia 2 
Sufi 3 
Baha i 4 
Other 5 
(specify) 
I sma i 1 i 1 
Hanafi 2 
Ma 1 i k i 3 
Shafii 4 
Hanbali 5 
Other 6 
(specify) 
Tableeg 1 
Deobandi 2 
Berelewi 3 
Other 4 
(specify) 
Sanatan 1 
Aryan 2 
Jain 1 
Other 2 
(specify) 
Saibaba 1 
Other 2 
(specify) 
(specify) 
89. Would you say that you go to church/temple/mosque: 
more than once a week once a week seldom 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
never 
90. At which church/temple/mosque do you normally attend prayers? 
Deane Rd. (Swaminarayan) 1. 
Adelaide St. (Shree Kutch Swaminarayan) 2. 
Chorley Old Rd. (Mandir/VHP) 3. 
Odd Fellows Hall (Saibaba) 4. 
Gloster St. (Mandhata Patels) 5. 
Zakariah Mosque 6. 
Medina Mosque 7. 
Tayaibah Mosque 8. 
Lena St. Mosque 9. 
Other (Specify) 10. 
91. Do your children receive religious instruction? 
Yes No Too Young 
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92. Do you donate money to: 
the Mandir (VHP)? Yes No 
the temple where you pray? Yes No 
the mosque's monthly collection? Yes No 
a mosque fund? Yes No 
another temple's fund? Yes No 
93. Who collects your donation to this fund? 
A committee member? Is the member: 0 self? 
Other (specify) 
1 a close relative? 
2 a close friend? 
3 an ordinary friend? 
4 an aurkhan/pichan? 
94. Over the past two years, how often did you attend an election and 
vote for committee members of: 
1975 1974 
Vishwa Hindu Parishad 
Islamic Culture Centre 
Mandhata Patel Mandel 
Shree Kutch Swaminarayan 
Swaminarayan (Deane Rd.) 
Lena Street Mosque 
Mistry Society 
Other (specify) 
95. Do you belong to a village society, district society, caste 
association? 
Yes No 
Which ones? Go to next question. 
Are you a committee member? 
Yes No 
On which committees do you sit? 
96. Do you belong to a burial society? 
Yes No 
Which one? Go to next question. 
Are you a committee member? 
Yes No 
97. Whom do you feel you could more easily accept as a leader of the 
Asian community in Bolton? 
A Sikh 
A Gujarati Hindu 
A Gujarati Muslim 
A Pakistani 
Accept 
. . . . 
. . . . 
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Don't Know 
. . . . . 
. . . . . 
98. How important do you feel that it is for a: 
Muslim to: 
avoid eating bacon or ham? 
attend Friday afternoon 
p~ayers at the mosque? 
organlse the marriages of 
one's daughters as soon 
as they complete their 
schooling? 
say prayers five 
times a day? 
grow a beard? 
bury the dead 
within 24 hours? 
send children to 
single sex schools? 
Hindu to: 
avoid eating meat? 
marry within one's 
own caste? 
cremate the dead 
within 24 hours? 
eat food cooked only 
by one's own caste? 
organise the marriages 
of one's daughters as 
soon as they complete 
their schooling? 
for members of each caste 
to maintain their superior 
position of their caste 
over other castes? 
belong to one's own 
caste association? 
very 
important 
· . . 
important 
· . . . . . . 
not other 
important comments 
. . . . . . 
. . . . 
. . . . . . . 
· . . . . . . . . 
very not other 
important important important comments 
· . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
· . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
99. When you talk to your friends, do you talk about political 
problems, such as what is happening in Bolton? in Britain? in East 
Africa? and in India? 
Bolton Britain East Africa India 
100. Some people say that the leaders of the Islamic Culture Centre, 
Vishwa Hindu Parishad, Sri Sathya Sai Baba, Shree Kutch Swaminarayan, 
Swaminarayan (Deane Rd.) and Lena Street Mosque should work together for 
the benefit of all Asians living in Bolton. Others say that their 
organisations should look only after their own people. What do you 
think? Should these leaders make a great effort to work together? make 
some effort? or make no effort? 
great effort some effort no effort 
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Topic 5 
I would like to get your opinion on some national, political and racial issues. 
101. Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a 
supporter of the: 
Labour Party 1 
Conservative Party 2 
Liberal Party 3 
Other (specify) 4 
102. Would you call yourself a strong supporter or not a strong 
supporter? 
103. Did you vote at the last national election? Yes No 
Did your wife vote at the last national election? Yes No 
104. How important to you are the following national issues? 
very important unimpor- not don't 
important tant interested know 
Our relations with 
with Common Market 
Countries? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Political 
Decentralisation? 
Price of Oil? 
Future of the 
National Health 
Service? 
Unemployment and 
inflation? 
Our relations with 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
India? ............ . 
105. During the past three years have you done any of the following: 
(a) Worn a party rosette, hung a 
political poster in your window, 
attended a party meeting? 
(b) Worked actively in a political 
campaign, canvassed etc.? 
(c) Worked part-time in a local 
political party office? 
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Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
No 
No 
106. Many different terms are used by white people to describe Indians, 
some are acceptab~e, some un~cceptable and some insulting. Can you 
rank the follow1ng terms 1nto those which you consider to be 
acceptable, those which are unacceptable and those which are insulting. 
(Instructions: show card to respondent) 
Acceptable = A Unacceptable = U Insulting = I 
Foreigner Asian Immigrant Indian Paki Coloured Blackie 
107. In the last year we heard a lot about equality and colour, 
equality of opportunity, equality of wages and equality of 
political rights and justice. How much real change do you think 
there has been in the position of Asians in Britain over the last 
few years? 
a lot some not much none don't know 
Topic 6 
I would like to ask you a few questions about your work. 
108. Can you tell me roughly how much you normally earn, that is the 
basic wage you bring home each week or month (where relevant): 
£20 £30 £40 £50 £60 £70 £80 £90 £100 and over 
109. What hours do you normally work? day .... evening .... night .... 
110. Do you belong to a union? 
Yes No 
To which union do you belong? Go to next question 
Do you attend union meetings? 
regularly sometimes rarely never 
Ill. Can you select from the following criteria three which you value 
most: 
112. 
1. Job security. 
11. Availability of overtime work. 
iii. Job is interesting. 
iv. Working with members of your own religious community. 
v. Working with other Asians. 
vi. Possibility to move on to a more responsible and better paying 
job. 
vii. Working under an Asian supervisor. 
Taking into consideration all thin~s a~out your usual job, how 
satisfied or dissatisfied are you w1th 1t? 
very satisfied satisfied dissatisfied very dissatisfied 
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113. How did you find your present job? 
heard from 
relatives 
heard from heard from 
close friend a friend advertisement other (specify) 
114. Is this your first job in Britain? 
Yes 
Go to next question. 
No 
What was your previous job? 
Where did you work? 
What job did you do before this one? 
Where did you work? 
If in Bolton, for whom did you work? 
If elsewhere, what is the name of town? 
115. What sort of job would you like to have? 
116. If different from your present job, do you feel that you stand a 
chance of getting such a job? 
Yes 
How likely is it that you 
would get this kind of job? 
Lack of 
training 
No 
Why not? 
Lack of 
English 
Racial 
discrimination 
Lack of 
experience 
Other 
(specify) 
117. Do you think that your children have a good chance of getting a 
better job than you have? 
Yes No No Children 
Can you give a reason for this? 
118. Have you found a job(s) for a relative or friend within the last 6 
months? 
Yes 
For whom did you find a job? 
relative close 
friend 
ordinary 
friend 
442 
other 
(specify) 
No 
119. Are you self-employed? 
Yes No 
Do you employ other persons? Go to next question. 
Yes No 
Are they full-time or part-time helpers? 
How many employees do you have? 
fu 11- time ....... . 
part-time ....... . 
120. How many of your employees are: 
relatives close ordinary other (specify) 
friends friends full-time ......... . ...... . ...... . .... part-time ......... . ...... . ...... . .... 
121. There is a lot of talk these days about social class. Some say 
that they belong to the middle class or working class. Do you 
ever think of yourself as belonging to a class? 
122. 
Yes No Don't Know Other 
To which class do you (specify) If you had to make a 
feel you belong? choice, in which class 
would you put yourself? 
Here are 20 cards on which are written the names of 20 jobs. 
bus driver nurse 
butcher clerk 
(own shop) postman 
solicitor carpenter 
primary school teacher 
supervisor in a mill 
labourer in a factory 
shop assistant 
civil engineer 
shopkeeper 
(own shop) 
doctor(GP) 
bricklayer 
textile worker 
high school teacher(man) 
waiter in an Asian-owned restaurant 
(own school) driving school instructor 
Can you rank these jobs in order: 
(a) from highest to lowest in terms of standard of living; 
(b) from highest to lowest in terms of value to society; 
(c) put the cards in order of those jobs: 
i. you consider to be equal to yours and available to you; 
ii. you consider to be above you, that is out of your reach 
because you lack the training and experience; 
iii. those jobs you consider to be unobtainable on the grounds 
of racial discrimination; 
iv. those jobs which you consider to be inferior to your job. 
443 
APPENDIX III 
This is a translation of a letter sent by Mr P's Caste Association 
to all caste members living in Britain. 
Uncorporate with Evil 
Dear Brothers and Sisters, 
Undoubtedly you are all aware of the burning social issue that has been 
so much talked about for the past two years. 
Mr P of Bolton (of Bardoli, India) called Miss C (of Lilapore, India) 
with the promise of joining her in matrimony. Miss C had lived with him 
since 28 April 1973 as his wife. However for one reason or another Mr P 
has not kept his promise to transform this relationship into the 
registered marriage. Eventually, since 19th February 1974, she has been 
left bereft by him. 
Not stopping at that, Mr P even plotted to have her returned to India 
after handing her passport to the Police. After hearing of the dastardly 
deed, the representatives of the various branches of the community met 
on 23rd February 1974 in Bolton and tried to settle this matter 
amicably. However, Mr P's stubbornness forced the Committee to arrange 
for Miss C to stay at Mr l's house, Leicester. 
To date unending efforts have been made to make Mr P and his relatives 
to see the sense in this matter. To this end, the Community has had to 
spend a fair amount of money and make numerous trips between 
Bolton and Leicester. 
During these personal meetings Mr P has acknowledged his errors and has 
consented to marry Miss C but later when was advised against this by 
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someone the Community hoped that there would be kindled within his heart 
some flicker of kindness. However this hope proved to be pious. 
Finally we called a general meeting of the whole Community on the 3rd 
and 4th of May 1975 in Bolton. (We)[l] failed to resolve this matter. He 
even refused to meet the honourable members of the community. 
It is essential to maintain a continuing vigilance against such evil 
acts. After giving considerable thought to the future implications of 
such acts, it has been decided to outcaste (excommunicate) Mr pIS 
family. Every member of the community should not maintain any 
relationship with his family. He should be neither invited to any social 
functions nor should we accept his invitation. After considerable 
pondering, the executive committee has had to make the regretful 
decision. We had no alternative but to resort to this course of action 
and we feel duty-bound to inform you of this decision. There is no doubt 
that all you brothers and sisters will co-operate to ensure that success 
of this action. 
WE HAVE BEEN LEFT WITH ONLY ONE WEAPON TO SUPPRESS THIS SORT OF EVIL IN 
THE COMMUNITY. IT IS IN YOUR HANDS TO STRENGTHEN THE HAND OF THE 
COMMUNITY. IF WE FAIL IN THIS, THEN THE COMMUNITY AS WE KNOW (IT)[2] 
WILL CEASE TO EXIST. 
It is hoped that all of you brothers and sisters will with mind and soul 
strengthen the hands of the community by not co-operating with 
Mr pIS family. 
The Executive Committee of Shree Parmir Samaj (UK). 
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FOOTNOTES 
1. My insertion to make the text read easily. 
2. My insertion to make the text read easily. 
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APPENDIX IV 
A NOTE ON THE USE OF MEASUREMENTS IN SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS 
There are a number of ways of analysing social networks; cluster 
analysis is one way. An alternative to these has been developed in this 
thesis. This entails developing a measure which summarises density, 
intensity and clusterability. The method reduces the links in a social 
network to the optimum spanning tree(s) (OST). Although this is not a 
new idea (see Deo,1974), its application to social networks was 
relatively new at the time when this research was done. Later on others 
drew attention to the application of algorithms to network analysis 
(Mitchell,1979). Since social networks comprise a mass of links between 
close friends of an anchor point (respondent), the mass of links is 
reduced to a minimum set of links which link every individual in the 
network only once to one other individual. The anchor point's 
(respondent's) relationships with each close friend is by definition of 
the same value, therefore in this instance it can be ignored within the 
calculation. It is the social relationships between close friends that 
is of interest. 
In graph theory where a defined set of minimum links are defined as 
the optimum links between individuals, the resultant tree is referred to 
as the optimum spanning tree. Weightings were attached to different 
levels of intensity of friendship between individuals. To close 
friendship between kin, a value of one was given, to close friendship 
between non-kin in a network a value of two was given, a value of three 
was given to ordinary friendship, a value of four to just know and a 
value of five to don't know relationships. Using Kruskal's algorithm for 
identifying optimum spanning trees, the computer plotted the optimum 
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spanning trees for every respondent anchoring social networks with four 
or more close friends. The optimum link is taken to be the most 
trustworthy, reliable and helpful possible between any two individuals, 
that is close friends of the respondent. 
From data collected on the close friends of respondents (question 
nos.65 and 66, see Appendix II), it is possible to reproduce a matrix 
conSisting of a maximum of 90 possible links for each ten person social 
network. At the time of the research a network of ten close friends was 
regarded as generating as many individual links as local computers could 
analyse; today this no longer correct. The difficulty that had to be 
overcome was to find a way of analysing two to three hundred social 
networks quickly and simply. The optimum spanning tree analysis is one 
such solution. 
The analysis was aimed at analysing the optimum links between the 
number of close friends identified by respondents. Some respondents 
claimed that all of their close friends were close friends of one 
another, in which instance the optimum spanning tree would be the same 
irrespective of which point it started. This pattern of analysis would 
be similar if a respondent claimed that all his close friends were kin, 
close friends, ordinary friends, acquaintances or strangers. The 
distinctions are made by weighting each of these forms of friendship or 
otherwise according to the intensity of the relationship (Chap.4). Where 
a social network of close friends comprises a mixture of relations of 
two or more different levels of intensity, the possible number of 
optimum spanning trees become more unique. The result is that different 
trees will have different total scores and different patterns. The 
vaguer the relationship and the lower the intensity of the friendship, 
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the greater number of possible trees that can be generated. 
One of the products of this form of analysis is a score which is 
calculated from the total value of each branch that makes up the final 
tree (Table A4 (i) and (ii)). Another feature of this form of analysis 
is that clusters of close friends within a social network can be 
identified. 
I have set out below the programme details I used to analyse the 
optimum spanning trees of respondents' social networks. 
Computer Program For Network Analysis 
10 DATA sample no, weightings of relationships in order by row. 
20 DIM A(9,10),M(45),Y(45),L(45),IA(45) 
30 READ SAMNO,NOFDS 
40 PRINT SAMNO;NOFDS; 
50 1=0 
60 FOR 11= NOFDS-1 TO 1 STEP -1 
70 FOR JJ=II TO NOFDS-1 
80 1=1+1 
90 READ IA(I) 
100 PRINT IA(I); 
110 NEXT JJ 
120 NEXT II 
130 IF NOFDS<4 GOTO 30 
140 REM 
150 FOR 11=1 TO 9 
160 FOR JJ=l TO 10 
170 A(II,JJ)=O! 
180 NEXT JJ 
190 NEXT II 
200 REM 
210 LL=O 
220 IJ=O 
230 PRINT 
240 FOR JJ=2 TO 10 
250 IJ=IJ+1 
260 FOR 11=1 TO IJ 
270 LL=LL+1 
280 A(II,JJ)=IA(LL) 
290 NEXT II 
300 NEXT JJ 
310 FOR 1=1 TO 9 
320 FOR J=l TO 10 
330 PRINT A(I,J); 
340 NEXT J 
350 PRINT 
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360 NEXT I 
370 REM 
380 REM 
390 REM 
400 N=NOFDS 
410 T1=0 
420 K=l 
430 1=1 
440 J=2 
450 M(K)=A(I,J) 
460 X(K)=I 
470 Y(K)=J 
480 J=J+1 
490 IF J=(N+1) GOTO 530 
500 REM PRINT I,J,K,A(I,J) 
510 IF A(I,J)<M(K) GOTO 450 
520 GOTO 480 
530 1=1+1 
540 J=I+1 
550 IF I=N GOTO 570 
560 GOTO 490 
570 PRINT M(K),X(K),Y(K) 
580 S=X(K) 
590 T=Y(K) 
600 A(S,T)=1000 
610 IF(K=N*(N-1)/2) GOTO 640 
620 K=K+1 
630 GOTO 430 
640 K=l 
650 FOR 11=1 TO N 
660 L(II)=II 
670 NEXT II 
680 S=X(K) 
690 T=Y(K) 
700 IF L(S)=L(T) GOTO 840 
710 IF L(S)<L(T) GOTO 770 
720 P=L(S) 
730 FOR 11=1 TO N 
740 IF (L(II)=P) L(II)=L(T) 
750 NEXT II 
760 GOTO 810 
770 Q=L(T) 
780 FOR 11=1 TO N 
790 IF L(II)=Q THEN L(II)=L(S) 
800 NEXT II 
810 PRINT M(K),X(K),Y(K),L(S),L(T) 
820 T1=Tl+M(K) 
830 PRINT T1 
840 K=K+l 
850 IF K=N*(N-1)/2 GOTO 870 
860 GOTO 680 
870 GOTO 30 
880 END 
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• 
Optimum Spanning Tree Analysis: No.6 
Five close friends: 
This is the matrix 
as it appears as 
completed in the 
schedule. 
Weightings are in 
near columns; 
the middle and 
far columns identify 
to which relation-
ship the weightings 
are attached and 
these are ranked by 
weight. 
The optimum spanning 
is constructed in 
terms of the lowest 
weighted relation-
ship. 
Total weight of = 
OST 
(5) 4 2 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 
4 255 
o 555 
o 055 
000 5 
213 
412 
515 
523 
524 
525 
534 
535 
545 
2 1 3 1 1 
2 
4 1 2 1 1 
6 
5 141 1 
11 
5 1 5 1 1 
16 
1 
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Optimum Spanning Tree Analysis: No.29 
Six close friends: (6) 3 5 2 5 5 2 5 1 2 4 5 3 2 4 2 
3 5 5 5 5 
02513 
o 022 2 
00044 
o 000 2 
125 
223 
234 
235 
236 
256 
312 
326 
445 
446 
513 
514 
515 
516 
5 2 4 4 
1 252 2 
1 
2 2 322 
3 
23422 
5 
23622 
7 
3 1 2 1 1 
10 
1 
4 
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